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Foreword
The 2013 Human Development Report, The 
Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse 
World looks at the evolving geopolitics of our 
times, examining emerging issues and trends 
and also the new actors which are shaping the 
development landscape.
The Report argues that the striking trans-
formation of a large number of developing 
countries into dynamic major economies with 
growing political influence is having a signific-
ant impact on human development progress.
The Report notes that, over the last decade, 
all countries accelerated their achievements in 
the education, health, and income dimensions 
as measured in the Human Development 
Index (HDI)—to the extent that no country 
for which data was available had a lower HDI 
value in 2012 than in 2000. As faster progress 
was recorded in lower HDI countries during 
this period, there was notable convergence in 
HDI values globally, although progress was 
uneven within and between regions.
Looking specifically at countries which lifted 
their HDI value substantially between 1990 
and 2012 on both the income and non-income 
dimensions of human development, the Report 
examines the strategies which enabled them to 
perform well. In this respect, the 2013 Report 
makes a significant contribution to develop-
ment thinking by describing specific drivers of 
development transformation and by suggesting 
future policy priorities that could help sustain 
such momentum.
By 2020, according to projections developed 
for this Report, the combined economic 
output of three leading developing countries 
alone—Brazil, China and India—will surpass 
the aggregate production of Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Much of this expansion is being 
driven by new trade and technology partner-
ships within the South itself, as this Report also 
shows.
A key message contained in this and previous 
Human Development Reports, however, is that 
economic growth alone does not automatically 
translate into human development progress. 
Pro-poor policies and significant investments 
in people’s capabilities—through a focus on 
education, nutrition and health, and employ-
ment skills—can expand access to decent work 
and provide for sustained progress.
The 2013 Report identifies four specific 
areas of focus for sustaining development 
momentum: enhancing equity, including on 
the gender dimension; enabling greater voice 
and participation of citizens, including youth; 
confronting environmental pressures; and man-
aging demographic change.
The Report also suggests that as global de-
velopment challenges become more complex 
and transboundary in nature, coordinated 
action on the most pressing challenges of 
our era, whether they be poverty eradication, 
climate change, or peace and security, is essen-
tial. As countries are increasingly interconnec-
ted through trade, migration, and information 
and communications technologies, it is no 
surprise that policy decisions in one place 
have substantial impacts elsewhere. The crises 
of recent years—food, financial, climate—
which have blighted the lives of so many point 
to this, and to the importance of working to 
reduce people’s vulnerability to shocks and 
disasters.
To harness the wealth of knowledge, ex-
pertise, and development thinking in the 
South, the Report calls for new institutions 
which can facilitate regional integration and 
South–South cooperation. Emerging powers 
in the developing world are already sources of 
innovative social and economic policies and 
are major trade, investment, and increasingly 
development cooperation partners for other 
developing countries.
Many other countries across the South have 
seen rapid development, and their experiences 
and South–South cooperation are equally an 
inspiration to development policy. UNDP is 
able to play a useful role as a knowledge broker, 
and as a convener of partners—governments, 
civil society and multinational companies—to 
share experiences. We have a key role too in 
facilitating learning and capacity building. This 
Report offers very useful insights for our future 
engagement in South–South cooperation.
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Finally, the Report also calls for a critical look 
at global governance institutions to promote a 
fairer, more equal world. It points to outdated 
structures, which do not reflect the new eco-
nomic and geopolitical reality described, and 
considers options for a new era of partnership. 
It also calls for greater transparency and ac-
countability, and highlights the role of global 
civil society in advocating for this and for 
greater decision-making power for those most 
directly affected by global challenges, who are 
often the poorest and most vulnerable people 
in our world.
As discussion continues on the global devel-
opment agenda beyond 2015, I hope many will 
take the time to read this Report and reflect 
on its lessons for our fast-changing world. 
The Report refreshes our understanding of 
the current state of global development, and 
demonstrates how much can be learned from 
the experiences of fast development progress in 
so many countries in the South.
Helen Clark
Administrator
United Nations Development Programme
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“It is when we all play safe 
that we create a world 
of utmost insecurity.”
Dag Hammarskjold
Overview
One of the most heartening developments in recent years has been the broad progress in human development of many 
developing countries and their emergence onto the global stage: the “rise of the South”. This growing diversity in voice and 
power is challenging the principles that have guided policymakers and driven the major post–Second World War institu-
tions. Stronger voices from the South are demanding more- representative frameworks of international governance that 
embody the principles of democracy and equity.
Just as important, many developing countries 
are reshaping ideas about how to attain human 
development. The rise of the South has resul-
ted not from adhering to a fixed set of policy 
prescriptions, but from applying pragmatic 
policies that respond to local circumstances 
and opportunities—including a deepening of 
the developmental role of states, a dedication 
to improving human development (including 
by supporting education and social welfare) 
and an openness to trade and innovation. Even 
so, future progress will require policymakers 
to play close attention to such issues as equity, 
voice and accountability, environmental risks 
and changing demography.
Over the past decades, countries across the 
world have been converging towards higher 
levels of human development, as shown by the 
Human Development Index (HDI), a composite 
measure of indicators along three dimensions: 
life expectancy, educational attainment and 
command over the resources needed for a decent 
living. All groups and regions have seen notable 
improvement in all HDI components, with 
faster progress in low and medium HDI coun-
tries. On this basis, the world is becoming less un-
equal. Nevertheless, national averages hide large 
variations in human experience. Wide disparities 
remain within countries of both the North and 
the South, and income inequality within and 
between many countries has been rising.
Although most developing countries have 
done well, a large number of countries have 
done particularly well—in what can be called 
the “rise of the South”. Some of the largest 
countries have made rapid advances, notably 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa 
and Turkey. But there has also been substan-
tial progress in smaller economies, such as 
Bangladesh, Chile, Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda 
and Tunisia.
The South has risen at an unprecedented 
speed and scale. For example, the current 
economic takeoffs in China and India began 
with about 1  billion people in each country 
and doubled output per capita in less than 20 
years—an economic force affecting a much lar-
ger population than the Industrial Revolution 
did.1 By 2050, Brazil, China and India com-
bined are projected to account for 40% of 
world output in purchasing power parity terms.
During these uncertain times, countries of 
the South are collectively bolstering world 
economic growth, lifting other developing 
economies, reducing poverty and increasing 
wealth on a grand scale. They still face for-
midable challenges and are home to many of 
the world’s poor. But they have demonstrated 
how pragmatic policies and a strong focus on 
human development can release the opportun-
ities latent in their economies, facilitated by 
globalization.
A changing world, 
a more global South
To the casual observer, the state of affairs in 
2013 may appear as a tale of two worlds: a 
resurgent South—most visibly countries such 
as China and India, where there is much hu-
man development progress, growth appears to 
remain robust and the prospects for poverty 
reduction are encouraging—and a North in 
crisis—where austerity policies and the absence 
of economic growth are imposing hardship 
on millions of unemployed people and people 
deprived of benefits as social compacts come 
under intense pressure. There are also deeper 
problems, shared by North and South: growing 
inequality in many countries, both developed 
and developing , which threatens global 
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The South needs the 
North, and increasingly 
the North needs the South
recovery and the sustainability of future pro-
gress and limits poverty reduction, as well as 
serious concerns about the environment.
While focusing on the rise of the South 
and its implications for human development, 
this Report is also about this changing world, 
driven in large measure by the rise of the South. 
It examines the progress being made, the chal-
lenges arising (some as a result of that very 
success) and the opportunities emerging for 
representative global and regional governance.
The headline story of a resurgent South is 
both uplifting and in some ways misleading. 
The South needs the North, and increasingly 
the North needs the South. The world is get-
ting more connected, not less. Recent years 
have seen a remarkable reorientation of global 
production, with much more destined for in-
ternational trade, which, by 2011, accounted 
for nearly 60% of global output. Developing 
countries have played a big part: between 1980 
and 2010, they increased their share of world 
merchandise trade from 25% to 47% and 
their share of world output from 33% to 45%. 
Developing regions have also been strengthen-
ing links with each other: between 1980 and 
2011, South–South trade increased from less 
than 8% of world merchandise trade to more 
than 26%.
Yet the United States remains the largest 
economy in the world in monetary terms and 
will remain so for the foreseeable future. If the 
US recovery hesitates and Europe is unable 
to pull itself out of its current economic and 
social doldrums, there will be a large knock-on 
effect on the developing world. Global chal-
lenges such as climate change and stressed 
ecosystems require countries to cooperate 
even more than before. While the rise of the 
South is reshaping power relations in many 
important respects, hard-won gains in human 
development will be more difficult to protect 
if cooperation fails and difficult decisions are 
postponed.
Indeed, one can go further and state that 
there is a “south” in the North and a “north” in 
the South. Elites, whether from the North or 
the South, are increasingly global and connec-
ted, and they benefit the most from the enorm-
ous wealth generation over the past decade, in 
part due to accelerating globalization. They 
are educated at the same universities and share 
similar lifestyles and perhaps values.
The changing global economy is creating 
unprecedented challenges and opportunities 
for continued progress in human development. 
Global economic and political structures are in 
flux at a time when the world faces recurrent 
financial crises, worsening climate change and 
growing social unrest. Global institutions ap-
pear unable to accommodate changing power 
relations, ensure adequate provision of global 
public goods to meet global and regional chal-
lenges and respond to the growing need for 
greater equity and sustainability.
This phenomenon, coupled with the diverse 
development paths followed by these countries 
from the South, presents an opportunity: the 
principles that have driven post–Second World 
War institutions and guided policymakers need 
recalibration, if not a reset, to accommodate 
the growing diversity in voice and power and 
to sustain development progress over the long 
term. These principles require reconsideration, 
and global institutions need greater flexibility 
to reinforce directions that put people first 
and nudge institutions to aim forcefully at a 
fairer, more just world. Potentially, the growing 
diversity in development patterns is creating 
space, even demands, for such a global dia-
logue and restructuring. There is scope then 
for innovation, and the emergence of global, 
regional and national governance frameworks 
that embody principles of democracy, equity 
and sustainability.
The developmental paths of Brazil, China 
and India, as well as less well recognized suc-
cess stories such as Bangladesh, Mauritius 
and Turkey, are reshaping ideas about how to 
attain human development. The success of 
these countries calls into question the notion 
of “right” policies, but that does not mean that 
valuable lessons cannot be drawn from the 
experiences of these successful countries. On 
the contrary, key drivers and principles of de-
velopment begin to emerge from the diversity 
of development paths that include deepening 
the developmental role of states, dedication to 
human development and social welfare, and 
openness to trade and innovation. And while 
this Report acknowledges the positive aspects 
of the rise of the South, it also underlines the 
imperatives of ensuring that concerns of equity 
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Individual achievements 
in health, education and 
income, while essential, 
do not guarantee progress 
in human development if 
social conditions constrain 
individual achievements 
and if perceptions 
about progress differ
and sustainability are fully incorporated into 
future policies and strategies. As the 2011 
Human Development Report also stressed, con-
tinued human development progress is unlikely 
if inequality and environmental destruction are 
not moved to the forefront of policy discus-
sions. Under worst case scenarios, a business 
as usual approach to development combined 
with environmental crises could reverse human 
development gains in the South or make this 
progress unsustainable.
Concerns for the future apply in the North 
as well, where low economic growth, high 
unemployment rates and austerity measures 
threaten the high levels of human development. 
In both the North and the South, ruling elites 
cannot afford to ignore these threats to social 
inclusion and social welfare, given the rising 
call for fairness and accountability—from cit-
izens, communities and civil organizations at 
home and abroad, facilitated by the explosion 
of social media.
To support policymaking and research that 
adequately address these contemporary and 
emerging global realities, measures and analyt-
ics are needed that broaden the human devel-
opment concept. The Human Development 
Report and the family of human development 
indices must meet this challenge by moving 
beyond a focus on measuring individual cap-
abilities to incorporate society-level capacities, 
concerns and perceptions. Individual achieve-
ments in health, education and income, while 
essential, do not guarantee progress in human 
development if social conditions constrain in-
dividual achievements and if perceptions about 
progress differ. The turmoil in several countries 
in the Arab States is a reminder that people, 
especially the young, who are better educated 
and healthier than previous generations put a 
high premium on meaningful employment, on 
exercising a voice in affairs that influence their 
lives and on being treated with respect. 
Furthermore, the promotion of social cohe-
sion and social integration, a stated objective 
of development strategies of countries such 
as Brazil, is based on evidence of the positive 
development impact of a unified society. More-
equal societies tend to do better in most meas-
ures of human development—from teenage 
pregnancies to suicide rates—than do unequal 
societies. This finding is borne out by studies 
in both developed and developing countries. 
These society-level aspects of development 
have been underappreciated in past conceptu-
alizations of development but are proving to be 
essential elements of any viable and desirable 
long-term development path.
Helping other countries catch up
All developing countries are not yet participat-
ing fully in the rise of the South. The pace of 
change is slower, for instance, in the majority 
of the 49 least developed countries, especially 
those that are landlocked or distant from 
world markets. Nevertheless, many of these 
countries have also begun to benefit from 
South–South trade, investment, finance and 
technology transfer. For example, there have 
been positive growth spillovers from China to 
other countries, particularly close trading part-
ners. To some extent, this has offset slackening 
demand from developed countries. Growth 
in low- income countries would have been an 
estimated 0.3–1.1 percentage points lower in 
2007–2010 had growth fallen at the same rate 
in China and India as in developed economies.2
Many countries have also benefited from 
spillovers into important human development 
sectors, especially health. Indian firms, for 
example, are supplying affordable medicines, 
medical equipment, and information and com-
munications technology products and services 
to countries in Africa. Brazilian and South 
African companies are having a similar impact.
Rising competitive pressures
Nevertheless, the arrival of exports from larger 
countries can also have disadvantages. Large 
countries generate competitive pressures that 
might stifle economic diversification and in-
dustrialization in smaller countries. Yet there 
are examples of industrial revival following 
such competitive jolts. A competitive role 
today may easily turn into a complementary 
role in the future. Moving from competition to 
cooperation seems to depend on policies that 
enable local agents to make the most of the new 
situation.
Increasingly, the most important engine 
of growth for countries of the South is their 
domestic market. The middle class is growing 
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in size and median income. By 2025, annual 
consumption in emerging markets is estimated 
to rise to $30 trillion. By then, the South will ac-
count for three-fifths of the 1 billion households 
earning more than $20,000 a year. Nevertheless, 
such expansion will be hampered as well as 
marred by significant pockets of deprivation. 
These disparities in the South’s expansion are 
not only un desirable in themselves; they also 
undermine the sustainability of progress, not 
least by creating social and political tensions.
These trends are leading to a more balanced 
world. Instead of having a centre of industrial-
ized countries and a periphery of less developed 
countries, there is now a more complex and 
dynamic environment.
While there is much awareness at the global 
and regional levels that the world is in trans-
ition, leaders, institutions and academics seem-
ingly find it difficult to put forward principles, 
institutions and policy recommendations that 
can secure the next steps in creating a more 
just and sustainable world. This may be in part 
because the world is changing so rapidly and on 
so many fronts, making shared assessments dif-
ficult and collective action elusive. This Report 
contributes to this conversation by critically 
assessing the contemporary global context and 
by promoting principles and concepts that 
can help a diverse world move towards human 
development strategies that meet the new 
challenges of the 21st century, reduce or even 
eliminate poverty and advance progress for all.
Policies, partnerships, principles
How have so many countries in the South been 
able to transform their human development 
prospects? Across most of these countries, 
there have been three notable drivers of devel-
opment: a proactive developmental state, tap-
ping of global markets, and determined social 
policy innovation. These drivers do not spring 
from abstract conceptions of how development 
should work; rather, they are demonstrated 
by the transformational development experi-
ences of many countries in the South. Indeed, 
they challenge preconceived and prescriptive 
approaches: on the one hand, they set aside 
a number of collectivist, centrally managed 
precepts; on the other hand, they diverge from 
the unfettered liberalization espoused by the 
Washington Consensus.
Driver 1: a proactive 
developmental state
A strong, proactive and responsible state 
develops policies for both public and private 
sectors—based on a long-term vision and 
leadership, shared norms and values, and rules 
and institutions that build trust and cohesion. 
Achieving enduring transformation requires 
countries to chart a consistent and balanced 
approach to development. However, countries 
that have succeeded in igniting and sustaining 
growth in incomes and human development 
have not followed one simple recipe. Faced 
with different challenges, they have adopted 
varying policies dealing with market regulation, 
export promotion, industrial development and 
technological progress. Priorities need to be 
people-centred and to promote opportunities 
while protecting people against downside 
risks. Governments can nurture industries that 
would not otherwise emerge because of incom-
plete markets. Despite posing some risks of 
rent seeking and cronyism, this has enabled sev-
eral countries of the South to turn inefficient 
industries into early drivers of export success as 
their economies became more open.
In large and complex societies, the outcome 
of any particular policy is inevitably uncer-
tain. Developmental states therefore need 
to be pragmatic and test a range of different 
approaches. Some features stand out: for in-
stance, people-friendly developmental states 
have expanded basic social services. Investing 
in people’s capabilities—through health, edu-
cation and other public services—is not an ap-
pendage of the growth process but an integral 
part of it. Rapid expansion of quality jobs is a 
critical feature of growth that promotes human 
development.
Driver 2: tapping of global markets
Global markets have played an important role 
in advancing progress. All newly industrializing 
countries have pursued a strategy of “importing 
what the rest of the world knows and exporting 
what it wants”. But even more important are 
the terms of engagement with these markets. 
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Without investment in people, returns from 
global markets tend to be limited. Success is 
more likely to be the result not of a sudden 
opening but of gradual and sequenced integ-
ration with the world economy, according to 
national circumstances, and accompanied by 
investment in people, institutions and infra-
structure. Smaller economies have successfully 
focused on niche products, whose success is 
often the fruit of years of state support built on 
existing competencies or the creation of new 
ones.
Driver 3: determined social 
policy innovation
Few countries have sustained rapid growth 
without impressive levels of public investment 
—not just in infrastructure, but also in health 
and education. The aim should be to create vir-
tuous circles where growth and social policies 
reinforce each other. Growth is generally much 
more effective in reducing poverty in countries 
where income inequality is low than in coun-
tries with high inequality. Promoting equality, 
particularly among different religious, ethnic 
or racial groups, also helps minimize social 
conflict.
Education, health care, social protection, 
legal empowerment and social organization all 
enable poor people to participate in growth. 
Sectoral balance—especially paying attention 
to the rural sector—and the nature and pace of 
employment expansion are critical in determ-
ining how far growth spreads incomes. But 
even these basic policy instruments may not 
empower disenfranchised groups. The poor 
fringes of society struggle to voice their con-
cerns, and governments do not always ensure 
that services actually reach everyone. Social 
policy has to promote inclusion—ensuring 
nondiscrimination and equal treatment is 
critical for political and social stability—and 
provide basic social services that can underpin 
long-term economic growth by supporting the 
emergence of a healthy, educated labour force. 
Not all such services need to be provided pub-
licly. But the state should ensure that all citizens 
have secure access to the basic requirements of 
human development.
An agenda for development transformation 
is thus multifaceted. It expands poor people’s 
assets by increasing public expenditures on ba-
sic services. It improves the functioning of state 
and social institutions to promote both growth 
and equity. It reduces bureaucratic and social 
constraints on economic action and social mo-
bility. It involves communities in setting budget 
priorities and holding leadership accountable.
Sustaining the momentum
Many countries of the South have demon-
strated much success. But even in the higher 
achieving countries, future success is not guar-
anteed. How can countries in the South con-
tinue their progress in human development, 
and how can the progress be extended to other 
countries? This Report suggests four import-
ant areas to facilitate this: enhancing equity, 
enabling voice and participation, confronting 
environmental challenges and managing demo-
graphic change. This Report points to the high 
cost of policy inaction and argues for greater 
policy ambition.
Enhancing equity
Greater equity, including between men and 
women and among other groups, is not only 
essential in itself, but also important for pro-
moting human development. One of the most 
powerful instruments for this purpose is edu-
cation, which boosts people’s self- confidence 
and enables them to find better jobs, engage in 
public debate and make demands on govern-
ment for health care, social security and other 
entitlements.
Education also has striking impacts on health 
and mortality. Research for this Report shows 
that a mother’s education level is more import-
ant to child survival than is household income. 
Projections also show that policy interventions 
have a greater impact in countries and regions 
where education outcomes are initially weaker. 
This has profound policy implications, po-
tentially shifting the emphasis from efforts to 
boost household income to measures to im-
prove girls’ education.
This Report makes a strong case for policy 
ambition. An accelerated progress scenario 
suggests that low HDI countries can converge 
towards the levels of human development 
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achieved by high and very high HDI countries. 
By 2050, aggregate HDI could rise 52% in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (from 0.402 to 0.612) and 
36% in South Asia (from 0.527 to 0.714). Such 
policy interventions will also have a positive 
impact on the fight against poverty. By con-
trast, the costs of inaction will rise, especially in 
low HDI countries, which are more vulnerable. 
For instance, failing to implement ambitious 
universal education policies will adversely 
affect many essential pillars of human develop-
ment for future generations.
Enabling voice and participation
Unless people can participate meaningfully 
in the events and processes that shape their 
lives, national human development paths will 
be neither desirable nor sustainable. People 
should be able to influence policymaking and 
results—and young people in particular should 
be able to look forward to greater economic 
opportunities and political participation and 
accountability.
Dissatisfaction is increasingly high in both 
the North and the South as people call for 
more opportunities to voice their concerns and 
influence policy in order to ensure basic social 
protection and social progress. Among the 
most active protesters are young people. In part 
this is a response to limited employment op-
portunities for educated young people. History 
is replete with popular rebellions against 
unresponsive governments. Such upheaval can 
derail human development—as unrest impedes 
investment and growth and autocratic govern-
ments divert resources to maintaining law and 
order.
It is hard to predict when societies will reach 
a tipping point. Mass protests, especially by 
educated people, tend to erupt when people 
feel excluded from political influence and when 
bleak economic prospects lower the opportun-
ity cost of engaging in such protests. These 
effort-intensive forms of political participation 
are then easily coordinated by new forms of 
mass communication.
Confronting environmental challenges
Environmental threats such as climate change, 
deforestation, air and water pollution, and 
natural disasters affect everyone. But they hurt 
poor countries and poor communities most. 
Climate change is already exacerbating chronic 
environmental threats, and ecosystem losses are 
constraining livelihood opportunities, espe-
cially for poor people.
Although low HDI countries contribute the 
least to global climate change, they are likely 
to endure the greatest loss in annual rainfall 
and the sharpest increase in its variability, with 
dire implications for agricultural production 
and livelihoods. The magnitude of such losses 
highlights the urgency of adaptation measures.
The cost of inaction will likely be high. The 
longer the inaction, the higher the cost. To 
ensure sustainable economies and societies, 
new policies and structural changes are needed 
that align human development and climate 
change goals in low-emission, climate-resilient 
strategies and innovative public-private finan-
cing mechanisms.
Managing demographic change
Between 1970 and 2011, world population 
increased from 3.6  billion to 7  billion. As 
that population becomes more educated, its 
growth rate will slow. Moreover, development 
prospects are influenced not just by the total 
number of people, but also by the population’s 
age structure. An increasingly critical concern 
is a country’s dependency ratio—that is, the 
number of younger and older people divided 
by the working-age population ages 15–64.
Some poorer regions could benefit from a 
“demographic dividend” as the share of the 
working-age population rises, but only if there 
is strong policy action.3 Girls’ education is a 
critical vehicle of a possible demographic di-
vidend. Educated women tend to have fewer, 
healthier and better educated children; in 
many countries educated women also enjoy 
higher salaries than do uneducated workers.
By contrast, the richer regions of the South 
confront a very different problem: as their 
population ages, the share of the working-age 
population falls. The rate of population age-
ing matters because developing countries will 
struggle to meet the needs of an older popu-
lation if they are still poor. Many developing 
countries now have only a short window of 
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opportunity to reap the full benefits of the 
demographic dividend.
Demographic trends are not destiny, how-
ever. They can be altered through education 
policies in particular. This Report presents 
two scenarios for 2010–2050: a base case 
scenario, in which current education trends 
continue, and a fast track scenario, in which 
the countries with the lowest initial levels 
embrace ambitious education targets. For low 
HDI countries, the decline in the dependency 
ratio under the fast track scenario is more 
than twice that under the base case scenario. 
Ambitious education policies can enable me-
dium and high HDI countries to curb projec-
ted increases in their dependency ratio, thus 
easing the demographic transition towards an 
ageing population.
Addressing these demographic challenges 
will require raising educational attainment 
levels while expanding productive employment 
opportunities—by reducing unemployment, 
promoting labour productivity and increasing 
labour force participation, particularly among 
women and older workers.
Governance and partnerships 
for a new era
The rise of the South is providing both op-
portunities and challenges for the formidable 
problems of an increasingly interconnected 
world. Challenges such as management of cli-
mate change; use of global commons; and reg-
ulation of trade, finance and migration have 
cross-border consequences. Some elements 
of global public goods can be provided at the 
regional level, but effective provision usually 
requires considerable multilateral coordination 
and cooperation. Neither the North nor the 
newly influential South can sit out the regional 
or global dialogues needed to forge agreement 
on these issues. Countries of the South are 
in a position not just to contribute financial 
resources towards strengthening regional and 
multilateral processes, but also to bring the 
substantial experience gained through their hu-
man development achievements and pragmatic 
policies in many of these areas.
The South has promoted new arrangements 
and institutions such as bilateral and regional 
trade agreements and financial mechanisms. 
Consequently, today’s systems of international 
governance are a mosaic of old structures and 
new arrangements. And they may become 
even more diverse: international cooperation is 
likely to involve an ever more complex web of 
bilateral, regional and global processes.
Many of the current institutions and prin-
ciples for international governance were de-
signed for a world very different from today’s. 
One consequence is that they underrepresent 
the South. To survive, international institutions 
need to be more representative, transparent 
and accountable. Indeed, all intergovernmental 
processes would be invigorated by greater 
participation from the South, which can bring 
substantial financial, technological and human 
resources as well as valuable solutions to critical 
world problems.
In all of this, governments are understand-
ably concerned with preserving national sov-
ereignty. While appropriate in some cases, this 
focus can encourage zero-sum thinking. A bet-
ter strategy would be “responsible sovereignty”, 
whereby countries engage in fair, rule-based 
and accountable international cooperation, 
joining in collective endeavours that enhance 
global welfare. Responsible sovereignty also 
requires that states ensure the human rights 
security and safety of their citizenry. According 
to this view, sovereignty is not just a right, but 
also a responsibility.
The current context has profound implica-
tions for the provision of public goods. Among 
the areas meriting urgent attention are those re-
lated to trade, migration and climate change. In 
some cases, public goods can be delivered by re-
gional institutions, which can avoid the polar-
ization that sometimes slows progress in larger, 
multilateral forums. But increasing regional co-
operation may have  disadvantages—adding to 
a complex, multilevel and fragmented tapestry 
of institutions. The challenge therefore is to 
ensure “coherent pluralism”—so that institu-
tions at all levels work in a broadly coordinated 
fashion.
International governance institutions can be 
held to account not just by member states, but 
also by global civil society. Civil society organ-
izations have already influenced global trans-
parency and rule setting on such issues as aid, 
debt, human rights, health and climate change. 
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Networks of civil society now take advant-
age of new media and new communications 
technologies. Yet civil society organizations 
also face questions about their legitimacy and 
accountability and may take undesirable forms. 
Nevertheless, the future legitimacy of interna-
tional governance will depend on institutions’ 
capabilities to engage with citizen networks 
and communities.
Priorities for a new era
Through all this, the fundamental principles of 
human development remain critical. As ever, 
the aim is to expand choices and capabilities for 
all people, wherever they live. Many countries 
of the South have already demonstrated what 
can be done. But they have gone only part of 
the way. For the years ahead, this Report sug-
gests five broad conclusions.
Rising economic strength in the 
South must be matched by a full 
commitment to human development
Investments in human development are jus-
tified not only on moral grounds, but also 
because improved health, education and social 
welfare are key to success in a more competitive 
and dynamic world economy. In particular, 
these investments should target the poor—
connecting them to markets and increasing 
their livelihood opportunities. Poverty is an 
injustice that can and should be remedied by 
determined action.
Good policymaking also requires a focus on 
enhancing social capacities, not just individual 
capabilities. Individuals function within social 
institutions that can limit or enhance their 
development potential. Policies to change 
social norms that limit human potential, such 
as gender discrimination, early marriages and 
dowry requirements, open up opportunities for 
individuals to reach their full potential.
Less developed countries can learn 
and benefit from the success of 
emerging economies of the South
The unprecedented accumulation of financial 
reserves and sovereign wealth funds in both the 
North and South provides an opportunity to 
accelerate broad-based progress. A small por-
tion of these funds should be dedicated to hu-
man development and poverty eradication. At 
the same time, South–South trade and invest-
ment flows can leverage foreign markets in new 
ways that enhance development opportunities, 
such as by participating in regional and global 
value chains.
Burgeoning South–South trade and invest-
ment in particular can lay the basis for shifting 
manufacturing capacity to other less developed 
regions and countries. Recent Chinese and 
Indian joint ventures and startup manufactur-
ing investments in Africa could be a prelude to 
a much expanded force. International produc-
tion networks provide opportunities to speed 
development by allowing countries to leap-frog 
to more sophisticated production modes.
New institutions can facilitate 
regional integration and 
South–South relationships
New institutions and partnerships can help 
countries share knowledge, experiences and 
technology. This can be accompanied by new 
and stronger institutions to promote trade and 
investment and accelerate experience sharing 
across the South. One step would be to estab-
lish a new South Commission to bring a fresh 
vision of how the South’s diversity can be a 
force for solidarity.
Greater representation for the South 
and civil society can accelerate 
progress on major global challenges
The rise of the South is leading to a greater 
diversity of voice on the world stage. This 
presents an opportunity to build governance 
institutions that fully represent all constitu-
encies and that would make productive use 
of this diversity in finding solutions to world 
problems.
New guiding principles for international 
organizations are needed that incorporate the 
experience of the South. The emergence of the 
Group of 20 is an important step in this direc-
tion, but the countries of the South also need 
more equitable representation in the Bretton 
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Woods institutions, the United Nations and 
other international bodies.
Active civil society and social movements, 
both national and transnational, are using the 
media to amplify their calls for just and fair 
governance. The spread of movements and 
the increase in platforms for vocalizing key 
messages and demands challenge governance 
institutions to adopt more-democratic and 
more-inclusive principles. More generally, 
a fair and less unequal world requires space 
for a multiplicity of voices and a system of 
public discourse.
The rise of the South presents 
new opportunities for generating 
a greater supply of public goods
A sustainable world requires a greater supply 
of global public goods. Global issues today 
are increasing in number and urgency, from 
mitigation of climate change and international 
economic and financial instability to the fight 
against terrorism and nuclear proliferation. 
They require a global response. Yet in many 
areas, international cooperation remains slow 
and at times dangerously hesitant. The rise of 
the South presents new opportunities for more 
effectively providing global public goods and 
for unlocking today’s many stalemated global 
issues.
Publicness and privateness are in most cases 
not innate properties of a public good but so-
cial constructs and as such represent a policy 
choice. National governments can step in when 
there is underprovision at the national level. 
But when global challenges arise, international 
cooperation is necessary—and can happen only 
through the voluntary actions of many govern-
ments. Given the many pressing challenges, 
progress in determining what is public and 
what is private will require strong, committed 
personal and institutional leadership.
*    *    *
This Report presents the contemporary global 
context and charts a path for policymakers and 
citizens to navigate the increasing interconnec-
tedness of the world and to face the growing 
global challenges. It describes how the dynam-
ics of power, voice and wealth in the world are 
changing—and identifies the new policies and 
institutions necessary to address these 21st 
century realities and promote human devel-
opment with greater equity, sustainability and 
social integration. Progress in human develop-
ment requires action and institutions at both 
the global and national levels. At the global 
level, institutional reforms and innovation are 
required to protect and provide global public 
goods. At the national level, state commitment 
to social justice is important, as is the under-
standing that one-size-fits-all technocratic 
policies are neither realistic nor effective given 
the diversity of national contexts, cultures and 
institutional conditions. Nevertheless, over-
arching principles such as social cohesion, state 
commitment to education, health and social 
protection, and openness to trade integration 
emerge as means of navigating towards sustain-
able and equitable human development.
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Introduction
When developed economies stopped growing in the 2008–2009 financial crisis but developing economies kept on grow-
ing, the world took notice.1 The rise of the South, seen within the developing world as an overdue global rebalancing, has 
been much commented on since. This discussion has typically focused narrowly on gross domestic product (GDP) and trade 
growth in a few large countries. Yet there are broader dynamics at play, involving many more countries and deeper trends, 
with potentially far-reaching implications for people’s lives, for social equity and for democratic governance at the local and 
global levels. As this Report shows, the rise of the South is both the result of continual human development investments and 
achievements and an opportunity for still greater human progress for the world as a whole. Making that progress a reality 
will require informed and enlightened global and national policymaking, drawing on the policy lessons analysed in this Report.
The rise of the South is unprecedented in its 
speed and scale. Never in history have the 
living conditions and prospects of so many 
people changed so dramatically and so fast. 
Great Britain, where the Industrial Revolution 
originated, took 150 years to double output 
per capita; the United States, which indus-
trialized later, took 50 years.2 Both countries 
had a population below 10 million when they 
began to industrialize. In contrast, the current 
economic takeoffs in China and India began 
with about 1  billion people in each country 
and doubled output per capita in less than 
20 years—an economic force affecting a hun-
dred times as many people as the Industrial 
Revolution did.3
The rise of the South must be understood as 
the story of a dramatic expansion of individual 
capabilities and sustained human development 
progress in the countries that are home to the 
vast majority of the world’s people. When 
dozens of countries and billions of people move 
up the development ladder, as they are doing 
today, it has a direct impact on wealth creation 
and broader human progress in all countries 
and regions of the world. There are new op-
portunities for catch-up for less developed 
countries and for creative policy initiatives that 
could benefit the most advanced economies as 
well.
A close look at the diverse pathways that 
successful developing countries have pursued 
enriches the menu of policy options for all 
countries and regions while providing insights 
into values and world views that can inform 
future development cooperation and con-
structive responses to the most severe global 
challenges. The goal, as always, is to accelerate, 
wherever possible, broad-based progress that 
raises standards and expands people’s choices 
in all countries and communities in all key 
dimensions of human development, from 
health and education and livelihoods to the 
personal freedom to control and improve 
one’s own life.
Transforming the South requires changing 
the rules that underpin global relationships. 
Most multilateral organizations were designed 
to reflect an international order newly emer-
ging from the Second World War. That world 
view no longer resonates with the 21st century 
rebalancing of global demographics, wealth 
and geopolitical influence. The growing policy- 
shaping influence of the South is visible in the 
international response to the 2008 financial 
crisis. In the past, financial decisions were made 
by the major industrial powers alone, as in the 
1985 Plaza Accord. This time, a more extensive 
group, the Group of 20 (G20), which includes 
the largest developing economies, played a key 
role. People in the South are also increasingly 
taking leadership positions in long-established 
international organizations.4
These are just preliminary signs of change in 
international institutions and of the possibil-
ity that the new actors in the South may help 
resume efforts to provide better global public 
goods. Indeed, the rise of the South adds to the 
urgency with which governments and inter-
national organizations will need to confront 
challenges that are likely to loom large in the 
future: equity in opportunities, civic engage-
ment in governance, environmental sustainab-
ility and the demographic bulge, to name a few. 
The next sections elaborate on specific features 
of the rise of the South.
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Broad-based progress
The 21st century transformation of the South 
has been accompanied by major advances 
in public health, education, transportation, 
telecommunications and civic engagement in 
national governance. The human development 
consequences have been profound: the pro-
portion of people living in extreme poverty fell 
from 43.1% in 1990 to 22.4% in 2008; more 
than 500 million people have been lifted out of 
poverty in China alone.5
Countries at low levels of human develop-
ment accelerated their achievements in health, 
education and income more in the past decade 
than in the preceding one. The number of 
countries with a Human Development Index 
(HDI) value below the 25th percentile in 1990 
dropped from 33 to 30 between 1990 and 
2000 and was halved from 30 to 15 between 
2000 and 2012 (figure 1). At the upper end of 
the distribution, the number of countries with 
an HDI value above the 75th percentile rose 
from 33 to 43 between 1990 and 2000 and 
from 43 to 59 between 2000 and 2012. The 
picture is more mixed in the middle quartiles of 
the HDI. Overall, no country had a lower HDI 
value in 2012 than in 2000, in contrast to the 
prior decade, when 18 countries had a lower 
HDI value in 2000 than in 1990.
Between 1990 and 2012, almost all countries 
improved their human development status. 
Of 132 countries with a complete data series, 
only 2 had a lower HDI value in 2012 than in 
1990 (Lesotho and Zimbabwe). Progress was 
particularly rapid in more than 40 countries of 
the South, whose increases in HDI value were 
significantly larger than predicted for coun-
tries that were at a similar level of HDI value 
in 1990.6 This includes countries as diverse as 
Ghana, Rwanda and Uganda in Sub-Saharan 
Africa; Bangladesh and India in South Asia; 
Tunisia in the Arab States; China, Lao PDR 
and Viet Nam in East Asia and the Pacific; and 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (figure 2).
Global rebalancing
For the first time in 150 years, the combined 
output of the developing world’s three 
FIGURE 2
More than 40 countries of the South had greater gains on the HDI between 1990 and 
2012 than would have been predicted from their previous performance on the HDI
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Today, the South as a 
whole produces about 
half of world economic 
output, up from about 
a third in 1990
leading economies—Brazil, China and 
India—is about equal to the combined GDP 
of the long- standing industrial powers of the 
North—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.7 This 
represents a dramatic rebalancing of global eco-
nomic power. In 1950, Brazil, China and India 
together accounted for only 10% of the world 
economy, while the six traditional economic 
leaders of the North accounted for roughly 
half. According to projections in this Report, 
by 2050 Brazil China and India will together 
account for 40% of global output (figure 3), far 
surpassing the projected combined production 
of today’s Group of Seven bloc.8
Today, the South as a whole produces about 
half of world economic output, up from about 
a third in 1990. The combined GDP of eight 
major developing countries alone—Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South 
Africa and Turkey—now equals the GDP of 
the United States, still by far the world’s biggest 
national economy.9 As recently as 2005, the 
combined economic weight of those eight 
countries was barely half that of the United 
States.
This major increase in share of economic 
output would not mean much in human de-
velopment terms, however, if it had not been 
accompanied by an unprecedented reduction 
in deprivation and expansion of human capab-
ilities. The first Millennium Development Goal 
of halving the proportion of people living on 
less than $1.25 a day relative to 1990 has been 
met three years before the target date. This is 
primarily because of the success of some of the 
most populous countries in eradicating extreme 
poverty: Brazil, China and India have all dra-
matically reduced the proportion of their people 
who are income poor—Brazil from 17.2% of 
the population in 1990 to 6.1% in 2009, China 
from 60.2% in 1990 to 13.1% in 2008 and India 
from 49.4% in 1990 to 32.7% in 2010.10
Broader development challenges, however, 
have not diminished. An estimated 1.57 billion 
people, or more than 30% of the population of 
the 104 countries studied for this Report, live in 
multidimensional poverty,11 a measure of both 
FIGURE 3
Brazil, China and India combined are projected to account for 40% of global output by 2050, up from 10% in 
1950
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Note: Output is measured in 1990 purchasing power parity dollars.
Source: HDRO interpolation of historical data from Maddison (2010) and projections based on Pardee Center for International Futures (2013).
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Latin America, in 
contrast to overall global 
trends, has seen income 
inequality fall since 2000
the number and the intensity of over lapping 
human deprivations in health, education and 
standard of living. For many of the rapidly 
growing countries of the South, the population 
living in multidimensional poverty exceeds that 
living in income poverty. And income inequal-
ity is on the rise in many countries. Based on cal-
culations for the Inequality-adjusted HDI for 
132 countries in 2012, almost a quarter of HDI 
value, 23%, is lost to inequality. Between 1990 
and 2005, Inequality- adjusted HDI trends 
for 66 countries show that overall inequality 
declined only marginally, because declining 
inequality in health and education was offset 
by rising inequality in income.12 Latin America, 
in contrast to overall global trends, has seen 
income inequality fall since 2000 but still has 
the most unequal distribution of all regions. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has the most inequality in 
health, and South Asia in education.
Massive expansion of 
the middle class
The middle class in the South is growing 
rapidly in size, income and expectations. 
Between 1990 and 2010, the South’s share of 
the global middle class population expanded 
from 26% to 58%. By 2030, more than 80% 
of the world’s middle class is projected to be 
residing in the South and to account for 70% 
of total consumption expenditure.13 The Asia–
Pacific Region will host about two-thirds of 
the world’s middle class by 2030, Central and 
South America about 10% and Sub-Saharan 
Africa 2% (figure 4). Within Asia, China 
and India will account for more than 75% of 
the middle class as well as its share of total 
consumption. Another estimate is that by 
2025, annual consumption in emerging mar-
ket economies will rise to $30  trillion, from 
$12 trillion in 2010, with the South home to 
three-fifths of the 1 billion households earning 
more than $20,000 a year.14 The continued ex-
pansion of the middle class is certain to have a 
profound impact on the world economy.
The sheer number of people in the South—
the billions of consumers and citizens—
multiplies the global human development 
consequences of actions by governments, 
companies and international institutions in the 
South. The South is now emerging alongside 
the North as a breeding ground for technical 
innovation and creative entrepreneurship. In 
North−South trade the newly industrializing 
economies have built capabilities to efficiently 
manufacture complex products for developed 
country markets. But South−South interac-
tions have enabled companies in the South to 
adapt and innovate with products and pro-
cesses that are better suited to local needs. This 
is creating new business models, as companies 
develop products that can reach customers 
with lower disposable incomes. The rise of the 
South is also diffusing technology through new 
models of extensive coverage with low margins, 
which serve lower income households and 
reach a large number of consumers in markets 
that have weak support infrastructure.
The world is also becoming more educated. 
Assuming a robust increase in school enrol-
ment rates, the share of the world’s people older 
than 15 who lack formal schooling is projected 
to shrink from 12% in 2010 to 3% in 2050, 
and the share with secondary or tertiary edu-
cation will climb from 44% in 2010 to 64% in 
2050. Furthermore, the digital divide is rapidly 
narrowing, giving people from everywhere 
FIGURE 4
The middle class in the South is projected to continue to grow
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The rapid expansion 
of educated people in 
much of the South adds 
to the urgency of job 
creation on a mass scale
comparable access to information, especially 
through increasingly affordable mobile broad-
band Internet.
The rapid expansion in the educated popula-
tion in much of the South adds to the urgency 
of job creation on a mass scale. Countries of 
the South that experience low dependency 
rates in the future can create a “demographic 
dividend” only if the increase in the labour 
force is matched by equally rapid expansion of 
employment opportunities. If enough decent 
jobs are not available to meet this demographic 
demand, the consequences are likely to include 
rising civil unrest, as demonstrated by the 
youth-led insurrections of the Arab Spring.
Unprecedented connectedness
Trade, travel and telecommunication ex-
changes are expanding worldwide at an un-
precedented pace. People are moving between 
countries in numbers never seen before, as 
business professionals, as tourists and as mi-
grants. In 2010, first-generation immigrants 
accounted for nearly 3% of the world’s pop-
ulation, or more than 215 million people—a 
three-fold increase since 1960.15 Nearly half 
of remittances sent home by emigrants from 
the South come from workers living in other 
developing countries.
Countries of the South are also hosting more 
tourists than ever from other developing coun-
tries: by 2020, there will be nearly 1.6 billion 
tourist arrivals globally, with 75% of them ex-
pected to be intraregional. The share of South–
South trade in world commerce has more than 
tripled over the past three decades to 25%; 
South–South foreign investment now accounts 
for 30%–60% of all outside investment in the 
least developed countries.16
There has been an exponential rise in the 
number of people in the South with access to 
the world wide web (Internet). The takeoff 
has been especially notable in the past decade 
(figure 5). Between 2000 and 2010, average 
annual growth in Internet use surpassed 30% in 
around 60 developing countries with a popula-
tion of 1 million or more. In September 2012, 
the online social networking website Facebook 
recorded 1 billion monthly active users, with 
140.3  billion connections among “friends”; 
four of the five countries with the greatest 
number of Facebook users are in the South: 
Brazil, India, Indonesia and Mexico.17
Interdependence in commerce is allowing 
more people to participate in the global mar-
ketplace, from Ugandan banana exporters 
to shrimp farmers on the Mekong River. The 
global trade to GDP ratio, a conventional 
measure of trade integration, reached 22% in 
1913, a dramatic increase over the estimated 
FIGURE 5
The exponential rise in Internet use in the South has been most notable over the past decade
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Source: World Bank 2012a.
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2% in 1800.18 Today the ratio exceeds 56%.19 
At least 15 developing countries have substan-
tial trading relationships with more than 100 
trade partners as both exporters and importers, 
up from about 6 in 1996 (figure 6). The South 
now accounts for half of global trade flows, up 
from barely a quarter 30 years ago. These in-
creasing trade connections are deepening even 
faster “horizontally”, on a South–South  basis, 
than on the traditional North–South axis.
A substantial share of South−South trade 
continues to be driven by demand in the 
North, but the opposite is also true: develop-
ing countries are major importers from the 
North. Since 2007, for example, US exports 
to established partners in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) have risen 20%, but US exports to 
Latin America and the Caribbean and China 
have risen more than 50%. The South needs the 
North, but, increasingly, the North also needs 
the South.
Countries of the South are also emerging 
as natural hubs for absorbing technologies 
and developing new products. There is now 
greater potential for human development 
thanks to technology transfer from the South. 
Technology transfer from the North often 
requires costly adaptation due to differences 
in absorptive capacity. Technological trans-
fer from the South has been more amenable 
to direct adoption.20 And technological 
adaptation by the South has also led to new 
kinds of innovation with immediate human 
development benefits. Take the uses to which 
Africans are putting affordable Asian-built 
FIGURE 6
At least 15 developing countries have substantial trading relationships with more than 100 trade partners as both exporters and importers
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The South is now in a 
position to influence old 
models of development 
cooperation with 
augmented resources 
and home-grown lessons, 
but it also exerts new 
competitive pressures 
on other aspects of 
bilateral cooperation
mobile phones: cellular banking is cheaper and 
easier than opening a traditional bank account, 
farmers can obtain weather reports and check 
grain prices and entrepreneurs can provide 
business services through mobile phone kiosks. 
These and other transformations multiply the 
possibilities of what people can do with tech-
nology: participating in decisions that affect 
their lives; gaining quick and low-cost access to 
information; producing cheaper, often generic 
medicines, better seeds and new crop varieties; 
and generating new employment and export 
opportunities. These new technologies are con-
necting people in formerly isolated and mar-
ginalized rural communities and in poor urban 
neighbourhoods. They also give them access to 
valuable tools, resources and information and 
enable them to more actively participate in the 
wider national and even global society.
Pragmatic development policies
The rise of the South spans diverse country 
experiences, showing that there are multiple 
ways to achieve and sustain human develop-
ment. Countries were pragmatic in adopting 
policies suited to their unique circumstances: 
for example, between 1979 and 1989, no fewer 
than 40% of China’s national regulations were 
deemed experimental.21 There were broadly 
shared common approaches as well. Most 
fast-developing countries of the South opened 
up to foreign trade, investment and technolo-
gies. But that opening alone did not guarantee 
success. They also invested in their own human 
development capabilities, strengthened do-
mestic institutions and built new areas of com-
parative advantage. The critical combination of 
external openness with internal preparedness 
allowed countries to prosper in the global mar-
ketplace, with positive human development 
outcomes for the population at large.
Active government leadership was crucial 
in accelerating economic progress and min-
imizing social conflict. Growth created the 
needed fiscal space for investment in health 
and education and paved the way for a virtuous 
synergy between economic and social policy. 
Well known innovative programmes in Brazil, 
India and Mexico—conditional cash transfer 
programmes and rural employment guarantee 
programmes—exemplify active interest in 
fostering a more equitable distribution of eco-
nomic and social opportunities. China has also 
stressed the importance of such an approach in 
its strategic pursuit of a “harmonious society”. 
Elements of these programmes have been emu-
lated by many other countries in the South.
A common emphasis of these social initi-
atives has been to promote equity and social 
integration, aspects that were underappreciated 
in past development models but are proving to 
be essential elements of any sustainable path for 
human progress. Ruling elites are increasingly 
recognizing that social and economic progress 
can profoundly influence their own legitimacy. 
Investments in social welfare and public goods 
have become building blocks for long-term 
development. These exemplary  initiatives—
which combine health, education and eco-
nomic policies in a broader agenda of equity, 
empowerment and participation—highlight 
the importance of supporting social justice not 
only on moral grounds, but also as a crucial 
means of advancing human development.
New partners for development
The South is now in a position to influence, 
even reshape, old models of development 
cooperation with augmented resources and 
home-grown lessons, but it also exerts new 
competitive pressures on other aspects of 
bilateral cooperation. The rise of the South is 
spurring innovation in bilateral partnership 
and regional cooperation, resulting in greater 
options within the South for concessional 
finance, infrastructural investment and techno-
logy transfer. The growing assistance from the 
South is often without explicit conditions on 
economic policy or approaches to governance. 
The development emphasis on improved infra-
structure, for example, has been rediscovered 
because of the domestic experience and lessons 
of some emerging economies. Over the past 
decade, nearly half of financing for infrastruc-
ture in Sub-Saharan Africa was provided by 
governments and regional funds from else-
where in the South.22
Furthermore, the extraordinary increase in 
capital accumulation in the fastest growing 
economies of the South—exemplified most 
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New development 
partnerships have opened 
opportunities for bilateral 
trade and investment 
exchanges, sustaining 
the rise of the South
notably by the surge in foreign exchange 
 reserves—represents a largely untapped store 
of development capital. Three-quarters of the 
increase in foreign exchange reserves between 
2000 and 2011 was accumulated by countries 
of the South, partly as self-insurance against fu-
ture financial downturns and crises (figure 7).
As early as 1995, the United Nations 
Development Programme identified 23 de-
veloping countries as being pivotal to South–
South cooperation. Over the past decade, those 
countries have accelerated their engagement 
with other developing countries.23 Outside 
the OECD, Brazil, China and India are the 
three largest donors.24 Other countries such as 
Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey are also import-
ant in regional development. New develop-
ment partnerships, fashioned on “win-win” for 
all parties, have supported development efforts 
and opened opportunities for bilateral trade 
and investment exchanges, sustaining the rise of 
the South. In the process, international regimes 
are realigning, and international organizations 
are reorienting to the shifts in global economic 
power due to the rise of the South.
*    *    *
This Report examines in greater detail many 
aspects of the rise of the South and their im-
plications for human development. Chapter 
1 takes stock of the current status of human 
development globally and regionally, with an 
emphasis on trends, challenges and advances 
in such key interrelated areas as poverty, in-
equality, social integration and human security. 
Chapter 2 shows how countries of the South 
are emerging as significant players in the world 
economy, becoming both drivers of growth 
and catalysts for change in other developing 
countries, and identifies some of the emerging 
challenges. Chapter 3 looks at the policies and 
strategies that have underpinned progress in 
some of the more successful countries of the 
South. Chapter 4 asks two basic questions: can 
this progress be sustained, and what are likely 
to be the future challenges to sustaining human 
development? Chapter 5 looks at prospects for 
policies and principles for a new framework of 
global and regional governance that fully rep-
resents and responds to the rise of the South in 
the long-term interests of the South and North 
alike. As the Report shows, the increasingly 
complex challenges of the 21st century require 
new partnerships and new approaches that re-
flect the realities of this rapidly changing world.
FIGURE 7
Official foreign exchange reserves by country group
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“The political problem of 
mankind is to combine 
three things: Economic 
Efficiency, Social Justice 
and Individual Liberty.”
John Maynard Keynes
1.
The state of human development
From Brazil to South Africa to India to China, the largest developing countries have become major drivers of the global 
economy. In 2012, however, even the most vigorous economies of the South began to be affected by the financial problems 
of the North. Struggling to emerge from a debt crisis and large budget deficits, many developed countries are imposing 
severe austerity programmes that are not only causing hardship for their own citizens, but are also undermining the human 
development prospects of millions of other people across the world.
The first Human Development Report in 
1990 laid out a vision of economic and social 
progress that is fundamentally about people 
enlarging their choices and capabilities. Since 
then, there has been substantial progress: many 
developing economies continue to grow rapidly 
and raise standards of human development. 
The rise of the South is a feature of a rapidly 
changing world. The South now accounts for 
almost a third of world output1 and consump-
tion.2 Without the robust growth in these 
economies, led by China and India, the global 
economic recession would have been deeper.3
Nevertheless, there are signs of contagion, 
with real concern that in an interconnected 
world the crisis in the North may slow devel-
oping countries’ progress. In industrialized 
countries, with some notable exceptions, 
governments are introducing harsh austerity 
measures that reduce the government’s wel-
fare role and cut back on spending and public 
services,4 leading to hardship and exacerbating 
economic contractions. Living standards are 
declining for many people in the developed 
world. Several countries have seen major street 
demonstrations and general disillusionment 
with politicians and economic management as 
a result.
The world has known similar crises: in 
Europe and the United States in the 1930s, 
in Latin America in the 1980s and in Asia in 
the 1990s. But this time around, well into the 
second decade of the 21st century, the crisis is 
again happening in the heart of Europe.
Governments are imposing austerity pro-
grammes because of a legitimate concern about 
the sustainability of sovereign debt. But there is 
a risk that short-term measures will cause long-
term damage, eroding the human development 
and social welfare foundations that enable 
economies to grow, democracies to flourish and 
societies to be less unequal and less vulnerable 
to shocks.5
There is also evidence that deploying drastic 
austerity programmes too quickly can deepen 
and prolong recessions. Fiscal consolidation has 
already had contractionary effects on private 
domestic demand and gross domestic product 
(GDP)6 while weakening economic conditions 
and increasing un employment.7 Rollbacks of 
health, education and other public services are 
likely to impair the health of the population, 
the quality of the labour force and the state 
of scientific research and innovation for years 
to come (box 1.1). This could put progress 
in human development on a lower trajectory 
for some time (box 1.2). Moreover, economic 
stagnation reduces the tax revenues that gov-
ernments need to finance social services and 
public goods.
Much of this damage is avoidable. Historical 
evidence indicates that the best time to cut defi-
cits is after economic growth has taken off.8 As 
John Maynard Keynes put it succinctly nearly 
75 years ago, “The boom, not the slump, is the 
right time for austerity.”9
It is also vital to consider not just the quantity 
of public expenditure, but also its composition 
and how it can be changed. According to the 
International Labour Organization, a fiscally 
neutral change in the composition of gov-
ernment revenues and expenditures designed 
to foster employment and promote human 
development could create 1.8–2.1 million jobs 
in 33 advanced economies over the next year or 
two.10
While countries have different degrees of 
freedom to adjust their spending priorities, for 
many there is ample scope for reprioritization. 
For instance, military spending worldwide 
exceeded $1.4  trillion in 2010, more than 
the GDP of the world’s 50 poorest countries 
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combined. Even where fiscal consolidation is 
necessary, it need not involve cuts in welfare 
services. Consolidation through enhanced effi-
ciency and reduced subsidies on fossil fuels, for 
instance, could leave social spending relatively 
unaffected.11
The countries of the South have shown 
greater resilience in the face of the current 
global economic crisis. After transitory set-
backs following the 2008 crisis, African and 
Latin American countries have resumed their 
upward trajectories of human development and 
growth. This is partly because they have been 
more pragmatic, taking countercyclical meas-
ures and postponing debt reduction for more 
appropriate times. Continuing demand from 
the South has also helped sustain many devel-
oping country exports, offsetting the effects of 
sluggish economic activity in the North.12
At the same time, many developing coun-
tries continue to invest in long-term human 
development. They recognize a clear positive 
correlation between past public investment in 
social and physical infrastructure and progress 
BOX 1.1
Fairness, macroeconomics and human development
The rising income inequality in the United States and some European coun-
tries highlights fairness in how incomes are distributed and who benefits 
from growth. These concerns are entering the mainstream political dis-
course in developed countries, though with limited impact on policies so 
far. Unemployment in developed countries is at its highest level in years, 
and a large share of the workforce has had no significant increase in real 
wages over the last few decades, while the richest deciles have seen a 
substantial increase in income. Increasing inequality has been accompanied 
by demands by many of the better- off for smaller government and fiscal re-
straint: the well-off have not only benefited disproportionately from earlier 
growth, but also appear committed to protecting their gains. It is surprising 
that in democracies, despite considerable pressure from civil society, gov-
ernment agendas are dominated by austerity programmes rather than social 
protection programmes.
The call for austerity measures is not limited to countries in the euro 
area. The United Kingdom plans to reduce public investment by about 2% 
of GDP under the current austerity programme. This call for austerity comes 
when public investment is at a historic low. For instance, net public invest-
ment in the United Kingdom for fiscal year 2011/2012 is less than 2% of 
GDP. A continued push for reduced government and social expenditures may 
well worsen the prospects for recovery and growth.
Macroeconomic policies can have large consequences for human devel-
opment. Cutting social spending to reduce public debt can have long-term 
effects. If economies keep contracting, successive rounds of debt reduction 
will do little to further debt sustainability. Cutting spending reduces aggre-
gate demand, which, coupled with high income inequality, makes it chal-
lenging to revive the economy and put people back to work. In the quest for 
full employment, reduced aggregate demand has to be compensated for. 
In the United States (and other industrialized countries) this was achieved 
through low interest rates, which, along with new financial instruments and 
lax regulation, caused a bubble that eventually led to the current financial 
crisis. Countries in the euro area, constrained in their use of policy instru-
ments, cannot use monetary policies to devalue (or inflate) their way out of 
a crisis.
Source: Atkinson 2011, 2012; Block 2013; HM Treasury 2010; Nayyar 2012; Sen 2012; Stiglitz 2012.
BOX 1.2
Short-term cuts have long-term consequences: rising fertility rates in Africa
Why did fertility rates rise between 1970 and 1990 in many Sub-Saharan 
African countries despite falling in every other region? The evolution of 
fertility rates appears to be associated with social expenditure cuts, par-
ticularly in education, made as part of structural adjustment programmes 
in the 1980s.
Cuts in education not only limit human capabilities, but also affect the 
age structure of the population years later because of their impact on birth 
rates. Countries with lower levels of education, especially countries where 
girls lack secondary education, tend to have higher fertility rates. Almost 
universally, women with higher levels of education have fewer children. This 
effect is particularly strong in countries that are early in their demographic 
transition and still have high overall fertility rates. Education reduces fertility 
rates by enhancing information, changing the incentives for behaviour and 
empowering people to better pursue their own preferences.
In the 1980s, Sub-Saharan Africa saw a partial reversal in the progress 
towards demographic transition, with real expenditure per capita on educa-
tion falling nearly 50% on average. Between 1980 and 1986, enrolment in 
primary education dropped from 79% to 73% for the region as a whole (fall-
ing in 16 countries and rising in 17). The reduced education expenditures had 
a negative impact on female education, causing average female combined 
primary and secondary gross enrolment rates to increase more slowly than 
in the period before the structural adjustment programmes.
Source: Lutz and KC 2013; Rose 1995.
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There is a clear positive 
correlation between past 
public investment in social 
and physical infrastructure 
and progress on the 
Human Development Index
on the Human Development Index (HDI).13 
Governments in the South have also appreci-
ated that sustainable progress must be based on 
social integration. Brazil and India, for example, 
have supported aspects of human development 
underappreciated in past development models 
by introducing cash transfer programmes and 
right-to-work programmes.
Overall, over the past few decades, many 
countries of the South have made substantial 
strides in HDI performance, not only boosting 
economic growth and reducing poverty, but 
also making large gains in health and education 
(discussed in greater detail later in the chapter). 
This broad-based achievement is notable because 
income growth does not necessarily translate 
into gains in other aspects of human develop-
ment. Growth may generate resources to invest 
in health and education, but the link is not auto-
matic. Moreover, growth may have little impact 
on other important human development priorit-
ies such as participation and empowerment.
Now more than ever, indicators are needed 
to capture these dimensions as well as the 
environmental sustainability of development 
pathways.
Progress of nations
Every Human Development Report has mon-
itored human progress, notably through the 
HDI, a composite measure that includes indic-
ators along three dimensions: life expectancy, 
educational attainment, and command over 
the resources needed for a decent living. Other 
indices have delved into inequality, poverty 
and gender deficits. HDI values for 2012 are 
presented in statistical table 1.
The HDI in 2012 reveals much progress. 
Over the past decades, countries across the 
world have been converging towards higher 
levels of human development. The pace of pro-
gress on the HDI has been fastest in countries 
in the low and medium human development 
categories. This is good news. Yet progress re-
quires more than average improvement in HDI 
value. It will be neither desirable nor sustain-
able if increases in HDI value are accompanied 
by rising in equality in income, unsustainable 
patterns of consumption, high military spend-
ing and low social cohesion (box 1.3).
In 2012, the global average HDI value was 
0.694; Sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest 
HDI value (0.475), followed by South Asia 
(0.558). Among developing regions, Europe 
and Central Asia had the highest HDI value 
(0.771), followed by Latin America and the 
Caribbean (0.741).
There are large differences across HDI groups 
and regions in the components of the HDI—
life expectancy, mean years of schooling and 
income. Average gross national income (GNI) 
per capita in very high HDI countries is more 
than 20 times that in low HDI countries (table 
1.1). Life expectancy in very high HDI coun-
tries is a third higher than in low HDI coun-
tries, while average years of schooling among 
adults over 25 are nearly three times greater 
in very high HDI countries than in low HDI 
countries. However, expected years of school-
ing, which better reflect changing education 
opportunities in developing countries, present 
a much more hopeful picture: the average 
incoming elementary school student in a low 
HDI country is expected to complete 8.5 years 
of school, about equal to the current years of 
schooling among adults in high HDI countries 
(8.8 years). Overall, most low HDI countries 
have achieved or are advancing towards full 
enrolment in elementary school and more than 
50% enrolment in secondary school.
There are large disparities in achievements 
within HDI groups and regions. One way of 
assessing disparities within country groups is to 
compare the ratio of the highest to the lowest 
HDI values among countries in the group. This 
ratio is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed 
by the Arab States, South Asia, and Latin 
America and the Caribbean. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, most of the disparity arises from sub-
stantial differences in income per capita (with 
a ratio of 70.114) and mean years of schooling 
(with a ratio of 7.8). In South Asia, the dis-
parities also arise primarily from differences 
in income per capita, with a ratio of 10.7, and 
mean years of schooling (with a ratio of 4.0). 
In the Arab States, and to a lesser extent Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the main driver is 
differences in income per capita.
Overall, the last decade has seen greater 
convergence in HDI values, involving accel-
erated human development among countries 
with lower HDI values. All HDI groups and 
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regions saw notable improvement in all HDI 
components, with faster progress in low and 
medium HDI countries. East Asia and the 
Pacific and South Asia saw continuing progress 
from earlier decades, while Sub-Saharan Africa 
saw more rapid progress in the last decade. The 
convergence in HDI values has become more 
pronounced in the last decade.
One of the principal components of the 
HDI is life expectancy. In 2012, average life ex-
pectancy was 70.1 years, with wide differences 
across HDI groups: 59.1 years in low HDI 
countries and 80.1 years in very high HDI 
countries. Differences across countries are 
even wider, with a low of 48.1 years in Sierra 
Leone and a high of 83.6 years in Japan. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, life expectancy stagnated at 
49.5 years between 1990 and 2000, a result of 
the HIV and AIDS pandemic. Between 2000 
and 2012, however, it increased 5.5 years.
Another important influence on the HDI, 
and one of the most sensitive indicators of 
BOX 1.3 Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate in Economics
What is it like to be a human being?
Almost half a century ago, the philosopher Thomas Nagel published a fa-
mous paper called “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The question I want to ask 
is: what is it like to be a human being? As it happens, Tom Nagel’s insight-
ful paper in The Philosophical Review was also really about human beings, 
and only marginally about bats. Among other points, Nagel expressed deep 
scepticism about the temptation of observational scientists to identify the 
experience of being a bat—or similarly, a human being—with the associ-
ated physical phenomena in the brain and elsewhere in the body that are 
within easy reach of outside inspection. The sense of being a bat or a human 
can hardly be seen as just having certain twitches in the brain and of the 
body. The complexity of the former cannot be resolved by the easier tracta-
bility of the latter (tempting though it may be to do just that).
The cutting edge of the human development approach is also based on a 
distinction —but of a rather different kind from Nagel’s basic epistemologi-
cal contrast. The approach that Mahbub ul Haq pioneered through the series 
of Human Development Reports which began in 1990 is that between, on 
the one hand, the difficult problem of assessing the richness of human lives, 
including the freedoms that human beings have reason to value, and on the 
other, the much easier exercise of keeping track of incomes and other exter-
nal resources that persons—or nations—happen to have. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) is much easier to see and measure than the quality of human 
life that people have. But human well-being and freedom, and their connec-
tion with fairness and justice in the world, cannot be reduced simply to the 
measurement of GDP and its growth rate, as many people are tempted to do.
The intrinsic complexity of human development is important to acknowl-
edge, partly because we should not be side-tracked into changing the ques-
tion: that was the central point that moved Mahbub ul Haq’s bold initiative to 
supplement—and to some extent supplant—GDP. But along with that came 
a more difficult point, which is also an inescapable part of what has come 
to be called “the human development approach.” We may, for the sake of 
convenience, use many simple indicators of human development, such as 
the HDI, based on only three variables with a very simple rule for weight-
ing them—but the quest cannot end there. We should not spurn workable 
and useful shortcuts—the HDI may tell us a lot more about human quality 
of life than does the GDP—but nor should we be entirely satisfied with the 
immediate gain captured in these shortcuts in a world of continuous practice. 
Assessing the quality of life is a much more complex exercise than what can 
be captured through only one number, no matter how judicious is the selec-
tion of variables to be included, and the choice of the procedure of weighting.
The recognition of complexity has other important implications as well. 
The crucial role of public reasoning, which the present Human Development 
Report particularly emphasizes, arises partly from the recognition of this 
complexity. Only the wearer may know where the shoe pinches, but pinch-
avoiding arrangements cannot be effectively undertaken without giving 
voice to the people and giving them extensive opportunities for public 
discussion. The importance of various elements in evaluating well-being 
and freedom of people can be adequately appreciated and assessed only 
through persistent dialogue among the population, with an impact on the 
making of public policy. The political significance of such initiatives as the 
so-called Arab Spring, and mass movements elsewhere in the world, is 
matched by the epistemic importance of people expressing themselves, in 
dialogue with others, on what ails their lives and what injustices they want 
to remove. There is much to discuss—with each other and with the public 
servants that make policy.
The dialogic responsibilities, when properly appreciated across the 
lines of governance, must also include representing the interest of the peo-
ple who are not here to express their concerns in their own voice. Human 
development cannot be indifferent to future generations just because they 
are not here—yet. But human beings do have the capacity to think about 
others, and their lives, and the art of responsible and accountable politics 
is to broaden dialogues from narrowly self-centred concerns to the broader 
social understanding of the importance of the needs and freedoms of people 
in the future as well as today. This is not a matter of simply including those 
concerns within one single indicator—for example, by overcrowding the 
already heavily loaded HDI (which stands, in any case, only for current well-
being and freedom)—but it certainly is a matter of making sure that the dis-
cussions of human development include those other concerns. The Human 
Development Reports can continue to contribute to this broadening through 
explication as well as presenting tables of relevant information.
The human development approach is a major advance in the difficult 
exercise of understanding the successes and deprivations of human lives, 
and in appreciating the importance of reflection and dialogue, and through 
that advancing fairness and justice in the world. We may be much like bats 
in not being readily accessible to the measuring rod of the impatient obser-
vational scientist, but we are also capable of thinking and talking about the 
many- sided nature of our lives and those of others—today and tomorrow—
in ways that may not be readily available to bats. Being a human being is 
both like being a bat and very unlike it.
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HDI comparisons are 
typically made between 
countries in the North 
and the South, and on 
this basis the world is 
becoming less unequal
human well-being, is child survival. In 2010, the 
global under-five mortality rate was 55 deaths 
per 1,000 live births, though spread unevenly 
across HDI groups. Low HDI countries had the 
highest rate (110 deaths per 1,000 live births), 
followed by medium HDI countries (42), high 
HDI countries (18) and very high HDI coun-
tries (6). Poor child health can permanently 
damage a child’s cognitive development and 
later affect labour productivity as an adult.
HDI comparisons are typically made between 
countries in the North and the South, and on 
this basis the world is becoming less unequal. 
Nevertheless, national averages hide large vari-
ations in human experience, and wide disparities 
remain within countries of both the North and 
the South. The United States, for example, had 
an HDI value of 0.94 in 2012, ranking it third 
globally. The HDI value for residents of Latin 
American origin was close to 0.75, while the 
HDI value for African-Americans was close 
to 0.70 in 2010–2011.15 But the average HDI 
value for an African-American in Louisiana was 
0.47.16 Similar ethnic disparities in HDI achieve-
ment in very high HDI countries can be seen in 
the Roma populations of southern Europe.
The range in human development is also 
wide in some developing countries. In Brazil, 
for example, the highest HDI value in 2000, 
the most recent year for which subnational data 
are available, was in São Caetano do Sul in the 
state of São Paulo (0.92), while the lowest was 
in Manari in the state of Pernambuco (0.47). 
China has similar, if less marked, provincial 
variations, with Shanghai at the top (0.91), and 
Tibet at the bottom (0.63).17
Income and human development
Another essential component of human de-
velopment and the HDI is command over 
resources, as measured by income per capita. 
Between 1990 and 2012, income per capita 
rose in all four HDI groups, though in varying 
degrees (figure 1.1). The highest average annual 
growth in income per capita was recorded in 
China and Equatorial Guinea, both over 9%. 
Only 12 countries surpassed 4% growth, while 
19 saw income per capita fall.
One of the most striking achievements has 
been in Sub-Saharan Africa. From 2003 to 
2008—the five years preceding the global 
TABLE 1.1
HDI and components, by region and HDI group, 2012
Region and HDI group HDI
Life expectancy 
at birth (years)
Mean years 
of schooling 
(years)
Expected years 
of schooling 
(years)
Gross national 
income 
per capita 
(2005 PPP $)
Region
Arab States 0.652 71.0 6.0 10.6 8,317
East Asia and the Pacific 0.683 72.7 7.2 11.8 6,874
Europe and Central Asia 0.771 71.5 10.4 13.7 12,243
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.741 74.7 7.8 13.7 10,300
South Asia 0.558 66.2 4.7 10.2 3,343
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.475 54.9 4.7 9.3 2,010
HDI group
Very high human development 0.905 80.1 11.5 16.3 33,391
High human development 0.758 73.4 8.8 13.9 11,501
Medium human development 0.640 69.9 6.3 11.4 5,428
Low human development 0.466 59.1 4.2 8.5 1,633
World 0.694 70.1 7.5 11.6 10,184
Note: Data are weighted by population and calculated based on HDI values for 187 countries. PPP is purchasing power parity.
Source: HDRO calculations. See statistical table 1 for detailed data sources.
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financial crisis—income per capita in the 
region grew 5% a year, more than twice the 
rate of the 1990s (figure 1.2).18 This upward 
trend was led by resource-rich countries that 
benefited from price increases in Africa’s main 
commodity exports—notably, gas, oil, minerals 
and agricultural products—thanks mostly to 
strong demand from the South, led by China.
But growth was also widespread in other 
countries, with strong performance among 
more diversified economies and agriculture- 
based economies. Despite commodity price 
increases, many net commodity-importing 
countries, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda and 
Uganda, continued to grow fast. Sub-Saharan 
African economies were also partly shielded 
from global shocks by greater regional integra-
tion, particularly in East Africa.
As most Human Development Reports have 
underscored, what matters is not only the level 
of income, but also how that income is used. A 
society can spend its income on education or 
on weapons of war. Individuals can spend their 
income on essential foods or on narcotics. For 
both societies and individuals, what is decisive 
is not the process of wealth maximization, but 
how they choose to convert income into human 
development. Table 1.2 shows country successes 
in this respect, as measured by the largest posit-
ive difference between GNI per capita and HDI 
ranks.19 New Zealand tops the list for very high 
human development countries, and Cuba tops 
the list for high human development countries.
Poverty
One of the world’s main priorities is to erad-
icate poverty and hunger. This is the first of 
the eight Millennium Development Goals, 
for which the target for 2015 was to halve the 
proportion of people living on less than $1.25 
a day relative to 1990. This goal was achieved 
three years before that target date, primarily 
because of the success of some of the most pop-
ulous countries: Brazil (where the percentage 
of the population living on less than 2005 PPP 
$1.25 a day went from 17.2% to 6.1%), China 
(from 60.2% to 13.1%) and India (from 49.4% 
to 32.7%).20 As a result, many fewer people are 
poor. For example, between 1990 and 2008, 
China alone lifted a remarkable 510  million 
people out of poverty.21
FIGURE 1.1
Income per capita is rising to varying degrees in all four HDI groups
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FIGURE 1.2
Sub-Saharan Africa has sustained income growth over the last decade
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Poor people do not just suffer from a lack of 
income. Poverty has multiple dimensions, with 
deficits in health and education, for example. 
Moreover, an estimated 10% of the global pop-
ulation is afflicted by some form of disability, 
potentially limiting their standard of living 
regardless of income.22
In the early and middle 20th century, 
European countries reduced poverty not only 
by increasing incomes, but also by providing 
public goods such as health care and educa-
tion.23 When considering relative poverty 
levels, it is also important to consider the social 
and political arenas, including whether the 
poor can “appear in public without shame”.24 
Translating income into a decent standard 
of living depends on a range of assets and 
capabilities. These are all issues in which the 
state has an important role facilitating access 
to health, education, and public and personal 
safety (box  1.4). How income is converted 
into well-being, particularly for the poor, also 
depends on environmental circumstances.25
Poverty can be measured more comprehens-
ively using the Multidimensional Poverty Index 
(MPI), which looks at overlapping deprivations 
in health, education and standard of living. The 
MPI is the product of the multidimensional 
poverty headcount (the share of people who are 
multidimensionally poor) and the average num-
ber of deprivations that each multidimension-
ally poor household experiences (the intensity 
of their poverty). Focusing on the intensity 
of poverty enables the MPI to provide a more 
complete picture of poverty within a country or 
a community than is available from headcount 
measures alone. In the 104 countries covered by 
the MPI, about 1.56 billion people—or more 
than 30% of their population—are estimated to 
live in multidimensional poverty.26 This exceeds 
the estimated 1.14 billion people in those coun-
tries who live on less than $1.25 a day, although 
it is below the proportion who live on less than 
$2 a day.27 The pattern holds true for all four 
HDI groups, though the difference is larger in 
low HDI countries than in medium of high 
HDI countries (figure 1.3). This also holds true 
for many of the rapidly growing countries of the 
South (figure 1.4).
The countries with the highest headcount 
percentages based on the MPI are in Africa: 
Ethiopia (87%), Liberia (84%), Mozambique 
(79%) and Sierra Leone (77%; see statistical 
table 5). The countries with the highest in-
tensity of poverty (deprivations in at least 
33% of weighted indicators) are Ethiopia and 
Mozambique (about 65% each in 2007–2011), 
followed by Burkina Faso (64%), Senegal 
(59%) and Liberia (58%). Despite having a 
smaller proportion of multidimensional poor 
(lower headcount ratio) than Liberia does, 
Mozambique has a higher MPI value (0.512) 
because it has the highest intensity of depriva-
tion among countries with data.
TABLE 1.2
Top five countries that rank better on the HDI than on gross national income per 
capita in 2012
HDI group and country HDI value
Gross national income (GNI) 
per capita (2005 PPP $)
GNI rank 
minus HDI 
rank
Very high human development
New Zealand 0.919 24,358 26
Ireland 0.916 28,671 19
Australia 0.938 34,340 15
Korea, Rep. 0.909 28,231 15
Israela 0.900 26,244 13
High human development
Cuba 0.780 5,539 44
Georgia 0.745 5,005 37
Montenegro 0.791 10,471 24
Albania 0.749 7,822 21
Grenada 0.770 9,257 21
Medium human development
Samoa 0.703 3,928 28
Tonga 0.710 4,153 26
Fiji 0.702 4,087 24
Kyrgyzstan 0.622 2,009 24
Ghana 0.558 1,684 22
Low human development
Madagascar 0.483 828 28
Togo 0.459 928 16
Kenya 0.519 1,541 15
Zimbabwe 0.397 424 14
Nepalb 0.463 1,137 11
a. The difference between GNI and HDI ranks is also 13 for Chile, Estonia and Greece, all very high HDI countries.
b. The difference between GNI and HDI ranks is also 11 for Liberia, a low HDI country.
Source: HDRO calculations. See statistical table 1 for detailed data sources.
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BOX 1.4
Subjective indicators of well-being: increased acceptance in thinking and policy
Interest in using subjective data to measure well-being and human prog-
ress and to inform public policy has grown in recent years.1 In the United 
Kingdom, the government committed itself to explore the use of subjective 
indicators of well-being, as suggested by Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009). 
Bhutan has integrated the subindicators that constitute the Gross National 
Happiness Index into its public policy measures. Subjective data can com-
plement but not substitute for objective data.
Kahneman and Krueger (2006) lay the analytical basis for measuring 
subjective well-being on the fact that people often depart from the standards 
of the “rational economic agent”. Making inconsistent choices, not updating 
beliefs in the light of new information, desisting from gainful exchanges: 
all violate the assumption of rationality that underlies the translation of ob-
served behaviour into a theory of revealed preferences in economics. If the 
assumed link between observed data and actual preferences is tenuous, the 
case for relying exclusively on objective data is weakened, and there exists 
a greater case for using subjective data as well.
Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009) adopt subjective well-being as one of 
their three conceptual approaches to measuring quality of life. They point 
out that the approach has strong links to the utilitarian tradition but also 
has broader appeal. Subjective measures of quality of life, however, do not 
have objective counterparts. For instance, there is no observed measure of 
happiness, whereas inflation can be measured as either actual or perceived 
inflation. They further note that subjective approaches allow for a distinction 
between quality of life dimensions and the objective factors that shape them.
Subjective measures are not without problems. They are ordinal in na-
ture and usually are not comparable across countries and cultures or reliable 
across time. Thus it can be misleading to use subjective indicators such as 
happiness as the only or main policy criterion. However, these indicators—
appropriately measured and carefully used—can be valuable supplements 
to objective data to inform policy, particularly at the national level.
An important subjective indicator of well-being that can be gleaned 
from surveys is overall life satisfaction. Data for 149 countries place aver-
age life satisfaction globally at 5.3 on a scale of 0–10 (see table), with a 
low of 2.8 in Togo and a high of 7.8 in Denmark (see statistical table 9). Not 
surprisingly, life satisfaction tends to be higher in countries with higher hu-
man development.
Overall life satisfaction and satisfaction with health care and education
HDI group and region
Overall life satisfaction, 2007–2011a 
(0, least satisfied, 
10, most satisfied)
Satisfaction with 
health care, 2007–2009a
(% answering “yes”)
Satisfaction with education 
quality, 2011
(% answering “yes”)
HDI group
Very high human development 6.7 61.9 61.3
High human development 5.9 55.2b 58.0
Medium human development 4.9 68.7b 69.2
Low human development 4.5 50.0 56.5
Region
Arab States 4.8 54.3b 50.0
East Asia and the Pacific 5.1b 79.5b 68.2b
Europe and Central Asia 5.3 44.8 51.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 6.5 56.7 61.4b
South Asia 4.7 64.8 73.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.4 50.1b 52.0
World 5.3 61.0b 64.2
a. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.
b. Value is not displayed in the statistical tables because data are not available for at least half the countries covering at least two-thirds of the population of the group.
Source: HDRO calculations based on Gallup (2012).
Other important subjective indicators of human well-being are sat-
isfaction with the quality of health care and education. Survey results 
indicate that high-quality health care and education can be delivered 
at a wide range of income and human development levels. Average 
global satisfaction with health care quality was 61%, with a low of 
19% in Ethiopia and a high of 90% in Luxembourg (see statistical table 
7). Average global satisfaction with education quality was 64%, with 
a low of 35% in Mali and a high of 94% in Cambodia (see statistical 
table 8).
In South Asia, 65% of respondents indicated satisfaction with health 
care quality, with Pakistan at 41% and Sri Lanka at 83%, the latter showing 
that even at comparatively low levels of income it is possible to reinforce 
social perceptions about community and the state. By contrast, health care 
satisfaction is 45% in Europe and Central Asia.
1. Dolan, Layard and Metcalfe 2011. Krueger and Schkade (2008) note that over 2000–2006, 157 papers and numerous books were published in the economics literature using data on life satisfaction or subjective 
well-being.
Source: Kahneman and Krueger 2006; Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009; Dolan, Layard and Metcalfe 2011; Stewart 2013.
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or country, the “wrong” 
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In South Asia, the highest MPI value is in 
Bangladesh (0.292 with data for 2007), fol-
lowed by Pakistan (0.264 with data for 2007) 
and Nepal (0.217 with data for 2011). The 
proportion of the population living in mul-
tidimensional poverty is 58% in Bangladesh, 
49% in Pakistan and 44% in Nepal, and the 
intensity of deprivation is 50% in Bangladesh, 
53% in Pakistan and 49% in Nepal. Although 
a larger proportion of the population (head-
count) lives in multidimensional poverty in 
Bangladesh than in Pakistan, the intensity of 
deprivation is higher in Pakistan. Moreover, 
in Bangladesh and Nepal, the living standards 
dimension contributes more than the health 
and education dimensions, but in Pakistan, the 
health dimension contributes more than the 
other two dimensions.
Equity and human development
An essential part of human development is 
equity. Every person has the right to live a 
fulfilling life according to his or her own values 
and aspirations. No one should be doomed to 
a short life or a miserable one because he or 
she happens to be from the “wrong” class or 
country, the “wrong” ethnic group or race or 
the “wrong” sex.
Inequality
Inequality reduces the pace of human devel-
opment and in some cases may even prevent it 
entirely. This is most marked for inequality in 
health and education and less so for inequality 
in income, where the effects are more sub-
stantial in high and very high HDI countries. 
An analysis of 132 developed and developing 
countries for this Report finds an inverse rela-
tionship between inequality and human devel-
opment (box 1.5), reinforcing the conclusions 
of several studies of developed countries.28
The effects of inequality on human develop-
ment can be captured by the Inequality-adjusted 
Human Development Index (IHDI), which ex-
amines the average level of human development 
and its distribution along the dimensions of life 
expectancy, educational attainment and com-
mand over the resources needed for a decent 
living. Where there is no inequality, the IHDI 
equals the HDI. A difference between the two 
denotes inequality; the greater the difference, 
the greater the inequality.29
Based on IHDI calculations for 132 coun-
tries in 2012, almost a quarter of HDI value, or 
23% is lost to inequality (see statistical table 3). 
Low HDI countries suffer most because they 
tend to have greater inequality in more dimen-
sions. Low HDI countries lose a third of HDI 
value to inequality, whereas very high HDI 
countries lose only 11%.
Globally, there have been much greater re-
ductions in inequality in health and education 
in the last two decades than in income.30 This 
is partly because of the measures used—life 
expectancy and mean years of schooling have 
upper bounds to which all countries eventually 
converge. But for income, there is no upper 
limit. Virtually all studies agree that global 
income inequality is high, though there is no 
consensus on recent trends.31 One study that 
integrated the income distribution of 138 
countries over 1970–2000 found that although 
mean income per capita has risen, inequality 
has not.32 Other studies conclude the oppos-
ite.33 Still others find no change at all.34
IHDI trends for 66 countries over 1990–
2005 show that overall inequality declined 
marginally due to declines in health and 
education inequality being offset by increases 
in income inequality (figure  1.5). Most 
FIGURE 1.3
The lower the HDI value, the larger the gap between income poverty and 
multidimensional poverty
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Source: HDRO calculations.
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regions show rising inequality in income and 
declining inequality in health and education 
(figure  1.6). Latin America has seen income 
inequality fall since 2000, but it still has the 
most unequal distribution of all regions. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has the most inequality 
in health, while South Asia has the most in-
equality in education.
The world has made much progress in re-
ducing inequality in educational attainment 
in both enrolment ratios and expected years 
of schooling over 1990–2010, particularly in 
Europe and Central Asia (loss due to inequality 
in education declined almost 68%), East Asia 
and the Pacific (34%) and Latin America and 
the Caribbean (32%). In both developed and 
developing countries, the average enrolment ra-
tio for primary education is nearly 100%. And 
more children are finishing school.
Declines in inequality in both health and 
education may reflect corresponding govern-
ment priorities and innovations in social policy. 
There is also a link between health and educa-
tion. Better education for women, for example, 
FIGURE 1.4
There is notable variation among countries in the gap between income poverty and multidimensional 
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tends to result in better health outcomes for 
them and for the next generation. Thus life 
expectancy and educational attainment may 
move in tandem. Most inequality in education 
today reflects disparities in quality (box 1.6): 
many developing countries have dual-track sys-
tems, with the well-off attending good schools 
and universities, mostly privately funded, and 
the poor attending inadequate, mostly publicly 
funded facilities.35
Rising inequality, especially between groups, 
can lead to social instability, undermining long-
term human development progress. Persistence 
of inequality often results in a lack of intergen-
erational social mobility, which can also lead to 
social unrest.
The rise in income inequality to some extent 
reflects a failure of national fiscal, and particu-
larly taxation, systems. This can be offset by so-
cial protection. In Latin America, for example, 
income inequality has declined as a result of 
cash transfer programmes.
Gender and women’s status
Gender equality is both a core concern and 
an essential part of human development. All 
too often, women are discriminated against 
in health, education and the labour market, 
which restricts their freedoms. The extent of 
discrimination can be measured through the 
Gender Inequality Index (GII), which cap-
tures the loss of achievement due to gender 
inequality in three dimensions: reproductive 
health, empowerment and labour market 
participation. The higher the GII value, the 
greater the discrimination. Based on 2012 
data for 148 countries, the GII shows large 
variations across countries, ranging from 
0.045 (in Netherlands) to 0.747 (in Yemen), 
with an average of 0.463 (see statistical 
table 4).
High gender disparities persist in South Asia 
(0.568), Sub-Saharan Africa (0.577) and the 
Arab States (0.555). In South Asia, the three 
driving factors are low female representation 
in parliament (18.5%), gender imbalances in 
educational achievement (28% of women have 
completed at least secondary education, com-
pared with 50% of men) and low labour force 
participation (31% of women are in the labour 
force, compared with 81% of men).
Between 2000 and 2012, progress in redu-
cing the GII value has been virtually univer-
sal, but uneven.36 Countries in the very high 
human development group outperform those 
in other human development groups and 
demonstrate greater parity between women 
and men in educational attainment and labour 
market participation. Even in this group, how-
ever, several countries have huge gender gaps in 
BOX 1.5
Inequality holds back human development
HDRO research using Human Development Index (HDI) data yields robust findings of an in-
verse relationship between inequality and subsequent improvement in human development, 
driven mostly by inequality in health and education rather than in income.
Using data on 132 countries for 2012, regression analysis showed the effects of multidi-
mensional inequality (measured as the loss in the Inequality-adjusted Human Development 
Index relative to the HDI) on the HDI and each of its components (health, education and in-
come) due to four explanatory variables: overall inequality in human development, inequality 
in life expectancy, inequality in educational attainment and inequality in income per capita. 
A different regression was used for each explanatory variable, and all regressions included 
dummy variables to control for the level of human development (low, medium, high and very 
high). Overall inequality in human development, inequality in life expectancy and inequality 
in educational attainment showed a highly statistically significant (at the 1% level) negative 
correlation, but inequality in income per capita showed no correlation. Results were robust to 
different specifications, including grouping countries with low and medium human develop-
ment on the one side and countries with high and very high human development on the other.
Source: HDRO.
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parliamentary representation. Italy, for ex-
ample, managed to increase female represent-
ation more than 50%, but women still occupy 
only around a fifth of all seats (20.7%). In 
Ireland, female parliamentary representation is 
still below 20% while in Rwanda, women out-
number men in parliamentary representation 
(52% compared with 48%).
Though many countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa showed improvement in their GII value 
between 2000 and 2012, they still perform 
worse than countries in other regions, mainly 
because of higher maternal mortality ratios 
and adolescent fertility rates and huge gaps in 
educational attainment.
One of the most disturbing trends con-
cerns the sex ratio at birth, which is deteri-
orating in some fast-growing countries. The 
natural ratio for children ages 0–4 is 1.05 (or 
105 boys to 100 girls). But in the 175 coun-
tries for which 2012 data are available, the 
average was 1.07, and 13 countries had a 
ratio of 1.08–1.18.37
In some countries, sex-selective abortion and 
infanticide are artificially altering the demo-
graphic landscape, leading to a shortage of 
girls and women. This is not just a concern for 
gender justice and equality; it also has major 
implications for democracy and could lead to 
social violence.
The high male sex ratio at birth reflects wo-
men’s status in society, entrenched patriarchal 
mores and prejudices, which are an aspect of 
deep-rooted sociocultural beliefs, the changing 
aspirations of urban and rural societies, and the 
dowry system in some countries.38 In recent 
FIGURE 1.6
Most regions show declining inequality in health and education and rising inequality in income
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years, the problem has been exacerbated by 
the spread and misuse of ultrasound techno-
logies that enable parents to exercise age-old 
preferences for boys. The key driver, however, 
is the combination of patriarchal mores and 
greater economic value of boys in the presence 
of a dowry system. In absence of the latter—for 
instance, in African countries—patriarchal pre-
judices alone do not manifest in high male sex 
ratio at birth.
Redressing this imbalance will involve chan-
ging many social norms, including those that 
affect the economic incentives of the house-
hold to have boys rather than girls. This would 
include effectively ending the exploitative 
dowry system,39 generating greater economic 
opportunities for women, creating conditions 
for women to have greater control over their 
lives and enhancing their political participa-
tion and decisionmaking within households.
It has often been argued that improving 
education for women helps raise their levels 
of health and nutrition and reduces fertility 
rates.40 Thus, in addition to its intrinsic value 
in expanding women’s choices, education 
also has an instrumental value in enhancing 
health and fertility outcomes of women and 
children. In this respect, low and medium 
HDI countries still have some way to go. 
There was also a gender imbalance among the 
uneducated population in high and very high 
HDI countries in 1970–2010, although there 
was substantially more gender balance at all 
education levels in these countries for girls 
and young women currently of school attend-
ance age.
Important as education and job creation 
for women are, they are not enough. Standard 
policies to enhance women’s income do not 
take into account gender differences within 
households, women’s greater burden of 
unpaid work and gender division of work 
as per cultural norms. Policies based on eco-
nomic theory that does not take these factors 
into account may have adverse impacts on 
women, even though they create economic 
prosperity.41 Key to improving gender equity 
are political and social reforms that enhance 
women’s human rights, including freedom, 
dignity, participation, autonomy and collect-
ive agency.42
BOX 1.6
Education quality: achievement on the Programme for International Student 
Assessment
The education component of the Human Development Index has two measures: mean years 
of schooling and expected years of schooling. But even more than years of schooling, quality 
of education is a key factor in expanding human capabilities (see figure).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Programme for Interna-
tional Student Assessment (PISA) collects internationally compatible data on the educational 
attainment of students and allows for cross-country comparison of average learning scores, 
share of low-performing schools and consistency of quality outcomes. For example, the ad-
vantages of a highly educated labour force, which countries such as the United States have 
traditionally had, appear to be eroding as young cohorts in other countries (such as Ireland, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea) reach and surpass the qualifications found in the United 
States.
In the most recent PISA, conducted in 63 countries and territories in 2009, many coun-
tries showed impressive strides in quality of learning outcomes. Students from Shanghai, 
China, outperformed students from 62 countries in reading, mathematics and science skills. 
They were followed by students from the Republic of Korea, Finland and Hong Kong, China 
(SAR) in reading; Singapore, Hong Kong, China (SAR) and the Republic of Korea in math-
ematics; and Finland, Hong Kong, China (SAR) and Singapore in science. The United States 
performed below average in mathematics, sharing 29th place with Ireland and Portugal; 
slightly above average in science, in 21st place; and above average in reading, sharing 15th 
place with Iceland and Poland. Brazil, Chile, Indonesia and Peru have seen impressive gains, 
catching up from very low levels of performance. Investments by some countries in education 
quality will likely bring future payoffs in a more knowledge-driven globalized world.
Programme for International Student Assessment scores in reading positively 
correlate with HDI values
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Progress in human 
development achieved 
sustainably is superior to 
gains made at the cost 
of future generations
Intergenerational equity 
and sustainability
When one crisis follows another, it is easy to 
lose perspective about important long-term 
consequences of current actions. It is thus 
important to bear in mind that today’s choices 
can have a large and decisive influence on the 
choices available for decades in the future. 
Sustainable human development is about 
understanding the links between temporal 
choices of different generations and about 
assigning rights to both present and future 
generations.
Clearly a balance is needed. Enhancing 
people’s capabilities now—especially the 
capabilities of those who are poor or live with 
multiple deprivations—is vital as a matter of 
basic rights and part of the universalism of life 
claims.43 Moreover, poverty and misery today 
have negative consequences for the future. The 
objective should thus be both intragenerational 
and intergenerational equity.
Investing in people today requires a prudent 
balance between debts incurred today and 
the obligations they impose on future gen-
erations. As the 1994 Human Development 
Report underscores, “All postponed debts 
mortgage sustainability, whether economic 
debts, social debts or ecological debts.”44 The 
recent economic crisis has brought to the fore 
the sustainability of economic debt, public 
and private, when economies are not growing, 
while tending to draw attention away from 
the critical issues of social and ecological 
debts. On the environmental front, there is 
already extensive evidence of severe damage 
to ecosystems from the choices of past and 
current generations. Poor countries cannot 
and should not imitate the production and 
consumption patterns of rich countries. And 
rich countries must reduce their ecological 
footprint because from a global perspective 
their per capita consumption and production 
are not sustainable.
Of particular concern now are the global 
challenges of climate change and fragile 
ecosystems. An influential study concluded 
that “Humanity has already transgressed at 
least three planetary boundaries,”45 a point 
repeated in the 2012 Report of the UN 
Secretary General’s High Level Panel on 
Global Sustainability.46 Few countries are 
following an ecologically sustainable path 
now, underscoring the need for technological 
innovations and shifts in consumption that 
can facilitate movement towards sustainable 
human development.47
Figure 1.7 plots the ecological footprint of 
consumption of 151 countries against their 
HDI value in 2012.48 Very few countries have 
both a high HDI value and an ecological 
footprint below the world average biocapacity 
(1.79 global hectares per capita in 2008). This 
does not bode well for the world. Over time, 
the situation is becoming more dire. While 
some high HDI countries have an ecological 
footprint below the world average, their foot-
prints have been increasing over time.
People care not only about the choices open 
to them, but also about how those choices 
are secured, by whom and at whose expense. 
Progress in human development achieved sus-
tainably is superior to gains made at the cost of 
future generations. Indeed, a proper accounting 
system for sustainable human development 
would include both future human develop-
ment and current achievements.
Better ways to monitor environmental 
sustainability are also needed. The 2012 UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development 
called for measures that address the con-
nections between present and future sets of 
choices. Such measures should monitor the 
accumulation of economic and environmental 
debt based on the premise that every citizen on 
the planet, whether alive or not yet born, has 
an equal right to live a comfortable, fulfilling 
life. These measures should also highlight 
planetary boundaries or “tipping points”, 
recognizing that climate change, for example, 
already imposes substantial costs, with the 
brunt of them borne by poor countries and 
poor communities.
Social integration
Human development involves expanding in-
dividual capabilities. Yet individuals are also 
bound up with others. Thus, how individuals 
relate to each other is important in building 
cohesive and enduring societies. Integrating 
different groups can be as critical for well- being 
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and social stability as economic success. 
Inequity and exclusion are social injustices that 
fundamentally weaken human freedoms.
An integrated society relies on effective 
social institutions that enable people to act 
collectively, enhancing trust and solidarity 
between groups. These institutions include 
formal nongovernmental organizations, 
informal associations and cooperatives, as 
well as norms and rules of behaviour. They 
influence individual human development 
outcomes, social cohesion and social stability. 
To differentiate them from individual capab-
ilities, the functioning of these institutions 
and their impact on people can be described 
as “social competencies” (box 1.7). The extent 
to which social competencies foster more- 
cohesive societies can be assessed by their 
success at achieving social inclusion and so-
cial stability.
Some developing countries have sought to 
address social exclusion by distributing the 
benefits of growth more evenly in a refinement 
of the growth with redistribution strategy. 
But this commodity-centric view of inclusive 
growth does little to end the economic and so-
cial discrimination that often has long-standing 
historical and cultural roots. Such discrimina-
tion may be widespread even in countries with 
high income per capita. Clearly income growth 
alone cannot achieve social cohesion; active 
policies are needed.
The impact of inequity can persist over 
generations. For instance, a study of eight 
developed countries found that more-unequal 
countries usually had lower social mobility.49 In 
FIGURE 1.7
Few countries show both the high HDI and low ecological footprint required for sustainable human 
development
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the United Kingdom in particular, as inequal-
ity rose, intergenerational mobility declined.
The 2010 Latin America and the Caribbean 
Human Development Report highlighted the 
link between the lack of social mobility and 
persistent inequality.50 In Brazil, at least a 
quarter of inequality in earnings is associ-
ated with household circumstances, such as 
parents’ educational attainment, race or ethni-
city, or place of birth.51 Such persistence of in-
come distribution patterns across generations 
is also evident in Chile and Mexico, although 
Mexico has seen increased intergenerational 
mobility in recent years.52 Generally, Latin 
America suffers from low social mobility, 
stifling opportunities for individuals at the 
BOX 1.7
Social competencies: human development beyond the individual
Individuals cannot flourish alone; indeed, they cannot function alone. The 
human development approach, however, has been essentially individualis-
tic, assuming that development is the expansion of individuals’ capabilities 
or freedoms. Yet there are aspects of societies that affect individuals but 
cannot be assessed at the individual level because they are based on rela-
tionships, such as how well families or communities function, summarized 
for society as a whole in the ideas of social cohesion and social inclusion. 
Individuals are bound up with others. Social institutions affect individuals’ 
identities and choices. Being a member of a healthy society is an essential 
part of a thriving existence.
So one task of the human development approach is to explore the nature 
of social institutions that are favourable for human flourishing. Development 
then has to be assessed not only for the short-run impact on individual capa-
bilities, but also for whether society evolves in a way that supports human 
flourishing. Social conditions affect not only the outcomes of individuals in a 
particular society today, but also those of future generations.
Social institutions are all institutions in which people act collectively 
(that is, they involve more than one person), other than profit-making mar-
ket institutions and the state. They include formal nongovernmental or-
ganizations, informal associations, cooperatives, producer associations, 
neighbourhood associations, sports clubs, savings associations and many 
more. They also consist of norms and rules of behaviour affecting human 
development outcomes. For example, attitudes towards employment af-
fect material well-being, and norms of hierarchy and discrimination affect 
inequality, discrimination, empowerment, political freedom and so on. To 
describe what those institutions can be and do, and to understand how they 
affect individuals, we can use the term social competencies.
Central to the human development perspective is that societal norms 
affect people’s choices and behaviours towards others, thus influenc-
ing outcomes in the whole community. Community norms and behaviours 
can constrain choice in deleterious ways from a human development 
 perspective—for example, ostracizing, or in extreme cases killing, those 
who make choices that contravene social rules. Families trapped in pov-
erty by informal norms that support early marriage and dowry requirements 
might reject changes to such entrenched social norms. Social institutions 
change over time, and those changes may be accompanied by social tension 
if they hamper the interests of some groups while favouring others.
Policy change is the outcome of a political struggle in which differ-
ent groups (and individuals) support or oppose particular changes. In this 
struggle, unorganized individuals are generally powerless, but by joining 
together they can acquire power collectively. Social action favouring human 
development (such as policies to extend education, progressive taxation and 
minimum wages) happens not spontaneously, but because of groups that 
are effective in supporting change, such as producer groups, worker associa-
tions, social movements and political parties. These organizations are espe-
cially crucial for poorer people, as demonstrated by a group of sex workers 
in Kolkata, India, and women in a squatter community in Cape Town, South 
Africa, who improved their conditions and self-respect by joining together 
and exerting collective pressure.
Societies vary widely in the number, functions, effectiveness and con-
sequences of their social competencies. Institutions and norms can be clas-
sified as human development–promoting, human development–neutral and 
human development–undermining. It is fundamental to identify and encour-
age those that promote valuable capabilities and relationships among and 
between individuals and institutions. Some social institutions (including 
norms) can support human development in some respects but not in others: 
for example, strong family bonds can provide individuals with support during 
upheavals, but may constrain individual choices and opportunities.
Broadly speaking, institutions that promote social cohesion and hu-
man development show low levels of disparity across groups (for example, 
ethnic, religious or gender groups) and high levels of interaction and trust 
among people and across groups, which results in solidarity and the absence 
of violent conflict. It is not a coincidence that 5 of the 10 most peaceful 
countries in the world in 2012, according to the Global Peace Index, are also 
among the most equal societies as measured by loss in Human Development 
Index value due to inequality. They are also characterized by the absence of 
discrimination and low levels of marginalization. In some instances antidis-
criminatory measures can ease the burden of marginalization and partially 
mitigate the worst effects of exclusion. For instance, US law mandating that 
hospital emergency rooms offer treatment to all patients regardless of their 
ability to pay partly mitigates the impact of an expensive health care system 
with limited coverage, while affirmative action in a range of countries (in-
cluding Brazil, Malaysia, South Africa and the United States) has improved 
the situation of deprived groups and contributed to social stability.
The study of social institutions and social competencies must form an 
essential part of the human development approach—including the forma-
tion of groups; interactions between groups and individuals; incentives and 
constraints to collective action; the relationship among groups, politics and 
policy outcomes; the role of norms in influencing behaviours; and how norms 
are formed and changed.
Source: Stewart 2013; Institute for Economics and Peace 2012.
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The presence of 
inequalities can 
adversely affect social 
interactions and restrict 
freedom of choice
bottom of the income distribution for whom 
performance in society is determined largely 
by background characteristics beyond their 
control. The problem is particularly intract-
able in heterogeneous societies, as members of 
deprived groups find it particularly difficult to 
progress.
Inequity and exclusion endure when the 
excluded and those at the lower ends of the 
distribution lack the political voice to seek 
redress. More-equal and more-just societies, 
essential for satisfactory and sustainable hu-
man progress, thus require greater voice and 
political participation and more-accountable 
governments (box 1.8).
Even in the European Union, where a large 
part of the population has seen rising prosper-
ity, some groups have been left behind. The 
Roma, for example, have been part of European 
civilization for more than a thousand years. 
With an estimated 7–9 million people, they are 
Europe’s biggest ethnic minority, present in all 
27 EU member states. Most are EU citizens but 
continue to suffer discrimination and social ex-
clusion. As two regional Human Development 
Reports have revealed, the Roma are often 
trapped in a vicious cycle of social exclusion 
that has persisted generation after generation.53
The presence of inequalities can adversely 
affect social interactions and restrict freedom 
BOX 1.8
Poverty’s structural dimensions
The traditional agendas for reducing poverty recognize but inadequately ad-
dress its structural sources. Contemporary interventions to promote inclu-
sive growth have tended to focus on the outcomes of development through 
expanding and strengthening social safety nets. While such public initiatives 
are to be encouraged, they address the symptoms of poverty, not its sources.
The results of such restrictive interventions are reduction of income pov-
erty to varying degrees and some improvement in human development. But 
across much of the South, income inequalities have increased, social dis-
parities have widened and injustice remains pervasive, while the structural 
sources of poverty remain intact. Any credible agenda to end poverty must 
correct the structural injustices that perpetuate it.
Unequal access to assets
Inequitable access to wealth and knowledge disempowers the excluded 
from competing in the marketplace. Rural poverty, for example, originates 
in insufficient access to land and water for less privileged segments of rural 
society. Land ownership has been not only a source of economic privilege, 
but also a source of social and political authority. The prevailing structures of 
land ownership remain inimical to a functioning democratic order. Similarly, 
lack of access to capital and property perpetuates urban poverty.
Unequal participation in the market
With the prevailing property structures of society, the resource-poor remain 
excluded from more-dynamic market sectors. The main agents of produc-
tion tend to be the urban elite, who own the corporate assets that power 
faster growing economic sectors. By contrast, the excluded partake only as 
primary producers and wage earners, at the lowest end of the production 
and marketing chains, leaving them with little opportunity to share in market 
economy opportunities for adding value to their labour.
Capital markets have failed to provide sufficient credit to the excluded, 
even though they have demonstrated their creditworthiness through low 
default rates in the microcredit market. And formal capital markets have 
not provided financial instruments to attract the savings of the excluded 
and transform them into investment assets in the faster growing corporate 
sector.
Unjust governance
This inequitable and unjust social and economic universe can be com-
pounded by unjust governance. Often the excluded remain voiceless in the 
institutions of governance and thus underserved by public institutions. The 
institutions of democracy remain unresponsive to the needs of the excluded, 
both in the design of policy agendas and in the selection of electoral candi-
dates. Representative institutions thus tend to be monopolized by the afflu-
ent and socially powerful, who then use office to enhance their wealth and 
perpetuate their hold over power.
Promoting structural change
To correct these structural injustices, policy agendas need to be made 
more inclusive by strengthening the capacity of the excluded to partici-
pate on more equitable terms in the market economy and the democratic 
polity. Such agendas should reposition the excluded within the processes 
of production, distribution and governance. The production process needs 
to graduate the excluded from living out their lives exclusively as wage 
earners and tenant farmers by investing them with the capacity to become 
owners of productive assets. The distribution process must elevate the ex-
cluded beyond their inherited role as primary producers by enabling them 
to move upmarket through greater opportunities to share in adding value 
through collective action. Access to assets and markets must be backed by 
equitable access to quality health care and education, integral to empower-
ing the excluded.
The governance process must increase the active participation of 
the excluded in representative institutions, which is crucial to enhancing 
their voice in decisionmaking and providing access to the institutions of 
governance.
Source: Sobhan, R. 2010. Challenging the Injustice of Poverty.
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of choice. Subjective data can provide an in-
sight into the state of social integration within 
a country or community. Evidence suggests a 
small negative correlation between losses due 
to inequality and satisfaction with freedom 
of choice and with the community. Evidence 
also suggests that people in countries with a 
high HDI value are generally more satisfied 
with their freedom of choice and with the 
community. Exploring these associations can 
offer important policy lessons for countries 
(table 1.3).
Human security
The 1994 Human Development Report argued 
that the concept of security must shift from the 
idea of a militaristic safeguarding of state bor-
ders to the reduction of insecurity in people’s 
daily lives (or human insecurity).54 In every 
society, human security is undermined by a 
variety of threats, including hunger, disease, 
crime, unemployment, human rights violations 
and environmental challenges. The intensity 
of these threats differs across the world, but 
human security remains a universal quest for 
freedom from want and fear.
Consider economic insecurity. In the coun-
tries of the North, millions of young people 
are now unable to find work. And in the 
South, millions of farmers have been unable 
to earn a decent livelihood and forced to mi-
grate, with many adverse effects, particularly 
for women. Closely related to insecurity in 
livelihoods is insecurity in food and nutri-
tion. Many developing country households 
faced with high food prices cannot afford 
two square meals a day, undermining progress 
in child nutrition. Another major cause of 
impoverishment in many countries, rich and 
poor, is unequal access to affordable health 
care. Ill health in the household (especially 
of the head of the household) is one of the 
most common sources of impoverishment, 
as earnings are lost and medical expenses are 
incurred.
Perspectives on security need to shift from a 
misplaced emphasis on military strength to a 
well rounded, people-centred view. Progress in 
this shift can be gleaned in part from statistics 
on crime, particularly homicides, and military 
spending.
Crime
Freedom from fear should be reflected in low 
crime rates, specifically low homicide rates. 
A few studies have also used homicide rates 
to assess civic engagement and trust.55 The 
2012 Caribbean Human Development Report, 
for example, argues that violent crime erodes 
confidence in future development prospects, 
reduces the competitiveness of industries and 
services by imposing burdensome security 
costs and damages the investment climate. 
Crime may also lead to a brain drain from the 
country or affected community. And diverting 
resources to control crime reduces the funds 
available to invest in health care and education, 
thus slowing social integration and dampening 
development.56
In recent years, the global average hom-
icide rate for 189 countries with data was 
6.9 per 100,000 people,57 with a low of 0 
in Monaco and a high of 91.6 in Honduras 
TABLE 1.3
Inequality and satisfaction with freedom of choice and community
HDI group and region
Overall loss in 
HDI value due to 
inequality, 2012 (%)
Satisfaction 
with freedom of 
choice, 2007–2011a 
(% satisfied)
Satisfaction with 
community,b 
2007–2011a 
(% answering yes)
HDI group
Very high human development 10.8 81.5 85.9
High human development 20.6 66.3 76.4
Medium human development 24.2 77.8 79.9
Low human development 33.5 61.8 72.2
Region
Arab States 25.4 54.6 67.6
East Asia and the Pacific 21.3 78.7c 80.1c
Europe and Central Asia 12.9 58.5 76.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 25.7 77.9 79.0
South Asia 29.1 72.9 83.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 35.0 69.1 65.2
World 23.3 73.9 79.0
a. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.
b. Based on the Gallup survey question on overall satisfaction with city.
c. Value is not displayed in the statistical tables because data are not available for at least half the countries covering at least 
two-thirds of the population of the group.
Source: Overall loss in HDI value due to inequality, HDRO calculations based on the Inequality-Adjusted HDI; satisfaction with 
freedom of choice and community, HDRO calculations based on Gallup (2012).
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(see statistical table 9). There is a small 
negative correlation between homicide rate 
and HDI value, with low HDI countries 
at 14.6 per 100,000  people, high HDI 
countries at 13.0 and very high HDI coun-
tries at 2.1. Homicide rates are highest in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (22.2 per 
100,000  people), followed by Sub-Saharan 
Africa (20.4), Europe and Central Asia (5.5), 
the Arab States (4.5), South Asia (3.7) and 
East Asia and the Pacific (2.8).
It can also be instructive to look at the 
homicide rates for cities. Contrary to popular 
perception, crime is not generally higher in 
poorer cities. Amartya Sen notes that Kolkata 
“is not only one of the poorest cities in India, 
and indeed in the world, but it also has the 
lowest violent crime rate of all Indian cities.”58 
This is also true for homicide: Kolkata’s average 
incidence of murder, 0.3 per 100,000 people, 
is lower than in much more affluent London 
(2.4) and New York (5.0).59
Sen argues that Kolkata has benefited from its 
long history as a “mixed” city, without ethnic or 
income separation between neighbourhoods. 
For several decades, the city has also had a sys-
tem of basic public services, including govern-
ment hospitals, schools, colleges and a low-cost 
public transport system, which have dampened 
the impacts of economic and social exclusion. 
In local trains, poor vendors commonly travel 
side by side with wage labourers and white-col-
lar workers.
But when people do not have access to ser-
vices, they may be more prone to crime. A UK 
study of reoffending criminals, for example, 
noted that many prisoners are victims of a 
lifetime of social exclusion60 and are effectively 
excluded from access to basic services.61
Military spending
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been 
no overall intensification of militarization, 
measured by military expenditure as a propor-
tion of GDP, partly because of changes in the 
threats to national security. While interstate 
conflicts appear to be on the decline since the 
early 1990s, the number of intrastate conflicts 
has increased since the mid-20th century.
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Not all countries have 
the preconditions for 
complete demilitarization, 
but most have scope for 
substantial slowing in 
their military spending
Today the majority of security threats come 
not from other countries but from insur-
gencies, terrorism and other civil conflicts.62 
Conflicts in the post–Cold War era have 
claimed more than 5 million casualties, 95% of 
them civilians.63
In South Asia, for example, all nine countries 
have experienced internal conflict in the last 
two decades, and the resulting casualties have 
outnumbered those from interstate conflicts.64 
Moreover, since 2001, more of the conflicts 
have been in the poorer regions of those coun-
tries than elsewhere.65
In 2010, military spending worldwide for 
the 104 countries with data available was 
more than $1.4  trillion, or 2.6% of world 
GDP. Most of the spending was by very 
high HDI countries. But as other countries’ 
economies have grown, particularly medium 
HDI countries, their military expenditures 
have been increasing. Between 1990 and 
2010, military spending more than tripled in 
medium HDI countries, while rising close to 
50% in low HDI countries and 22% in very 
high HDI countries and falling almost 47% 
in high HDI countries. Nevertheless, in the 
three HDI groups where total military ex-
penditure grew, the increase was slower than 
GDP growth. These aggregates hide consid-
erable diversity. Europe and Central Asia 
saw military spending decline 69% between 
1990 and 2010, while South Asia, East Asia 
and the Pacific, and the Arab States saw it rise 
43%–388%.66
Although development is often accompanied 
by a rise in military spending, this is not always 
the case (figure 1.8). The highest shares of mil-
itary spending as a proportion of GDP are in 
very high and high HDI countries, but some 
very high HDI countries have a share below 1% 
of GDP, among them Austria, Iceland, Ireland 
and Luxembourg.
This is of particular significance for the rising 
countries of the South. Costa Rica, for example, 
has not had an army since 1948.67 It spends 
nothing on the military and has thus been able 
to earmark more funds for social programmes 
and social investments.68 In 2009, it invested 
6.3% of GDP in education and 7% in health. 
Such choices contributed to its progress on the 
HDI from 0.621 in 1980 to 0.773 in 2012.
Today, around 20 countries have small or no 
armed forces. They tend to possess small territ-
ories, and many of them rely on external powers 
for national security. Not all countries have the 
preconditions for complete demilitarization, 
but most have scope for substantial slowing 
in their military spending. Particularly with 
respect to internal conflicts, India has shown 
that while policing may be more effective in 
curbing violence in the short term, redistri-
bution and overall development are better 
strategies to prevent and contain civil unrest in 
the medium term.69
*    *    *
This analysis of the state of human develop-
ment is positive and hopeful. Yet much work 
remains. Almost every country has challenges 
to overcome and opportunities for further 
progress. Of particular concern is that some 
developed countries, in response to the debt 
crisis, are pursuing austerity policies that could 
foreclose or reduce future choices and options 
for people in the South.
The only viable path to higher human de-
velopment is through active investment in 
enhancing capabilities and enlarging opportun-
ities. As the 1991 Human Development Report 
noted, “People who are healthier, confident, 
and skilled will be in a much better position 
to cope with a fast-changing environment and 
FIGURE 1.8
Development is not always accompanied by a rise in military spending
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meet the technological and competitive de-
mands of the international marketplace.”70
The next chapter documents the extent to 
which many countries of the South have been 
able to follow this route, as well as the global 
impact they are having. Later chapters will con-
sider how they have done this and examine the 
implication of the rise of the South for inter-
national governance and for reshaping global 
power relations.
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“When the music changes, 
so does the dance.”
African proverb
“I do not want my house to be 
walled in on all sides and my 
windows to be stuffed. I want 
the cultures of all the lands to 
be blown about my house as 
freely as possible. But I refuse 
to be blown off my feet by any.”
Mahatma Gandhi
2.
A more global South
A striking feature of the world scene in recent years is the transformation of many developing countries into dynamic 
economies that are doing well in economic growth and trade and progressing rapidly on human development. During these 
uncertain times, they are collectively bolstering world economic growth, lifting other developing economies, reducing pov-
erty and increasing wealth on a grand scale. They still face formidable challenges and are home to many of the world’s 
poor.1 But they have demonstrated how pragmatic policies and a strong focus on human development can release the 
opportunities latent in their economies, facilitated by globalization.
The rise of the South is noteworthy for its 
diversity. This wave of developing countries en-
compasses countries with very different endow-
ments, social structures, geography and history: 
for example, Algeria and Argentina, Brazil 
and Bangladesh, China and Chile, Ghana and 
Guyana, India and Indonesia, and Malaysia and 
Mozambique. These countries demonstrate 
that rapid people-centred development can 
take root in a wide range of contexts. And their 
experiences and knowhow are an expanding 
source of best practice that should enable other 
developing countries to catch up.
The rapidly expanding connections between 
these countries are also leading to a more 
balanced form of globalization. New trade 
routes are flourishing: countries as diverse as 
Morocco, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and 
Viet Nam each have substantial export and 
import relationships with more than 100 eco-
nomies.2 New and improved technologies, ad-
apted to local conditions, are boosting people’s 
productivity and enabling production to be 
shared across borders.
And all this is happening as people and con-
tinents are connected on a previously unima-
ginable scale. More than 2 billion people use 
the Internet, and every year more than 1 billion 
people travel internationally.3
This transformation is affecting the dynamics 
of regional and global relationships. The leading 
countries of the South played a crucial role in 
responding to the 2008 financial crisis. Dialogue 
is intensifying on the appropriate provisioning 
of global public goods, such as curbing climate 
change, developing rules for stable financial mar-
kets, advancing multilateral trade negotiations 
and agreeing on mechanisms to finance and 
produce green technologies. It may seem that in-
creasing the number of participants will make it 
more difficult to arrive at a global consensus. But 
the rise of the South could help break stalemates 
on some of today’s global issues and lead to more 
development- friendly global agreements.
Rebalancing: a more global 
world, a more global South
Global production is rebalancing in ways not 
seen for 150 years. Growth in the cross-border 
movement of goods, services, people and ideas 
has been remarkable. In 1800, trade accoun-
ted for 2% of world output.4 The proportion 
remained small right after the Second World 
War, and by 1960 it was still less than 25%. By 
2011, however, trade accounted for nearly 60% 
of global output.5 The expansion it represents is 
widely distributed, with at least 89 developing 
countries increasing their trade to output ratio 
over the past two decades (box 2.1).6
Today, as a result of reduced trade barriers 
and lower transport costs, the production of 
manufactures is fragmented across borders, 
with many countries trading intermediate 
goods.7 And changes in information techno-
logy have made services increasingly tradable. 
The result has been a remarkable rise in intrain-
dustry and intrafirm trade.
Developing countries, particularly in Asia, 
have ridden these shifts to great advantage. 
Between 1980 and 2010, they increased their 
share of world merchandise trade from about 
25% to 47%8 and their share of world output 
from 33% to 45%. Today, developing countries 
account for a third of value added in world 
production of manufactured goods.9 Between 
1990 and 2010, the merchandise exports of 
eight developing country members of the Group 
of 20 (G20) increased 15-fold, from about 
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$200 billion to $3 trillion.10 But trade has also 
increased for many other countries. In 2010, mer-
chandise exports per capita from Sub-Saharan 
Africa were more than twice those from India.11 
In 1995–1996 Thailand had around 10 trading 
partners to which it exported more than $1 bil-
lion in goods each; just 15 years later it had three 
times as many, spread across the globe (map 2.1).12
BOX 2.1
The South’s integration with the world economy and human development
In a sample of 107 developing countries over 1990–2010, about 87% can 
be considered globally integrated: they increased their trade to output ratio, 
have many substantial trading partnerships1 and maintain a high trade to 
output ratio relative to countries at comparable income levels.2 All these 
developing countries are also much more connected to the world and with 
each other: Internet use has expanded dramatically, with the median annual 
growth in the number of users exceeding 30% between 2000 and 2010.
While not all globally integrated developing countries have made rapid 
gains in Human Development Index (HDI) value, the converse is true. Almost 
all developing countries that made the most improvement in HDI value rela-
tive to their peers between 1990 and 2012 (at least 45 in the sample here) 
have integrated more with the world economy over the past two decades; 
their average increase in trade to output ratio is about 13 percentage points 
greater than that of the group of developing countries with more modest 
improvement in HDI value. This is consistent with earlier findings that coun-
tries tend to open more as they develop.3
The increasingly integrated countries with major improvement in HDI 
value include not only the large ones that dominate the headlines, but also 
dozens of smaller and least developed countries. Thus they constitute a 
larger and more varied group than the emerging market economies often 
designated by acronyms, such as BRICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, 
China and South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), CIVETS 
(Colombia, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) and MIST 
(Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea [Republic of Korea] and Turkey).
The figure below plots improvement in HDI value4 against the change 
in trade to output ratio, an indicator of the depth of participation in global 
markets. More than four-fifths of these developing countries increased their 
trade to output ratio between 1990 and 2012. Among the exceptions in the 
subgroup that also made substantial improvement in HDI value are Indonesia, 
Pakistan and Venezuela, three large countries that are considered global play-
ers in world markets, exporting or importing from at least 80 economies. Two 
smaller countries whose trade to output ratio declined (Mauritius and Panama) 
continue to trade at levels much higher than would be expected for countries 
at comparable income levels. All countries that had substantial improvement 
in HDI value and increased their trade to output ratio between 1990 and 2012 
are highlighted in the upper right quadrant of the figure. Countries in the lower 
right quadrant (including Kenya, the Philippines and South Africa) increased 
their trade to output ratio but made modest improvement in HDI value.
Human progress and trade expansion in the South
Relative improvement in HDI value, 1990–2012
Change in trade to output ratio, 1990–2010
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1. Bilateral trade exceeding $2 million in 2010–2011.
2. Based on results from a cross-country regression of trade to GDP ratio on income per capita that controls for population and landlockedness.
3. See Rodrik (2001).
4. Relative HDI improvement is measured by residuals from a regression of the change in the log of HDI value between 1990 and 2012 on the log of initial HDI value in 1990. Five countries with black dots in the upper 
left quadrant made substantial improvement in HDI value but reduced their trade to output ratio between 1990 and 2010, though they either maintained a large number of substantial trading ties globally or traded 
more than predicted for countries at comparable levels of income per capita. Countries with open circles in the upper right and lower right quadrants had modest relative improvement in HDI value between 1990 and 
2012 but increased their trade to output ratio or maintained a large number of substantial trading ties.
Source: HDRO calculations; trade to output ratios from World Bank (2012a).
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Global rebalancing has been accompanied 
by an unprecedented linking of developing re-
gions. Between 1980 and 2011, South–South 
trade as a share of world merchandise trade rose 
from 8.1% to 26.7%, with growth particularly 
remarkable in the 2000s (figure 2.1). Over the 
same period, the share of North–North trade 
declined from about 46% to less than 30%. 
These trends hold even when exports and 
imports of natural resources are excluded.13 
South–South trade has been an important 
growth stimulus during the recent economic 
downturn. Countries of the South are export-
ing more merchandise (and manufactures) to 
each other than to countries of the North, and 
those exports are more intensive in skills and 
technology.14
Sub-Saharan Africa has become a major 
new source and destination for South–South 
trade. Between 1992 and 2011, China’s 
trade with Sub-Saharan Africa rose from 
$1  billion to more than $140  billion. Indian 
companies are investing in African industries 
ranging from infrastructure to hospitality and 
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telecommunications, while Brazilian firms are 
some of the largest employers in Angola.15
Trade in capital goods and services
South–South trade offers developing countries 
access to affordable capital goods that are often 
more appropriate to their needs than are capital 
goods from richer countries and that are there-
fore more likely to be acquired, adopted and 
imitated.16 Even India has benefited. In 2010, 
capital goods such as electrical machinery, 
nuclear reactors and boilers dominated India’s 
imports from China (60%) and cost an estim-
ated 30% less than if they had been sourced 
from richer countries.17 This still does not 
reflect the full dynamism of such exchanges. 
For example, China’s fourth-largest turbine 
producer, Mingyang, recently acquired 55% of 
India’s Global Wind Power, with the aim of in-
stalling 2.5 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity 
in India.18
In 2010–2011, crucial inputs for aug-
menting productive capacity and infrastruc-
ture—road vehicles and equipment, industrial 
machinery, professional equipment and fix-
tures, chemicals, and iron and steel—made 
up nearly half of least developed countries’ 
imports from China (table 2.1). The largest 
import category was textiles and leather, in-
cluding yarn and fabric that are used as inputs 
for least developed countries’ exports of ap-
parel to markets in the North. Consumer elec-
tronics and apparel and footwear accounted 
for less than 20% of least developed countries’ 
imports from China.
Developing countries have also seized oppor-
tunities for trade in services. Advances in in-
formation technology have facilitated services 
trade at different skill levels: lower skill work, 
as in call centres and data entry; medium-skill 
work, as in back office accounting, program-
ming, ticketing and billing ; and high-skill 
work, as in architectural design, digital anim-
ation, medical tests and software development. 
This trend is expected to intensify as developing 
countries take advantage of the benefits of scale 
from servicing their own expanding consumer 
markets.
One of the largest internationally traded 
services is tourism, which accounts for as 
much as 30% of world exports of commercial 
FIGURE 2.1
As a share of world merchandise trade, South–South trade more than tripled over 
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TABLE 2.1
Least developed countries’ trade with China, 2000–2001 and 2010–2011 ($ millions at 
current exchange rates)
Sector
Imports from China Exports to China
2000–2001 2010–2011 2000–2001 2010–2011
Agricultural raw materials 16 105 243 1,965
Food and beverages 164 1,089 378 841
Fuel, ores and metals 42 323 3,126 44,244
Chemicals 232 2,178 1 93
Textiles and leather 1,323 8,974 14 138
Iron and steel 61 1,642 0 1
Other material-based manufactures 236 3,132 44 540
Industrial machinery 400 4,415 1 1
Electronics 382 3,806 3 7
Road vehicles and equipment 266 6,691 0 1
Apparel and footwear 266 2,577 4 129
Professional equipment and fixtures 147 2,291 1 34
Note: Export values are averaged for 2000 and 2001 and for 2010 and 2011 and rounded to the nearest whole number, as reported 
by China; import values include cost, insurance and freight.
Source: HDRO calculations based on UNSD (2012).
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The increase in trade 
and investment by 
multinational corporations 
and others can be 
likened to a third 
industrial revolution
services.19 Tourists spent roughly $1 trillion in 
2010; China was among the most popular des-
tinations (more than 57 million arrivals), along 
with Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and 
Turkey. The UN World Tourism Organization 
projects that by 2020, three-fourths of more 
than 1.5  billion tourist arrivals will occur 
within the same geographic region.
Foreign direct investment
The increase in output and trade in many 
developing countries has been assisted by 
large inflows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI): between 1980 and 2010, the countries 
of the South increased their share of global 
FDI from 20% to 50%.20 FDI flows into 
developing countries have been a forerunner 
of outward FDI from developing countries. 
The growth rate of the South’s FDI inflows 
and outflows rose rapidly in the 1990s and 
early to mid-2000s (figure 2.2). FDI from 
the South destined for other countries in the 
South grew 20% a year over 1996–2009.21 
In many least developed countries, a size-
able share of inward FDI now originates in 
other developing countries, especially from 
the fast-growing multinational corporations 
based in the South.
These investments generally involve links 
with local firms and transfers of technology 
that make intensive use of labour and local con-
tent. There is some evidence of a strong regional 
dimension to South–South FDI, with most 
investments in countries in the same region, of-
ten to neighbours and to countries with shared 
languages.22 The biggest outward investor from 
the South is China, with an investment stock of 
$1.2 trillion.23
In 1990, companies in the South made up 
only 4% of the Fortune Global 500 ranking of 
the world’s biggest corporations; in 2011, their 
share was 22%. Today, one in four transnational 
corporations is based in the South. Though the 
enterprises may be smaller, they are numerous: 
there are now more Korean than Japanese mul-
tinational companies, and more Chinese ones 
than US ones. Enterprises from the South are 
going global earlier than firms from developed 
countries did at a similar stage of develop-
ment.24 They are augmenting their compet-
itiveness by acquiring strategic assets such as 
brands, technology and distribution networks 
(box 2.2).
Production networks
The increase in trade and investment by 
multi national corporations and others has 
been linked to the expansion of international 
production networks, especially in Asia. 
Likened to a third industrial revolution,25 
these networks split production processes 
into multiple steps that cross national bor-
ders. As a result, developing countries have 
been able to diversify their industrial struc-
tures and participate in complex production 
processes. Developing countries engage ini-
tially in the labour- intensive segments, typ-
ically in product assembly, and then graduate 
to component fabrication and equipment 
manufacture. Meanwhile, the less complex 
production relocates to less advanced neigh-
bouring economies. At the same time, these 
manufacturing plants create demand for 
domestic firms to supply inputs and producer 
FIGURE 2.2
Foreign direct investment flows to and from the 
South have veered sharply upward since the 1990s
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services. In this way, opportunities to par-
ticipate in international production have 
widened for new entrants—as for Malaysia 
in the 1970s, Thailand in the 1980s, China in 
the 1990s and Viet Nam today.
The North has played an important role in 
this rise of the South, just as the South is contrib-
uting to the North’s recovery from the economic 
slowdown (box 2.3). International production 
networks have been driven mainly by final 
demand in the North. The surge in integrated 
production networks within Asia alone resulted 
in a high-technology export boom of nearly 
$320 billion between 1995 and 2005.26
Personal networks
Many transnational opportunities in both trade 
and investment arise through personal connec-
tions, often between international migrants 
and their countries of origin. In 2010, an es-
timated 3% of the world’s people (215 million) 
were first-generation immigrants,27 and close 
to half of them lived in developing countries.28 
Almost 80% of South–South migration takes 
place between bordering countries.29
Migrant diasporas are a huge source of 
foreign exchange. In 2005, South–South 
remittances were estimated at 30%–45% of 
worldwide remittances.30 Diasporas are also 
a source of information about market oppor-
tunities. Diasporas can be associated with in-
creased bilateral trade and FDI.31 For example, 
US multinational firms with a high proportion 
of employees from particular countries have 
less need to rely on joint-venture partners in 
countries with which their employees have 
cultural ties.32
Links can also be strengthened when mi-
grants return to their home country. Many 
information technolog y professionals in 
California’s Silicon Valley, for example, have 
taken their ideas, capital and networks back 
with them when they return to their home 
countries. Other returnees are building new 
infrastructure, universities, hospitals and 
businesses. Returning entrepreneurs stay in 
touch with former colleagues, facilitating 
the diffusion of business information. Cross-
border scientific collaboration also dispro-
portionately involves scientists with diaspora 
ties.33
Other flows of information are made possible 
by the widening penetration of the Internet 
and new social media. Between 2000 and 
2010, average annual growth in Internet use 
BOX 2.2
Acquisitions by the South of brands in the North
In 2011, 61 of the world’s biggest corporations on the Fortune 500 list were 
Chinese, 8 were Indian and 7 Brazilian. Just five years earlier, China had 16 
on the list, India 5 and Brazil 3. The South is going global through outward 
investment using mergers and acquisitions. The acquisition of venerated 
brands from the North by companies in lower and upper middle-income 
countries is a portent of the rise of the South. In 2005, the Chinese com-
pany Lenovo bought IBM’s laptop division for $1.25  billion and took over 
$500  million of its debt. In 2010, Zhejiang Geely purchased the Swedish 
car company Volvo. In 2011 alone, Chinese firms spent $42.9 billion on an 
eclectic mix of more than 200 acquisitions: Sany Heavy Industry Co. acquired 
Putzmeister, Germany’s largest concrete pump maker; Liugong Machinery 
Co. Ltd. purchased the Polish construction equipment manufacturer Huta 
Stalowa Wola; and Shandong Heavy Industry Group bought a 75% stake in 
Italy’s Ferretti Group, a luxury yacht maker.
India’s Tata Group acquired the Anglo-Dutch steel firm Corus for 
$13.3 billion in 2007 and Jaguar Land Rover for $2.6 billion in 2008. The 
Aditya Birla Group bought US aluminium firm Novelis in 2007 and Columbian 
Chemicals in 2011. Mahindra and Mahindra acquired Sangyong, a bankrupt 
Korean carmaker. Brazil’s food companies have also been active: in 2007, 
JBS Friboi bought Swift, a US rival, to ease its entry into the United States. 
In 2011, Turkish companies made 25 deals worth nearly $3 billion. One of 
Turkey’s famous acquisitions is Godiva, a Belgian chocolate manufacturer, 
bought for $850 million by Yildiz Holding. There are scores of lesser known 
purchases of smaller brands from the North by companies in Southeast Asia 
and the Arab States. (Many big purchases are also South–South. In 2010, 
India’s Bharti Airtel acquired the African operations of Zain for $10.7 billion, 
and China spent $9.8  billion in 27 deals across Brazil, India, the Russian 
Federation and South Africa.)
South–North acquisitions are often interpreted in patriotic terms. 
Whether the deals help short-run profitability and value creation is unclear. 
In the long run, however, the strategic motives (outside the resource sector) 
appear to be about acquiring proprietary knowledge, skills and competen-
cies that will help companies expand abroad and at home. Acquiring an 
established, albeit struggling, brand from the North gives companies from 
the South a foothold in mature markets. The acquiring companies lower their 
cost base by diversifying and globalizing supply chains and gain the technol-
ogy and tacit knowhow (such as risk management or credit rating in the case 
of financial institutions) to enhance operating capabilities.
Source: HDRO; China Daily 2012; The Economist 2011a,b, 2012a; Deloitte 2012a,b; Luedi 2008.
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Host countries need to 
invest in the capacity of 
their people to identify 
and use the knowledge 
embedded in foreign 
capital and ideas
was exceptionally high in around 60 develop-
ing countries (figure 2.3).34 Of the 10 countries 
with the most users of popular social network-
ing sites such as Facebook, 6 are in the South.35 
While these rates reflect in part the low base in 
2000, the spread and adoption of new media 
have revolutionized many sectors across diverse 
countries (box 2.4).
Impetus from human development
Successful performance in trade, investment 
and international production also depends on 
rising levels of human development, as illus-
trated by the association between high export 
earnings per capita and achievement in edu-
cation and health (figure 2.4). The more suc-
cessful countries in the upper right quadrant 
of the figure also tend to have better economic 
opportunities for women. Increased trade 
draws new workers, often women, into the 
labour market, expanding their choices. These 
new workers do not always benefit from good 
working conditions; efforts to keep costs low 
can put pressure on wages and work environ-
ments. Some governments may be reluctant to 
expand worker rights, if they believe it would 
raise production costs and reduce competitive-
ness (box 2.5).36
The capacity of people and institutions also 
affects the benefits from FDI. Host countries 
need to invest in the capacity of their people 
to identify, assimilate and develop the useful 
knowledge embedded in foreign capital and 
ideas.37 Indeed, an educated and healthy 
workforce is often a key factor in influencing 
the decision of foreign investors on where to 
locate. This positive association between FDI 
inflows and achievements in health and edu-
cation is evident for a sample of 137 countries 
(figure 2.5).38
This relationship between a skilled popu-
lace and inward foreign investment tends to 
be mutually reinforcing. But there are out-
liers. FDI could still flow to countries with 
modest achievements in human development 
if they are exceptionally well endowed in 
natural resources. Between 2003 and 2009, 
for instance, many resource-rich African 
countries where FDI contributed substan-
tially to economic growth saw some of the 
lowest nonincome Human Development 
Index (HDI) values.39 However, the impact 
on development is limited when such invest-
ments are confined to enclaves and delinked 
from the rest of the economy. Spillover 
benefits from FDI are unlikely to be wide-
spread if there is no sustained investment in 
people’s capabilities. In this regard, relatively 
BOX 2.3
Ties that bind: the mutual dependence of North and South
A substantial share of South–South trade, especially in manufactured parts 
and components, is driven by demand in the North. This makes the countries 
of the South sensitive to shocks in the North. After the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis, for instance, exports from Southeast Asia to Japan, the European 
Union and the United States fell about 20% between 2008 and 2009. The 
percentage drop in China’s exports to these economies was also in double 
digits.
The North is also increasingly relying on the South to power its own re-
bound. Since 2007, US exports to China and Latin America and the Caribbean 
have grown two and a half times faster than US exports to traditional mar-
kets in the North. Helped by a weak dollar and increasing purchasing power 
in the South, expansion of US exports involved not only traditional sectors 
such as aircraft, machinery, software and Hollywood movies, but also new, 
high-value services such as architecture, engineering and finance. Behind 
Shanghai’s booming architectural wonders (including Shanghai Towers, 
which will be the country’s tallest building in 2015) are US designers and 
structural engineers, who are drawing an ever-increasing share of fees and 
royalties from services exported to Brazil, China and India.
Furthermore, a growing “app economy” supported by such companies 
as Apple, Facebook and Google employs more than 300,000 people whose 
creations are easily exported across borders. Zynga, a large company that 
makes online games and mobile applications, recorded $1.1  billion in 
revenue in 2011, a third of it from players outside the United States. The 
impact of a growing consumer class in the South is felt not only in ser-
vices, but also in manufacturing and commodities. A third of US exports 
are now accounted for by firms employing fewer than 500 people; through 
new techniques, such as three-dimensional printing, many are recapturing 
markets once lost to imports. Emerging markets have also revived the US 
role as a commodity producer (of grains, for example). These shifting trade 
patterns suggest that a slowdown in the South would halt growth in the 
newly dynamic exports from the North, just as the recession in the North 
hit the South.
Source: HDRO; The Economist 2012b.
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Human development is 
vital for participating in 
global supply chains; 
an abundance of 
low-wage and low-skill 
labour is not enough
resource-poor Ethiopia and Tanzania are 
noteworthy for their large increase in nonin-
come HDI value between 2000 and 2010 and 
for their above-average FDI over the same 
period.
Human development is also vital for parti-
cipating in global supply chains. Contrary to 
popular perception, an abundance of low-wage 
and low-skill labour is not enough. Even as-
sembling components made elsewhere can be 
complex, requiring individual skills and social 
competencies to coordinate and organize on 
a large scale. People can learn such skills with 
appropriate education, training and policy 
support. Basic human capabilities are also 
crucial.40 China, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand in East Asia; Brazil, Costa Rica and 
Mexico in Latin America and the Caribbean; 
and Morocco and Tunisia in the Arab States 
have some of the highest trade shares in parts 
and components. Widespread benefits accrue 
only when activities are scaled up (box 2.6). 
However, it should also be noted that in trade 
of parts and components, the share of value 
added by any one country is generally low. In 
countries where production takes place almost 
entirely in enclaves connected to overseas sup-
ply chains, with limited ties to the domestic 
economy, the benefits to the rest of the eco-
nomy are limited.41
Helping other countries catch up
All developing countries are not yet participat-
ing fully in the rise of the South. The pace of 
change is slower, for instance, in the majority 
of the 49 least developed countries, especially 
those that are landlocked or far from world 
markets. Nevertheless, many of these countries 
have also begun to benefit from South–South 
FIGURE 2.3
Between 2000 and 2010, Internet use grew more than 30% a year in around 60 developing countries
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trade, investment, finance and technology 
transfer.
A recent study of trends over 1988–2007 
finds positive growth spillovers from China 
to other developing countries, particularly 
close trading partners.42 These benefits have 
to some extent offset slackening demand from 
developed countries. Growth in low-income 
countries would have been an estimated 
0.3–1.1 percentage points lower in 2007–2010 
had growth fallen at the same rate in China 
and India as in developed economies.43 FDI 
from a single source country, China, was cred-
ited with contributing substantially to growth 
rates in several African countries, including in 
2008–2009 when other growth impulses were 
dissipating. Between 2003 and 2009, the estim-
ated contribution to growth from Chinese FDI 
ranged from 0.04 percentage point in South 
Africa to 1.9 percentage points in Zambia. The 
contribution was also high in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (1.0 percentage point), 
Nigeria (0.9), Madagascar (0.5), Niger (0.5) 
and Sudan (0.3).44
Commodity producers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and elsewhere have benefited from a 
prolonged commodity boom arising in East 
and South Asia. Cheap imports also increase 
the purchasing power of low-income con-
sumers and the competitiveness of export- 
oriented producers. Some African countries 
may, however, be hampered by the enclave 
character of extractive industries, which re-
duces the potential gains from South–South 
trade and exposes economies to the risk of 
Dutch disease. Nevertheless, the primary 
sector can generate sizeable backward and 
forward links, as Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Trinidad and Tobago have 
shown. Possibilities include agroindustry and 
logistics infrastructure, as well as demand for 
services (in food processing and distribution, 
construction, repair and maintenance), all of 
which create jobs, income and learning and 
can enable entrepreneurs to begin new cycles 
of innovation and investment.
Several encouraging signs are evident. 
The more recent investments from East and 
BOX 2.4
Mobile phones and the Palapa Ring: connecting Indonesia
Indonesia used telecommunications technology to connect its large cluster 
of far-flung islands and to open the country to the outside world in ways 
unimaginable a generation ago. This transformation was not spontaneous: 
it required extensive private and public investment and prescient policy 
guidance from the state-run information and communications technology 
council, Dewan Teknologi Informasi dan Komunikasi Nasional (DETIKNAS). 
With a diverse population stretched across a vast archipelago of nearly a 
thousand inhabited islands, Indonesia faced formidable obstacles in its 
transition to the digital age. Communications between islands was limited. 
Landline telephones were few, available to most ordinary Indonesians only 
in major cities and at high cost.
By 2010, however, 220 million mobile phones were registered in a coun-
try of 240 million people. An estimated 85% of adults owned phones, as 
state encouragement and market competition slashed the prices of hand-
sets and phone service alike. The number of Indonesian Internet users has 
also grown exponentially. As recently as 2008, just an estimated 13 million 
had regular Internet access. By late 2011, more than 55 million people did, 
according to industry surveys. The majority of young Indonesians in urban 
areas now enjoy Internet access, mostly through mobile phones, but also 
through the country’s 260,000 Internet cafes (warnets).
Through DETIKNAS the government has made Internet access a national 
priority, building what it calls a Palapa Ring of fibre-optic cables throughout 
the archipelago. It is closing in on its goal of wiring schools in a thousand 
remote rural villages with Internet service and has introduced e-budgeting 
and e-procurement systems for its own business operations. Perhaps most 
striking is the explosion of social media. In July 2012, there were 7.4 million 
registered Facebook users in greater Jakarta alone—the second most of 
any city in the world, after Bangkok’s 8.7 million. In all of Indonesia, there 
were 44 million Facebook accounts—almost as many as India’s 49 million. 
Indonesia has become a country where cabinet ministers send daily tweets 
to constituents. It has the third most Twitter subscribers in the world, and 
environmentalists use online databases and Google Earth mapping tools to 
publicize deforestation.
The human development benefits of this digital revolution are apparent, 
Indonesian analysts say, with mobile phones giving rural communities ac-
cess to public health information, banking services and agricultural market 
information. Civic engagement has benefited, with online public information 
services expanding since the 2010 passage of a far-ranging access to infor-
mation law. The economy is profiting too. A December 2011 study by Deloitte 
Access Economics calculated that the Internet economy already accounts for 
1.6% of Indonesia’s GDP, greater than the value of natural gas exports and 
comparable to the share in Brazil (1.5%) and the Russian Federation (1.6%), 
though still less than in China (2.6%) and India (3.2%). Deloitte projects an 
increase to at least 2.5% of GDP in five years, a substantial contributor to 
Indonesia’s International Monetary Fund–predicted annual GDP growth rate 
of 6%–7% through 2016.
Source: Karimuddin 2011; Deloitte 2011.
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South Asia in the African commodity sector 
show fewer enclave characteristics. And many 
governments in the South are being more 
pragmatic. While adopting sound macroe-
conomic policies, strengthening institutions 
and becoming more open, they are actively 
engaging in industrial policy and promoting 
entrepreneurship, education, skill formation 
and technology upgrading. While supporting 
industrial clusters and economic zones and 
expanding regional trade and investment, they 
are also creating finance and credit facilities 
for small and medium-size enterprises. Sound 
macroeconomic policy helps manage the risks 
of large foreign exchange inflows, while smart 
industrial policy strenghtens domestic links 
and enhances market multipliers.
Many countries have also benefited from 
technology transfer and FDI into sectors that 
contribute to human development. Indian 
firms, for example, are supplying affordable 
medicines, medical equipment, and informa-
tion and communications technology products 
and services to countries in Africa. Brazilian 
and South African companies are doing the 
same in their regional markets. Asian FDI in 
Africa has also expanded utility and telecom-
munications infrastructure.
Rising competitive pressures
Nevertheless, exports from larger countries can 
also have disadvantages. Large countries gener-
ate competitive pressures in smaller countries 
that can stifle economic diversification and 
industrialization. Examples span the electrical 
industry in Zambia, clothing in Kenya and 
Senegal and textiles in South Africa.45 Clothing 
exports from Africa would struggle to retain 
their trade share in major markets without the 
trade preferences and liberal rules of origin 
available through the US African Growth and 
Opportunity Act and the EU Everything But 
Arms initiative.46
Even larger countries are not immune from 
competitive pressures. Chinese exports affect 
Brazilian manufacturing through imports of 
cheaper manufactures and indirectly through 
competition in third markets.47 As an indirect 
response, in September 2011, Brazil formally 
submitted a proposal to the World Trade 
Organization to examine trade remedies for 
redressing currency fluctuations that lead to 
import surges.48 India has long sought re-
ciprocal market access for its automobiles in 
China.
To check the adverse consequence of rising 
exports on some of its partners, China is 
providing preferential loans and setting up 
training programmes to modernize the gar-
ment and textile sectors in African countries.49 
China has encouraged its mature industries 
such as leather to move closer to the supply 
chain in Africa and its modern firms in tele-
communications, pharmaceuticals, electronics 
and construction to enter joint ventures with 
African businesses.50
Moreover, there are instances where com-
petitive jolts have been followed by industrial 
revival. Ethiopia’s footwear industry, for 
example, was initially displaced by cheap East 
Asian imports, resulting in large-scale layoffs 
FIGURE 2.4
Export earnings per capita and human development are highly correlated
Log of exports per capita, 2008–2010
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and business closures, especially in the lower 
end of the market traditionally catered to by 
Ethiopian microenterprises. But the industry 
soon rebounded, even finding its way into the 
international market.51 One survey found that 
78 of the 96 Ethiopian firms that reported in 
2006 being hit hard by import competition had 
adjusted and become competitive within a few 
years. Nigeria’s plastics industry experienced a 
similar revival.52
Another concern is that the current patterns 
of demand from other countries in the South 
could accentuate the chronic specialization by 
many African economies in primary commod-
ities. The experience of the least developed 
countries, 33 of which are in Africa, seems to 
bear out this concern (see table 2.1). In 2011, 
agricultural raw materials and fuel, metals 
and ores made up more than 96% of least 
developed countries’ exports to China. Total 
exports of manufactures by least developed 
countries to China were less than $1 billion; 
manufactured imports from China exceeded 
$38 billion.
Over the longer term, however, South–South 
cooperation could undo this pattern by fos-
tering sequential investments outside natural 
resource industries in agriculture and manufac-
turing, as well as in services such as finance and 
telecommunications. In Africa, after years of 
neglect by governments and traditional donors, 
infrastructure has again become a priority, 
drawing on the experiences and support of 
the region’s new development partners. Some 
BOX 2.5
Decent work in a competitive world
The availability of decent, well paying jobs is economically empowering, 
especially for women. Yet today’s competitive global environment pressures 
workers to do more in less time for a lower wage. From both a human de-
velopment and a business perspective, competitiveness is best achieved by 
raising labour productivity. Competitiveness squeezed out through lower 
wages and longer working hours is not sustainable. Labour flexibility should 
not mean adhering to practices that compromise decent working condi-
tions. At least 150 countries have signed on to core International Labour 
Organization conventions on such matters as freedom of association and 
discrimination in the workplace. Labour laws on minimum wage, employ-
ment protection, working hours, social security and forms of contracts all 
aim to reduce inequality, insecurity and social conflict; they also provide 
incentives for businesses to pursue high-road management strategies. The 
view that more regulation is always bad for business has been discredited. 
One of the World Bank Group’s core Doing Business indicators on employ-
ing workers, which ranked countries on the leniency of measures related to 
hiring and firing workers, was discontinued because it falsely implied that 
fewer regulations were always preferable.
International retailers and sourcing agents have a responsibility 
to ensure that working conditions in the firms they source inputs from 
comply with international standards. Consider the recent case of one of 
the world’s most valuable companies, Apple, and its contractor, Foxconn. 
After a series of media exposés that documented terrible labour condi-
tions in Foxconn factories, Apple asked a monitoring group, the Fair Labor 
Association, to investigate. When the association published its findings 
of low pay, long hours and hazardous working conditions, Foxconn agreed 
to substantial reforms, eventually reducing the average workweek to 
49 hours as required by Chinese law. As China’s largest private sector 
employer, Foxconn had the power to directly improve and indirectly influ-
ence the working conditions of millions of people. Notable in this episode 
was that public opinion in a country of the North (US media and advocacy 
groups) pressured a corporation headquartered in that country to nudge 
a partner in a country of the South to uphold that country’s own labour 
standards. This outcome was possible only in an era when trade, busi-
ness practices and ethics and the universality of basic human rights are 
coalescing into a global norm.
Source: HDRO; Berg and Cazes 2007; Duhigg and Greenhouse 2012; Heller 2013.
FIGURE 2.5
Current foreign direct investment is positively associated with achievements in 
health and education in previous years
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countries have even resorted to unique credit 
arrangements to fund infrastructure, backed by 
supplies of commodities.53
Neither the complementary nor the com-
petitive perspective is sufficient to explain 
South–South interactions. Because a com-
petitive role today may easily turn into a 
complementary role tomorrow, these labels 
should not be applied rigidly. Moving from 
competition to cooperation seems to depend 
on policies for dealing with new challenges. 
More pessimistic pronouncements that 
there is no hope for industrialization in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have been overtaken by 
realities on the ground, which demonstrate an 
ability to advance despite or maybe because of 
competition. In this regard, African writers 
such as Dambisa Moyo are positive about the 
mutually beneficial role of new actors in the 
continent.54
The shift from traditional to emerging mar-
kets is also affecting countries in ways that are 
difficult to predict. Take the timber industry in 
Africa, which has reoriented itself from serving 
a predominantly European market towards 
China.55 In sheer volume China is the most 
important market, which is good for focusing 
business on it. The set of technical standards 
that China requires of exporters, however, is 
less onerous than those the European Union 
requires. Standards range from product spe-
cifications to accreditation from third-party 
certification schemes for forest sustainability 
and health regulations governing formalde-
hyde emissions. There is no evidence so far 
that the shift towards emerging markets is 
being accompanied by a ratcheting up of the 
technical standards they require, which would 
have required upgrading workers’ skills and 
capabilities.56
Innovation and entrepreneurship 
in the South
In North–South trade, the newly industri-
alizing economies developed capabilities for 
efficiently manufacturing complex products 
for developed country markets. But South–
South interactions have enabled companies 
in the South to adapt and innovate in ways 
that are more suited to developing countries. 
This includes new business models whereby 
companies develop products for a large num-
ber of low-income customers, often with low 
margins.
Countries of the South are also natural 
locations for experimentation in new tech-
nologies and products, such as those based 
on the global system for mobile (GSM) com-
munications standard. Under the 2005 GSM 
Emerging Markets Initiative, manufacturers 
slashed the price of mobile handsets by more 
than half and expanded the GSM subscriber 
BOX 2.6
Final assembly is about more than low wages
The iPhone and iPad, two popular technology products, are assembled in a 
firm in Shenzen, China, and sold worldwide at retail prices in the hundreds 
of dollars. The value of labour performed in China, at under $10, accounts 
for less than 2% of the cost of an iPad, while just 3.6% of the wholesale 
cost of an iPhone went to Chinese workers. The rest of the value is earned 
by suppliers of parts and components headquartered in Germany, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea and the United States. Korean firms LG and Samsung 
make the display and memory chips; Apple retains the product design, soft-
ware development and marketing functions in the United States; and the 
assembly firm is owned by a company from Taiwan Province of China.
The low share of value captured by workers in China could give the 
impression that assembly does not require much sophistication. This is 
misleading. While Asia is attractive because of cheaper wages, espe-
cially for semiskilled workers, a more important challenge for technology 
companies is managing global supply chains that involve procuring parts 
and components from hundreds of companies. This requires a rare com-
bination of industrial skills, flexibility, speed and diligence at both the in-
dividual and collective levels. For instance, an Apple executive told The 
New York Times that “the US has stopped producing people with the skills 
we need.”
Consider this incident from mid-2007, when Apple hastily redesigned 
the glass for the iPhone’s screen. The first delivery of a new load of strength-
ened, scratch-free glass arrived at a Foxconn plant in the middle of the night, 
and work started immediately. Within three months, Apple had sold a mil-
lion iPhones. It took 15 days to hire 8,700 industrial engineers to oversee 
the 200,000 assembly-line workers eventually involved in manufacturing 
iPhones. Apple’s internal estimate was that a similar feat in the United 
States would have taken nine months.
Source: HDRO; Kraemer, Linden and Dedrick 2011; Xing and Detert 2010; Duhigg and Bradsher 2012.
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Companies doing well in 
the South tend to be long-
term risk-takers and agile 
in adapting and innovating 
products for local buyers
base by 100 million connections a year. This 
in turn stimulated investment: in 2007, mo-
bile operators, including South Africa’s MTN 
and Kuwait’s Zain, announced a five-year 
plan to invest an additional $50  billion in 
Sub-Saharan Africa to improve mobile cover-
age and expand it to 90% of the population. 
Indeed, the spectacular increase in phone 
connectivity in Africa has been driven almost 
entirely by companies based in India, South 
Africa and the United Arab Emirates.57
Mobile phone manufacturers have also 
re-engineered products for the needs of lower 
income consumers. For example, in 2004, TI 
India, a research and development centre of 
Texas Instruments in Bengaluru, designed a 
single-chip prototype for use in high-quality, 
low-cost mobile phones. In 2005, Nokia, in co-
operation with TI, began to market the Indian-
made one-chip handsets in India and Africa, 
selling more than 20 million units. Single-chip 
designs have also emerged for other devices, 
including affordable digital display monitors 
and medical ultrasound machines. Intel has 
developed a handheld device for rural banking, 
and Wipro has marketed a low-power desktop 
computer for basic Internet connectivity. And 
in 2008, Tata announced the ultra-low-cost 
Nano car, exportable in kits for assembly by 
local technicians.
Technolog y diffusion through South–
South investment is also unleashing entre-
preneurial spirit, particularly in Africa. People 
are often self-organizing, creating buyer–seller 
relationships and becoming entrepreneurs to 
fill unmet needs in spontaneously sprouting 
markets. This is evident in the uses to which 
Africans are putting affordable Asian-built 
mobile phones: cellular banking, for example, 
is cheaper and easier than opening a bank 
account; farmers can obtain weather reports 
and check produce prices; and entrepreneurs 
can provide business services through mobile 
phone kiosks. The use of mobile phones in 
Niger has improved the performance of the 
grain market, and Ugandan farmers are using 
mobile phones to obtain higher prices for 
their bananas.
These and other transformations multiply 
the possibilities of what people can do with 
technology: participating in decisions that 
affect their lives; gaining quick and low-cost 
access to knowledge; producing cheaper, often 
generic medicines, better seeds and new crop 
varieties; and generating new employment and 
export opportunities. These possibilities cut 
across income classes, reaching down to the 
grassroots.
To respond to the changing needs of middle 
class consumers, companies doing well in the 
South tend to be long-term risk-takers and 
agile in adapting and innovating products for 
local buyers. Consumers in the South tend to 
be younger, are often first-time shoppers for 
modern appliances with distinct in-store habits 
and are usually more receptive to branding. 
Companies in emerging market economies 
have the advantage of different management 
approaches from those dominant in the North: 
majority shareholders have greater power and 
redeploy resources more speedily than those in 
companies in the North.58
Some of these developments are based on 
interactions among research and develop-
ment institutions, businesses and community 
stakeholders. In such ways, innovation and its 
benefits spread, spawning faster change. There 
is greater appreciation of a broader role for the 
state in stimulating research and development 
and in nurturing synergies stemming from 
cooperation among private, university and 
public research institutions. For example, many 
African countries have emulated the early suc-
cess of Mauritius in attracting East Asian FDI 
by creating export processing zones. Malaysia’s 
investment promotion policies have also been 
widely copied.
Increasingly, the most important engine of 
growth for countries of the South is likely to 
be their domestic market. The middle class is 
growing in size and income. By 2030, 80% of 
the world’s middle class is projected to live in 
the South. Countries in South Asia and East 
Asia and the Pacific will alone account for 60% 
of the middle class population and 45% of total 
consumption expenditure.59 Another estim-
ate is that by 2025, a majority of the 1 billion 
households earning more than $20,000 a year 
will live in the South.60
Since 2008, Chinese, Indian and Turkish 
apparel firms have shifted production from 
shrinking global markets to expanding do-
mestic markets. Greater reliance on domestic 
markets will boost internal dynamism and 
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Instead of having a centre 
of industrialized countries 
and periphery of less 
developed countries, there 
is now a more complex 
and dynamic environment
contribute to more- inclusive growth. Given 
current trends, African consumers will continue 
to benefit from increased imports of affordable 
products. Flourishing local markets are likely 
to breed local entrepreneurs and attract more 
investment in extractive industries as well as in 
infrastructure, telecommunications, finance, 
tourism and manufacturing—particularly light 
manufacturing industries in which African 
countries have latent comparative advantage. In 
this scenario, which has already begun to play 
out in the past decade and in other regions, 
host economies undergo structural change, and 
indigenous industry responds to competitive 
pressure from imports and investment inflows 
by upgrading production. But the process is 
proving difficult in countries where technolo-
gical capabilities and infrastructure are less well 
developed.
Such expansion of domestic markets will be 
hampered by substantial pockets of deprivation 
and lagging regions within large developing 
countries. Although South Asia, for example, 
reduced the proportion of the population liv-
ing on less than $1.25 a day (in 2005 purchas-
ing power parity terms) from 61% in 1981 to 
36% in 2008, more than half a billion people 
there remained extremely poor.61
These disparities undermine the sustainab-
ility of progress because they create social and 
political tensions. In India, the Maoist rebels 
are active in a large swathe of the country’s 
hinterlands; in neighbouring Nepal, Maoists 
evolved from an ill-equipped militia to become 
the country’s largest political party within 12 
years.
New forms of cooperation
Many developing countries are emerging as 
growth poles and drivers of connectivity and 
new relationships, opening up opportunities 
for less developed countries of the South to 
catch up and leading to a more balanced world. 
Instead of having a centre of industrialized 
countries and periphery of less developed 
countries, there is now a more complex and 
dynamic environment. Countries of the South 
are reshaping global rules and practices in 
trade, finance and intellectual property and es-
tablishing new arrangements, institutions and 
partnerships.
Development assistance
The rise of the South is influencing develop-
ment cooperation bilaterally, regionally and 
globally. Bilaterally, countries are innovating 
through partnerships that bundle investment, 
trade, technology, concessional finance and 
technical assistance. Regionally, trade and 
monetary arrangements are proliferating in 
all developing regions, and there are pioneer-
ing efforts to deliver regional public goods. 
Globally, developing countries are participat-
ing actively in multilateral forums—the G20, 
the Bretton Woods institutions and others—
and giving impetus to reforms in global rules 
and practices.
A rising number of developing countries 
provide aid bilaterally and through regional 
development funds. Often, this involves en-
twining conventional development assistance 
with trade, loans, technology sharing and 
direct investments that promote economic 
growth with some degree of self-reliance. 
Countries of the South provide grant aid on 
a smaller scale than traditional donors do 
but also give other forms of assistance, often 
without explicit conditions on economic 
policy or approaches to governance.62 In pro-
ject-based lending, they may not always have 
been very transparent, but they do give greater 
priority to the needs identified by receiving 
countries, ensuring a high degree of national 
ownership (table 2.2).
Brazil, China and India are important 
providers of development assistance, which 
is substantial for countries in Sub-Saharan 
TABLE 2.2
Different models of development partnerships
Paris Declaration principle Traditional donors New development partners
Ownership
National development strategies 
outline priorities for donors
National leadership articulates 
need for specific projects
Harmonization
Shared arrangements to minimize 
burden on recipients
Fewer bureaucratic procedures to 
minimize burden on recipients
Managing for results
Recipient-led performance 
assessment practices
Focus on delivering aid quickly 
and at low cost
Mutual accountability
Greater accountability through 
targets and indicators
Mutual respect of sovereignty; 
policy conditionality eschewed
Source: Adapted from Park (2011).
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There is much scope 
to strengthen regional 
integration through 
practical measures such 
as streamlining transit and 
transport procedures
Africa.63 Brazil has transplanted its successful 
school grant programme and its programme 
for fighting illiteracy to its African partners. 
In 2011, it had 53 bilateral health agreements 
with 22 African countries.64 China has comple-
mented its investment flows and trade arrange-
ments with finance and technical assistance 
for building hard infrastructure. In July 2012, 
China pledged to double concessional loans 
to $20 billion over the next three years.65 The 
Export-Import Bank of India has extended 
$2.9 billion in lines of credit to Sub-Saharan 
African countries and has pledged to provide 
an additional $5  billion over the next five 
years.66 Between 2001 and 2008, countries and 
institutions from the South met 47% of offi-
cial infrastructure financing for Sub-Saharan 
Africa.67
The new development partners from the 
South follow their own model of bilateral co-
operation (box 2.7). The scale of their financial 
assistance, combined with their approach to 
conditionality, can enhance policy autonomy 
in less developed countries.68 Less developed 
countries can now look to more emerging part-
ners for development support.69 This expands 
their choices, as foreign powers compete for 
influence, access to local consumers and favour-
able investment terms.
The regional development assistance 
architecture is also evolving through the 
regional development banks: the African 
Development Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank. In 2009, playing a countercyclical role, 
the regional development banks together 
provided 18.4% ($3.4  billion) of the aid 
provided by all multilateral institutions, a 
42% increase over 2005. Development assist-
ance from the Arab States has also made im-
portant contributions, reaching $6 billion in 
2008.70 Some of the largest financiers of in-
frastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa between 
2001 and 2008 were regional banks and 
funds based in Arab States.71 Development 
assistance from regional development banks 
may become more important to low-in-
come countries in the coming years (as may 
South–South development assistance) if 
policymakers in wealthy countries curtail aid 
commitments because of domestic economic 
and political challenges.72
Development partners in the South have not 
sought to engage with or overturn the rules of 
multilateral development assistance. But they 
have indirectly introduced competitive pres-
sures for traditional donors and encouraged 
them to pay greater attention to the needs and 
concerns of developing countries. In contrast 
to many traditional donors’ focus on social sec-
tors, new partners have in recent years invested 
heavily in new infrastructure across low-in-
come countries—resulting in, for instance, a 
35% improvement in electricity supply, a 10% 
increase in rail capacity and reduced price of 
telecommunications services.73
Trade and financial agreements
Africa, Asia and Latin America have seen an 
expansion of trade agreements—bilateral, 
subregional and regional. In South Asia, these 
regional agreements have trumped political 
differences. In East Africa, greater regional 
integration has helped shield economies from 
global shocks.74 There is scope to strengthen 
regional integration through practical meas-
ures such as streamlining transit, transport 
and customs procedures and harmonizing 
national regulatory schemes. There is also 
scope to lower tariffs on South–South trade in 
BOX 2.7
Brazil, China and India at work in Zambia
The model of bilateral cooperation being practiced by new development partners from the 
South has been changing rapidly. Until recently, the contribution of the new partners to 
Zambia’s overall development finance was small. Of the total $3 billion in grants and loans 
that Zambia received between 2006 and 2009, disbursements by Brazil, China and India 
made up less than 3%.
In November 2009, China and Zambia announced that China would extend a $1 billion 
concessional loan, in tranches, to Zambia for the development of small and medium-size 
enterprises. This is the equivalent of 40% of Zambia’s total public external debt stock. In 
2010, the Export-Import Bank of China extended a $57.8 million loan to Zambia to procure 
nine mobile hospitals. Also in 2010, India announced a line of credit of $75 million, fol-
lowed by another line of credit of $50 million, to finance a hydroelectric power project. 
Brazil has invested heavily in mining equipment at the Konkola Copper Mines in the North-
western province of Zambia (managed by an Indian company). The large Brazilian mining 
company, Vale, is in a joint venture with the South African company Rainbow in copper 
prospecting and mining in Zambia, with an initial investment of about $400 million. Brazil 
and Zambia have also signed technical cooperation agreements covering livestock and 
health.
Source: HDRO; Kragelund 2013.
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final products, which are higher than those on 
North–South trade.75
In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, several countries of the South developed 
new monetary arrangements, which are trans-
forming the financial architecture and creat-
ing space for countries to craft homegrown 
policies. The new lending arrangements 
emphasize pragmatism over ideology and 
conditionality.
In addition, the global financial architec-
ture is being shaped by the rising South’s vast 
financial reserves. A number of countries, 
not just Brazil, China and India, but also 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Thailand and others have amassed 
pools of foreign exchange reserves as self-in-
surance against future financial downturns 
and crises (figure 2.6). Between 2000 and the 
third quarter of 2011, global foreign exchange 
reserves rose from $1.9 trillion to $10.1 tril-
lion, with a dominant share of the increase 
accumulated by emerging and developing 
countries, whose reserves totalled $6.8  tril-
lion.76 Some of these countries used their 
reserves to stimulate growth in the aftermath 
of the 2008 global financial crisis. In a reversal 
of roles, these funds have been sought by the 
International Monetary Fund for assistance 
with the financial crisis in Europe.
Developing countries with large reserve 
holdings generally transfer part of these to 
sovereign wealth funds. According to data by 
the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, these 
funds had an estimated $4.3  trillion in assets 
at the end of 2010, with $3.5  trillion held 
by developing and emerging economies and 
$800 billion in East Asia alone.77 As of March 
2011, developing and emerging economies 
held 41 sovereign wealth funds, 10 with assets 
of $100–$627 billion.
Large foreign exchange reserves and sover-
eign wealth funds are not the most efficient 
insurance against financial shocks. This unpre-
cedented accumulation of foreign exchange 
has opportunity costs both for the countries 
holding the reserves and for other developing 
countries.78 The resources could be deployed 
in more productive ways to support the pro-
vision of public goods, to provide capital to 
projects that enhance productive capacities 
and economic and human development and 
FIGURE 2.6
Emerging market economies have amassed large foreign exchange reserves 
since 1995
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With climate-related 
natural disasters 
and rising sea levels 
threatening to undermine 
human development 
progress, countries 
recognize that they 
have little choice but 
to formulate policies 
on adapting to climate 
change now and 
mitigating climate 
change for the future
to promote regional and subregional financial 
stability by increasing the resource pools of 
regional institutions.
Overall, the rise of the South is infusing 
new patterns of resource accumulation into 
the global financial system and building a 
denser, multilayered and more heterogeneous 
financial architecture for the South. These 
arrangements sometimes substitute for the 
Bretton Woods institutions, but in most cases, 
the emerging institutions and arrangements 
complement the global financial architecture. 
The changing financial landscape in the South 
has the potential to promote financial stabil-
ity and resilience, support the development 
of long-run productive capacities, advance 
aims consistent with human development 
and expand national policy space. Moreover, 
emerging economies are having a transform-
ative effect by pressing the Bretton Woods 
institutions to respond to concerns about 
representation, governance principles and the 
use of conditionalities.
The G20 has expanded its participation in 
such key global financial governance institu-
tions as the Financial Stability Board, tasked 
with ensuring greater accountability in institu-
tions that set international financial standards. 
Likewise, all G20 countries, among others, are 
now represented in the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions. 
The South is also gaining influence in the 
International Monetary Fund, where China has 
filled a newly created deputy managing director 
post and stands to become the third largest 
shareholder.79 At the World Bank, the voting 
power of developing and transition economies 
rose 3.13 percentage points in 2010, reaching 
47.19%.80
Migration policy
Regional organizations such as the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union 
and the Common Market of the South have 
added migration to their agendas. Some of 
this activity is through regional consultations, 
which are informal, nonbinding processes ded-
icated to finding common ground among coun-
tries. Many of these processes are interregional 
and straddle origin and destination regions 
in ways intended to enable capacity building, 
technical standardization and agreements on 
issues such as readmissions. They have lowered 
barriers to communication and provided a 
venue for countries to come together, under-
stand each other’s perspectives and identify 
common solutions.
These dialogues can be credited with pav-
ing the way for subsequent successful efforts 
on migration, most ambitiously the Berne 
Initiative 2001–2005, the 2006 High Level 
Dialogue on Migration and Development 
hosted by the UN General Assembly and the 
subsequent creation of the Global Forum on 
Migration and Development.81 As the 2009 
Human Development Report recommended, 
such efforts could improve outcomes for 
migrants and destination communities by lib-
eralizing and simplifying channels that allow 
people to seek work abroad, ensuring basic 
rights for migrants, reducing transaction costs 
associated with migration, enabling benefits 
from internal mobility and making mobility 
an integral part of national development 
strategies.82
Environmental protection
The UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development in Rio de Janeiro demonstrated 
the promise of regional arrangements, as gov-
ernments from the South showed how they 
are coming together to manage the resources 
they share. One initiative, negotiated by gov-
ernments from the Asia–Pacific region, will 
protect the Coral Triangle, the world’s richest 
coral reef that stretches from Malaysia and 
Indonesia to the Solomon Islands and provides 
food and livelihoods to more than 100 million 
people. In the Congo River Basin, countries 
are working together against the illegal timber 
trade to conserve the world’s second largest 
rainforest.83 At Rio+20, a group of regional 
development banks announced a $175 billion 
initiative to promote public transportation 
and bicycle lanes in some of the world’s largest 
cities.84
The rise of the South is also reflected in 
an array of bilateral arrangements to tackle 
climate change. With climate-related natural 
disasters and rising sea levels threatening to 
undermine human development progress, 
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Developing countries 
trade more among 
themselves than with 
the North, and this trend 
can go much further
countries recognize that they have little choice 
but to formulate policies on adapting to climate 
change now and mitigating climate change for 
the future. Countries are, for example, agreeing 
to cooperate on technology development and 
to establish region-specific carbon markets. A 
partnership between China and the United 
Kingdom will test advanced coal combustion 
technologies, while India and the United States 
have forged a partnership to develop nuclear 
energy in India.85
Countries in the South are also developing 
and sharing new climate-friendly technologies. 
China, the fourth largest producer of wind 
energy in 2008, is the world’s largest producer 
of solar panels and wind turbines.86 In 2011, 
India’s National Solar Mission helped spur a 
62% increase in investment in solar energy to 
$12  billion, the fastest investment expansion 
of any large renewables market. Brazil made an 
8% increase in investment in renewable energy 
technology to $7 billion.87
Regional, bilateral and national initiatives 
in the South to mitigate climate change and 
protect environmental resources are positive 
steps. But climate change and the environment 
are inherently global issues that require global 
resolution through multilateral agreements. 
The cooperation and participation of rising 
economies of the South in such agreements are 
vital to their success. Regional collaboration 
and agreement may be a step in this direction, 
indicating genuine interest in tackling the cli-
mate challenge.
Sustaining progress in 
uncertain times
The rise of the South was facilitated by a his-
toric global expansion of trade and investment. 
More than 100 developing countries recorded 
growth in income per capita of more than 3% 
in 2007. Recently, the economic slowdown 
in developed countries has nudged the South 
to look towards regional demand.88 Already, 
developing countries trade more among them-
selves than with the North, and this trend can 
go much further. South–South trade blocs 
remain riddled with nontariff barriers that 
constrict the scale of trade possibilities. Large 
foreign exchange reserves remain idle when 
there are higher returns and more- secure 
opportunities for South–South investment. 
There is potential to expand development 
partnerships and regional and interregional 
cooperation.
The rise of the South has underpinned rapid 
economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
enhanced opportunities there for human de-
velopment progress. Many of the fastest grow-
ing economies in this century rank low on 
human development. While some have made 
progress on nonincome indicators, others have 
not.
Governments should seize the growth mo-
mentum and embrace policies that convert 
rising incomes into human development. 
Policies that build human capabilities and do-
mestic productive capacity will enable coun-
tries to avoid “the commodities trap” and 
diversify economic activity. South–South co-
operation can help bring out the learning and 
diffusion potential in trading, investing and 
partnering in all industries, even commodit-
ies. South–South partnerships can facilitate 
industrial diversification through FDI and 
joint ventures, technology sharing through 
peer learning, and provision of affordable 
products and innovative uses that meet the 
needs of the emerging entrepreneurial class. 
This cooperation is already happening and 
can be scaled up substantially in the years 
ahead.
All said, the rise of the South has been 
dramatic but is still in its early stages. The 
breadth of social, economic, technological 
and entrepreneurial connectedness among 
developing countries today is unprecedented. 
The daily headlines may carry dismal mes-
sages about world events. But interspersed 
among these discouraging notes are frequent 
snippets reporting on entrepreneurial ven-
tures and common-sense applications of new 
technologies by enterprising people in unex-
pected places.
Multiply each story by the number of people 
in developing countries and the cumulative 
potential for a rising South across all regions is 
astounding. Chapter 3 explores this potential 
by identifying some of the core drivers that 
have enabled leading countries of the South 
to make rapid progress, offering inspiration to 
other countries that might follow.
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Global prospects are uncertain, and the 
economic downturn in the North is ad-
versely affecting the South. With the right 
reforms, however, including a shift in policy 
orientation,89 the promise of sustained human 
progress is stronger as a result of the shift 
within the world economy brought about by 
the rise of the South.
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“We cannot expect that 
all nations will adopt like 
systems, for conformity is 
the jailer of freedom and 
the enemy of growth.”
John F. Kennedy
“Wisdom lies neither in fixity 
nor in change, but in the 
dialectic between the two.”
Octavio Paz
3.
Drivers of development transformation
How have so many countries in the South transformed their human development prospects? Given their social and political 
diversity and their contrasting natural resource endowments, their trajectories have often diverged. Yet some underlying 
themes have been consistent. This chapter looks at the experience of some of the more successful countries and at three 
of their common drivers: their proactive developmental states, their capacity to tap into global markets and their focus on 
social policy innovation.
Many countries have made substantial pro-
gress over the past two decades: the rise 
of the South has been fairly broad-based. 
Nevertheless, several high achievers have not 
only boosted national income, but also had 
better than average performance on social 
indicators in areas such as health and educa-
tion. One way to identify high achievers is to 
look at countries with positive income growth 
and good performance on measures of health 
and education relative to other countries at 
comparable levels of development. These 
high achievers include some of the largest 
 countries—Brazil, China and India—as well 
as smaller countries, such as Bangladesh, 
Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, the Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda and Viet Nam 
(figure 3.1).
This chapter analyses the performance of 
a set of countries that, since 1990, have sub-
stantially improved both income growth and 
the nonincome dimensions of human devel-
opment, namely health and education. Some 
countries were more successful in one aspect 
than the other: Brazil and Turkey did better 
on the nonincome dimensions of the Human 
Development Index (HDI), whereas China’s 
performance over 1990–2010 was dominated 
by growth in income (in part because when 
reforms began in the late 1970s, China’s 
achievements in health and education were 
already high).1 Furthermore, as mentioned in 
chapter 1, the group of countries whose im-
provements on the HDI stood out relative to 
the performance of peers between 1990 and 
2012 includes least developed countries, such 
as Lao PDR, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda 
and Uganda.
Another way of identifying high achiev-
ers in human development is to look for 
countries that have been more successful 
in closing the “human development gap,” 
as measured by the reduction in their HDI 
shortfall (the distance from the maximum 
HDI score).2 Table 3.1 lists 26 countries that 
were among either the top 15  developing 
countries that registered the largest reduction 
in HDI shortfall over 1990–20123 or the top 
15 that registered the highest rates of annual 
growth in income per capita during the same 
period.
The first set of countries successfully sup-
plemented fast economic growth with social 
policies that benefit society more broadly, es-
pecially the poor. China, for instance, reduced 
its HDI shortfall more than all other countries 
FIGURE 3.1
Some countries have performed well on both the nonincome and the income 
dimensions of the HDI
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Source: HDRO calculations.
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except Iran and the Republic of Korea. The 
Republic of Korea, despite lower economic 
growth than China, had the biggest gains in 
HDI value. Viet Nam also fared well, ranking 
third in income growth and among the top 
20 in HDI improvement. Sri Lanka, too, has 
had high income growth as well as a notable 
reduction in HDI shortfall despite years of 
internal conflict.4
India’s economic performance has also been 
impressive, averaging nearly 5% income growth 
a year over 1990–2012. Nevertheless, India’s 
per capita income is still low, around $3,400 in 
2012; to improve living standards, it will need 
further growth, since it is difficult to achieve 
much poverty reduction through redistribu-
tion alone at low income. India’s performance 
in accelerating human development, however, 
is less impressive than its growth performance. 
Indeed, Bangladesh, with much slower eco-
nomic growth and half India’s per capita in-
come, does nearly as well—and better on some 
indicators.
Among the top 15 countries in reducing 
HDI shortfall are Algeria, Brazil and Mexico, 
even though their growth in income per cap-
ita averaged only 1%–2% a year over 1990–
2012. Their experience points to the second 
broad strategy that has paid human develop-
ment dividends: giving primacy to state in-
vestment in people’s capabilities—especially 
their health, education and nutrition—and 
making their societies more resilient to eco-
nomic, environmental and other threats and 
shocks.
There is a lesson here: countries cannot 
rely on growth alone. As the 1993 and 1996 
Human Development Reports argued, the link 
between growth and human development is 
not automatic.5 It needs to be forged through 
pro-poor policies by concurrently investing in 
health and education, expanding decent jobs, 
preventing the depletion and overexploit-
ation of natural resources, ensuring gender 
balance and equitable income distribution 
and avoiding unnecessary displacement of 
communities.
This is not to say that economic growth does 
not matter. Poor countries with many poor 
people need higher incomes. At the national 
level, faster growth can enable countries to re-
duce debts and deficits and generate additional 
public revenues to step up investment in basic 
goods and services, especially in health and 
education. And at the household level, income 
growth helps meet basic needs, improve living 
standards and enhance quality of life.
Nevertheless, higher income does not neces-
sarily produce a corresponding improvement in 
TABLE 3.1
Selected developing countries that registered large reductions in HDI shortfall or 
high rates of growth in gross national income per capita, 1990–2012
Country
HDI 
(value)
Reduction in 
HDI shortfalla
Average annual growth 
in gross national 
income per capita
(%) Rank (%) Rank
1990 2012 1990–2012 1990–2012
Korea, Rep. 0.749 0.909 63.6 1 4.2 8
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.540 0.742 43.9 2 2.5 32
China 0.495 0.699 40.5 3 9.4 1
Chile 0.702 0.819 39.4 4 3.8 13
Saudi Arabia 0.653 0.782 37.3 5 0.4 77
Argentina 0.701 0.811 36.9 6 3.5 18
Malaysia 0.635 0.769 36.6 7 3.6 17
Tunisia 0.553 0.712 35.6 8 2.9 29
Turkey 0.569 0.722 35.5 9 2.5 33
Qatar 0.743 0.834 35.3 10 3.2 22
Mexico 0.654 0.775 35.0 11 1.3 58
Algeria 0.562 0.713 34.4 12 1.0 69
Panama 0.666 0.780 34.3 13 3.9 11
Brazil 0.590 0.730 34.1 14 1.7 50
Brunei Darussalam 0.782 0.855 33.4 15 –0.4 87
Viet Nam 0.439 0.617 31.8 21 5.9 3
Mauritius 0.626 0.737 29.8 25 3.6 14
Dominican Republic 0.584 0.702 28.3 28 3.9 12
Myanmar 0.305 0.498 27.8 30 7.9 2
Sri Lanka 0.608 0.715 27.3 31 4.4 7
Guyana 0.502 0.636 26.7 36 5.3 4
Lao PDR 0.379 0.543 26.5 39 4.4 6
India 0.410 0.554 24.5 45 4.7 5
Bangladesh 0.361 0.515 24.1 47 3.9 10
Trinidad and Tobago 0.685 0.760 23.9 49 3.6 15
Mozambique 0.202 0.327 15.6 72 4.1 9
a. Reduction in the distance from the maximum HDI score.
Note: Based on a balanced panel of 96 developing countries.
Source: HDRO calculations.
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This chapter identifies 
three drivers of 
transformation: a 
proactive developmental 
state, tapping of global 
markets and determined 
social policy innovation
human well-being. Populations in large cities, 
for example, typically report high income per 
capita, but they also have high levels of crime, 
pollution and traffic congestion. In rural areas, 
farming households may see income grow while 
lacking a village school or health centre. Initial 
conditions have considerable influence on the 
pace of countries’ current and future develop-
ment. Nonetheless, they are not the only things 
that matter (box 3.1).
In fact, the links between economic growth 
and human development have snapped several 
times. The 1996 Human Development Report 
identified six unwelcome types of growth: job-
less growth, which does not increase employ-
ment opportunities; ruthless growth, which 
is accompanied by rising inequality; voiceless 
growth, which denies the participation of the 
most vulnerable communities; rootless growth, 
which uses inappropriate models transplanted 
from elsewhere; and futureless growth, which 
is based on unbridled exploitation of environ-
mental resources.6
What accounts for the superior generation 
of growth and its conversion into human 
development? What are the policy lessons 
from the diverse human development exper-
iences of these countries? Indeed, what are 
the drivers of transformation? This chapter 
identifies three:
•	 A proactive developmental state.
•	 Tapping of global markets.
•	 Determined social policy innovation.
These drivers are not derived from abstract 
conceptions of how development should work; 
rather, they are demonstrated by the trans-
formational development experiences of many 
countries in the South. Indeed, they challenge 
preconceived and prescriptive approaches: on 
the one hand, they set aside a number of col-
lectivist, centrally managed precepts; on the 
other hand, they diverge from the unfettered 
liberalization espoused by the Washington 
Consensus.
These drivers suggest an evolution towards a 
new approach, in which the state is a necessary 
catalyst that pragmatically adjusts its policies 
and actions in line with new realities and the 
challenges of global markets. This new per-
spective recognizes that development does not 
happen automatically and that transformation 
cannot be left to markets alone. Instead, the 
BOX 3.1
History and initial conditions matter, but they are not destiny
“Initial conditions” have profound impacts, as certain characteristics are 
not only difficult to change, but also often perpetuated by institutions and 
policies. In societies that began with high inequality, elites can establish a 
legal framework that locks in their influence, which in turn enables them to 
maintain high inequality to their benefit. Take, for example, the Americas, 
where three distinct types of colonies took shape in the 1700s, depending 
on the initial conditions of soil, climate and native inhabitancy.
In the Caribbean, soil and climate made colonies suited for the pro-
duction of large-scale lucrative commodities. The distribution of wealth 
and human capital was extremely unequal, advantaging the elite who 
could assemble large companies of slaves. In Spanish America, abun-
dant in minerals and natives, authorities distributed land resources to 
the Spanish colonists. Elites served the Spanish crown and maintained 
their status after independence. Income inequality persisted across ra-
cial lines, with ownership of large tracts of land being a requirement for 
citizenship. In Peru today, as in many other countries, severe horizontal in-
equalities persist between indigenous populations and those of European 
descent. In the northern parts of the Americas the native population was 
not abundant, and soil and climate did not lend themselves to economies 
of scale. Thus, there was reliance on labourers of European descent with 
high human capital and more equal distribution of wealth. Because of 
abundant land and low capital requirements, most adult men operated as 
independent proprietors.
Haiti today is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. On the 
eve of its revolution in 1790, it was probably the richest country in the 
New World. Similarly, after the Seven Years War between the British and 
the French (1756–1763), the British debated whether to take Canada or 
Guadeloupe as reparation. Several centuries later the former proved to be 
more successful than other economies in the hemisphere.
Yet history and initial conditions are not insurmountable barriers. About 
half the progress in development, measured by the HDI, over the past 30 
years is unexplained by the initial HDI value in 1980. Countries that start at 
a similar level—such as India and Pakistan, Chile and Venezuela, Malaysia 
and the Philippines, or Liberia and Senegal—have ended up with differ-
ent outcomes. As the 2010 Human Development Report argued, if countries 
with similar starting points go on divergent development paths, but average 
global achievements have not changed, we can infer that it is national forc-
es policies, institutions, social context and idiosyncratic shocks that drive 
national development outcomes. No country remains a prisoner of history 
for long if it wants to break out.
Source: Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; Hoff 2003; Thorp and Paredes 2011; UNDP 2010a.
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A common feature 
of countries that 
have brought about 
transformational 
development is a strong, 
proactive state 
—also referred to as a 
“developmental state”
state needs to mobilize society through policies 
and institutions that advance economic and 
social development.
However, this is not a universal prescription. 
The way these three elements are translated 
into policies is context-specific, depending on 
country characteristics, government capacities 
and relationships with the rest of the world.
Driver 1: a proactive 
developmental state
Development is about changing a society to en-
hance people’s well-being across generations—
enlarging their choices in health, education 
and income and expanding their freedoms and 
opportunities for meaningful participation in 
society.
A common feature of countries that have 
brought about such transformations is a 
strong, proactive state—also referred to as 
a “developmental state”. The term refers to a 
state with an activist government and often an 
apolitical elite that sees rapid economic devel-
opment as their primary aim. Some countries 
go further and add an additional feature: a 
bureaucracy with the power and authority to 
plan and implement policies. High growth 
rates and improved living standards in turn 
provide the state apparatus and the ruling 
elites their legitimacy.7
In some notable cases, development progress 
is guided by a long-term vision, shared norms 
and values, and rules and institutions that build 
trust and cohesion. Further, viewing develop-
ment as transformation demands consideration 
of these intangible factors as well as an under-
standing of how they affect the organization 
of society and interact with individual policies 
and reforms.
Country ownership of development 
strategy, strong bureaucratic capacities and 
appropriate policies are essential elements 
that together shape the transformation pro-
cess.8 Policies must be aimed at facilitating 
transformation by identifying barriers to and 
potential catalysts of changes. In this process, 
institutions, societies and individuals need 
to set their own objectives and identify the 
strategies and policies that can achieve them. 
Although not pursued everywhere, broad 
participation of people, in the sense that they 
are being listened to, that their views are taken 
into account in decisionmaking and that they 
are actively involved in setting the agenda, is 
conducive to sustainable long-term develop-
ment—as is consistent political leadership 
backed by strong technocratic teams that can 
ensure institutional memory and continuity 
of policy (box 3.2).9
There is no simple recipe for connecting 
human development and economic growth 
or for accelerating growth.10 One study using 
cross-country data for 1950–2005 found 
that the vast majority of takeoffs in growth 
are not generated by substantial economic 
reforms and that most substantial economic 
reforms do not yield takeoffs in growth.11 
Successful countries have grown fast by 
gradually removing binding constraints to 
progress, not by implementing a long list of 
policies and reforms. The state has a critical 
role in that. Countries that have succeeded 
in igniting sustained growth, have faced 
different sets of challenges and adopted 
varying policies on market regulation, export 
promotion, industrial development and tech-
nological adaptation and progress.12 When a 
country is already growing fast, the challenge 
is to remove or anticipate future constraints 
as they become actually or potentially bind-
ing. Positive terms of trade shocks, like the 
recent commodity boom as a result of the 
rise of the South, can help begin growth 
acceleration but not sustain it. However, 
focused economic and institutional reforms 
appear to have statistically and quantitatively 
significant impacts on how sustained growth 
accelerations are.13
In many high-performing developing 
countries, the state operates differently from 
the conventional welfare state, which aims to 
correct market failures and build social safety 
nets while promoting market-led growth. 
Instead, developmental states have been pro-
active: initiating and monitoring transform-
ations in people’s lives.14 Rather than merely 
being market-friendly, these states have been 
development-friendly. Those with strong, 
innovative social programmes are often also 
people-friendly —a necessary progression in 
the move from a focus on growth to human 
development.
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One characteristic of 
developmental states is 
their pursuit of industrial 
policies to redress 
coordination problems 
and externalities by 
“managing” comparative 
advantage
Another characteristic of developmental 
states is their pursuit of industrial policies to 
redress coordination problems and external-
ities by “managing” comparative advantage.15 
For example, the state may foster industries 
believed to have a latent comparative advantage 
or seek to elevate those that are stuck in static 
comparative advantage. As a result, several 
industries that benefited from tariff protection 
subsequently succeeded in world markets.16 
Nonetheless, it can be difficult to attribute 
the success or failure of a particular industry 
to specific trade policies because government 
interventions are guided by multiple motives, 
from revenue generation to protection of spe-
cial interests.
Evidence across industries from studies of the 
benefits of industry protection is ambiguous. 
However, there is a distinction between the 
general desirability of “soft” industrial policies, 
such as improving infrastructure and technolo-
gical adoption, and “hard” industrial policies, 
such as direct taxes and subsidy interventions 
favouring specific industries, whose efficacy 
depends on country circumstances. There is no 
global prescription, though: what worked in 
East Asia may not work in Latin America.
•	 Japan. Japan has long acted as a develop-
mental state. By the 1870s, it had a group 
of “well-educated, patriotic businessmen 
and merchants and government that were 
focused on economic modernization”.17 
Many subsequent reforms created the infra-
structure of a modern country, including a 
unified currency, railroads, public education 
and banking laws. The government built 
and operated state-owned plants in indus-
tries ranging from cotton to shipbuilding. 
It also encouraged domestic production by 
raising import tariffs on many industrial 
products. Since the end of the Second World 
War, Japan has undergone a fundamental 
transformation from aid recipient to donor 
(box 3.3).
•	 Republic of Korea. Between 1960 and 1980, 
the Republic of Korea had significant 
BOX 3.2
What is a developmental state? Need it be authoritarian?
The recent literature on developmental states has grown out of the expe-
riences of the East Asian “miracle” economies: Japan before the Second 
World War and Hong Kong, China (SAR), the Republic of Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan Province of China in the second half of the 20th century. 
Recently, China and Viet Nam (as well as Cambodia and Lao PDR) can be 
seen as developmental states. Common traits include promoting economic 
development by explicitly favouring certain sectors; commanding competent 
bureaucracies; placing robust, competent public institutions at the centre of 
development strategies; clearly articulating social and economic goals; and 
deriving political legitimacy from their record in development.
That some East Asian developmental states were not democracies has 
prompted many to think that the developmental state model is also auto-
cratic. But evidence of the relationship between authoritarianism and de-
velopment is mixed. Democratic countries such as Japan and the United 
States have functioned as developmental states. After the Second World 
War France initiated planning by the Planning Commission, with sectoral 
industrial policy led by elite bureaucrats and the aggressive use of state-
owned enterprises. Since the 1950s, the Scandinavian countries have also 
acted as a type of developmental state, where political legitimacy is derived 
from the welfare state and full employment rather than from rapid growth. 
The Swedish state developed strategic sectors through public- private part-
nerships (iron and steel, railways, telegraphs and telephone, and hydroelec-
tric power). It also provided targeted protection to support the emergence 
of heavy industries, promoting research and development. Its welfare policy 
was closely integrated with strategies to promote structural change towards 
high-productivity sectors.
The United States has a long history of being a developmental state, go-
ing back to the early days of the republic. Alexander Hamilton, the first US 
treasury secretary, is widely considered the father and inventor of the infant 
industry argument. Between 1830 and 1945, the United States had some of 
the highest trade barriers in the world. In the same period it invested heavily in 
infrastructure (Pacific railways, Midwestern canals and agricultural infrastruc-
ture), higher education, and research and development. Even after the Second 
World War, when the United States had attained industrial supremacy, and 
despite the rise of market fundamentalism, the developmental state survived.
Block (2008) argues that the state has focused on translating cutting- edge 
technological research into commercial use through cooperation among a net-
work of people with high levels of technological expertise situated in state 
agencies, industries, universities and research institutions. Developmentalism 
has lived in the shadows of US policy because acknowledging the state’s cen-
tral role in promoting technological change is inconsistent with the claim that 
the private sector should be left alone to respond to market signals autono-
mously. Yet, although limited in scope due to a lack of legitimacy, unstable 
funding and other limitations caused by its “hidden” nature, the US develop-
mental state has been quite successful. In many sectors, the United States has 
developed international competitiveness through public funding for research 
and development and through public procurement for defence (computers, air-
craft, Internet) and health (drugs, genetic engineering).
Source: Evans 2010; Chang 2010; Edigheji 2010; Block 2008.
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More important than 
getting prices right, a 
developmental state 
must get policy priorities 
right. They should 
be people-centred, 
promoting opportunities 
while protecting against 
downside risks
success. After 1961, the government 
achieved a position of dominance over its 
business class through a series of reforms, 
including measures that increased the insti-
tutional coherence of the state, such as the 
creation of the Economic Planning Board, 
but centred on control over finance. It also 
avoided the capture of state policies on 
subsidies. Subsequently, it was able to guide 
a shift from import substitution to export 
promotion.18
Other rising countries of the South have 
pursued similar policies. Governments have 
partnered with the private sector to develop 
comparative advantage in the most promising 
sectors while ensuring effective macroeconomic 
management and promoting innovation. They 
have also paid special attention to expanding 
social opportunities by setting policy prior-
ities, nurturing selected industries, fostering 
state-market complementarities, committing to 
long-term reforms, having strong political lead-
ership, learning by doing and boosting public 
investment.
Setting policy priorities
More important than getting prices right, a 
developmental state must get policy priorities 
right. They should be people-centred, pro-
moting opportunities while protecting against 
downside risks. Getting policies and policy 
priorities right raises the equally important 
issue of getting policymaking right. Governing 
institutions and policies are profoundly and in-
extricably linked; one cannot succeed without 
the other. It is thus important to have policy 
processes managed by committed people in 
effective and responsive government structures. 
Policies also change at different stages of de-
velopment: at early stages, for example, many 
countries prioritize job creation and poverty 
reduction.
•	 Indonesia. From the mid-1970s, sup-
ported by revenues from newfound oil 
wealth, Indonesia complemented import- 
substituting industrialization with a major 
thrust in agriculture and rural development 
(see box 3.4 for the transformative poten-
tial of strategic investments in agriculture). 
This strategy of balanced growth increased 
the demand for labour, thus reducing un-
employment and increasing real wages.19 
Then in the mid-1980s, as oil income 
began to decline, Indonesia shifted from 
import substitution to outward-oriented 
industrialization, drawing in surplus labour 
from agriculture to work in manufacturing, 
which offered higher wages. By the early 
1990s, when the supply of surplus labour 
had been exhausted, poverty reduction con-
tinued primarily through wage increases. 
BOX 3.3 Akihiko Tanaka, President, Japan International Cooperation Agency
Japan and triangular cooperation
Bolstered by the remarkable economic performance of emerging countries, 
South–South cooperation and triangular cooperation have grown rapidly in 
recent years. They have outgrown their traditional role as complements to 
North–South cooperation and are now an indispensable source of knowl-
edge sharing and innovation for many developing countries.
There are four virtues and merits of South–South and triangular coop-
eration: the benefits accrued from sharing knowledge and experience among 
peers to find more effective solutions; sharing appropriate technology and 
experience that can promote convergence with North–South cooperation 
goals; respecting real ownership, with the South in the driver’s seat; and 
developing countries’ rapidly emerging as new donors.
As early as 1975, Japan recognized the value of South–South and 
triangular cooperation and began a large-scale triangular training pro-
gramme. Japan had experienced a development trajectory similar to that 
of some emerging countries today, having first been a net foreign aid re-
cipient then playing a dual role as aid recipient and emerging donor for a 
number of years before finally becoming only a donor as the first Asian 
member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
in 1964.
This development pathway led Japan to believe that sharing develop-
ment experience, knowledge and appropriate technology among developing 
countries can play a very useful role in development cooperation and thus 
warranted donor support.
A prime example is the cooperation among Brazil, Japan and 
Mozambique. Japan helped Brazil develop its own tropical savannah region, 
known as the Cerrado, making it a leading producer of soybeans and other 
agricultural products. The two countries now extend collaborative support to 
Mozambique to develop that country’s vast savannah.
An emerging challenge now is to scale up South–South and triangular 
cooperation as a central approach in development cooperation, while avoid-
ing excessive aid fragmentation among an increasing number of develop-
ment actors.
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Investing in people’s 
capabilities—through 
health, education and 
other public services—is 
not an appendage of 
the growth process but 
an integral part of it
Each phase thus involved a people- centred 
approach in which the growth strateg y 
was modified in response to changing 
conditions.
Enhancing public investment
Traditional economic and social policy 
thinking, as emphasized by the “Washington 
Consensus”, focused on getting economic fun-
damentals right as a precondition for economic 
growth, arguing that other human develop-
ment improvements would follow. A human 
development approach, on the other hand, de-
mands that improvement in poor people’s lives 
not be postponed. Thus, people-friendly devel-
opmental states are those that expand a number 
of basic social services (box 3.5).20 In this view, 
investing in people’s capabilities—through 
health, education and other public services—is 
not an appendage of the growth process but an 
integral part of it.
In addition to the levels of public expendit-
ures, their composition and the efficiency with 
which they are delivered, all taken together, in-
fluence the effective delivery of public services 
and expansion of capabilities. The effectiveness 
of public expenditure differs across coun-
tries. A global cross-country analysis shows a 
positive correlation between previous public 
expenditure per capita on health and education 
and current human development achievement 
(figure  3.2). Also, higher previous public 
spending per capita on health is associated with 
better child survival and lower under-five child 
mortality rates (figure  3.3). Such outcomes 
naturally depend on a country’s stage of devel-
opment and on how well the money is spent. 
Countries should put in place checks and bal-
ances to prevent reckless borrowing sprees and 
wasteful spending.
There has been much debate about whether 
public investment crowds in or crowds out 
private investment. Both outcomes are pos-
sible because of the many different uses of 
public capital in developing countries. From 
the lower levels of health, education and 
infrastructure development in South Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa than in the high- 
performing countries of East and Southeast 
Asia, it is reasonable to infer that public in-
vestment, as well as its composition, performs 
a critical role.
•	 Bangladesh. Bangladesh has sustained 
growth in part by increasing the rate of pub-
lic investment over time while avoiding the 
fiscal deficits that have plagued the rest of the 
region.
BOX 3.4
Investing in agriculture
Strategic investments in the agricultural sector can have transformative 
effects. Higher crop yields not only lead to improved livelihoods for farm-
ers, they also increase demand for goods and services in rural areas, giving 
rise to new opportunities for economic development. They may also lead to 
lower food prices, reducing the share of food in household expenditures and 
creating markets for other sectors of the economy.
Agricultural research is a public good and tends to be underpro-
vided by the private sector. Consequently, governments can make use-
ful contributions in this area. Recent studies on several African, Asian 
and Latin American countries show that increased public spending on 
agriculture is particularly good for promoting growth. Disaggregating 
agricultural expenditure into research and nonresearch spending shows 
that research spending is especially effective. Provision of other public 
goods, such as agricultural extension services and irrigation systems, is 
also beneficial.
China has the world’s largest agricultural research and development 
system in the world. Its research is based at the Chinese Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences, universities and the Chinese Academy of Science, 
which together comprise of more than 1,100 research institutions. China is 
becoming a leader in South–South cooperation with African countries, many 
of which are now benefiting from its research.
Agricultural technology has also been a strength of Brazil, where an 
estimated 41% of 2006 agricultural research spending in Latin America oc-
curred. The System for Agricultural Research and Innovation has contributed 
greatly to the nearly fourfold growth in agricultural efficiency per worker. 
The Brazil Agricultural Research Corporation, a state-owned enterprise, has 
been instrumental in increasing the land area used for cultivation. Similarly, 
many of Brazil’s agricultural programmes were developed with sustainability 
in mind. For example, to qualify for price support and credit programmes, 
farmers must respect zoning laws. Another programme, Moderagro, pro-
vides farmers with credit to improve agricultural practices and preserve 
natural resources, Produsa provides credit for planting on agricultural land 
that has degraded soil and Propflora uses credit to encourage the planting of 
forests (particularly palm oil).
Source: OECD 2006, 2011a; Fan and Saurkar 2006; Fan, Nestorova and Olofinbiyi 2010; Stads and Beintema 2009; World Bank 2012a.
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A dynamic view of 
comparative advantage 
has enabled several 
countries to turn 
inefficient industries 
unable to withstand 
foreign competition into 
drivers of export success 
once their economies 
became more open
•	 India. India increased central government 
spending on social services and rural devel-
opment from 13.4% in 2006–2007 to 18.5% 
in 2011–2012.21 And social services as a pro-
portion of total expenditure rose from 21.6% 
in 2006–2007 to 24.1% in 2009–2010 and 
to 25% in 2011–2012.
Nurturing selected industries
Governments can encourage a market- 
disciplined private sector by adopting a 
dynamic view of comparative advantage, 
nurturing sectors that would not otherwise 
emerge due to incomplete markets.22 Although 
this poses some political risks of rent seeking 
and cronyism, it has enabled several countries 
of the South to turn industries previously 
derided as inefficient and unable to withstand 
foreign competition into early drivers of 
export success once their economies became 
more open.
•	 India. For decades after independence in 
1947, India followed a strategy of state-
led, import-substituting industrialization. 
It inhibited the private sector while be-
stowing wide powers on technocrats who 
controlled trade and investment, creating 
a system that became increasingly laden 
with bureaucratic intricacies (the “licence 
Raj”).23 During these years, however, there 
was a deliberate policy to build human 
capabilities and invest in world-class ter-
tiary education, though perhaps neglecting 
primary education. Following the reforms 
of the 1990s, these investments paid off 
when India was unexpectedly able to 
capitalize on its stock of skilled workers 
in emergent information technology–en-
abled industries, which by 2011–2012 
were generating $70 billion in export earn-
ings. Another industry built during the 
inward-looking years is pharmaceuticals. 
India granted patents only to processes, 
not to products, which encouraged firms to 
reverse engineer and become world leaders 
in generic drugs.24 Similar tales of capacity 
building can be told for India’s automobile, 
chemical and service industries, now vigor-
ously tapping into world markets.
•	 Brazil. For long stretches, Brazil also exper-
imented with inward-oriented economic 
strategies. During these periods, individual 
firms that benefited from large domestic 
BOX 3.5
Eastern Europe and Central Asia: where North meets South
Connecting the North and the rising South is the transforming East. Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia accounts for 5% of world population and output. Its 
experience in managing a rapid transition from centrally planned to market 
economies holds useful policy lessons for developing countries elsewhere. 
The first phase of the transformation began with a sharp drop in living stan-
dards and human development. While each country managed a subsequent 
recovery under varying political and economic conditions, the overall experi-
ence underscores the importance of social inclusion and a responsible role 
of the state.
The  2011  Regional Human Development Report for Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States showed a negative correlation be-
tween Human Development Index values and measures of social exclusion 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It noted that economic variables ac-
counted for less than a third of the risks contributing to individual exclu-
sion. Labour  informality, corruption and lengthy procedures for business 
startups were associated with high social exclusion. By contrast, because 
employment facilitates inclusion, functional and accessible labour market 
institutions were found to be important. A major lesson from two decades 
of transition is that the state has a critical role in creating an environment 
for inclusive growth and societies. Abruptly abandoning areas of respon-
sibility by the state or insisting on rapid privatization of all state-owned 
companies may prove very costly for societies in the long run. Yet at the 
same time, retaining these responsibilities does not mean keeping the 
earlier structures intact. On the contrary, reforms to strengthen national 
institutions’ transparency and accountability and to limit the scope of cor-
ruption are necessary to improve the quality of governance and efficiency 
of governments.
Many countries of the region are now active members of the European 
Union. They, together with Croatia, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation 
and Turkey, have also become emerging donors, with aid disbursements 
exceeding $4 billion in 2011. The emerging donors are also active in bi-
lateral or trilateral exchange of knowledge with countries with common 
heritage or beyond. In recent years Romania has shared its experience 
conducting elections with Egypt and Tunisia, Poland has helped Iraq 
with small and medium- size enterprise development, the Czech Republic 
has cooperated with Azerbaijan on environmental impact assessments 
and Slovakia has assisted Moldova and Montenegro in public finance 
management.
Source: HDRO; UNDP 2011b.
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markets were not encouraged to export and 
compete globally. But when they did so, 
they were able to rely on capacities built up 
over decades. Embraer, for example, is now 
the world’s leading producer of regional jet 
commercial aircraft of up to 120 seats.25 The 
country’s steel and shoe industries also grew 
under public ownership, with research and 
development augmenting capabilities for 
domestic innovation.
Prioritizing job creation
Pragmatic policies aimed at creating secure 
and remunerative jobs are likely to strengthen 
the link between economic growth and 
human development. Evidence from Asia 
suggests that countries with simultaneously 
high rates of growth and poverty reduction 
also rapidly expanded employment. This 
was true for Malaysia and Thailand in the 
1970s, China and Indonesia in the 1980s and 
India and Viet Nam in the 1990s.26 The first 
generation of fast-growing Asian econom-
ies—Hong Kong, China (SAR), Republic 
of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province 
of China—expanded employment 2%–6% 
a year before the 1990s, while raising pro-
ductivity and wages. Such patterns of growth 
were often led by small-scale agriculture as in 
Taiwan Province of China and by labour-in-
tensive export-oriented manufacturing in 
Hong Kong, China (SAR), the Republic of 
Korea and Singapore.27
The success of some Asian countries—
such as the Republic of Korea and later 
Thailand—holds lessons for less developed 
economies, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
because they created jobs two to three times 
faster when they were at a comparable level 
of development. For example, over the past 
10 years, Africa’s labour force expanded by 
91 million people but added only 37 million 
jobs in wage-paying sectors.28 With proact-
ive government policies in labour- intensive 
subsectors of manufacturing and agriculture, 
as well as retail, hospitality and construction, 
Africa is projected to create up to 72 million 
jobs by 2020, an additional 18  million jobs 
over present growth levels.29 Such policies, 
however, require not only investing in young 
people’s education and training, but also 
improving infrastructure aimed at economic 
diversification and removing obstacles to 
private entrepreneurship, such as lack of fin-
ance and onerous regulations.30
•	 Mauritius. The possibilities of labour- 
intensive growth are higher when countries 
are at a lower level of industrialization. 
Analysing the performance of Mauritius 
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States have to be 
conscious that the 
nature of growth (and the 
intensity of labour use in 
sectors that drive growth) 
evolves as the economy 
transforms, and to respond 
with matching investments 
in people’s skills
over two decades, one study finds that 
during the first decade (1982–1990), 80% 
of annual economic growth was accounted 
for by new employment and capital accu-
mulation.31 Unemployment dropped from 
20% to below 3%, with the number of jobs 
growing 5.2% a year. Economic growth in 
the next decade (1991–1999), however, 
was driven less by accumulation of capital 
and more by the productivity growth of 
workers, a result of investment in human 
capabilities.32
•	 Bangladesh. The more rapid decline in 
poverty in the 1990s compared with the 
1980s33 was attributed to both the expansion 
of labour- intensive exports (such as garments 
and fisheries) and the increase in employ-
ment in the rural nonfarm sector (compris-
ing small and cottage industries, construction 
and other nontradable services). The stim-
ulus, however, came less from productivity 
improvements within this sector than from 
rising demand facilitated by an increase in 
crop production, an inflow of remittances 
and growing exports.34
•	 Rwanda. Expansion in jobs does not always 
have to come from export-oriented manufac-
turing. In Rwanda, jobs in tourism services 
have increased over the past decade. The 
sector now sees export earnings that exceed 
those from coffee and tea and employs nearly 
75,000 people.35
•	 Uganda. Like Rwanda’s, Uganda’s high 
growth during the 1990s was poverty alle-
viating because of income growth in agricul-
ture through large scale absorption of labour, 
especially in the cash crops sector that was 
buoyed by world prices and improvement in 
agriculture’s terms of trade.36
•	 Thailand. Developing countries endowed 
with arable land can continue to create 
stable jobs in agriculture, even though 
its share in total output typically declines 
over time. This is the case in Thailand, 
whose employment pattern of the 1960s is 
comparable to that of many Sub-Saharan 
African countries today. While Thailand 
has since become a manufacturing power-
house, millions of stable jobs continue to be 
created in nonmanufacturing sectors such 
as retail, hospitality and construction, as 
well as in commercial farming: the number 
of stable jobs in agriculture increased from 
519,000 in 1960 to nearly 3  million in 
2008. Overall, in the 1990s alone, Thailand 
increased its share of stable jobs by 11 per-
centage points (as Brazil did between 1970 
and 1988).37
•	 Indonesia. Indonesia before the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis stood out for pursuing growth 
that had a high labour intensity. Real wages 
increased at an average annual rate of 5% for 
two decades preceding the crisis. Between 
1990 and 1996 alone, formal nonagricultural 
employment increased from 28.1% of the 
workforce to 37.9% and the share of work-
force in agriculture declined from 55.1% 
to 43.5%.38 Post-crisis, when some of the 
development gains were reversed, the pro-
portionate increase in poverty was lowest for 
agricultural workers.39
As these examples suggest, patterns of growth 
are rarely consistently pro-poor over consec-
utive decades. This is because developmental 
transformation is synonymous with the change 
in the structure of production and sectors differ 
in their capacities to create jobs. Skilled and un-
skilled jobs, for example, require a different mix 
of complementary inputs, such as formal edu-
cation and industry-specific training. The larger 
point is that human development–oriented 
policies require both growth and an equitable 
expansion of opportunities. Developmental 
states, therefore, have to be conscious that the 
nature of growth (and the intensity of labour 
use in sectors that drive growth) evolves as the 
economy transforms, and they need then to 
respond with matching investments in people’s 
skills.
Fostering state–market 
complementarities
Both markets and governments can fail, but 
there are synergies when they work together. 
Development progress cannot be left to 
markets alone. Some markets not only fail 
to function, but may not exist at all at early 
stages of development. Most successful de-
velopmental states have introduced industrial 
and related policies that enhance the private 
sector’s potential to contribute to human de-
velopment, especially by creating jobs in new 
sectors.
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People-friendly 
developmental states 
need strong political 
leadership committed to 
equity and sustainability
•	 Turkey. The state created favourable eco-
nomic conditions that encouraged con-
struction and the manufacture of furniture, 
textiles, food and automobiles—all indus-
tries with a high capacity to absorb labour. 
Turkey’s export basket has since moved to-
wards products that involve more processing, 
higher technology content and the use of 
skilled labour.40
•	 Tunisia. Since the early 1970s, Tunisia has 
relied on financial and fiscal incentives 
to attract foreign and domestic capital to 
export-oriented industries, particularly for 
garment production.41 Various forms of 
business– government relations have en-
hanced industrial upgrading and promoted 
industry clusters. Today, Tunisia is among the 
top five exporters of apparel to the European 
Union.42 It also has the potential to export 
health services by providing treatment to vis-
itors from neighbouring countries, to a value 
equivalent to a quarter of Tunisia’s private 
health sector output.43
•	 Chile. After returning to democracy in the 
1990s, Chile encouraged investment and 
technological upgrading in sectors where 
the country had an intrinsic comparative 
advantage. It subsidized the formation and 
operation of innovation-based consortia 
between private firms and universities and 
engaged in other innovation-promoting 
activities.44
Committing to long-term 
development and reform
Achieving enduring transformation is a long-
term process that requires countries to chart a 
consistent and balanced approach to develop-
ment. Some technical or managerial solutions 
may appear to be attractive quick fixes, but they 
are generally inadequate.
•	 China. Since market-oriented reforms in the 
late 1970s, China has experienced a “com-
plex and interlocking set of changes: from a 
command to a market economy; from rural 
to urban; from agriculture to manufactur-
ing and services; from informal to formal 
economic activities; from a fragmented set 
of fairly self-sufficient provincial economies 
to a more integrated economy; and from 
an economy that was fairly shut off from 
the world to a powerhouse of international 
trade”.45 The scale of these changes required 
a committed state pursuing a long-term vis-
ion to build the necessary institutions and 
capacities. The leadership deliberately re-
placed the old guard, who might have been 
expected to resist change, with a younger, 
more open and better educated government 
bureaucracy. By 1988, a remarkable 90% of 
officials above the county level had been 
appointed since 1982.46 Capacity upgrading 
is still a priority, and the education levels 
of officials have risen continuously. The 
Chinese bureaucracy has been designed 
with a strong results orientation, linking 
career development to the achievement of 
central objectives of modernization and 
economic progress.47
People-friendly developmental states need 
strong political leadership committed to eq-
uity and sustainability. Effective leadership 
aligns the long-term goals of policymakers and 
enables constituencies to appreciate the state’s 
work in fostering individual capabilities and 
social integration for human development. This 
requires a balanced approach to development 
and an ability to convert crises into opportu-
nities for introducing broad-based economic 
reforms.
•	 Brazil. By the time the Brazilian trans-
formation to a developmental state began 
(around 1994), the government had imple-
mented macroeconomic reforms to control 
hyperinflation through the Real Plan and 
concluded the trade liberalization that had 
begun in 1988 with tariff reductions and 
the removal of other restrictions.48 Trade 
openness and prudent monetary and fiscal 
policy followed, as did innovative social 
programmes that reduced poverty and in-
come inequality.
In large and complex societies, the outcome 
of any particular policy is inevitably uncertain. 
Developmental states need to be pragmatic and 
test a range of different approaches.
•	 China. China’s reform and opening res-
ulted from an explicit choice in the late 
1970s to relax constraints on people’s par-
ticipation in economic decisions. But the 
institutional innovations that went on to 
underpin China’s transformation resembled 
Deng Xiaoping’s approach to “crossing the 
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river by feeling the stones”.49 Between 1979 
and 1989, no fewer than 40% of China’s 
national regulations were deemed experi-
mental. The first set of agrarian reforms per-
mitted farmers to lease land, submit a share 
of produce at fixed prices to the state and 
sell the surplus. Next came the expansion of 
the township and village enterprises.50 The 
gradual approach reflected the pragmatism 
of Chinese leaders. Another reason for this 
pragmatism was the perception that the 
transition was impossible to plan, com-
pounded by disillusionment with the whole 
planning system.
Driver 2: tapping of global markets
A common element of the fast-developing 
countries of the South has been to strengthen 
the capabilities of people and the competen-
cies of firms while embracing global markets. 
This has enabled them to source intermediate 
inputs and capital goods at competitive world 
prices, adopt foreign knowhow and technology 
and use them to sell to global markets.51 All 
newly industrializing countries have pursued 
a strategy of “importing what the rest of the 
world knows and exporting what it wants”.52 
Indeed, few countries have developed success-
fully by shunning international trade or long-
term capital flows; very few have sustained 
growth without increasing their trade to output 
ratio, and there is no evidence that in the post-
war period inward-looking economies have 
systematically developed faster than those that 
have been more open.53
This experience does not mean, however, 
that countries can ignite growth simply by 
dismantling trade and investment barriers. 
Some influential cross-national studies in the 
1990s purported to show that rapidly opening 
up would automatically lead to high economic 
growth. But these were subsequently found to 
have significant methodological limitations.54 
In particular, growth cannot be sufficiently 
explained by average tariff and nontariff 
barriers.55
Actual development experiences from the 
South have demonstrated a more nuanced 
consensus.56 In this view, successful and sus-
tained progress is more likely to be the result 
of gradual and sequenced integration with 
the world economy, according to national cir-
cumstances, and accompanied by investment 
in people, institutions and infrastructure.57 
Country studies confirm that what is needed 
is a package that involves the interaction of 
reforms in trade, exchange rates, and fiscal, 
monetary and institutional policies.58 A re-
cent study finds that more decisive benefits 
come from trade liberalization embedded in 
broader reforms: in the post-liberalization 
period between 1950 and 1998, the countries 
that were considered to have implemented 
such policies posted growth rates that were 
1.5 percentage points higher, investment rates 
that were 1.5–2 percentage points higher and 
trade to output ratios that were 5 percentage 
points higher.59
As countries develop, they tend to dismantle 
trade barriers and become more open.60 
HDRO analysis of the association between 
the change in trade openness and relative im-
provement in HDI value between 1990 and 
2010 supports this conclusion (see box 2.1 in 
chapter 2). Not all countries that increased 
trade openness made big improvements in 
HDI value relative to their peers. But those 
that did make big improvements in HDI value 
typically increased their trade to output ratio 
or established a global network of trade links 
of substantial bilateral value. In a sample of 95 
developing countries and transitional econom-
ies, the average increase in trade to output ratio 
of countries considered to be rapid improvers 
on the HDI between 1990 and 2012 was about 
13 percentage points higher than that of more 
modest improvers.
As discussed in box 2.1 in chapter 2, almost 
all countries with substantial improvement in 
HDI value over the past two decades have also 
become more integrated with the world eco-
nomy. Table 3.2 reconfirms this for a selected 
group of high human development–achieving 
countries discussed in this chapter, which have 
vigorously tapped opportunities presented by 
globalization by expanding their share of ex-
ports in world markets between 1990 and 2010. 
The only exception in this group is Mauritius, 
one of the first countries in the South to pur-
sue an export-oriented development strategy, 
whose share in world exports peaked in 2001.61 
As the more populous countries deepen their 
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integration with the world economy, they have 
accelerated their structural diversification in 
manufacturing and services and boosted ag-
ricultural productivity, helping lift hundreds 
of millions of people out of poverty in a few 
decades.
Gradual and sequenced integration
Rather than opening suddenly to world mar-
kets, some of the more successful countries have 
opened gradually, as the situation demanded.
•	 China. A rapid opening up in China would 
have shut down state enterprises without 
creating new industrial activities, so the 
state reformed gradually. To attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI), create jobs and 
promote exports, the state established spe-
cial economic zones, often in less built-up 
areas.62 At the same time, China increased 
the competencies of its workers and firms 
by requiring foreign firms to enter joint 
ventures, transfer technology or meet high 
requirements for domestic content. By the 
early 1990s, China was ready to expand its 
external interactions, building on invest-
ments in health and education during the 
1960s and 1970s and on the newly acquired 
competencies of farmers and firms. Between 
1993 and 1996, China was already the des-
tination of more than 10% of worldwide 
FDI inflows.63 Its trade to GDP ratio nearly 
doubled, from 21.7% in 1980 to about 
42% in 1993–1994. By 2011, China had 
completed 10 years of membership in the 
World Trade Organization and overtaken 
Germany as the second-largest exporter of 
goods and services.64
•	 India. Domestic reforms began in India 
in the mid-1980s and expanded after the 
1990–1991 external payments crisis. Before 
the reforms, India had import quotas and 
high tariffs on manufactured goods and 
banned imports of manufactured con-
sumer products.65 Early reforms focused 
on dismantling the systems of licences for 
industrial activity and ending restrictions 
on investment.66 Quantitative restrictions 
on manufactured capital goods were ended 
in 1993. Tariffs on manufactured goods 
were reduced quickly from 76.3% in 1990 to 
42.9% in 1992, but further cuts were spread 
over the next two decades to reach about 
8% in 2009. Restrictions on manufactured 
consumer products were gradually lifted 
and phased out by 2001, 10 years after the 
reforms began.67 In 2010, India’s trade to 
output ratio was 46.3%, up from only 15.7% 
in 1990. FDI also reached a peak of 3.6% 
of GDP in 2008, up from less than 0.1% 
in 1990.68
Building up industrial competencies 
for global markets
Several countries have built up industrial com-
petencies under periods of import substitution 
that they have subsequently used to supply 
overseas markets.
•	 Turkey. Trade performance after the 1980s 
rested on production capacities built in the 
pre-1980 era of import-substituting indus-
trialization in Turkey.69 Between 1990 and 
2010, its trade to GDP ratio rose from 32% 
to 48%, a substantial jump for a middle- 
income country with a large domestic mar-
ket. In 2011, the top exports—automobiles, 
iron and steel, and household appliances and 
consumer electronics—were all from indus-
tries that had grown under trade protection.
TABLE 3.2
Share of world exports of goods and services of high achievers in human 
development, 1985–1990 and 2005–2010 (%)
Country 1985–1990 2005–2010
Bangladesh 0.042 0.089
Brazil 0.946 1.123
Chile 0.232 0.420
China 1.267 8.132
Ghana 0.029 0.041
India 0.519 1.609
Indonesia 0.624 0.803
Malaysia 0.685 1.197
Mauritius 0.038 0.027
Thailand 0.565 1.095
Tunisia 0.116 0.118
Turkey 0.449 0.852
Note: Values are averages for 1985–1990 and for 2005–2010.
Source: World Bank 2012a.
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•	 Republic of Korea. When the Republic of 
Korea and some of the other East Asian 
economies went through a phase of mod-
erate import substitution for consumer 
goods, they did not protect domestic pro-
ducers of capital goods.70 Even when they 
were ambivalent about FDI in the 1980s, 
they chose to import technology under 
licensing agreements and to develop links 
with multinational firms. The goal was to 
build indigenous capabilities for the long 
haul by borrowing and assimilating foreign 
technologies.
•	 Thailand. Thailand’s manufacturing prowess 
continues to strengthen through the coun-
try’s participation in international produc-
tion networks. In 2009–2010, its exports 
of parts and  components—notably in the 
automotive and electronics industries—were 
valued at $48  billion, a quarter of its mer-
chandise exports. The government is keen to 
establish Thailand as the “Detroit of Asia”, 
not only a cluster for logistics, but also a 
high-tech hub that forges research collabora-
tion among firms, universities and the public 
sector.71
•	 Malaysia. Malaysia’s pre-eminence in the 
electronics industry began in the early days 
of the international division of labour, with 
its courting of multinational companies from 
countries in the North. Free trade zones, 
established primarily for manufacturing elec-
tronic goods,72 helped the country develop 
rapidly between the 1970s and the 1990s. 
Today, however, Malaysia’s economy is seen 
to be in a “middle-income trap”, no longer 
able to compete with low-cost production 
in neighbouring countries and lacking the 
skills for high-end tasks in global production 
networks.73 The government’s own advisory 
council is concerned that a slowdown in FDI 
inflows could affect the prospects for gradu-
ating to high-income status.74 Malaysia’s good 
record in secondary education does not seem 
to have produced a strong enough base for 
an innovation-driven economy: Malaysia’s 
future progress is hampered by inadequate 
research and development capacity and a lack 
of design and process engineers and technical 
and production workers.75
•	 Indonesia. In the 1990s, to avoid the high 
costs associated with aspects of protection, 
Indonesia and some other East Asian coun-
tries established export processing zones, 
bonded warehouses and duty drawback 
systems—all requiring a competent bureau-
cracy. When countries felt they lacked that 
capacity, they resorted to unconventional 
approaches. For a period Indonesia even 
privatized its customs administration.76 
Having weathered the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, Indonesia today stands out 
for effectively managing its commodity 
exports.77
Piggybacking on niche products
One option for smaller economies is to tap into 
world markets for niche products. The choice 
of successful products is not accidental; it is 
often the result of years of state support and 
facilitation that build on existing competencies 
or the creation of new ones.
•	 Chile. With active support from the state, 
Chilean firms have had major success in 
expanding exports of processed agricul-
tural food and beverages and forestry and 
fish products. For example, in the 1960s, 
there was substantial public research and 
development in the cultivation of grapes 
for wine production. There has also been 
a long history of subsidized plantations in 
forestry, and the state has made major ef-
forts to turn the wood, pulp and paper, and 
furniture cluster into a major export in-
dustry.78 Similar support from a nonprofit 
corporation, Fundación Chile, has helped 
make the country’s commercial salmon 
cultivation one of the most prolific in the 
world.79
•	 Bangladesh. Bangladesh took advantage of 
market distortions in world apparel trade.80 
But without the initiative of its entrepren-
eurs, it could easily have squandered the 
opportunity. In 1978, the Desh Company 
signed a five-year collaboration agreement 
with Daewoo, a Korean company, that con-
nected Bangladesh to international standards 
and a network of apparel buyers. Daewoo 
trained Desh employees in production and 
marketing in the Republic of Korea. Within 
a year, 115 of the 130 trainees had left Desh 
to start their own garment export firms.81 By 
2010, Bangladesh’s share of world apparel 
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exports had increased to about 4.8%, from 
about 0.8% in 1990.82
•	 Mauritius. With limited arable land, an 
expanding population and overreliance on 
one commodity (sugar), Mauritius had to 
seek a larger, overseas market. Asian gar-
ment exporters, constrained by quotas, were 
attracted to the country. Until the 1990s, 
Mauritius was one of the most protected 
economies, but it provided duty-free access 
to imported inputs, tax incentives and flex-
ible labour market conditions, including 
supporting the entry of women into la-
bour-intensive jobs in the export processing 
zones.83
•	 Ghana. Cocoa has been at the heart of 
Ghana’s economy for decades. In the 1970s 
and early 1980s, however, the sector faced 
near-collapse. Ghana restored its interna-
tional competitiveness with reforms begun 
in 1983, especially by devaluing the cur-
rency, increasing the capacity of the private 
sector in procurement and marketing, and 
giving farmers a much higher share of prices 
received. Between 1983 and 2006, the 
country doubled its production of cocoa 
per hectare, and today the sector supports 
the livelihoods of 700,000 people.84 Over 
the past 10 years, Ghana has also diversi-
fied into services, with the telecom sector 
growing fast and augmenting the capacity 
of farmers to connect to sources of market 
information. A recent survey found that 
around 61% of cocoa farmers owned mobile 
phones.85
A common thread that runs through the 
economies that have had meaningful engage-
ment with the world is their investment in 
people. Tariff reform, at home or in partner 
countries, may provide an unexpected open-
ing into export markets; some countries 
may enjoy resource windfalls or ride a wave 
of short-term success by mimicking others. 
However, the lesson is that development 
cannot be sustained without adequate invest-
ment in people’s skills to constantly upgrade 
the quality of products and production tech-
niques. The countries discussed here began 
from diverse initial conditions and have 
become adept at tailoring nurtured domestic 
strengths to reap external opportunities 
presented by world markets.
Driver 3: determined social 
policy innovation
Evidence shows that substantial public 
 investment—effectively deployed not just 
in infrastructure, but also in health and 
 education—is key to achieving and sustaining 
human development. Development strategies 
cannot succeed without a commitment to 
equality of opportunity, giving everyone a fair 
chance to enjoy the fruits of growth. Indeed, 
there is strong multicountry evidence that pro-
moting higher human development levels helps 
accelerate economic growth.86
A good test of a government’s commitment 
to equality of opportunity is its determination 
to provide education, particularly to girls. 
Countries that have sustained high long-term 
growth have generally put considerable effort 
into educating their citizens and deepening 
human capital.87 Investing in education is 
important for improving cognitive skills, as 
measured by the performance of students on 
mathematics and science tests.88 However, the 
benefits derive from investment not so much 
in the production of specialist skills but in 
“education for all”.89 Similarly, improvements 
in public health help growth by boosting la-
bour productivity.90
Growth accompanied by high or rising in-
equality generally involves slower advances in 
human development, poor social cohesion and 
slow reduction in poverty. Moreover, it is usu-
ally considered unsustainable.91 Thus the aim 
should be to create virtuous cycles in which 
growth and social policies reinforce each other. 
Growth has frequently been much more effect-
ive at reducing poverty in countries with low 
income inequality than in countries with high 
income inequality. Growth is also less effective 
in reducing poverty when the distribution of 
income worsens over time.92
The exceptions seem to be China and Brazil. 
Over the last 30 years, as a result of very high 
rates of growth, China has reduced poverty 
despite increasing income inequality. Similarly, 
in the early 2000s, Brazil used targeted 
policies to reduce poverty despite high income 
 inequality—though income distribution be-
came more equal over this period.
Promoting equality—especially equal-
ity across groups, known as horizontal 
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equality—also helps reduce social conflict. 
The sharpest contractions in growth after 
1975 occurred in countries with divided 
societies (as measured by indicators of in-
equality and ethnic fragmentation). They also 
suffered from weak institutions for conflict 
management, with poor quality government 
institutions that had less capacity to ensure 
the rule of law, democratic rights and social 
safety nets.93
Education, health care, social protections, 
legal empowerment and social organization all 
enable poor people to participate in growth. 
But even these basic policy instruments may 
not empower disenfranchised groups. Poor 
people on the fringes of society struggle to 
voice their concerns, and governments do not 
always evaluate whether services intended to 
reach everyone actually do.94 Often, problems 
are exacerbated by external shocks, but in many 
cases policies are implemented where local 
institutional capacity and community involve-
ment are low.
•	 Uganda. In post-conflict Uganda, a series 
of macroeconomic reforms, from the 
loosening of price control and exchange 
rates to changes in state-owned enterprises 
and the civil service, paved the way for a 
wide-ranging poverty reduction plan in 
1997. Uganda went on to become one of 
the few Sub-Saharan African countries to 
have halved extreme poverty before the 
Millennium Development Goal deadline of 
2015, from 56.4% in 1992–1993 to 24.5% 
in 2009–2010. However, increasing income 
inequality has slowed the pace of poverty re-
duction.95 On balance, the economic success 
of these efforts show that programmes are 
more effective when the national leadership 
is committed to reducing poverty, notably 
by enhancing the consistency of goals and 
approaches across government agencies.96 In 
turn, such progress can have a profound in-
fluence on the legitimacy of leaders and their 
governments.
Promoting inclusion
All countries have, to a greater or lesser ex-
tent, multireligious, multicultural, pluralistic 
societies, and different groups generally have 
different levels of human development. Even in 
advanced countries, there is persistent discrim-
ination against certain ethnic groups in labour 
markets.97 Nonmarket discrimination can be 
equally severe and destabilizing. Moreover, 
historical discrimination has long-lasting ef-
fects. Ensuring nondiscrimination and equal 
treatment, including providing special pro-
grammes for disadvantaged groups, is becom-
ing increasingly critical for political and social 
stability.
In the South, too, different levels of achieve-
ment often have historical or colonial origins—
for instance, in India, between upper and lower 
castes, and in Malaysia, among Bumiputras 
(Malays), Chinese and Indians. Economic 
prosperity alone cannot end group discrim-
ination that leads to horizontal inequality. 
To bridge inequalities and correct historical 
disadvantages, both India and Malaysia have 
adopted deliberate policy interventions, such 
as affirmative action.
Providing basic social services
States can underpin long-term economic 
growth by providing public services that 
contribute to a healthy, educated labour 
force. Such measures also help build national 
stability, reducing the likelihood of political 
unrest and strengthening the legitimacy of 
governments.
Developing countries sometimes receive 
policy advice urging them to view public 
expenditures on basic services as luxuries 
they cannot afford. Over the long term, 
however, these investments pay off. Although 
not all services need be publicly provided, 
a minimum universal level of basic health, 
education and social security needs to be es-
tablished to ensure that all citizens have secure 
access to the basic requirements of human 
development, whether from public or private 
providers. Compulsory public primary and 
secondary education has contributed decis-
ively to human development in Europe and 
in some developing countries, such as Costa 
Rica.
Access to high-quality education
Growth in HDI value is associated with growth 
in public spending on education. On average, 
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countries with higher government expenditures 
on health and education have experienced high 
growth in human development, although local 
variations may remain.
•	 Indonesia. During Indonesia’s economic 
boom years (from 1973 onwards), the gov-
ernment funded the construction of schools 
for basic education through development 
programmes, and in the following decade 
public expenditure on education more than 
doubled.
•	 India. Following the constitutional amend-
ment to make education a fundamental right 
for every child, India has taken progressive 
steps towards ending discrimination in its 
school system (box 3.6).
•	 Ghana. One of the earliest initiatives in in-
dependent Ghana was the 1951 Accelerated 
Development Plan for Education, which 
aimed at a massive expansion of primary 
and middle school education. The 1961 
Education Act removed fees for elementary 
education so that households had to pay only 
a modest amount for textbooks. Enrolment 
in public elementary schools doubled over 
the next six years. Between 1966 and 1970, 
the public discourse on education moved 
from access to quality. In the early 1970s, 
the focus came back to access, this time for 
secondary education. The next major round 
of reforms took place in 1987. The most 
significant aspect of the curriculum reform 
was to provide children with literacy in three 
languages—two Ghanaian languages and 
English—as well as modern farming skills, 
vocational skills and practical mathematics 
skills.
•	 Mauritius. The government of Mauritius 
developed a national consensus on providing 
high-quality primary, secondary and tertiary 
schooling free of charge.
•	 Bangladesh. The Ministry of Primary and 
Mass Education was established in 1992 
with the goal of universalizing primary edu-
cation and eliminating gender and poverty 
gaps in primary education in Bangladesh. 
Demand-side interventions, such as the 
Female Secondary School Assistance 
Program and the Food for Education pro-
gramme, broadened coverage, particularly 
for girls.
•	 China. In 1986, China’s National People’s 
Congress passed a law proclaiming the 
compulsory provision of nine-year basic 
education regardless of gender, ethnicity or 
race. From 1990 to 2000, the average years 
BOX 3.6
India’s Supreme Court issues a progressive verdict mandating seats for disadvantaged children in private schools
Most schools in developing countries are government run, but demand for 
private schools is expanding in response to the failures of public schools: 
bad infrastructure, overcrowded classrooms, poor access, teacher shortages 
and absenteeism. Parents with enough money send their children to private 
schools, creating a society in many countries divided between public and 
private school students.
India has made education free and compulsory for children ages 6–14. 
The vast majority of children are enrolled in government schools, especially 
in rural areas. But most children from elite households—the rich, the politi-
cal class, government employees and the growing middle class—are sent 
to private schools. In many instances, boys are sent to private schools, and 
girls to free government schools.
To reduce these trends towards segregation, India passed the Right 
of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act in 2009. It requires pri-
vate schools to admit at least 25% of students from socially disadvantaged 
and low-income households. In turn, private schools are reimbursed for 
either their tuition charge or the expenditure per student in government 
schools, whichever is lower. The act was based on the following rationales: 
schools must be sites for social integration, private schools do not exist 
independently of the state that provides them land and other amenities, 
the social obligation of private schools cannot be waived by contending 
that only children whose parents pay their fees have a right to be in these 
schools and the requirement to admit at least 25% of students from disad-
vantaged groups is fair given that these groups constitute around 25% of 
the population.
In a landmark judgement on 12 April 2012, the Supreme Court of India 
upheld the constitutional validity of the act, making two points in support 
of its decision. First, since the act obligates the state to provide free and 
compulsory education to all children ages 6–14, the state has the free-
dom to decide whether it shall fulfil its obligation through its own schools, 
aided schools or unaided schools. The 2009 act is “child-centric” and not 
“institution- centric”. Second, the right to education “envisages a reciprocal 
agreement between the state and the parents, and it places an affirmative 
burden on all stakeholders in our civil society.” Private, unaided schools sup-
plement the primary obligation of the state to provide free and compulsory 
education to the specified category of students.
Source: Government of India 2009; Supreme Court of India 2012.
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of schooling for people ages 15 and older in 
rural areas rose from 4.7 years to 6.8.
•	 Uganda. School fees for primary education 
were abolished in Uganda in 1997 with the 
aim of universalizing primary education. 
Initially this strained the education infra-
structure.98 To improve quality, the Ministry 
of Education emphasized five areas: cur-
riculum development, basic learning materi-
als, teacher training, language of instruction 
and quality standards. The early drops in 
quality and completion rates have since been 
reversed, and the gains have been solidified 
and extended.
•	 Brazil. State-led investments in education 
have dramatically improved development 
outcomes in Brazil. The transformation of 
education started with the equalization of 
funding across regions, states and muni-
cipalities. The national Development Fund 
for Primary Education, created in 1996, 
guaranteed national minimum spending per 
student in primary education, increasing 
the resources for primary students in the 
Northeast, North and Centre West states, 
particularly in municipally run schools. 
Funding “followed the student”, providing 
a significant incentive for school systems 
to expand enrolment. Similarly, states were 
required to share resources across muni-
cipalities so that all state and municipal 
schools could reach the per student spend-
ing threshold. As a result of this investment, 
Brazil’s math scores on the Programme for 
International Student Assessment rose 52 
points between 2000 and 2009, the third-
largest leap on record.
Access to high-quality health care
Advancing health requires more than 
high-quality health services. Previous Human 
Development Reports have shown that human 
poverty is multidimensional. Many countries 
are discovering that they need simultaneous 
interventions on multiple fronts. Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia, for example, have seen 
striking gains in life expectancy in the last 40 
years. Possible explanations include improve-
ments in health and drug technology, wide-
spread vaccinations, information technology 
advances, better access to improved water and 
sanitation, increased energy provision, and 
public and private investments in health.
•	 Bangladesh. To improve child survival 
rates, Bangladesh has taken a multisectoral 
approach: expanding education and employ-
ment opportunities for women; improving 
women’s social status; increasing political 
participation, social mobilization and com-
munity participation; disseminating public 
health knowledge; and providing effective, 
community-based essential health services 
(box 3.7).
Health service provision has been heavily 
skewed towards the better-off, who have 
been more likely to have good access to the 
public services and pay for private ones. 
Those with greatest access to health care 
have been workers in the formal sector, who 
have partly financed their needs with annual 
contributions. Workers in the informal sector 
are more difficult to provide for. In India, for 
example, there are no clearly identified regu-
lar employers who can contribute on behalf 
of the estimated 93% of the workforce in the 
informal sector.99
Everyone should be entitled to the same 
quality of health care, and several countries 
have attempted to provide and finance univer-
sal health coverage. Some have done so through 
public health services targeted to the poor. 
This is neither desirable nor efficient, generally 
resulting in a health care system in which poor 
people receive inferior quality services, often in 
public facilities, while the nonpoor get better 
health care services from the private sector. 
Health services targeted to the poor generally 
remain underfunded partly because the more 
powerful people who are not poor have no 
stake in making the system better. Also, spe-
cial insurance schemes for the poor miss the 
advantages of pooling risks across the whole 
population and are thus likely to become finan-
cially unviable, often diverting resources from 
preventive and primary care to more-expensive 
tertiary care.
Governments also attempt to finance health 
care through user fees. However, there is near 
unanimous consensus now that such fees have 
adverse consequences, especially for the poor. 
They discourage the poor from using ser-
vices and generally mobilize little in terms of 
resources.100
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The lesson from global experience is that the 
main source of financing for universal health 
care should be taxation. Most countries in 
Southeast Asia, for example, have embraced 
the idea. Governments have sought to reduce 
private out-of-pocket spending , increase 
pooled health finance and improve the reach 
and quality of health services, although cov-
erage varies.101 Identifying and reaching poor 
people remain challenges, and resource-poor 
developing countries such as Lao PDR and 
Viet Nam have relied heavily on donor-suppor-
ted health equity funds.
•	 Thailand. Thailand’s 2002 National Health 
Security Act stipulated that every citizen 
should have comprehensive medical care. 
By 2009, 76% of the population, about 
48  million people, were registered in the 
Universal Health Coverage Scheme, which 
provides free inpatient and outpatient 
treatment, maternity care, dental care and 
emergency care. The scheme is fully financed 
by the government, with a budget in 2011 of 
$34 million—$70 for each insured person—
which accounts for 5.9% of the national 
budget.102
•	 Mexico. In 2003, the Mexican state ap-
proved Seguro Popular, a public insurance 
scheme that provides access to compre-
hensive health care for poor households 
formerly excluded from traditional social 
security. Public resources for health have 
increased and are being distributed more 
fairly. Access to and use of health care ser-
vices have expanded. Financial protection 
indicators have improved. By the end of 
2007, 20 million poor people were benefit-
ing from the scheme.103 Mexico is a leader 
in moving rapidly towards universal health 
coverage by adopting an innovative finan-
cing mechanism.
•	 Rwanda. Access to health services has 
been expanded in Rwanda by introducing 
community- based health insurance. Health 
BOX 3.7
Bangladesh makes dramatic advances in child survival
In 1990, the infant mortality rate in Bangladesh, 97 deaths per 1,000 live 
births, was 16% higher than India’s 81. By 2004, the situation was reversed, 
with Bangladesh’s infant mortality rate (38) 21% lower than India’s (48). 
Three main factors seem to explain the dramatic improvements.
First, economic empowerment of women through employment in 
the garment industry and access to microcredit transformed their situ-
ation. The vast majority of women in the garment industry are migrants 
from rural areas. This unprecedented employment opportunity for young 
women has narrowed gender gaps in employment and income. The 
spread of microcredit has also aided women’s empowerment. Grameen 
Bank alone has disbursed $8.74 billion to 8 million borrowers, 95% of 
them women. According to recent estimates, these small loans have 
enabled more than half of borrowers’ households to cross the poverty 
line, and new economic opportunities have opened up as a result of 
easier access to microcredit. Postponed marriage and motherhood are 
direct consequences of women’s empowerment, as are the effects on 
child survival.
Second, social and political empowerment of women has occurred 
through regular meetings of women’s groups organized by nongovernmental 
organizations. For example, the Grameen system has familiarized borrow-
ers with election processes, since members participate in annual elections 
for chairperson and secretaries, centre-chiefs and deputy centre-chiefs, as 
well as board member elections every three years. This experience has pre-
pared many women to run for public office. Women have also been socially 
empowered through participation in the banks. A recent analysis suggests 
much better knowledge about health among participants in credit forums 
than among nonparticipants.
Third, the higher participation of girls in formal education has been en-
hanced by nongovernmental organizations. Informal schools run by the non-
governmental organization BRAC offer four years of accelerated primary 
schooling to adolescents who have never attended school, and the schools 
have retention rates over 94%. After graduation, students can join the for-
mal schooling system, which most do. Monthly reproductive health sessions 
are integrated into the regular school curriculum and include such topics as 
adolescence, reproduction and menstruation, marriage and pregnancy, fam-
ily planning and contraception, smoking and substance abuse, and gender 
issues. Today, girls’ enrolment in schools exceeds that of boys (15 years ago, 
only 40% of school attendees were girls).
Women’s empowerment has gone hand-in-hand with substantial im-
provements in health services and promotion. With injectable contracep-
tives, contraceptive use has surged. Nearly 53% of women ages 15–40 now 
use contraceptives, often through services provided by community outreach 
workers. BRAC also provided community-based instruction to more than 
13 million women about rehydration for children suffering from diarrhoea. 
Today Bangladesh has the world’s highest rate of oral rehydration use, and 
diarrhoea no longer figures as a major killer of children. Almost 95% of chil-
dren in Bangladesh are fully immunized against tuberculosis, compared with 
only 73% in India. Even adult tuberculosis cases fare better in Bangladesh, 
with BRAC-sponsored community volunteers treating more than 90% of 
cases, while India struggles to reach 70% through the formal health system.
Source: BRAC n.d.; Grameen Bank n.d.; World Bank 2012a.
Chapter 3 Drivers of development transformation    |    81
Universal public health 
and education policies 
can be designed and 
implemented without 
sacrificing quality for the 
sake of greater coverage
care providers were given incentives by link-
ing resources to performance. As a result, 
health care became more affordable in rural 
areas. And there were visible improvements 
in health outcomes. Under-five mortality fell 
from 196 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2000 
to 103 in 2007, and the maternal mortality 
ratio declined more than 12% a year over 
2000–2008. Rwanda is on track to reach the 
Millennium Development Goal for maternal 
health.
One concern in a number of countries is the 
emergence of dual-track services. Even if public 
provision is universal in principle, quality and 
access may be poor, driving people towards 
expensive private providers.
•	 China. Much of China’s health care success 
took place between 1950 and 1980, when 
the government established a three-level 
system of village clinics, township health 
centres and county hospitals in rural areas 
and health centres and district hospitals in 
urban areas. Since the 1980s, however, the 
health sector has been driven by a fee-for-
service model. As a result, while China’s 
overall health status has continued to im-
prove, disparities have grown between the 
eastern and western provinces and between 
rural and urban areas. In many parts of the 
country quality health care has become un-
affordable for the poor.
•	 Chile. Before 1980, Chile’s health system 
was publicly financed through social secur-
ity and public funds. After health reform 
in 1981, however, risk insurance was in-
troduced, and market mechanisms began 
to regulate levels of protection. By 2006, a 
dual system of coverage was in place. The 
National Health Care Fund, funded by fed-
eral government tax revenues and by premi-
ums from beneficiaries, covered 69% of the 
population, but its resource constraints 
have prevented it from ensuring timely and 
quality services. Private  health  insurance 
companies covered 17% of the population. 
The National  Health Care Fund offers a 
universal health plan. This dual system has 
been criticized because it leaves low-income 
and high-risk populations to be treated 
mainly in the public system, which is poorly 
resourced and thus tends to provide lower 
quality service. In 2004, aware of the risks, 
the state introduced El Plan de Acceso 
Universal de Garantías Explícitas, which 
guarantees a medical benefits package con-
sisting of a prioritized list of diagnoses and 
treatment for 56 health conditions, as well 
as universal coverage for all citizens.
Providing universal health care and at least 
nine years of compulsory education requires 
strong state commitment, involvement and 
consistency over time. The challenge for coun-
tries in the South is to ensure equity in access to 
health and education services and basic quality 
standards to prevent a dual-track service in-
dustry that provides low-quality public services 
(or none at all) to the poor and higher quality 
private services to the rich.
Universal public health and education 
policies can be designed and implemented 
without sacrificing quality for the sake of 
greater coverage. Poor people have no al-
ternatives to a public system, while wealthier 
people can pay for private services. Such 
dynamics entrench inequalities, reduce social 
integration and undermine sustainable human 
development. New programmes, such as those 
in China, Mexico and Thailand, illustrate the 
possibilities of ensuring that basic services are 
universal and of reasonable quality. When 
financial resources are adequately provided, 
publicly provided services need not be inferior 
to private services.
Increasing social cohesion by 
broadening development
Transforming development requires that all 
citizens feel vested in the broader goals of 
society, showing respect and compassion for 
others and a commitment to building social 
cohesion. This requires that states and citizens 
understand that human development is about 
more than just enhancing individual capabil-
ities. Individual capabilities are embedded in 
a broader social system whose health requires 
enhanced social competencies (see box 1.7 in 
chapter 1).
More effective social protection systems are 
also needed to help individuals and communit-
ies manage risks to their welfare. Globalization 
has contributed to the dismantling of some 
aspects of social protection and social insur-
ance, especially for systems relying on universal 
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Cash transfer 
programmes—important 
in reducing poverty 
and improving income 
inequality—cannot 
substitute for public 
provision of essential 
goods and services
coverage and large government expenditures. 
At the same time, it has increased the need for 
social protection, as fluctuations in economic 
activity become more frequent. Thus, social 
policies become as important as economic 
policies in advancing human development. In 
fact, social and economic policies can hardly 
be disentangled because their goals and instru-
ments are analogous.104
In many parts of the South, states have in-
troduced and provided social protection pro-
grammes to integrate poor people into the new 
economy. Cash transfer programmes have been 
particularly important in reducing poverty 
and improving income inequality through 
redistribution. But transfers cannot substitute 
for public provision of essential goods and 
services (box  3.8). At best, they can supple-
ment resources of the poor. Offering cash so 
that households can buy health care of their 
choice is unlikely to work where high- quality 
health care is in short supply. Similarly, giving 
cash to households so that they can choose 
their school is unlikely to help the poor if few 
schools offer high- quality education. Nor can 
cash transfers substitute for incomes earned 
through decent work.
•	 India. India’s National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme provides up to 100 days 
of unskilled manual labour to eligible rural 
poor at the statutory minimum agricultural 
labour wage. This initiative is promising be-
cause it provides access to income and some 
insurance for the poor against the vagaries 
of seasonal work and affords individuals the 
self-respect and empowerment associated 
with work.105 In addition, it aims to help 
build economies in rural areas by develop-
ing infrastructure. The scheme has innov-
ative design features such as social audits 
and advanced monitoring and information 
systems.
BOX 3.8 Cevdet Yılmaz, Minister of Development, Turkey
Strengthening social protection in Turkey
As recently as 2002, an estimated 30% of Turkey’s people lived below the 
government’s poverty threshold of $4.30 a day. Government spending on so-
cial protection accounted for just 12% of GDP, less than half the EU average 
of 25%. And expenditures on social assistance for the poor accounted for 
only 0.5% of GDP, prompting criticism that Turkey’s social support systems 
were both fragmented and insufficient.
Over the past decade, however, Turkey’s strong economic performance, 
pro-poor approach to social policies and targeted assistance with greater 
resources have helped accelerate poverty reduction. Key policy changes 
include systematic strengthening of social assistance programmes, condi-
tional cash transfers, social security reforms and an ambitious transforma-
tion of the national public health system. Under the conditional cash transfer 
programme alone, launched in 2003, more than 1 million children have re-
ceived health care support, and about 2.2 million have benefited from educa-
tion aid. School children have received more than 1.3 billion textbooks since 
2003 under a new free schoolbook programme, and nearly 1 million now get 
free transportation to school.
As a result of these and other initiatives, the share of the population 
living on less than $4.30 a day fell sharply, to 3.7% in 2010, and the share of 
GDP devoted to poverty assistance and related social services nearly tripled, 
to 1.2%.
The share of social expenditures in Turkey’s GDP is still less than the EU 
average, and social assistance schemes have not yet had the desired impact 
on poverty rates. To increase their effectiveness, the government is working 
on new methods of poverty measurement and social protection, new ap-
proaches to in-kind and cash assistance, stronger links to job opportunities 
and continuing consultations with targeted communities and households.
Similarly, the expansion and modernization of health services have 
had a direct, measurable impact on public health. Health insurance is 
now available to the entire population. Under the Health Transformation 
Programme launched in 2003, family practitioners were assigned to fami-
lies to strengthen basic health services, with primary and emergency health 
care provided free of charge. The results have been swift and encouraging. 
For the first time, almost all children are getting free regular vaccinations. 
Seven million schoolchildren get free milk every day. Iron and vitamin D 
supplements are provided without charge to mothers and children. Infant 
mortality rates have fallen sharply, to 10 per 1,000 live births in 2010, down 
from 29 in 2003, according to government figures. This two-thirds drop 
greatly exceeds the reduction targeted under the Millennium Development 
Goals.
Pro-child policies go beyond health care and education, to broader as-
sistance for their home communities. The government started a new Social 
Support Program in 2008 to develop social cohesion and ensure social inte-
gration, particularly in the less-developed eastern regions of the country. Its 
projects aim to increase participation in national economic and social life 
by disadvantaged people marginalized by poverty and social exclusion. The 
goals of the programme’s several thousand projects to date go beyond job 
creation in these lower income regions to include support for young people 
and women to express themselves through cultural, artistic and athletic 
accomplishments.
More important, though, is what these improvements already mean to 
the lives of ordinary Turkish families. Throughout the country, parents and 
children alike can now look forward to healthier, more secure, more fulfilling 
lives—the underlying goal and core principle of human development.
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•	 China. The Minimum Livelihood Guarantee 
Scheme is the Chinese government’s main 
response to the new challenges of social pro-
tection brought about by increasing privat-
ization and engagement with the global 
market. It guarantees a minimum income in 
urban areas by filling the gap between actual 
income and a locally set poverty line. So, des-
pite increasing income inequality in China, 
there is potential for redistributive policies to 
reduce poverty and enhance food security. In 
addition, extending equal rights to migrants 
in cities can have a decisive impact on their 
ability to access comparable social services.
•	 Brazil. Despite slower economic growth than 
in China and India, Brazil has reduced in-
equality by introducing a poverty reduction 
programme, extending education and raising 
the minimum wage. Its conditional cash 
transfer programme Bolsa Escola, launched 
in 2001, followed the conceptual foundation 
of others in Latin America, such as Mexico’s 
Progresa (now called Oportunidades; 
box 3.9). In 2003 Bolsa Escola was expanded 
to Bolsa Familia by folding several other 
cash and in-kind transfer programmes into 
a unified targeting system under streamlined 
administration. By 2009, Bolsa Familia 
covered more than 12  million households 
across the country, or 97.3% of the target 
population. These programmes have also 
broken ground in terms of programme ad-
ministration and female empowerment by 
developing innovative distribution channels, 
such as ATM cards for low-income mothers 
without bank accounts. The result has been 
substantial declines in poverty and extreme 
poverty and reduced inequality.106
•	 Chile. In response to findings that state sub-
sidies were not reaching the extreme poor, 
Chile Solidario was launched in 2002 to reach 
the extreme poor with a combination of aid 
and skill development. Focusing on house-
hold assistance, it takes the view that extreme 
poverty is multidimensional, extending bey-
ond low income to include other deprivations 
in basic capabilities such as health and educa-
tion. Furthermore, poverty reduction requires 
the mitigation of vulnerability to common 
events, such as sickness, accidents and unem-
ployment. Together with other social policies, 
the programme has increased the take-up of 
BOX 3.9
Conditional cash transfer programmes and Mexico’s Oportunidades
Conditional cash transfer programmes are designed to increase beneficiaries’ 
incomes and their access to health and education by making transfers condi-
tional on requirements such as visits to health clinics and school attendance. 
They target certain beneficiaries (typically individuals from low-income or 
disadvantaged households) and provide support in cash instead of as in-kind 
benefits, with the transfers conditional on activities related to health and 
education. Moreover, the programmes can be designed to allow rigorous im-
pact evaluation. For instance, the Tekopora programme in Paraguay has been 
shown to have positive impacts on nutrition, health, education and poverty 
reduction without having negative impacts on labour supply.
Mexico’s Oportunidades is a conditional cash transfer programme tar-
geted to poor households conditional on children’s school attendance and 
medical checkups and parents’ attendance at community meetings where 
information is provided on personal health and hygiene. The programme is 
designed to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Originally 
called Progresa, it aims to alleviate current and future poverty by giving par-
ents financial incentives (cash) to invest in the health and education of their 
children. The programme, which started in 1997, is one of the largest condi-
tional cash transfer programmes in the world, distributing about $3 billion to 
some 5 million beneficiary households in 2012.
Oportunidades transfers, given bimonthly to female heads of house-
hold, have two parts. The first, received by all beneficiary households, 
is a fixed food stipend, conditional on family members obtaining preven-
tive medical care, and is intended to help families spend on more and 
better nutrition. The second comes in the form of education scholarships 
and is conditional on children attending school a minimum of 85% of the 
time and not repeating a grade more than twice. The education stipend 
provided for each child under age 18 enrolled in school between the 
third grade of primary school and the third (last) grade of junior high 
varies by grade and gender. It rises substantially after graduation from 
primary school and is higher for girls than for boys during secondary and 
tertiary school. Beneficiary children also receive money for school sup-
plies once a year.
Conditional cash transfer programmes cost less than traditional in-
kind social assistance interventions. Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and Mexico’s 
Oportunidades, the two largest programmes in Latin America, cost less than 
1% of GDP. In some cases they have been perceived as tools to provide 
access to universal basic rights such as health and education, but in others 
they have led to the exclusion of some localities due to the inadequate sup-
ply of services.
Source: Hailu and Veras Soares 2008; Ribas, Veras Soares and Hirata 2008.
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A broader social and 
poverty reduction 
agenda is needed 
in which policies to 
address inequalities, 
institutional failures, social 
barriers and personal 
vulnerabilities are as 
central as promoting 
economic growth
health and education services during boom 
times, while playing a countercyclical role in 
economic downturns by providing a much 
needed safety net to the poor.
The rising South is thus developing a broader 
social and poverty reduction agenda in which 
policies to address inequalities, institutional 
failures, social barriers and personal vulner-
abilities are as central as promoting economic 
growth. This follows from an increased under-
standing that social challenges extend beyond 
income poverty; they also include lack of access 
to education, poor health, social inequality and 
limited social integration (box 3.10).
*    *    *
An agenda for development transformation 
that promotes human development is multifa-
ceted. It expands people’s assets by universal-
izing access to basic social services; extending 
credit to the population, especially the poor; 
protecting common resources; and introducing 
land reform where relevant. It improves the 
functioning of state and social institutions to 
promote equitable growth where the benefits 
are widespread. It prioritizes rapid growth in 
employment and works to ensure that jobs are 
of high quality. It reduces bureaucratic and so-
cial constraints on economic action and social 
mobility. It holds leadership accountable. It in-
volves communities in setting budget priorities 
and disseminating information. And it focuses 
on social priorities.
Many countries of the South have demon-
strated what can be achieved through a devel-
opmental state. But even in higher achieving 
countries, continuing success is not guaranteed. 
Countries across the world are facing a series of 
challenges, from rising inequality to spreading 
environmental degradation. The next chapter 
addresses these threats and considers what is 
needed to sustain future progress in human 
development.
BOX 3.10 Michael Bloomberg, Mayor, New York City
Why New York City looked South for antipoverty policy advice
In New York City, we are working to better the lives of our residents in many 
ways. We continue to improve the quality of education in our schools. We 
have improved New Yorkers’ health by reducing smoking and obesity. And 
we have enhanced the city’s landscape by adding bike lanes and planting 
hundreds of thousands of trees.
We have also sought to reduce poverty by finding new and better ways 
to build self-sufficiency and prepare our young people for bright futures. To 
lead this effort, we established the Center for Economic Opportunity. Its 
mission is to identify strategies to help break the cycle of poverty through 
innovative education, health and employment initiatives.
Over the last six years, the centre has launched more than 50 pilot 
programmes in partnership with city agencies and hundreds of community- 
based organizations. It has developed a customized evaluation strategy for 
each of these pilots, monitoring their performance, comparing outcomes and 
determining which strategies are most successful at reducing poverty and 
expanding opportunity. Successful programmes are sustained with new pub-
lic and private funds. Unsuccessful programmes are discontinued, and re-
sources reinvested in new strategies. The centre’s findings are then shared 
across government agencies, with policymakers, with nonprofit partners and 
private donors and with colleagues across the country and around the world 
who are also seeking new ways to break the cycle of poverty.
New York is fortunate to have some of the world’s brightest minds work-
ing in our businesses and universities, but we recognize there is much to 
learn from programmes developed elsewhere. That is why the centre began 
its work by conducting a national and international survey of promising an-
tipoverty strategies.
In 2007, the centre launched Opportunity NYC: Family Rewards, the first 
conditional cash transfer programme in the United States. Based on similar 
programmes operating in more than 20 other countries, Family Rewards re-
duces poverty by providing households with incentives for preventive health 
care, education and job training. In designing Family Rewards, we drew on 
lessons from Brazil, Mexico and dozens of other countries. By the end of 
our three-year pilot, we had learned which programme elements worked in 
New York City and which did not; information that is now helpful to a new 
generation of programmes worldwide.
Before we launched Opportunity NYC: Family Rewards, I visited 
Toluca, Mexico, for a firsthand look at Mexico’s successful federal con-
ditional cash transfer programme, Oportunidades. We also participated 
in a North–South learning exchange hosted by the United Nations. 
We worked with the Rockefeller Foundation, the World Bank, the 
Organization of American States and other institutions and international 
policymakers to exchange experiences on conditional cash transfer pro-
grammes in Latin America, as well as in Indonesia, South Africa and 
Turkey.
Our international learning exchanges are not limited to these cash 
transfer initiatives; they also include innovative approaches to urban trans-
portation, new education initiatives and other programmes.
No one has a monopoly on good ideas, which is why New York will 
continue to learn from the best practices of other cities and countries. And 
as we adapt and evaluate new programmes in our own city, we remain com-
mitted to returning the favour and making a lasting difference in communi-
ties around the world.
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“Each generation will reap what 
the former generation has sown.”
Chinese proverb
“We have to free half of the 
human race, the women, 
so that they can help to 
free the other half.”
Emmeline Pankhurst
4.
Sustaining momentum
Much of the news about developing countries in recent decades has been positive, especially their accelerated progress in 
human development. But what of the future? Can these countries continue to advance human development at the same rapid 
pace, and can other countries in the South share in the benefits? Yes, with the right policies. These include enhancing equity, 
enabling voice and participation, confronting environmental pressures and managing demographic change. Policymakers 
will need to strive for greater policy ambition and to understand the high cost of policy inaction.
Over the next few years, policymakers in de-
veloping countries will need to follow an am-
bitious agenda that responds to difficult global 
conditions, notably the economic slowdown, 
which has decreased demand from the North. 
At the same time, they will need to address 
their own urgent policy priorities.
Policy priorities for 
developing countries
Four policy priorities stand out for developing 
countries over the next few years if they are to 
continue the gains of recent decades and if the 
benefits are to extend to countries still lagging 
behind:
•	 Enhancing equity. Equity and social justice, 
valuable in their own right, are important 
for expanding capabilities.1 Progress in hu-
man development is difficult to sustain in 
the face of growing or persistent inequity.2 
Inequity in specific capabilities—for ex-
ample, proxied and measured as disparities 
in health and education outcomes, as well 
as in income—also impedes progress in hu-
man development, though the effects may 
be less pronounced. At the core of these 
negative relationships is gender inequality: 
women’s health and education are crucial to 
addressing demographic and other human 
development challenges. Although some 
countries in Latin America and elsewhere 
have greatly reduced income inequality, not 
all countries recognize the importance of 
addressing inequality in health, education 
and income.3
•	 Enabling voice and participation. As educa-
tion levels rise and access to information and 
communication technologies spreads, people 
are demanding more participation in political 
processes, challenging decisionmakers to be 
more accountable and expand opportun-
ities for open public discourse. Restricted 
opportunities for political participation, at 
a time when unemployment is rising and the 
economic environment is deteriorating, can 
fuel civil unrest. Expanded opportunities for 
political participation, along with greater 
government accountability in ensuring that 
basic human needs are met, can foster human 
freedoms and sustain human development. 
Strong political participation by the relat-
ively deprived provides an important source 
of support for pro–human development 
policy change.
•	 Confronting environmental pressures. 
Climate change and local stresses on natural 
resources and ecosystems are increasing 
pressure on the environment in almost all 
countries, regardless of their stage of de-
velopment. Unless action is taken urgently, 
future progress in human development 
will be threatened. Building on scenarios 
developed for Human Development Report 
2011, this Report argues for aggressive ac-
tion nationally and internationally to tackle 
these challenges.
•	 Managing demographic change. In some de-
veloping countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, large cohorts of young people are 
entering the workforce. In other countries, 
notably in East Asia, the share of working- 
age people in the population is falling as 
the share of elderly rises. New policy inter-
ventions are needed to generate sufficient 
productive employment while meeting the 
growing demand for social protection.
There will be other challenges to human 
development, including volatile commodity 
prices, especially for food and fuel. In an in-
creasingly globalized world, these and other 
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concerns will make for a complex environment 
with attendant risks, including progress re-
versals, rising insecurity and greater inequal-
ity. Forecasting is difficult in such a complex 
environment because modelling may miss key 
variables, such as technological progress, that 
can dramatically change both production and 
personal possibilities. Nevertheless, modelling 
scenarios are helpful for illustrating policy 
choices and their implications.
Enhancing equity
Greater equity, including between men and 
women and across groups (religious, racial and 
others), is not only valuable in itself, but also 
essential for promoting human development. 
One of the most powerful instruments for 
advancing equity and human development is 
education, which builds people’s capacities and 
expands their freedom of choice. Education 
boosts people’s self-confidence and makes it 
easier for them to find better jobs, engage in 
public debate and make demands on govern-
ment for health care, social security and other 
entitlements.
Education also has striking benefits for 
health and mortality (see box 4.1 on differences 
in education futures in the Republic of Korea 
and India). Evidence worldwide establishes that 
BOX 4.1
Why population prospects will likely differ in the Republic of Korea and India
Educational attainment has risen rapidly in the Republic of Korea. In the 
1950s a large proportion of school-age children received no formal educa-
tion. Today, young Korean women are among the best educated women in 
the world: more than half have completed college. As a consequence, elder-
ly Koreans of the future will be much better educated than elderly Koreans 
of today (see figure), and because of the positive correlation between educa-
tion and health, they are also likely to be healthier.
Assuming that enrolment rates (which are high) remain constant, the 
proportion of the population younger than age 14 will drop from 16% in 2010 
to 13% in 2050. There will also be a marked shift in the population’s educa-
tion composition, with the proportion having a tertiary education projected 
to rise from 26% to 47%.
For India, the picture looks very different. Before 2000, more than half the 
adult population had no formal education. Despite the recent expansion in ba-
sic schooling and impressive growth in the number of better educated Indians 
(undoubtedly a key factor in India’s recent economic growth), the proportion 
of the adult population with no education will decline only slowly. Partly be-
cause of this lower level of education, particularly among women, India’s 
population is projected to grow rapidly, with India surpassing China as the 
most populous country. Even under an optimistic fast track scenario, which 
assumes education expansion similar to Korea’s, India’s education distribu-
tion in 2050 will still be highly unequal, with a sizeable group of uneducated 
(mostly elderly) adults. The rapid expansion in tertiary education under this 
scenario, however, will build a very well educated young adult labour force.
Comparative population and education futures in the Republic of Korea and India
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A mother’s education 
is more important to 
her child’s survival 
than is household 
income or wealth
better education of parents, especially of moth-
ers, improves child survival. Moreover, working 
women and more-educated women (who tend 
to complete their schooling before bearing 
children) are likely to have fewer children.4 
Educated women also have healthier children 
who are more likely to survive (table 4.1), thus 
reducing the incentive to have a larger family.5 
Educated women also have better access to con-
traception and use it more effectively.6
Drawing on Demographic and Health 
Surveys and micro-level surveys, research for 
this Report reinforces these arguments, finding 
mother’s education to be more important to 
child survival than household income or wealth 
is. This has profound policy implications, po-
tentially shifting emphasis from efforts to boost 
household income to measures to improve girls’ 
education.
This relationship can be illustrated by data 
on child mortality (see table 4.1). Many 
African countries, most notably Mali and 
Niger, have a high under-five mortality rate. 
But in every country, the mortality rate is 
lower among better educated mothers. In 
some countries, such as Nigeria, much lower 
child mortality is associated with primary 
education; in others, such as Liberia and 
Uganda, the decisive difference is associated 
with secondary education.
A modelling exercise conducted for this 
Report projects the impact of differences in 
education levels on child mortality over 2010–
2050 under two scenarios. The “base case” 
scenario assumes that current trends in educa-
tional attainment at the national level continue 
without substantial new funding commitments 
or policy initiatives. Under this assumption, 
the proportion of each group of children— 
categorized by age and gender—advancing to 
the next education level remains constant (see 
Technical appendix).
The “fast track” scenario assumes much 
more ambitious education policy targets, 
similar to those achieved in recent decades 
by the Republic of Korea, for example, with 
the proportion of schoolchildren advancing 
to the next education level steadily increasing 
TABLE 4.1
Under-five mortality rate and total fertility rate by mother’s education level
In selected countries, most recent year available since 2005
Country Survey year
Under-five mortality rate 
(per 1,000 live births)
Total fertility rate 
(births per woman)
No education Primary
Secondary 
or higher Overall No education Primary
Secondary 
or higher Overall
Bangladesh 2007 93 73 52 74 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.7
Egypt 2008 44 38 26 33 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.0
Ethiopia 2005 139 111 54 132 6.1 5.1 2.0 5.4
Ghana 2008 103 88 67 85 6.0 4.9 3.0 4.0
India 2005/2006 106 78 49 85 3.6 2.6 2.1 2.7
Indonesia 2007 94 60 38 51 2.4 2.8 2.6 2.6
Liberia 2009 164 162 131 158 7.1 6.2 3.9 5.9
Mali 2006 223 176 102 215 7.0 6.3 3.8 6.6
Niger 2006 222 209 92 218 7.2 7.0 4.8 7.0
Nigeria 2008 210 159 107 171 7.3 6.5 4.2 5.7
Rwanda 2007/2008 174 127 43 135 6.1 5.7 3.8 5.5
Uganda 2006 164 145 91 144 7.7 7.2 4.4 6.7
Zambia 2007 144 146 105 137 8.2 7.1 3.9 6.2
Note: Data refer to the period 10 years before the survey year.
Source: Lutz and KC 2013.
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A greater emphasis 
on education can 
substantially reduce 
child deaths in all 
countries and regions
over the years. The results from the fast track 
scenario show substantially fewer child deaths 
as mother’s level of schooling rises. The model 
also shows that a greater emphasis on progress 
in education would substantially and continu-
ally reduce child deaths in all countries and 
regions, as a direct result of improvements in 
girls’ education (table 4.2).
India has the most projected child deaths 
over 2010–2015, almost 7.9 million, account-
ing for about half the deaths among children 
under age 5 in Asia.7 In the final projection 
period, 2045–2050, nearly 6.1 million children 
are projected to die under the base case scenario 
but just half that many (3.1 million) under the 
fast track scenario.
China has more people than India but is pro-
jected to have less than a quarter (1.7 million) 
the number of child deaths over 2010–2015. 
And due to China’s advances in education, 
projections look optimistic under both scen-
arios. If China follows the fast track scenario, as 
seems likely, child deaths will decline to about 
half a million by 2045–2050, less than a third 
of the current level.
Projections are less optimistic for some 
other countries. Under the base case scenario, 
child deaths in Kenya, for example, would 
rise from about 582,000 in 2010–2015 to 
about 1.6 million in 2045–2050. Under the 
fast track scenario, the number of deaths 
over 2045–2050 would drop to 371,000, 
much better, but not far below the level in 
2010–2015.
The projected declines in child deaths re-
flect the combined effects of better educated 
women having fewer children and of fewer 
of those children dying. The projections also 
show that policy interventions have a greater 
impact where education outcomes are initially 
weaker.
These results underscore the importance of 
reducing gender inequality, especially in edu-
cation and in low Human Development Index 
TABLE 4.2
Projected number of deaths of children under age 5, by education scenario, 2010–2015, 2025–2030 and 
2045–2050 (thousands)
Country or region
2010–2015 2025–2030 2045–2050
Base case Base case Fast track Base case Fast track
Country
Brazil 328 224 177 161 102
China 1,716 897 871 625 526
India 7,872 6,707 4,806 6,096 3,064
Kenya 582 920 482 1,552 371
Korea, Rep. 9 8 9 7 7
Mali 488 519 318 541 150
Pakistan 1,927 1,641 1,225 1,676 773
South Africa 288 198 165 134 93
Region
Africa 16,552 18,964 12,095 24,185 7,495
Asia 15,029 11,715 8,924 10,561 5,681
Europe 276 209 204 196 187
Latin America and the Caribbean 1,192 963 704 950 413
North America 162 160 155 165 152
Oceania 11 11 11 12 10
Note: See Technical appendix at the end of this Report for a discussion of the base case and fast track scenarios.
Source: Lutz and KC 2013.
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Dissatisfaction is on the 
rise as people call for 
more opportunities to 
voice their concerns and 
influence policy, especially 
on basic social protection
(HDI) countries. Gender inequality is espe-
cially tragic not only because it excludes wo-
men from basic social opportunities, but also 
because it gravely imperils the life prospects of 
future generations.
Enabling voice and participation
In the 1995 Human Development Report, 
Mahbub ul Haq highlighted that unless people 
can participate meaningfully in the events and 
processes that shape their lives, national human 
development paths will be neither desirable nor 
sustainable.
Equitable and sustainable human devel-
opment requires systems of public discourse 
that encourage citizens to participate in the 
political process by expressing their views 
and voicing their concerns. People should be 
able to influence policymaking and results, 
and young people should be able to look for-
ward to greater economic opportunities and 
political accountability. Exclusion from this 
process limits people’s ability to communicate 
their concerns and needs and can perpetuate 
injustices.
Autocratic regimes impose restrictions 
that directly counter human development by 
restraining essential freedoms. But even in 
democracies, poor people and poor groups of-
ten have limited access to information, voice or 
public participation. Poor people need to work 
together to effectively exercise their political 
voice. Yet in many countries, organizations 
representing the poor are not supported but 
discouraged. Democracies can also extend 
accountability from what is often a narrow 
constituency of elites to all citizens, particu-
larly those who have been underrepresented in 
public discourse, such as women, youth and the 
poor.
Governments that do not respond to cit-
izens’ needs or widen opportunities for polit-
ical participation risk losing their legitimacy. 
Dissatisfaction is on the rise in the North 
and the South as people call for more oppor-
tunities to voice their concerns and influence 
policy, especially on basic social protection. 
According to a recent International Labour 
Organization report, government dissatisfac-
tion, measured by the Social Unrest Index, rose 
in 57 of 106 countries from 2010 to 2011. The 
largest increases were in countries of the North, 
followed by those in the Arab States and Sub-
Saharan Africa.9
People in the North have been protesting 
against austerity measures and reductions in 
public spending and jobs, as in France, Greece, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Citizens 
have challenged governments to address the 
social consequences of their policies, pointing 
out that the burden of austerity is being borne 
disproportionately by the poor and socially 
disadvantaged.10 Other focuses of unrest have 
included food prices, unemployment and 
pollution:
•	 Rising food prices. Riots in response to high 
food prices in 2008 challenged stability in 
more than 30 countries in Africa and the 
Arab States.11
•	 Unemployment and low wages. Workers are 
demanding that governments respond to 
their needs. The unemployed are voicing 
their dissatisfaction in many countries.12 In 
Viet Nam strikes doubled in 2011 as workers 
struggled to gain higher wages in the face of 
inflation.13
•	 Environmental pollution. Mass protests 
against environmental pollution are also 
widespread. Protesters in Shanghai, China, 
for example, fought a proposed wastewater 
pipeline,14 and in Malaysia local residents 
have been opposing the construction 
of a rare earth metal refinery in their 
neighbourhood.15
Among the most active protesters are youth, 
in part a response to job shortages and lim-
ited employment opportunities for educated 
young people. In a sample of 48 countries, 
youth unemployment was more than 20% in 
2011, well above the 9.6% overall rate.16 Youth 
discontent in response to rising unemploy-
ment is even more likely in areas with an edu-
cated population.17 Education alters people’s 
expectations of government and instils the 
political skills and resources needed to chal-
lenge government decisions. This is not to 
say that the educated have greater rights. But 
unless governments give greater priority to 
job creation, they are likely to face increasing 
youth dissatisfaction as education coverage 
expands (figure 4.1).18
At the same time, mobile broadband Internet 
and other modern technologies are opening 
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Participation and 
inclusivity, valuable in their 
own right, also improve 
the quality of policies and 
their implementation and 
reduce the probability 
of future upheaval
new channels through which citizens, particu-
larly young people, can demand accountability. 
They are also enabling people in different coun-
tries to share values and experiences, bringing 
them closer together.
The Internet and social media, as “low-cost 
aggregators” of public opinion, are amplify-
ing people’s voices. In China, for example, 
the post-1990 generation is highly educated, 
politically aware and outspoken on social 
media.19 Less than a week after the July 2011 
high-speed train accident in Wenzhou, China’s 
two major microblogs (weibos) had distributed 
some 26  million messages commenting on 
the accident and expressing concerns about 
safety.20
Social movements and media draw attention 
to specific issues, but this does not always 
result in political transformations that benefit 
the broader society. In India, for example, the 
Anna Hazare movement against corruption 
created pressure for change. Critics, however, 
point out that such movements can favour 
policies that may not be supported by the 
wider electorate. Thus, it is important to 
institutionalize participatory processes that 
can adjust the political balance by providing a 
platform for excluded citizens to demand ac-
countability and redress of inequities, ranging 
from systemic discrimination to unfair and 
unjust exclusion.21
Participation and inclusivity, valuable in 
their own right, also improve the quality of 
policies and their implementation and reduce 
the probability of future upheaval. Failure to 
build an accountable and responsive polity 
may foment discontent and civil strife. This can 
derail human development. History is replete 
with popular rebellions against unresponsive 
governments, as unrest deters investment and 
impedes growth and governments divert re-
sources to maintaining law and order.
In recent years, countries in both the North 
and the South have faced escalating crises of le-
gitimacy that have pitted citizens against their 
institutions. Millions of people in the Arab 
States have risen to demand opportunities, 
respect and dignity as well as fuller citizenship 
and a new social contract with those who 
govern in their name. As a result, Egypt, Libya 
and Tunisia have seen autocratic governments 
deposed, Yemen has embarked on an interna-
tionally brokered political transition, Jordan 
and Morocco have undertaken political re-
forms and Syrian Arab Republic is in the throes 
of civil war.
One way to foster peaceful change is to 
allow civil society to mature through open 
FIGURE 4.1
Under the fast track scenario, education outcomes are enhanced
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Accountability and 
inclusion are vital not only 
in the political sphere, 
but also in economic and 
social areas, through 
promoting job creation 
and social inclusion
practice. Even under autocratic governments, 
Egypt and Tunisia, for example, had fairly 
well developed associational structures and 
self- disciplined political opposition move-
ments. By contrast, Libya lacked such exper-
ience, which contributed to an all-out civil 
war. Building political cohesion after conflict 
is difficult in countries that lack a tradition 
of civic participation. Diverse experiences 
show that changes in political regimes do not 
automatically enhance voice, participation, in-
clusion or accountability or make states work 
more effectively.
Accountability and inclusion are vital not 
only in the political sphere, but also in eco-
nomic and social areas, through promoting 
job creation and social inclusion, especially in 
societies with a large and growing educated 
population. This requires effective mediating 
institutions; otherwise, modernization can 
be destabilizing.22 This is not to suggest that 
people should be educated only if there are 
jobs for them—in the human development 
paradigm, access to knowledge and education 
is an end in itself—but recent social upheavals 
show that a mismatch between education and 
economic opportunity can lead to alienation 
and despair, especially among young people.
Of the 20 countries with the largest increases 
in mean years of schooling over 1980–2010, 
8 were in the Arab States (figure 4.2). In most 
of these countries, employment opportunities 
failed to keep pace with educational attain-
ment. Most countries that were part of the 
recent unrest in the Arab States are in the lower 
right quadrant of figure 4.2, because they had 
major gains in educational attainment but 
below-median employment to population 
ratios.23
It is hard to predict when societies will 
reach a tipping point. Many factors precip-
itate demands for change. When educated 
FIGURE 4.2
In most countries, employment opportunities have not kept pace with educational attainment
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Around the world 
people are calling on 
governments to become 
more accountable to 
citizens and to expand 
public opportunities to 
influence policymaking
young people cannot find work, they tend 
to feel aggrieved. Average years of school-
ing have risen over the past 30 years in all 
countries with data available.24 Yet griev-
ances alone do not trigger upheavals. The 
public can be angry, but if people believe 
that the cost in time and effort to engage 
in political action outweighs the likelihood 
of real change, they may not act.25 Mass 
protests, especially by educated people, tend 
to erupt when bleak prospects for economic 
opportunities lower the opportunity cost of 
engaging in political activity. These “effort- 
intensive forms of political participation”26 
are then easily coordinated through new 
forms of mass communication.
Around the world people are calling on 
governments to become more accountable to 
citizens and to expand public opportunities to 
influence policymaking. Such transformations 
have taken place in the past. For example, Karl 
Polanyi documented the Great Transformation 
of 1944, where governments in the North 
responded to demands from civil society and 
labour unions to regulate the market and ex-
tend social protection so that the market served 
society rather than society being subservient to 
the market.27 Many governments introduced 
regulations to constrain the activities of firms 
and improve working conditions and ex-
tended social services and social protection. 
Governments also assumed power over mac-
roeconomic policy and introduced some re-
strictions on international trade. The time may 
be right again for a transformation, appropriate 
for 21st century concerns and conditions.28
Confronting environmental pressures
A major challenge for the world is to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. While it might seem 
that carbon productivity (GDP per unit of car-
bon dioxide) would rise with human develop-
ment, the correlation is quite weak (figure 4.3). 
At each HDI level, some countries have greater 
carbon productivity than others.
Consider medium HDI Guatemala and 
Morocco, countries with nearly identical 
HDI values. Guatemala’s carbon productivity 
($5.00 per kilogram in purchasing power parity 
terms) is nearly twice that of Morocco ($2.60). 
Differences can be just as great among provinces 
or states within countries, as in China.29 These 
findings reinforce the arguments that progress 
in human development need not worsen 
carbon use and that improved environmental 
policy can accompany human development.
To sustain progress in human development, 
far more attention needs to be paid to the 
impact human beings are having on the envir-
onment. The goal is high human development 
and a low ecological footprint per capita (the 
lower right quadrant of figure 1.7 in chapter 1). 
Only a few countries come close to creating 
such a globally reproducible high level of 
human development without exerting unsus-
tainable pressure on the planet’s ecological 
resources. Meeting this challenge on a global 
scale requires that all countries adjust their de-
velopment pathway: developed countries will 
need to reduce their ecological footprint, while 
developing countries will need to raise their 
HDI value without increasing their ecological 
footprint. Innovative clean technologies will 
play an important part in this.
FIGURE 4.3
At each HDI level, some countries have greater carbon productivity than others
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Some 3.1 billion more 
people would live 
in extreme income 
poverty in 2050 under 
an environmental 
disaster scenario than 
under the accelerated 
progress scenario
While environmental threats such as climate 
change, deforestation, air and water pollution, 
and natural disasters affect everyone, they hurt 
poor countries and poor communities most. 
Climate change is already exacerbating chronic 
environmental threats, and ecosystem losses 
are constraining livelihood opportunities, 
especially for poor people. A clean and safe 
environment should be seen as a right, not 
a privilege. The 2011 Human Development 
Report highlighted that equity and sustainab-
ility are inextricably linked. Sustainable soci-
eties need policies and structural changes that 
align human development and climate change 
goals through low-emission, climate-resilient 
strategies and innovative public-private finan-
cing mechanisms.30
Most disadvantaged people contribute little 
to global environmental deterioration, but 
they often bear the brunt of its impacts.31 For 
example, although low HDI countries contrib-
ute the least to global climate change, they are 
likely to experience the greatest loss in annual 
rainfall and the sharpest increases in its vari-
ability, with dire implications for agricultural 
production and livelihoods. The magnitude of 
such losses highlights the urgency of adopting 
coping measures to increase people’s resilience 
to global climate change.32
Natural disasters, which are increasing in 
frequency and intensity, cause enormous eco-
nomic damage and loss of human capabilities. 
In 2011 alone, natural disasters accompanying 
earthquakes (tsunamis, landslides and ground 
settlements) resulted in more than 20,000 
deaths and damages totalling $365  billion, 
including loss of homes for about a million 
people.33 The impact has been severe for small 
island developing states, some of which have 
incurred losses of 1% of GDP—and some as 
much as 8% or even multiples of their GDP. 
St. Lucia, for example, lost almost four times 
its GDP in 1988 from Hurricane Gilbert, 
and Granada lost twice its GDP in 2004 from 
Hurricane Ivan.34
The 2011 Human Development Report ex-
amined several environmental scenarios. The 
“environmental challenge” scenario factored 
in the anticipated adverse effects of global 
warming on agricultural production, access to 
clean water and improved sanitation, and pol-
lution. Under this scenario, the average global 
HDI value would be 8% lower by 2050 than 
under the “base case” scenario, which assumes 
a continuation but not a worsening of current 
environmental trends. Most dramatically, the 
average regional HDI value in both South Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa would be 12% lower 
under the environmental challenge scenario 
than under the base case scenario. Under a 
more severe “environmental disaster” scenario, 
the global HDI value in 2050 would fall 15% 
below that under the baseline scenario—22% 
below in South Asia and 24% below in Sub-
Saharan Africa, effectively halting or even 
reversing decades of human development pro-
gress in both regions.
This Report looks more specifically at the 
impact of these environmental scenarios on 
the number of people living in extreme income 
poverty (figure 4.4). Some 3.1  billion more 
people would live in extreme income poverty in 
2050 under the environmental disaster  scenario 
than under the accelerated progress scenario 
(table  4.3). Under the base case scenario, by 
contrast, the number of people in extreme 
income poverty worldwide would decline 
by 2050.
Some 2.7 billion more people would live in 
extreme income poverty under the environ-
mental disaster scenario than under the base 
case scenario, a consequence of two interrelated 
factors. First, the model shows an increase of 
1.9 billion people in extreme income poverty 
due to environmental degradation. Second, 
environmental calamities would keep some 
800 million poor people from rising out of ex-
treme income poverty, as they would otherwise 
have done under the base case scenario (see 
Technical appendix).
These outcomes underscore a central mes-
sage of this Report: environmental threats are 
among the most grave impediments to lifting 
human development, and their consequences 
for poverty are likely to be high. The longer 
action is delayed, the higher the cost will be.
Managing demographic change
Between 1970 and 2011, the world popu-
lation swelled from 3.6  billion to 7  billion. 
Development prospects are influenced by the 
age structure of the population, as well as its 
size.35 Declining fertility rates and shifts in 
Chapter 4 Sustaining momentum    |    95
age structure can have considerable effects on 
economic growth.36 Over 1970–2010, the de-
pendency ratio (the ratio of younger and older 
people to the working-age population ages 15–
64) declined sharply in most  regions—most 
dramatically in East Asia and the Pacific, where 
it dropped 39.5%, followed by Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the Arab States, where 
it fell 34%.
Over 2010–2050, however, dependency ra-
tios are likely to rise in medium, high and very 
high HDI countries, particularly in developed 
countries and in East Asia and the Pacific. In 
poorer regions, such as South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, dependency ratios will con-
tinue to fall, but more slowly.
Changing demography will profoundly affect 
most countries in the South in coming decades, 
FIGURE 4.4
Different environmental scenarios have different impacts on extreme poverty
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TABLE 4.3
Population in extreme poverty under the environmental disaster scenario, by region, 2010–2050 (millions)
Region 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Increase, 
2010–2050
Difference
From 
base case 
scenario, 2050
From 
accelerated 
progress 
scenario, 2050
Arab States 25 25 39 73 145 120 128 144
East Asia and the Pacific 211 142 211 363 530 319 501 522
Europe and Central Asia 14 6 17 32 45 30 41 44
Latin America and the Caribbean 34 50 90 138 167 134 135 155
South Asia 557 530 738 978 1,207 650 1,126 1,194
Sub-Saharan Africa 371 377 496 709 1,055 685 788 995
World 1,212 1,129 1,592 2,293 3,150 1,938 2,720 3,054
Note: Extreme poverty is defined as $1.25 a day in purchasing power parity terms. See Technical appendix for a discussion of the base case and fast track scenarios.
Source: HDRO calculations based on Pardee Center for International Futures (2013).
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Demographic trends 
are not deterministic. 
They can be influenced 
by education policies 
and sometimes by 
migration policies
but in very different ways. Some poorer coun-
tries will benefit from a demographic dividend 
as the share of the population in the workforce 
rises.37 Richer regions of the South, however, 
will confront the challenge of rising depend-
ency ratios, with ageing populations and full 
school enrolment mirrored by a decline in the 
number of people earning incomes.
In the long term, both demographic chal-
lenges can be mitigated by raising educational 
achievement. First, education accelerates 
reductions in fertility rates where they are 
still high. Second, education can boost labour 
productivity in richer countries with smaller 
workforces. At the same time, governments 
will need to foster job creation more actively to 
expand opportunities for productive employ-
ment for younger and older workers alike.
The failure of economic opportunity and 
productivity to keep pace with these demo-
graphic changes can not only keep countries 
from benefiting from the demographic di-
vidend, it can also threaten social stability, as 
seen in many countries in recent years.
Modelling demography 
and education
Demographic trends are not deterministic, 
however. They can be influenced, at least indir-
ectly, by education policies and sometimes by 
migration policies.38 Effective policy options 
can be identified by modelling demographic 
and education trends.39 Two scenarios for 
2010–2050 illustrate the impact of different 
policy responses: the base case scenario, in 
which enrolment ratios remain constant at 
each level of education, and a fast track scen-
ario, in which countries with the lowest initial 
education levels embrace ambitious education 
targets.40
The dependency ratio is an increasingly 
critical concern. A high dependency ratio can 
impoverish a country and lead to reversals in 
human development. The base case scenario 
projects a 9.7 percentage point decline in the 
dependency ratio over 2010–2050 for low 
HDI countries, a 9 percentage point increase 
for medium HDI countries, a 15.2 percentage 
point increase for high HDI countries and a 
28.7 percentage point increase for very high 
HDI countries (figure 4.5). Under the fast 
track scenario, the dependency ratio for low 
HDI countries drops 21.1 percentage points 
over 2010–2050, more than twice the decrease 
under the base case scenario. The dependency 
ratio rises more slowly under the fast track 
scenario than under the base case scenario for 
medium HDI countries (6.1 percentage points) 
and high HDI countries (4.9 percentage 
points); however, this rise is less pronounced 
for very high HDI countries.
Under the base case scenario, the share of 
the elderly in the population rises for all HDI 
groups: 3.9 percentage points for low HDI 
countries, 17.7 percentage points for medium 
HDI countries, 20.2 percentage points for high 
HDI countries and 22.3 percentage points for 
very high HDI countries.41 Over 2010–2050, 
the share of the young population is projec-
ted to fall in all HDI groups. For low HDI 
countries, the dependency ratio will decrease 
because the decline in the share of the young 
population is greater than the rise in the share 
of the elderly population.
In the Arab States, South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, the dependency ratio is pro-
jected to decline under the base case scenario 
and even faster under the fast track scenario. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the depend-
ency ratio falls 11.8 percentage points under 
the base case scenario and 25.7 percentage 
points under the fast track scenario.
In East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and 
Central Asia, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the dependency ratio is projected 
to increase. East Asia and the Pacific will see a 
striking increase in the share of the elderly—up 
25.8 percentage points, which is an even greater 
rise than in very high HDI countries.
Brazil and Chile demonstrate the potential 
for ambitious education policies to alter de-
pendency ratios. In Brazil, the dependency ra-
tio rises 15.6 percentage points under the base 
case scenario but only 10.8 percentage points 
under the fast track scenario (table 4.4). Chile 
would see a similar increase, 20.2 percentage 
points and 17.3 percentage points.
The challenges differ considerably by country 
under the two scenarios. Under the base case 
scenario, China would experience a more rapid 
increase (27.3 percentage points) than, say, 
Thailand (23.9 percentage points) or Indonesia 
Chapter 4 Sustaining momentum    |    97
(8.7 percentage points), countries where even a 
more ambitious education policy would have 
only a limited impact on dependency ratios 
because education levels are already high.
Countries can respond to a declining labour 
force in various ways. They can reduce unem-
ployment, promote labour productivity and 
foster greater labour force participation, partic-
ularly among women and older workers. They 
can also outsource work to offshore production 
and attract international migrants.42
Without proper policy measures, demo-
graphic dynamics can increase inequality in 
the short run, given that differences in the 
speed of the demographic transition across 
households give richer households an initial 
advantage. Declining fertility rates and shifts 
in age structures can affect economic growth.43 
Reinforcing the cross-country analysis conduc-
ted for this Report, a recent study finds that 
youth dependency ratios tend to be higher for 
poor households and lower for wealthier ones, 
especially in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and that differences in youth depend-
ency ratios between rich and poor dissipate 
over time.44 During demographic transitions, 
FIGURE 4.5
Education policies can alter dependency ratios
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the wealthiest people tend to lead the decline 
in fertility, producing a short-term increase in 
income inequality as they capture the benefits 
of demographic change first. Then the middle 
class catches up as its members educate daugh-
ters and plan families, followed by the poor. 
Eventually fertility is lower across all income 
groups, and the economic benefits of the demo-
graphic dividend are spread more evenly.45 This 
is consistent with previous studies for Latin 
America and Africa.46
This short-term rise in inequality is not 
inevitable, however, and can be influenced by 
public policies, especially in education and 
reproductive health, that enable the benefits 
of the demographic transition to reach all 
income groups at the same time. Consider 
the three countries with the largest declines in 
child dependency ratios: Côte d’Ivoire (with a 
GDP per capita in 2011 of $1,800), Namibia 
($6,800) and Peru ($10,300). In Côte d’Ivoire, 
the dependency ratio fell most among the rich 
and least among the poor; in Namibia, it fell 
most in the middle of the income range; and 
in Peru, it fell across the board in roughly equal 
amounts.47 See box 4.2 for a discussion of the 
distribution of the benefits of the demographic 
dividend in China and Ghana.
In 13 of 18 countries with a declining de-
pendency ratio and rising female education 
over 1970–2010, rising labour productivity 
over 1980–2008 and falling unemployment 
over 2005–2010, the female labour participa-
tion rate grew faster than the overall labour par-
ticipation rate over 2000–2004 to 2005–2010, 
indicating greater gender balance in the labour 
market. Employment, however, did not neces-
sarily become easier as education levels rose. 
Indeed, in some countries, the labour market 
situation became tighter for better educated 
female workers. Additional policy measures are 
needed to promote labour market conditions 
that offer productive opportunities for a more 
qualified and expanded labour force.
TABLE 4.4
Trends in dependency ratios, selected countries, 1970–2050
Country 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Scenario 2020 2030 2040 2050
Bangladesh 0.929 0.946 0.859 0.704 0.560
Base case 0.462 0.434 0.433 0.481
Fast track 0.457 0.422 0.418 0.465
Brazil 0.846 0.724 0.656 0.540 0.480
Base case 0.443 0.484 0.540 0.637
Fast track 0.437 0.460 0.499 0.589
Chile 0.811 0.629 0.564 0.540 0.457
Base case 0.471 0.549 0.609 0.659
Fast track 0.467 0.531 0.582 0.630
China 0.773 0.685 0.514 0.481 0.382
Base case 0.408 0.450 0.587 0.655
Fast track 0.404 0.434 0.562 0.628
Ghana 0.934 0.946 0.887 0.799 0.736
Base case 0.704 0.656 0.643 0.645
Fast track 0.686 0.595 0.548 0.532
India 0.796 0.759 0.717 0.638 0.551
Base case 0.518 0.496 0.491 0.511
Fast track 0.510 0.474 0.463 0.480
Indonesia 0.868 0.807 0.673 0.547 0.483
Base case 0.452 0.457 0.504 0.571
Fast track 0.451 0.454 0.501 0.567
Thailand 0.904 0.756 0.532 0.447 0.417
Base case 0.426 0.488 0.576 0.656
Fast track 0.425 0.484 0.570 0.650
Turkey 0.850 0.787 0.671 0.560 0.478
Base case 0.458 0.467 0.504 0.585
Fast track 0.450 0.443 0.473 0.547
Source: HDRO calculations based on Lutz and KC (2013). See Technical appendix for a discussion of the base case and fast track scenarios.
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Impact of the rate of 
population ageing
Populations are ageing faster than in the past, 
as fertility rates decline and life expectancy 
rises.48 For example, for the share of the elderly 
population to double from 7% to 14% took 
more than a century (from 1865 to 1980) in 
France, 85 years in Sweden, 83 in Australia and 
69 in the United States. Ageing is progressing 
faster still in developing countries. In eight of a 
sample of nine developing countries, the share 
of the elderly population is projected to reach 
14% in 30 years or less (figure 4.6). The only 
BOX 4.2
China and Ghana: who benefits from the demographic dividend?
The global trend towards slower population growth and population ageing 
is driven partly by China, the world’s most populous country, which is going 
through a demographic transition. For Sub-Saharan Africa, a fast track edu-
cation policy with incremental enrolment gains could accelerate the demo-
graphic transition and generate a demographic dividend for the region. The 
cases of China and Ghana illustrate what can happen.
China
In 1970, youth constituted the largest share of China’s population, resulting in 
a high dependency ratio of 0.770, with 1.08 boys for each girl among infants 
ages 0–4 (figure 1). By 2010, China’s population pyramid looked completely dif-
ferent. As fertility rates fell, the share of the working-age population rose faster 
than the share of the youth population, lowering the dependency ratio to 0.382. 
The gender imbalance became more pronounced among infants, with 1.18 boys 
for each girl. The productive-age population (ages 35–50), currently the largest 
population share, will reach retirement in 15–25 years. By 2030, China will thus 
face the challenge of an ageing population, putting more pressure on the social 
sector and raising the dependency ratio. At retirement, this cohort will have a 
higher educational attainment than its predecessors 40 years ago.
Under the fast track scenario, with strong education policies, the age struc-
ture of China’s population in 2050 will be transformed, with the population ages 
60–64 becoming the largest cohort. The education level of the working-age 
group will rise considerably, contributing to a more productive workforce. A 
more skilled and productive workforce could offset some of the negative effects 
of a high dependency ratio and a large share of older people. In this scenario, 
the ratio of boys to girls will fall to 1.06, close to the global average.
Figure 1 Demographic prospects for China
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Source: Lutz and KC 2013. See Technical appendix for a discussion of the base case and fast track 
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Ghana
In 1970, Ghana had a population of 8.7  million. The largest share of the 
population was young people, resulting in a high dependency ratio (0.934). 
The share of the population without formal education was also high, es-
pecially among women. By 2010, Ghana’s population had nearly tripled, to 
24.4 million. Its age structure had changed little, although improvements in 
life expectancy rounded out the middle of the pyramid. The youth popula-
tion, though smaller than in 1970, remained large, and the dependency ratio 
was still high, at 0.736. Education levels, however, had improved consider-
ably, and the share of people with primary and secondary education had 
increased.
Ghana’s prospects for 2050 differ markedly under the two education 
policy scenarios. In the base case, which assumes constant enrolment ratios 
over 2010–2050, Ghana’s population pyramid would remain triangular, with 
a large share of young people and a high dependency ratio (0.645; figure 2). 
The population is projected to reach 65.6 million in the base case scenario, 
but just 48.2 million in the fast track scenario.
Under the fast track scenario, the demographic outlook would change 
considerably as falling fertility rates lower the dependency ratio to 0.532, 
mainly because of the decrease of the youth as a share of Ghana’s total 
population. The share of working-age people with no education would also 
fall, implying a rise in productivity and improved capacity for benefiting from 
the demographic dividend, provided that job creation matches the labour 
supply of these new cohorts.
Figure 2 Demographic prospects for Ghana
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exception is Ghana, where it is expected to take 
50 years or more.
The rate of population ageing matters be-
cause if developing countries are still poor after 
the demographic transition, they will struggle 
to meet the needs of an older population. Many 
developing countries have only a brief window 
of opportunity to reap the full benefits of the 
demographic dividend of a larger working-age 
population.49
The need for ambitious policies
To accelerate and sustain development progress, 
countries need to adopt ambitious policies 
that expand women’s education and that have 
cross-cutting benefits for human development. 
Timing is critical. Countries that act promptly 
to take advantage of the demographic dividend 
and avoid further environmental damage can 
reap substantial gains. Countries that do not 
could face high costs that would be compoun-
ded over time.
The importance of bold, prompt policy ac-
tion can be demonstrated through two more 
scenarios that show the impact of different 
policy measures on projected HDI and its 
components in 2050. The base case scenario 
assumes continuity with historical trends and 
policies in recent decades. The accelerated pro-
gress scenario sets some of the choices and tar-
gets along 12 policy dimensions for aggressive 
but reasonable interventions to reduce poverty, 
expand infrastructure and improve governance. 
Examples of ambitious targets are a doubling of 
lending by international financial institutions 
over 10 years, a 50% increase in migration over 
20 years,50 a 20% increase in health spending 
over 10 years, a 20% expansion in infrastruc-
ture over 30 years and a 20% improvement in 
governance over 10 years.
The projections of the base case scenario are 
fairly optimistic in that they carry forward the 
momentum of advances over recent decades, 
including dramatic improvements in human 
development. Countries do much better under 
the accelerated progress scenario, with progress 
most rapid in low HDI countries (figure 4.7). 
Aggregate HDI rises 52% in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (from 0.402 to 0.612) and 36% in 
South Asia (from 0.527 to 0.714). Low HDI 
FIGURE 4.6
Populations are ageing more rapidly in developing 
countries
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FIGURE 4.7
Human development prospects for 2050 are 
greater under the accelerated progress scenario, 
especially for low HDI countries
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(2013).
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countries thus converge towards the levels of 
human development achieved by high and very 
high HDI countries.
Ambitious, fully integrated policies can 
thus provide strong leverage for advancing 
human development (figure 4.8). The effects 
are strongest for Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, followed by the Arab States and Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The impacts are 
weaker in Europe and Central Asia and in East 
Asia and the Pacific.
Across all regions, the greatest impacts result 
from policy interventions in health and educa-
tion. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, am-
bitious policies raise HDI value in 2050 from 
0.612 under the base case scenario to 0.651. 
In most regions, improving governance has 
the next greatest impact through progress on 
reducing corruption, strengthening democratic 
institutions and empowering women. In South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, however, infra-
structure investment is even more important.
The two scenarios show notable differences 
in the individual dimensions of the HDI. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, life expectancy rises from 
53.7 years in 2010 to 69.4 in 2050 under the 
base case scenario, partly in response to sus-
tained progress against HIV/AIDS and other 
communicable diseases, but to 72.9 under the 
accelerated progress scenario. Over the same 
period, the average years of formal education in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are projected to rise from 
4.3 to 6.7 under the base case scenario, but to 
8.1 under the accelerated progress scenario.
The gains under the accelerated progress 
scenario are even larger for GDP per capita (fig-
ure 4.9). This is true for all HDI groups, where 
differences across scenarios are considerable in 
both cases. Globally, GDP per capita would 
rise from $8,770 in 2010 to $17,873 in 2050 
under the base case scenario and to $27,995 
under the accelerated progress scenario. The 
largest differential gains would be in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, GDP per capita would rise from $1,769 
in 2010 to $5,730 in 2050 under the base case 
scenario and to an impressive $13,210 under 
the accelerated progress scenario—more than 
double the level under the base case scenario. 
Under the accelerated progress scenario, South 
Asia would see a stunning rise from $2,871 to 
$23,661.
The differential rise in income directly influ-
ences poverty reduction. Under the base case 
scenario, income poverty almost disappears in 
China but decreases only marginally in Sub-
Saharan Africa, as the population continues to 
grow, and remains high in India, which would 
still have more than 130 million poor people in 
2030. Under the accelerated progress scenario, 
the number of poor people falls much more 
rapidly, nearly disappearing in some countries 
and regions (table 4.5).
Substantially reducing poverty by 2050 de-
pends on ambitious policy measures. Failing to 
act boldly to avert the environmental disaster 
scenario, for instance, would severely inhibit 
poverty reduction.
Seizing the moment
Greater progress in human development is 
both possible and imperative. But accelerating 
FIGURE 4.8
Human development outcomes through 2050 improve more under the accelerated 
progress scenario
HDI
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
205020452040203520302025202020152010
Accelerated
progress scenario:
low, medium and 
high HDI countries
Base case scenario:
low, medium and 
high HDI countries
Accelerated
progress scenario:
very high HDI 
countries
Base case scenario:
very high HDI 
countries
Note: See Technical appendix for a definition of the base case and accelerated progress scenarios.
Source: HDRO calculations based on Pardee Center for International Futures (2013).
102    |    HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013
progress will require coordinated policy 
measures across development fronts. One of 
the most important of these is equity, because 
more- equitable societies fare better in most 
aspects of well-being and are more sustainable. 
Another is reducing child mortality: rapid 
progress is possible in all countries through 
education, particularly of women.
Policies also need to consider other forces 
that will influence development, especially 
people’s meaningful participation in the 
processes that shape their lives. Demand for 
participation grows as people become more 
educated and more connected. Other major 
issues are environmental and demographic 
change; countries need to act during brief 
windows of opportunity to avoid high costs in 
forgone human development.
Most of the opportunities for sustaining and 
even accelerating the momentum in human 
development lie in the hands of national gov-
ernments. In an increasingly globalized world, 
however, governments do not act alone. The 
final chapter considers the complex web of in-
ternational arrangements with which national 
governments need to engage and how regional 
and global institutions can work more effect-
ively for sustainable human development.
FIGURE 4.9
Advances in GDP per capita through 2050 are especially strong under the accelerated 
progress scenario
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TABLE 4.5
Number of people in extreme poverty by region and selected countries, base case and accelerated 
progress scenarios, 2010–2050 (millions)
Region or country 2010 2020 2030 2040
2050,
base case
2050,
accelerated 
progress
Arab States 25 19 17 16 17 1
East Asia and the Pacific 211 74 42 29 29 9
China 94 13 5 1 1 0
Europe and Central Asia 14 2 3 3 4 1
Latin America and the Caribbean 34 29 26 27 32 13
South Asia 557 382 243 135 81 13
India 416 270 134 53 21 2
Sub-Saharan Africa 371 333 297 275 267 60
World 1,212 841 627 485 430 96
Note: Extreme poverty is defined as $1.25 a day in purchasing power parity terms. See Technical appendix for a discussion of the base case and fast track 
scenarios.
Source: HDRO calculations based on Pardee Center for International Futures (2013).
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“Let us join hands to try to 
create a peaceful world where 
we can sleep in security 
and wake in happiness.”
Aung San Suu Kyi
“The forces that unite us are 
intrinsic and greater than 
the superimposed influences 
that keep us apart.”
Kwame Nkrumah
5.
Countries of the South have been developing 
rapidly, and many are much more actively 
engaged on the world stage. They have been 
pursuing their individual and collective 
interests through a variety of channels, par-
ticularly regional arrangements and bilateral 
partnerships that permit them to engage on 
issues of their choosing, often very much on 
their own terms. Brazil, China, India and other 
emerging economies have forged deeper and 
stronger economic relations with their neigh-
bours and across the developing world: they 
are rapidly expanding their global markets and 
production; they have presented innovative 
complements to the Bretton Woods financing 
institutions; they are increasingly influential in 
global regulation of trade, money and finance; 
and they are influencing culture, science, the 
environment, peace and security.
The new arrangements promoted by the 
South and the resulting pluralism are challen-
ging existing institutions and processes in the 
traditional domains of multilateralism—fin-
ance, trade, investment and health—sometimes 
directly and sometimes indirectly through 
alternative regional and subregional systems. 
Global and regional governance is becoming a 
multifaceted combination of new arrangements 
and old structures that need collective nurturing 
in multiple ways. Reforms in global institutions 
must be complemented by stronger cooperation 
with regional institutions—and in some cases 
broader mandates for those regional institu-
tions. The accountability of organizations must 
be extended to a wider group of countries, as 
well as to a wider group of stakeholders. In some 
respects, progress has become more difficult. 
Country groups are in flux, their coordination 
mechanisms have become increasingly unwieldy 
and in many cases deliberations among groups 
have come to a near standstill.1 The growing 
diversity of voices in international governance 
thus brings both opportunities and challenges 
for human development.
At the same time, there are signs of a more di-
verse global civil society.2 New voices from the 
South are calling for more accountability and 
broader representation. Civil society organ-
izations have already influenced global trans-
parency and rule setting on aid, debt, human 
rights, health and climate change. Civil society 
networks can now take advantage of new me-
dia and new communications technologies that 
make it easier to establish links between local 
and transnational activists and allow people 
to share ideas and concerns and to generate 
collective perspectives in a global public sphere.
In an interconnected world, every country’s 
actions have implications for its neighbours 
and, ultimately, for people everywhere, today 
and in the future. Responsible sovereignty re-
quires carefully and conscientiously taking into 
account the global and regional consequences 
of national behaviour.
Some major challenges can be addressed 
constructively at the regional or bilateral level, 
including regional trade and security issues. 
But these issues also require longer term in-
ternational solutions. The continuing impasse 
in negotiations at the Doha World Trade 
Organization (WTO) round impedes progress 
towards agricultural self-sufficiency and the 
Governance and partnerships 
for a new era
Today’s systems for international development and global governance are a mosaic of old structures and new arrange-
ments. The rise of the South will make these systems more diverse: international cooperation is likely to involve an even 
more complex web of bilateral, regional and global processes. All these structures, however, will need to work better 
in concert —particularly for the provision of public goods. Duplication of effort and failure to agree on common norms 
and goals are not just inefficient, but potentially counterproductive, setting back human progress. It is vital to strengthen 
both global and regional organizations while extending representation and accountability to a wider group of states and 
stakeholders to reflect the emergence of these new forces. This chapter considers options and offers conclusions for this 
new era of partnership.
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Areas of global 
international concern 
meriting urgent attention 
include trade, migration, 
climate change and 
development. Each 
area, along with its 
governance, has been 
significantly altered by 
the rise of the South
eradication of poverty and hunger in Africa 
and elsewhere in the developing world. Other 
urgent issues such as climate change can be re-
solved only globally, and failing to act on them 
collectively today will make them even more 
acute and costly in the future.
A new global view of public goods
This changing world has profound implications 
for the provision of public goods such as clean 
air and other shared resources that the market 
alone produces or allocates insufficiently or not 
at all and for which state mechanisms are es-
sential.3 Desirable global public goods include 
a stable climate and a healthy global commons. 
They require rules for more stable financial 
markets, progress on trade reforms (such as 
those involved in the Doha round of trade 
negotiations) and mechanisms to finance and 
produce green technologies.
To that end, we need to rethink what is pub-
lic and what is private, what is best provided 
unilaterally and what multilaterally, and, im-
portantly, when taking collective action, what 
our respective responsibilities are. Public provi-
sion of goods is important at the national and 
global levels, but coexistence of the public and 
the private is inevitable (box 5.1). For example, 
in responding to climate change and the deple-
tion of natural resources such as coal, oil and 
water, governments have partnered with the 
private sector to invest in research and develop-
ment for alternative sources of energy.
Areas of global international concern merit-
ing urgent attention and cooperation include 
trade, migration, climate change and devel-
opment. Each area, along with its governance, 
has been significantly altered by the rise of the 
South. At the same time, the new position of 
the South presents opportunities for agreement 
and improved cooperation.
Trade
Countries throughout the South would be-
nefit from the completion of the far-reaching 
international trade agreements envisioned by 
the Doha development round of the WTO. 
However, the Doha round remains stalled 
while an increasingly complex web of bilateral 
BOX 5.1
The shifting line between public and private in transportation
Whether mass transportation is provided publicly or privately has an impor-
tant bearing on shared development goals of sustainability and affordable 
access. A society more concerned with equitable outcomes is more likely to 
provide greater amounts of public transportation. Cost savings from econo-
mies of scale are passed on to the public in the form of relatively cheap 
access to public transportation. In more egalitarian societies, low-earning 
groups, including students, the elderly and the disabled, are likely to receive 
further discounts and subsidies. The idea is to reduce the excludability of 
transportation services.
Mass public transport can minimize the congestion and carbon emis-
sions from vehicles traditionally associated with private transportation. 
When a sizeable public transportation system already exists, it can be more 
amenable to the quick introduction of greener technologies. For example, 
New Delhi mandates the use of compressed natural gas in public buses, a 
much greener fuel than gasoline (the buses are run by both the public and 
the private sectors).
Environmentally conscious societies tend to incentivize the use of public 
over private transport through congestion and carbon taxes on private ve-
hicles, as in London, Milan and Singapore (and considered by San Francisco). 
Making public transportation affordable is not the only challenge. Because 
more-affluent people generally prefer private transport, the answer is to 
make public transport less of an inferior good by ensuring safety, efficiency 
and reliability.
Public-private partnerships could be one way forward. They tend to result 
in more efficient construction and operation of projects. The public partner 
safeguards property rights, provides the regulatory framework and some-
times uses subsidies to meet the gap between private and social returns.
Most railway projects in Latin America and the Caribbean have been 
implemented through public-private partnerships. India has one of the most 
rapidly expanding public-private partnership programmes in transport; be-
tween 1995 and 2006, about 230 public-private partnership projects costing 
$15.8  billion were implemented. China has extensively used the build- 
operate- transfer model of public-private partnerships for toll roads and other 
infrastructure, especially since the 2000s.
Spurred by increasing gas prices, private companies are likely to conduct 
research on greener fuels and technologies on their own account. However, 
public funding and incentives are also required to ensure socially optimal 
levels of research into greener fuels and technologies. Indeed, green tech-
nological breakthroughs are one of the most essential global public goods 
and must remain in the public domain.
Source: World Bank 2003, n.d.; Cheng, Hu and Zhao 2009.
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With the rise of the 
South, migration patterns 
are changing. Nearly 
half of remittances sent 
home to countries in 
the South come from 
emigrant workers in other 
developing countries
and regional trade arrangements has developed. 
These arrangements, involving fewer and some-
times more-homogeneous players, can align 
interests and realize mutual gains for those 
engaged, without the deadlock encountered at 
the multilateral level.
Subregional trade and investment groups, 
such as the Economic Community of West 
Africa States and the Common Market of 
the South, have facilitated greater economic 
interaction and policy cooperation in other 
areas as well, from security to water resource 
management. These bilateral and regional 
arrangements offer opportunities for further 
South–South economic integration and 
provide a training ground for building compet-
itive strengths.4
Still, despite the benefits of bilateral and re-
gional trade agreements, without better global 
trade rules and coordinating mechanisms there 
are considerable efficiency costs. While en-
couraging freer trade among members, trading 
blocs tend to erect barriers to free trade with 
each other, ultimately reducing global welfare.5 
Other efficiency losses can result from the 
increased market power that countries gain by 
consolidating into trading blocs.6 As research 
for this Report has shown, freer and fairer trade 
rules can accelerate human development when 
coupled with sustained public investment in 
human capabilities—including health, educa-
tion and other social services—and essential 
infrastructure—such as modern transportation 
and telecommunications links.
Many aspects of a freer, nondiscriminatory 
trade regime are best overseen by a stronger, 
reinvigorated set of multilateral agreements, 
but since regionalism may be here to stay, one 
way forward is to gradually “multilateralize re-
gionalism”. This would involve the WTO’s ini-
tiating “soft-law” ideas, such as the negotiation 
of voluntary best-practice guidelines for new 
regional trade agreements and modifications 
of existing ones: the WTO could, for example, 
organize a hierarchy of guidelines for North–
North, North–South and South–South re-
gional trade agreements.7
Migration
In 2010, at least 25 economies of the South 
reported remittance inflows from migrants 
exceeding 10% of GDP. Yet governance of 
migration is largely unilateral, by destination 
countries or bilateral. There are few mechan-
isms for multilateral coordination.8 Real hu-
man development concerns are at stake, most 
importantly, the rights of migrants. While re-
mittances provide income for poor households, 
social upheaval and disruption also come with 
large-scale migration. Multilateral mechanisms 
could liberalize and simplify channels that 
allow people to seek work abroad, ensure basic 
rights for migrants, reduce transaction costs as-
sociated with migration and improve outcomes 
for migrants and destination communities 
alike.9
With the rise of the South, migration pat-
terns are changing. Nearly half of remittances 
sent home to countries in the South come from 
emigrant workers in other developing coun-
tries. In recent years, regional organizations 
and economic integration processes have added 
migration to their agendas. These include the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the 
African Union, the Common Market of the 
South and the Southern African Development 
Community.10 In 2012, the Global Forum on 
Migration and Development held discussions 
on South–South migration for the first time.
While the governance of migration is not 
inevitably or exclusively a multilateral issue, 
international coordination mechanisms could 
provide a supporting framework for the emer-
ging networks of regional and bilateral agree-
ments. The beneficial impact of these dialogues 
could be multiplied by global initiatives on 
migration issues.
With the continuing growth in annual 
international migration—from an estimated 
70  million four decades ago to more than 
200  million today, originating largely from 
the South—there is a growing need for rules 
to protect the rights of migrants and provide 
agreed international norms for the flow of im-
migrants between source and host countries.11 
Such rules would benefit all parties, in both 
economic and social terms, while the costs of 
inaction will continue to mount. These costs 
are not solely or even primarily financial: they 
include the profound human costs of forcibly 
prolonged family separation, all-too-common 
mistreatment in the workplace and the unne-
cessary and indefensible degradation of human 
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dignity when foreign resident workers are not 
accorded basic legal rights.
Climate change
Climate change is perhaps the most widely 
recognized issue that requires global cooper-
ation through multilateral agreements. The 
South is going beyond bilateral approaches by 
incorporating ways to tackle climate change 
into national development strategies. China 
has pledged to reduce its carbon intensity 
(carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP) 
40%–45% from 2005 levels by 2020.12 In 2010, 
India announced voluntary targeted reductions 
of 20%–25% in carbon intensity.13 Korean law-
makers approved a national emissions trading 
programme in March 2012 to reduce emissions 
from factories and power plants.14 At the UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development 
in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, Mozambique an-
nounced a new Green Economy Roadmap. 
And Mexico recently enacted the world’s first 
comprehensive climate change law, aiming to 
cut emissions and build the renewable energy 
sector.15
Addressing climate change requires true 
multilateralism. For example, to reduce global 
greenhouse emissions by the amount required, 
the North and the South have to reach a mu-
tually acceptable and fair agreement on how 
to share responsibilities while ensuring that 
the legitimate development aspirations of the 
South can be met.
The 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development in Rio de Janeiro created oppor-
tunities for collaboration and alliances among 
groups of rich and poor; public and private; 
and civil, corporate and state bodies. For ex-
ample, Unilever, Coca-Cola and Walmart were 
among 20 large multinational corporations 
that committed, through the Consumer Goods 
Forum, to eliminating deforestation from 
their supply chains.16 Microsoft promised to 
go carbon-neutral by 2012. And FEMSA, the 
Latin American soft drink bottler, said it would 
obtain 85% of its energy needs in Mexico from 
renewable resources.17 Despite many promising 
initiatives though, a wide gap remains between 
the emissions reductions needed, on the one 
hand, and the modest reductions promised, on 
the other.
Development cooperation
An essential component of more-inclusive 
international governance should be more- 
inclusive and more- effective forms of develop-
ment cooperation. Developing countries are 
increasingly providing development assistance 
and investment bilaterally and regionally, 
through new financing arrangements and tech-
nological cooperation that offer alternatives 
to or complement the approaches of tradi-
tional donors and strengthen choices for aid 
recipients.
In 2011, developing countries and civil 
society organizations endorsed the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-
operation at the 4th High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Republic of Korea. 
Ownership, focus on results, inclusive develop-
ment partnerships, mutual accountability and 
transparency were selected as the underlying 
pillars for a new global monitoring framework. 
Stronger emphasis was placed on country sys-
tems as the way of doing business, coupled with 
a demand on behalf of partner countries to 
explain any deviance. Traditional Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) donors recognized that a different 
governance structure would be needed to sup-
port a broader partnership and accommodate 
emerging economies.18 Based on the core prin-
ciples of national ownership and capacity, this 
partnership would establish an international 
governing mechanism and indicators for assess-
ing progress.
Along with traditional donors, new de-
velopment partners, including Brazil, China 
and India, endorsed the principles of national 
ownership and capacity building. However, the 
Busan Declaration noted that these partners 
have domestic development challenges of their 
own and have their established methods of 
foreign cooperation. This was reflected in the 
text of the declaration, which stated that for 
these countries the “principles, commitments 
and actions agreed in Busan shall be the ref-
erence for south-south partnerships on a vol-
untary basis”.19 Moving forward, the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee and the 
United Nations Development Programme are 
to jointly support the new Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Cooperation 
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through the UN Development Cooperation 
Forum. Despite signatories’ commitment to 
transparency, the outcome document does 
not contain any other time-bound measurable 
commitments or targets to which citizens can 
hold them to account.
The post-Busan architecture has yet to 
take shape. But some intermediate priorities 
have surfaced. One is for traditional donors 
to meet their commitments from the 2005 
Group of Eight Gleneagles summit to increase 
aid and to deliver on better coordination and 
alignment.20 Traditional donors can also work 
with emerging donors, who can contribute 
knowledge and experience from a developing 
country perspective. The United Nations, with 
its universal membership, is well positioned 
to engage partners from the South in such tri-
lateral development cooperation through the 
UN Development Cooperation Forum. One 
of the main tasks is to achieve better alignment 
between North–South and South–South de-
velopment cooperation and global norms.
The Busan agreement marks a first step in re-
shaping development cooperation so that it can 
be more effective and better harness the poten-
tial of emerging countries. As with other global 
public goods, once common understanding is 
reached at the global level, operationalizing the 
principles can in most cases be decentralized to 
national governments using the agreed com-
mon policy frameworks. Take the Millennium 
Declaration of September 2000 and the global 
agreement on the Millennium Development 
Goals that eventually emerged. Agreement 
on these goals gave impetus to a wide range 
of activities and institutions by highlighting 
a simple truth: enhancing the capabilities of 
people and advancing the development of all 
societies are important global public goods.21 
The actual progress in the achievement of these 
goals has been very much at the country level, 
through national initiatives and ownership.
Better representation 
for the South
The current institutions and principles for in-
ternational governance require rethinking or at 
least recalibrating to accommodate the growing 
diversity in voice and power and to sustain 
long-term development progress. Many were 
designed, long before the rise of the South, for 
a post–Second World War order that does not 
match contemporary reality.
As a consequence, these institutions greatly 
underrepresent the South. Voting quotas in the 
Bretton Woods institutions are weighted to-
wards countries in the North, despite changing 
global economic realities. For example, China, 
which is the world’s second largest economy 
and holds more than $3  trillion in foreign 
reserves, has had a smaller voting share in the 
World Bank than both France and the United 
Kingdom.
Similarly, the United Nations Security 
Council makes decisions on global peace and 
security with a permanent membership that 
reflects the geopolitical structure of 1945. At 
the 2012 United Nations General Assembly 
meeting in New York, several heads of gov-
ernment from the South again voiced their 
long-standing demands for permanent seats on 
the council for Africa, Latin America and such 
unrepresented developing country powers as 
India.22
The major international institutions need 
to be more representative, transparent and ac-
countable. The Bretton Woods institutions, the 
regional development banks and even the UN 
system all risk diminishing relevance if they fail 
to represent all member states and their people 
adequately. These bodies need to respect and 
draw constructively on the experiences of both 
the South and the North and to aim for equit-
able and sustainable outcomes for present and 
future generations.
At the same time, the rising South has to 
assume more responsibility on the global stage, 
in line with its increasing economic power and 
political clout, including by contributing more 
resources to multilateral organizations.23 The 
South has to take larger leadership roles at both 
the regional and global levels. Greater transpar-
ency and accountability in global institutions, 
while desirable in and of themselves, will facilit-
ate more such participation by the South.
There have been some positive moves in this 
direction. Developing countries are already 
playing a greater role in the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions and in global dialogues through the 
summits for Group of 20 (G20) heads of state. 
The OECD has opened membership to some 
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developing countries. Developed countries 
should welcome these changes, as the success 
of the South extends benefits to the North and 
advances the prosperity of all.
Indeed, some intergovernmental processes 
would be invigorated by greater participation 
from the South, which can bring substantial 
financial, technological and human resources. 
Emerging economies could lead in achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals, innovat-
ing in climate change mitigation and conclud-
ing the Doha development round.
Global organizations that are more rep-
resentative of the world’s countries would in 
principle be accountable to the world’s people 
through national governments. However, state 
mediation alone is inadequate. International 
governance is increasingly influenced by 
a multitude of voices and actors through 
global movements and transnational activist 
networks. Indeed, this has been the thrust of 
antiglobalization movements, sometimes self-
described as “global democracy” movements, 
which cut across a range of issues, articulate di-
verse concerns and embrace an almost endless 
variety of political messages but share the basic 
concern of making transnational power and 
governance accountable to civil society.
To this end, today’s multilateral institutions 
are encouraged to recalibrate their representa-
tion and guiding principles, in areas such as:
•	 Voice. Matching the circles of stakeholders 
and decisionmakers so that all have an ef-
fective voice in global matters that concern 
them.
•	 Public goods. Building bridges across organ-
izational lines to facilitate the multilevel, 
multisector, multiactor production that 
many global public goods require.
•	 Leadership. Encouraging global leaders, state 
and nonstate, individually or collectively, to 
exercise leadership to assist the international 
community on issues that are caught in 
global policy stalemates and problems that 
are reaching crisis proportions.
•	 Convening. Realigning existing organizations 
to reflect changing global economic and 
political realities, and vesting them with the 
authority and expertise to effectively mediate 
among different stakeholders.
•	 Information and resources. Helping poorer 
countries in the South participate more 
effectively in global governance through bet-
ter access to information, technical assistance 
and finance.
•	 Citizen participation. Drawing on the wealth 
of ideas and views emerging from citizen 
networks and from participants previously 
sidelined from the global discourse.
International organizations are becoming 
more inclusive and sensitive to the require-
ments of a rapidly changing world. The United 
Nations Economic and Social Council, for 
example, has established the Development 
Cooperation Forum to promote more broad-
based discussion of development assistance. 
There is scope for renewed multilateralism. 
However, there have been only modest gov-
ernance reforms at the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The United 
Nations Security Council’s core structure re-
mains unchanged, despite decades of debate. 
More-determined reform is needed for multi-
lateral institutions to facilitate cross-national 
collaboration on stalemated global issues in 
ways viewed as fair and just by all countries.
Global civil society
International governance institutions can be 
held to account not just by member states, but 
also by global civil society, which can shape the 
exercise of power and act as a countervailing 
force to states and markets. All kinds of volun-
tary associations—including nongovernmental 
organizations, social movements, advocacy 
groups, unions and community groups—have 
used channels of influence such as elections, 
lobbying, media and public campaigns to be-
come drivers of social change within many lead-
ing countries of the South—including Brazil, 
Egypt, India and South Africa. In the Indian 
state of Kerala a rich history of civic engage-
ment influenced the government to prioritize 
extensive social rights and equity- promoting 
public policies. In Brazil, the Sanitarista move-
ment of health care professionals played a 
central role in developing the country’s public 
health care system and expanding services to 
the poor.24
National civil society groups are increasingly 
using their experience engaging with national 
governments to open up independent networks 
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of North–South and South–South dialogues 
outside traditional official international 
governance channels. These transnational 
networks are laying the groundwork for an 
emerging global civil society that is pushing for 
action on issues ranging from climate change to 
migration policy to human rights.
The potential for global civil society to influ-
ence decisionmaking on critical global issues 
has been greatly magnified by the Internet 
revolution, which enables hyperconnectivity 
of disparate groups and offers platforms for 
citizens’ ideas and concerns to spread rapidly 
around the globe. People can speak to people, 
and communities of scientists and other pro-
fessionals can share ideas, unmediated by state 
power or markets. This new ease of global com-
munication is fuelling creative partnerships, 
empowering individuals and social organiza-
tions, leading to new forms of solidarity and 
allowing people to interact and express their 
values internationally.
The recent uprisings in several Arab States 
countries, the culmination of complex his-
torical developments, have shown that social 
media is a force that world leaders and global 
institutions ignore at their peril. The rapid 
spread and wide response to the video Kony 
2012, about indicted war criminal Joseph 
Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army, showed 
that social media can engage many millions of 
people in discussion of important issues within 
days.25 There may be disagreement over the le-
gitimacy of particular concerns and platforms, 
but the rapid sharing of information across 
social networks clearly sways public opinion 
on issues that matter to the global citizenry and 
ultimately influences international governance.
Indeed, one of the most valuable tools of 
global civil society is the ability to diffuse new 
norms that transform the behaviour of state and 
private actors. By taking up and framing issues 
and pressuring states, civil society networks 
can put new issues on the table and influence 
government and international action towards 
new treaties, stronger enforcement mechanisms 
and even direct intervention. Classic examples 
of civil society influence on global norms 
include the global diffusion of the women’s 
suffrage movement, the antislavery movement 
and the Red Cross movement that led to the 
production of the Geneva conventions and the 
International Federation of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies. More recently, global 
civil society networks have been influential in 
institutionalizing anti–land mine legislation, 
more open access to AIDS medicines and cam-
paigns opposing violence against women.
While global civil society holds much 
potential for influencing international gov-
ernance norms and decisionmaking, the likely 
contribution of civil society organizations 
and transnational networks should be kept in 
perspective. Higher levels of resourcing lead 
the international nongovernmental organiza-
tions of the North to wield disproportionate 
influence in the global civil society space.26 
The international human rights regime, for 
example, often emphasizes civil and political 
rights, which are of particular concern to civil 
society in Eastern Europe, rather than social 
rights, which figure much more centrally in 
the demands of popular movements in the 
South. Limitations on civic space as well as 
other constraints can affect the capacity of civil 
society organizations to function.27 A further 
consideration is one of transparency, as it 
can be unclear how autonomous civil society 
groups are from state and market forces. When 
civil society organizations become extensions 
of state power, economic influence or tra-
ditional authority, civil society activity may 
magnify rather than reduce inequalities and 
instability.28
The future legitimacy of international 
governance will depend on the capabilities of 
institutions to engage with citizen networks 
and communities—understanding their con-
cerns and borrowing from their ideas and ap-
proaches to find direction for their own efforts 
and energies. Such engagement will maximize 
the legitimacy of their actions and ensure ac-
countability to the citizens of member states 
(box 5.2). The idea of ecological citizenship, for 
example, may be a promising way to construct 
from the ground up global public opinion on 
the provisioning of global public goods.29
To be effective, international organizations 
need to form productive partnerships with so-
cial media communities and nongovernmental 
organizations in the South and North alike. 
They should engage with citizen groups to sup-
port policy changes and a transition towards 
more-equitable principles and institutions of 
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international governance. The World Health 
Organization, for example, has had to man-
age state interests carefully and adjust to the 
emphasis on privatizing health services that 
became dominant in the 1980s. Its core com-
mitments to public health and its ties to civil 
society, however, have enabled it to continue to 
pursue policies that emphasize a rights-based 
approach to health.30
Towards coherent pluralism
The challenge facing the multilateral system in 
response to the rise of the South is not a false 
choice between globalism and regionalism or 
between older structures devised and managed 
by the traditional powers of the North and 
newer arrangements responding to the needs of 
the developing world. Rather, it is integrating, 
coordinating and in some cases reforming these 
institutions so that they can all work more 
effectively together. Diversity and flexibility in 
global governance mechanisms can be net pos-
itives for the international system but cannot 
substitute for the global pursuit of solutions to 
problems that are inherently global in nature. 
Policymakers working both regionally and 
internationally should strive towards a more 
coherent pluralism in multilateral governance, 
with shared norms and goals supporting varied 
yet complementary regional and global devel-
opment initiatives.
Recent experience in much of the South 
has shown that some public goods can be 
effectively provided at the regional level. As 
noted in chapter 2, regional institutions can 
sometimes respond to regional needs faster and 
more efficiently than can global forums—for 
example, programmes for eradicating endemic 
diseases, protecting shared ecosystems and 
removing barriers to intraregional commerce. 
In such  cases, it makes sense for like-minded 
neighbouring states to address these challenges 
cooperatively while pursuing global responses 
to these issues where needed.
Increasing regional cooperation can also have 
disadvantages—adding further complexity to 
an already diverse array of multilateral institu-
tions, with all the attendant risks of exclusion, 
duplication and interagency competition. In 
many areas, regional institutions have the po-
tential to complement global structures, even 
if that kind of coordination seems rare or inad-
equately synchronized today.
Global governance arrangements must 
respect the mixed strategies that countries 
are choosing. It is clear that developing and 
emerging economies are choosing to cooper-
ate in different ways—bilaterally, regionally 
BOX 5.2 Jo Leinen, Member of the European Parliament
A world parliament for global democracy?
Legitimacy and representativeness of the world’s people in global deci-
sionmaking are imperative for the governance of global issues, but global 
decisionmaking bodies have no institutional mechanisms for effective and 
influential citizen participation. At a time when intergovernmental decision-
making has shown its limits, the quest for equity and sustainability and the 
urgency of addressing defining challenges for our planet require the engage-
ment of the global citizenship.
A world parliament would complement the United Nations General 
Assembly—either formally integrated in the UN system or instituted as a 
separate body. This idea is not new, but as it matures, it is receiving increas-
ing support from civil society actors and regional parliaments (including the 
European, Latin American and African Parliaments) and was recently high-
lighted in the Manifesto for Global Democracy put forward by a multina-
tional group of intellectuals.1
A world parliament would be composed of delegates from national par-
liaments, representing multiple political parties from each country. Since 
the great majority of national parliaments are democratically elected, such 
a body would have a high level of representativeness and political ac-
countability. A world parliament would serve as a link between national 
policymaking and global decisionmaking, providing incentives for national 
parliaments and governments to consider the implications of decisions be-
yond national borders and instilling national parliaments with knowledge 
and experience on governing global issues.
This assembly could have one extended annual session, during which 
it would issue recommendations and add agenda items to the UN General 
Assembly and, by a qualified majority, submit agenda items to the UN 
Security Council for debate and decisions. The deliberations would possess 
a high moral and political authority, although the final decisionmaking power 
would remain with national governments. The composition of each national 
delegation could be determined either by national parliaments or through 
special elections allowing citizens to choose representatives for the world 
parliament. Delegation size would be proportional to a country’s population, 
an approach considerably different from international bodies where voting 
quotas are based on monetary contributions.
1. Beeston 2012.
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and internationally. Over time, as new sets 
of challenges have emerged, countries have 
created new forms of governance to deal with 
these. In finance, for example, countries want 
to diversify their exposure and their “insurance 
policies”. They seek to use a mixture of national 
reserves, bilateral credit lines, regional arrange-
ments and the IMF. The international regime 
needs to be pluralist while ensuring that co-
operation at the regional and subregional levels 
is consistent with mechanisms and policies at 
the international level.
The ultimate purpose of this “coherent 
pluralism” is to ensure that institutions at all 
levels work in a coordinated fashion to provide 
global public goods. The complementarity not 
just between global and regional institutions, 
but also across public, private and civil society 
organizations, has the potential to be con-
structive, even if it may appear fledgling and in-
adequate at present. Where new arrangements 
and new partnerships arise to meet the gaps 
left by old arrangements, they should be en-
couraged, avoiding duplication to the greatest 
extent possible. New arrangements at all levels 
must work in concert with each other and in 
step with existing multilateral organizations, 
aligning interests and sharing responsibilities.
While pluralism and greater diversity are 
welcome developments, duplication and ineffi-
ciency occur among the plethora of new organ-
izations. Moving towards a coherent structure, 
some organizations will survive, and others will 
be deemed redundant.
The governance of global public goods for 
sustained progress in human development re-
quires effective multilateralism. International 
institutions can also provide guidance on hu-
man rights and other universal principles and 
arbitrate in such areas as public international 
law. However, multilateralism will need to be 
more flexible to deal with new challenges and 
geopolitical realities. In a coherent pluralistic 
system, international institutions can serve as 
coordinating bodies, playing a catalytic or con-
vening role for all stakeholders. To do this, they 
need the mandate and sufficient expertise and 
resources to mediate and facilitate, to analyse 
and respond to often divergent interests and 
to propose workable and mutually beneficial 
outcomes. To fully engage the South, many 
international organizations need updating 
and transforming. The South in turn is more 
likely to use and fully support multilateral in-
stitutions that are seen to be acting as much in 
the interests of the South as in the interests of 
developed countries.
Financial architecture: redesign 
for the rising South
The rise of the South is creating new patterns of 
resource accumulation, potentially leading to a 
denser, multilayered and more heterogeneous 
financial architecture. This could promote fin-
ancial stability and resilience, support long-run 
productive capacities, advance human develop-
ment and enlarge national policy space.
In some cases, these emerging institutions 
and arrangements could substitute for some 
of the functions of the Bretton Woods institu-
tions, but in most cases, they complement the 
existing global financial architecture. Moreover, 
emerging institutions may prove transformative 
by prodding the Bretton Woods institutions to 
respond to concerns about representation, gov-
ernance principles and conditionalities.
The South has already developed several al-
ternative institutions and approaches, including 
regional monetary and support arrangements:
•	 The Chiang Mai Initiative emerged in the 
wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, tak-
ing the form of a series of swap arrangements 
among Asian countries. It evolved into the 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization, 
which allows members to draw on the 
multilateral swap facility to address bal-
ance of payments and short-term liquidity 
difficulties.
•	 The Arab Monetary Fund, founded in 1976 
by the 22 member countries of the League of 
Arab States, has some $2.7 billion to support 
emergency financing for member countries 
as well as broader monetary cooperation. 
There is also an aspiration for a unified Arab 
currency.31
•	 The Reserve Bank of India recently an-
nounced a $2  billion swap facility for 
members of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation.32
•	 The Latin American Reserve Fund, with a 
capitalization of about $2.3  billion, offers 
balance of payments support to members. 
It also guarantees third-party loans and 
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facilitates reserve investments and regional 
coordination of monetary policies. Its po-
tential is limited by its incomplete regional 
membership; Brazil, the region’s largest eco-
nomy, does not participate.33
•	 The Andean Development Corporation is 
gaining attention due to its fourfold growth 
in lending over 1991–2007 and almost 
exclusive ownership by members, nearly all 
of which are developing countries (except 
Portugal and Spain).34
Such regional arrangements, however, do not 
necessarily reduce the role of the IMF. Large 
disbursements from the funds can require bor-
rowing countries to be under IMF surveillance 
programmes, as with the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (box 5.3).
The evolving regional financial architecture 
fostered by countries of the South offers re-
newed space for policies that emphasize prag-
matism rather than ideology and ensures that 
conditionality is narrow and appropriate to 
the country (box 5.4).35 Regional institutions 
that lend closer to home are also more likely 
to design programmes that are more sensitive 
to political concerns and economically appro-
priate, with light-touch surveillance and less 
emphasis on conditionality.
Some institutions, such as the nascent Bank 
of the South,36 renounce conditionality al-
together. Others, including the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization and the Arab 
Monetary Fund, use conditionality only in 
specific circumstances, and it remains a point of 
discussion among members. Still others, such as 
the Latin American Reserve Fund, apply sur-
veillance but do not use the IMF’s top-down 
approach and instead collaborate with borrow-
ing governments.
Regional trade agreements
Regional and subregional trade arrangements 
have expanded and deepened in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America, even as the Doha round 
of global trade negotiations has stalled. 
Agreements that open up South–South trade 
hold enormous potential, with benefits at 
least as large as those providing greater access 
to markets in the North. OECD estimates 
BOX 5.3
Regional finance in Asia: Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization and the Asian Development Bank
The current financial crisis has been a powerful impetus for expanding 
the scope of the Chiang Mai Initiative, a regional agreement among the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, plus China, Japan and the Republic 
of Korea (ASEAN+3). In early 2009, the initiative was multilateralized and 
renamed the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization. At that time, dis-
bursements of more than 20% of the credits available to a country required 
that the borrowing country be under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
surveillance programme to address the difficult task of devising and imple-
menting regional surveillance.
ASEAN+3 members have continued to deepen the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization. In May 2012, the size of the currency swap pool was dou-
bled to $240 billion. For 2012–2013, the need to be under an IMF programme 
does not become operative until the swap drawn equals 30% of the maximum 
for the country (40% in 2014, pending the outcome of current discussions). The 
maturity of both the IMF-linked and the delinked swaps were lengthened. And 
for the first time, a precautionary credit line facility was introduced, allowing 
members to draw on swaps governed by a formula based on country size. (The 
Asian Bond Market Initiative was also expanded in May 2012.)
The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office opened on 30 January 
2012 to conduct IMF Article IV–type monitoring of members. It describes 
itself as the “regional surveillance unit of the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization”. Its purposes are to monitor and analyse regional econ-
omies and to contribute to the early detection of risks, implementation of 
remedial actions and effective decisionmaking by the initiative. Some ob-
servers have noted the tensions over the mandate and the continuing re-
luctance in Asia to criticize the policies of regional neighbours and thus the 
obstacles to conducting firm surveillance.
Prior to the global financial crisis, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
was already lending more in the region than the World Bank was. The cri-
sis accelerated this trend. In some cases, the ADB responded more quickly 
and with larger loans than the IMF and the World Bank did, and it intro-
duced new types of temporary rapid financing programmes and countercy-
clical lending facilities to support developing and low-income countries. In 
April 2009, Indonesia proposed that a portion of the IMF’s new financing 
be devolved to the ADB. With Group of 20 backing, the ADB introduced the 
Countercyclical Support Facility to provide up to $3 billion to economies in 
Asia affected by the crisis.
Between 2008 and 2009, the ADB’s lending commitments grew 42% 
and its disbursements 33%. Other regional development banks quickly fol-
lowed the ADB’s example and were granted a portion of the new funds com-
mitted to the IMF to establish new regional lending facilities to promote 
rapid counter cyclical support within their region.
Source: Woods 2010; Chin 2010, 2012; Ocampo and others 2010; ADB 2009; Ciorciari 2011; AMRO 2012.
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a welfare gain for the South of $59 billion if 
South–South tariffs were lowered to that of 
North–South levels.37 Even within Africa, 
given appropriate institutional arrangements 
for more open agricultural trade, there is huge 
potential for increasing the trade of the region’s 
many and diverse crops.
An example of a successful regional arrange-
ment is the Sao Paulo Round in 2010, in which 
22 developing countries agreed to reduce tariffs 
at least 20% on about 70% of the trade among 
themselves. The reductions were negotiated 
within the 1989 framework of the Global 
System of Trade Preferences, established to take 
advantage of the enabling clause within the 
agreements of the WTO, which allows devel-
oping countries to provide concessions to each 
other without jeopardizing their most favoured 
nation obligations.
Bilateral arrangements can facilitate trade 
flows when multilateral negotiations stall. 
Other options such as preferential trade ar-
rangements for furthering the goal of freer, 
nondiscriminatory trade could be overseen by a 
global multilateral institution like the WTO or 
by regional bodies.
Take, for example, negotiations aimed at re-
ducing the massive production and export sub-
sidies in agriculture given mainly by developed 
countries. Those subsidies distort world trade 
and expose farmers in developing countries to 
unfair competition. However, this issue is al-
most impossible to settle satisfactorily in a bilat-
eral or regional setting; it requires multilateral 
BOX 5.4 Enrique Garcia, President, CAF
CAF: a Latin American development bank
When established in 1970, the multilateral bank CAF had five Andean coun-
try members (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). Today, its 
shareholders include 18 countries from Latin America, the Caribbean and 
Europe as well as 14 private banks, and it obtains most of its funding in 
global financial markets. CAF promotes sustainable development and re-
gional integration through credit operations, grants and technical support 
and offers financial structuring to public and private sector projects in Latin 
America. Its headquarters are in Caracas, and it has offices in Asuncion, 
Bogota, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, La Paz, Lima, Madrid, Montevideo, Quito 
and Panama City. Over the last decade, Latin America has experienced rapid 
economic growth thanks to a favourable external environment, which has 
resulted in higher commodity prices, a stable macroeconomic environment 
and greater domestic demand due to poverty reduction and higher income. 
CAF has helped its member countries take advantage of these favourable 
economic conditions through a comprehensive development agenda that in-
cludes projects and programmes designed to support the region’s productive 
transformation and its competitive participation in the global economy, to 
improve the quality of institutions and to promote environmental conserva-
tion. CAF has provided substantial financing at times when markets were 
“dry” and other international financial institutions were imposing stringent 
conditions on their financing.
Among the reasons for CAF’s success in the region are its Latin American 
essence, the strong political and financial commitment of its member coun-
tries, the maintenance of prudent financial policies (especially in times of 
economic stress) and its policy of nonconditionality. Today, CAF is one of 
the main sources of multilateral financing for infrastructure and energy in 
the region, with approvals of more than $10 billion at the end of 2011, or 
some 30% of total multilateral lending for Latin America (compared with 
and $12.4 billion for the Inter-American Development Bank and $13.9 billion 
for the World Bank; see Ocampo and Titelman 2012). CAF’s countercycli-
cal role in times of economic turbulence in international markets and its 
support to shareholders when financing has become scarce have been espe-
cially valuable. In addition to channelling funds from international markets 
to the region, directed mainly to infrastructure projects, CAF, together with 
its member countries, has designed and implemented an ambitious agenda 
of programmes and projects supported by grants aimed at tackling some of 
Latin America’s major obstacles to growth.
CAF borrows in international capital markets through a funding strategy 
that aims to diversify sources of financing to mitigate interest rate and cur-
rency risks while matching the average maturity of its assets and liabilities 
to maintain sufficient liquidity in its portfolio. CAF obtained its first credit 
ratings in 1993 from the three main rating agencies, and its ratings have 
steadily improved, even during economic crises in the region. CAF is now 
the highest rated frequent bond issuer in Latin America. Since 1993 CAF 
has borrowed more than $13.9 billion through 87 bond issues in the most 
important international capital markets in the Asia, Europe Latin America 
and the United States. Prudent financial policies have made CAF a profit-
able institution that reinvests, through grants and technical cooperation, in 
programmes and projects to support its member countries.
CAF’s performance has been distinguished due to capacity to adapt 
to a changing and challenging environment. Of particular importance has 
been its governance structure. Since its foundation, CAF’s shareholders have 
given the institution the autonomy to design and implement operational poli-
cies without political pressure. Member countries have always supported 
the institution. Never in CAF’s history has a member country defaulted on its 
obligation, even during economic crises. With an ownership that is almost 
entirely Latin American (Portugal and Spain are minority shareholders due 
to their historical ties to the region), CAF has avoided the conflicts that have 
arisen in other multilateral institutions where donors’ and recipients’ aims 
are not always aligned. In this regard, CAF is recognized as an institution run 
by and for Latin America, providing a useful example of pragmatic financial 
integration.
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Responsible sovereignty 
takes the long-term 
interests of the world as a 
whole into account when 
formulating national policy
disciplines that can be negotiated only at the 
WTO. Most countries accept the necessity of 
a strong multilateral body to referee the rules 
of world trade while knowing that regionalism 
is here to stay; one way forward is to gradually 
“multilateralize regionalism”.38
Responsible sovereignty
While most governments support the 
principles of multilateralism, they are also 
understandably concerned with preserving 
national sovereignty. Overly strict adherence 
to the primacy of national sovereignty can 
encourage cross-border rivalries and zero-sum 
thinking. Countries on their own are less able 
to defend themselves from the contagion ef-
fects of financial crises or the ill effects of global 
warming. National action does not ensure 
that a country’s citizens have access to global 
public goods. Some governments are unable to 
sufficiently protect the human rights of their 
citizenry. A better strategy is responsible sover-
eignty—that is, taking the long-term interests 
of the world as a whole into account when 
formulating national policy.
Most global public goods depend on the 
effective management of cross-border con-
sequences and an adequate provision of na-
tional and regional public goods, and thus on 
national institutional capacity and a willingness 
to cooperate regionally and globally. Countries 
must take into account their respective inter-
national responsibilities in providing public 
goods and avoid undermining the collective 
welfare and the well-being of other countries, 
such as through pollution or other abuses of 
the global or regional commons. Responsible 
sovereignty includes taking steps towards 
collective  endeavours—such as trade liberal-
ization and climate change mitigation—that, 
if designed effectively, could greatly enhance 
global collective welfare.
In a highly interconnected world, effective 
national decisionmaking cannot be carried out 
in isolation from regional and global policies. 
National policies have regional and global 
consequences; examples include protectionist 
national responses to international economic 
downturns and the failure to regulate over-
fishing and ocean pollution. At the same time, 
regional and global policies provide a context 
for national policymaking. Countries and 
regional and multilateral organizations must 
come together and align national policies 
towards common international goals. In an 
increasingly globalized and interconnected 
world, this is a matter of enlightened self- 
interest: decisions taken at the national level 
today can affect people in all countries for gen-
erations to come.
If national leaders are unable to look bey-
ond narrowly conceived immediate national 
interests, the potential gains from cooper-
ation will be lost, and the costs of inaction 
will mount. National policies will undermine 
rather than reinforce and complement each 
other. Examples include public spending and 
stimulus policies in the wake of the global 
financial crisis: coordination by central banks 
around the world to lower interest rates in 
concert helped avert further deepening of the 
worldwide recession.
The South, due to its rising economic stature 
and political influence, is an increasingly im-
portant partner in global decisionmaking. The 
rise of the South, accompanied by stronger 
cross-border links, makes decisionmaking 
more interdependent than ever. The North 
and the South must find common ground for 
meaningful progress on today’s pressing global 
problems.
Responsible sovereignty also requires that 
states honour agreed universal human rights 
and obligations towards people residing in 
their territories and ensure their security and 
safety. The Responsibility to Protect initiative, 
for example, is an attempt to develop a new 
international security and human rights norm 
that can address the international community’s 
failures to prevent and stop genocides, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In this view, sovereignty is seen 
not just as a right, but also as a responsibility. 
While a positive step towards establishing 
guiding principles on global governance in 
human security, the initiative lacks procedures 
to ensure that the principles are upheld.39 
There are no agreed thresholds of violations 
or atrocities that would automatically activate 
international interventions. This mismatch 
between principles and procedures highlights 
the importance of building capacities into 
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The rise of the 
South presents 
opportunities 
for innovative 
new structures for 
development partnerships 
and new approaches to 
development policy, both 
globally and regionally
international governance systems to hold gov-
ernments and political systems accountable to 
the people they represent. Without binding 
mechanisms for holding states accountable to 
their citizens, the legitimacy of institutions 
such as the United Nations Security Council 
is brought into question. But agreement on a 
principle of responsible and mutually support-
ive sovereignty will be forthcoming only if the 
preconditions of global fairness and justice 
are met.
New institutions, new mechanisms
The rise of the South presents opportunities 
for innovative new structures for development 
partnerships and new approaches to devel-
opment policy, both globally and regionally. 
The substantial foreign reserves accumulated 
by the leading economies of the South could 
be leveraged for development financing in less 
developed countries, for example. New mech-
anisms for aid, trade and technology exchange 
within regions of the developing world can 
usefully parallel and complement existing ar-
rangements. The countries of the South them-
selves could take greater leadership roles in the 
global policy dialogue about the most urgent 
international development needs and about the 
most effective ways to meet these 21st century 
challenges.
Infrastructure development banks
The rise of the South is also creating new pos-
sibilities for financing equitable and sustainable 
human development. Brazil, China, India, the 
Russian Federation and South Africa, for ex-
ample, have proposed a BRICS Development 
Bank that would draw upon their considerable 
reserves to finance projects in developing 
countries.40 Like the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, such a bank 
could offer a range of instruments, including 
loans, equity and guarantees. In addition to 
financing productive projects, this flow of re-
sources would also assist with global financial 
rebalancing.
An important use for such reserves would be 
building infrastructure. To meet urgent needs, 
infrastructure spending in developing countries 
must reach $1.8–$2.3 trillion a year by 2020, or 
about 6%–8% of GDP, compared with current 
levels of $0.8–$0.9 trillion a year, or about 3% 
of GDP.41 One means of enabling and facilitat-
ing such investments would be through a devel-
opment bank for infrastructure and sustainable 
development. That could bolster developing 
country borrowing to finance economically 
productive infrastructure.
Because borrowers need to be concerned 
about debt sustainability, efforts are required to 
go beyond domestic government borrowing by 
leveraging other forms of financial assistance. A 
new institution could crowd in the right type 
of capital through guarantees and other instru-
ments.42 New institutions will be more effective 
if they work in concert with existing regional 
and global institutions, filling gaps in funding 
and investment.
Chapter 4 presented an accelerated progress 
scenario that set ambitious targets for raising 
the Human Development Index (HDI) value 
in all regions by 2050 through a series of pub-
lic spending initiatives. This scenario assumes 
about 20% improvement in infrastructure by 
2050, universal access to electricity by 2030, 
elimination of solid fuels as the primary 
source for heating and cooking in the home 
by 2030, renewable energy production 50% 
above the base case by 2050 and universal 
access to mobile telephone and broadband by 
2030. The largest projected increases in HDI 
value under this scenario are in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (65%) and South Asia (47%; figure 
5.1). Current average public investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia is around 
7.7% of GDP.43
Allocating a small fraction of the interna-
tional reserves of the nine G20 countries of 
the South could provide substantial additional 
resources for public investment in infrastruc-
ture in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
(figure 5.2). Depending on the share of reserves 
allocated, public investment would rise 17.6%–
52.8%. In fact, allocating just 3% of liquid in-
ternational reserves of the nine G20 countries 
of the South would increase the share of public 
investment in these countries 4.1%–11.7% of 
GDP, close to the average level of public invest-
ment for all developing countries.44
For reserve-holding countries and their sov-
ereign wealth funds, investing in developing 
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countries is financially attractive, allowing 
them to diversify while gaining higher profits 
without added risks.45 Sovereign wealth funds 
have long investment horizons and low risk 
of redemption, enabling them to make long-
term investments. Since many give priority to 
social over private returns, they can also take 
socially responsible positions. For example, 
Norway has applied global sustainability 
criteria to its sovereign wealth fund invest-
ments through the Norges Bank Investment 
Management, committing to the UN Global 
Compact Norms and investing in initiatives 
to reduce deforestation in Guyana, Indonesia 
and Tanzania.46 The governance challenge 
is to operationalize socially responsible in-
vestment, define suitable benchmarks and 
provide sovereign wealth funds easier access 
to investments with a high human develop-
ment impact.47
Institutions from the South, ranging from 
the BRICS Bank to the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization to the African Union, 
have considerable potential to influence 
international governance. Collective action 
requires a shared vision. The premise for this 
vision cannot be taken for granted. The pro-
liferation of regional and other arrangements 
shows that governments recognize the bene-
fits of, and have a commitment to, collective 
development.
A new South Commission?
In 1987, leaders of the Non-Aligned Move-
ment established the South Commission to ex-
plore policy options and areas for cooperation 
for the countries of the South. Its final report 
in 1990, The Challenge to the South, pro-
duced under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, 
then-president of Tanzania, and the economist 
Manmohan Singh, future prime minister of 
India, was a seminal and prescient analysis.48 
It identified climate change as a priority and 
underscored challenges that stubbornly persist 
today, such as poverty, social exclusion and 
the widening gap between rich and poor.49 
Equally important, the South Commission 
looked closely at the then-emerging possibil-
ities of greater South–South cooperation in 
aid, trade and other aspects of international 
policymaking.
FIGURE 5.1
Under the accelerated progress scenario, 
the largest projected increases in the Human 
Development Index are in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia
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Source: HDRO calculations based on Pardee Center for International Futures 
2013.
FIGURE 5.2
Allocating a small fraction of the international 
reserves of the nine G20 countries of the South 
could provide substantial additional resources for 
public investment in infrastructure in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia
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Rather than looking to 
the North for inspiration, 
developing countries are 
looking to their peers in 
the South for appropriate 
development models
The world and the South have been 
thoroughly transformed over the past two 
decades. The South of the 21st century is 
led by fast-growing economies with trillions 
of dollars of foreign exchange reserves and 
trillions more to invest outside their bor-
ders. Businesses from the South number 
among the world’s largest. The possibilities 
for collective action have never been greater; 
however, agreement on this cannot be taken 
for granted. The institutions for South–South 
co operation—the Group of 77, the Non-
Aligned Movement and South Summits—
were forged in the crucible of decolonization, 
which created strong political, economic, so-
cial, and cultural bonds among the emerging 
countries of the developing world. That form-
ative experience is increasingly distant from 
the current generation, and the commitment 
to South solidarity common to their elders is 
in many cases now giving way to the pursuit of 
national interests.
The new realities of the 21st century require 
a fresh look at these issues and at institutions 
led by the countries of the South themselves. 
A new South Commission, building on the 
legacy of the first commission but reflecting the 
strengths and needs of the South today, could 
provide a fresh vision, based on recognition of 
how the diversity of the South can be a force 
for a new kind of solidarity, aimed at acceler-
ating human development progress for decades 
to come. The economic links within the South 
and the mutual benefits of cooperation are 
likely to provide further incentives to establish 
such a body.
Conclusions: partners in a new era
The rise of the South has to some extent 
caught the world by surprise. The previous, 
if unspoken, assumption was that developing 
countries would steadily approach the stand-
ards of human development in industrialized 
countries (“convergence”) but that the indus-
trialized countries would remain in a strong, 
leading position. In many respects, that is still 
the case: average HDI values are substantially 
lower in many countries of the South. What 
has caught the world unawares, however, is that 
even at lower levels of human development, the 
countries of the South are now weighty players 
on the global stage, with the financial resources 
and political clout to sway international 
decisionmaking.
This was already evident during the early 
years of the 21st century, as China and other 
emerging economies accumulated vast re-
serves, which they held as US Treasury bonds, 
effectively propping up the US dollar. But the 
situation came into sharper relief after 2008, 
following the banking crisis and subsequent 
economic shocks that pushed some of the 
richer countries into recession and threatened 
the survival of one of the world’s major cur-
rencies. Now the countries of the North are 
looking to those of the South to keep the global 
economy moving forward.
In practice, each group of countries needs 
the other more than ever. The North needs the 
most vigorous countries of the South to sus-
tain demand for exported goods and services, 
especially as a number of their own economies 
and societies are weakened by fierce austerity 
programmes. The South needs the North not 
only as a mature market, but also as a source of 
innovation and complex technologies.
The rise of the South demonstrates that the 
world has become more diffuse and cross- 
connected. One consequence is that rather 
than looking to the North for inspiration, 
developing countries are looking to their peers 
in the South for appropriate development 
models. Here, rather than seeing a sterile 
menu of ideological options, they can examine 
what has worked, under what circumstances, 
and choose the most appropriate tools. 
Chapter 3 provided examples of programmes 
and policies that have worked to improve hu-
man development in emerging economies of 
the South, from investments in public health 
and education to conditional cash transfer 
programmes. Such examples can inspire sim-
ilar policies in other countries, but with un-
derstandings of specific national conditions, 
institutions and needs.
This Report has summarized some of the 
most effective drivers of development: a pro-
active developmental state, the capacity to 
tap into global markets and the promotion 
of social inclusion and broad-based human 
development. Within each of these there are 
multiple options but no universal solutions. 
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Good policymaking 
requires greater focus 
on enhancing social 
capacities, not just 
individual capabilities
What worked in one country might have 
stood little chance in another.
Nevertheless, the most successful coun-
tries have demonstrated that innovative and 
sometimes counterintuitive options can work. 
Paying parents to take their children to health 
clinics may seem unnecessary, but as the case 
of Mexico illustrates, it can work to improve 
children’s health; its conditional cash transfer 
programmes have sparked interest around the 
world. Similarly, using a mobile phone for 
banking made eminent sense in Kenya and 
the Philippines to people who had never had 
a personal bank account before and often lived 
nowhere near a bank office.
The countries of the South have thus been 
using their own ideas and energy to create a 
new momentum for human development. In a 
complex global political, economic and social 
environment, however, this dynamism may still 
not yield sustainable outcomes. Already there 
are signs of rising inequality and frustrated 
expectations that could lead to violent social 
strife. And there are serious concerns that over-
exploitation of global resources combined with 
the effects of climate change could wreck the 
earth for future generations.
That is why this Report has also focused on 
what is needed to ensure that human develop-
ment proceeds in ways that are both productive 
and sustainable. This includes measures aimed 
at enhancing equity, enabling voice and parti-
cipation, confronting environmental pressures 
and managing demographic change.
Addressing these issues will demand con-
siderable skill and commitment from national 
governments and civil society. As this chapter 
has argued, it will also demand much more 
fruitful global cooperation as national gov-
ernments, international organizations and a 
nascent global civil society feel their way to-
wards new models of mutual understanding 
and cooperation. Some of these will involve 
refashioning existing institutions to accom-
modate a new global power balance. Others 
may take any number of new institutional 
forms.
Through all this, the fundamental principles 
of human development endure. As ever, the 
aim is to expand the choices and capabilities for 
everyone, wherever they live. Many countries of 
the South have already demonstrated what can 
be done, but they have gone only part of the 
way. For the years ahead, this Report suggests 
five broad conclusions.
Rising economic strength in the 
South must be matched by a full 
commitment to human development
Investments in human development are justi-
fied not only on moral grounds, but also be-
cause good health, education and social welfare 
are key to success in a more competitive and dy-
namic world economy. In particular, these in-
vestments should target the poor— connecting 
them to markets and increasing their livelihood 
opportunities. Poverty is an injustice that can 
and should be remedied by determined action. 
There are sufficient global resources to achieve 
that goal, if they are directed towards that 
purpose.
Good policymaking also requires greater 
focus on enhancing social capacities, not just 
individual capabilities. Individuals function 
within social institutions that can limit or 
enhance their development potential. Policies 
that change social norms that limited human 
potential, such as new legal strictures against 
early marriages or dowry requirements, can 
open up additional opportunities for individu-
als to reach their full potential.
As this Report highlights, one consequence 
of the rise of the South is that most countries 
now have growing policy and fiscal space to set 
bold targets—to eliminate poverty, push for 
full employment commitments and innovate 
towards low-carbon pathways. More countries 
are unencumbered by conditionalities often at-
tached to international aid and resource trans-
fers, and the recent rise in commodity prices 
has reversed the long decline in terms of trade 
faced by many primary goods producers.50 This 
provides a cushion of resources that can be 
managed in ways that enhance national human 
development by governments committed to 
avoiding the “resource curse”.
Projections presented in chapter 4 reinforce 
this point. They show that with strong com-
mitment to human development and prudent 
macroeconomic policies, it is possible to reduce 
poverty dramatically in Sub-Saharan Africa—a 
region where baseline scenarios show a likely 
future increase in the number of poor people 
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The foundations exist 
for strong regional 
institutions, but more can 
be done to accelerate 
and deepen these 
relationships and 
ensure inclusiveness
because population growth outpaces economic 
growth.
Less developed countries can learn 
and benefit from the success of 
emerging economies in the South
The unprecedented accumulation of finan-
cial reserves and sovereign wealth funds in 
the South ($6.8 trillion) as well as the North 
($3.3  trillion) provides an opportunity to 
accelerate broad-based progress. Even a small 
portion of these funds dedicated to human de-
velopment and poverty eradication could have 
a large effect. As mentioned, public investment 
in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa could 
increase to 11.7% of GDP using just 3% of 
international reserves from some of the largest 
economies in the South.
At the same time, South–South trade and 
investment flows can leverage foreign markets 
in new ways, such as participating in regional 
and global value chains to facilitate the spread 
of ideas and technologies. Burgeoning South–
South trade and investment in particular can 
lay the basis for shifting manufacturing capacity 
to other less developed regions and countries. 
Recent Chinese and Indian joint ventures and 
startup manufacturing investments in Africa 
serve as a prelude to a much expanded force 
that this potential represents. To harness the 
full extent of this potential, new and innovative 
institutions may be called for. International 
production networks provide opportunities to 
speed up the development process by allowing 
countries to leap-frog to more sophisticated 
production nodes while offering the double 
benefit of protection against the vagaries of 
foreign exchange fluctuations.
South–South development cooperation and 
technology transfer hold immense potential 
to support human development. Technology 
transfers from the North require costly adapt-
ation due to differences in absorptive capacity, 
but technological transfers within the South 
are more likely to need little adaptation and 
to involve more-appropriate technologies and 
products. Growing markets in developing 
countries provide companies in the South an 
opportunity to mass market innovative and 
affordable versions of standard products, in-
cluding food, clothing, appliances and motor 
vehicles. Importantly, the sharp drop in the 
price of capital goods as a result of intense 
global competition led by China and India 
could accelerate the creation of manufactur-
ing production capacities in many developing 
countries. Such production can be adapted to 
the income levels and tastes of local consumers. 
This dynamic has the potential to provide 
the poor access to consumer goods, while 
innovators create jobs and develop producer 
capabilities.
New institutions and new partnerships 
can facilitate regional integration 
and South–South relationships
New institutions and partnerships can help 
countries share knowledge, experiences and 
technology.
In finance and aid, the South is already 
actively establishing regional governance insti-
tutions. Regional alternatives to the IMF, such 
as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization 
and the Latin American Reserve Fund, have 
freed up policy space for countries to pro-
tect national priorities while also addressing 
balance- of-payments problems and short-term 
liquidity issues.
The foundations exist for strong regional 
institutions, but more can be done to accelerate 
and deepen these relationships and ensure in-
clusiveness. As wealthy countries have curtailed 
aid to address domestic issues, regional devel-
opment banks and bilateral aid relationships 
provide additional resources for development 
projects. These new aid mechanisms also 
tend to emphasize pragmatism over ideology. 
Infrastructure development banks, for example, 
offer new possibilities for development finance. 
Brazil, China, India, the Russian Federation 
and South Africa have proposed a development 
bank to mobilize their considerable reserves to 
finance projects across developing countries. 
Building infrastructure would be an important 
use of such reserves.
Trade with other developing countries now 
accounts for a majority of merchandise and 
manufactures exports from developing coun-
tries, and these exports are increasingly skill- 
and technology-intensive. Stronger institutions 
are now needed to facilitate these South–
South trade and investment links. Expanded 
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A fair and less unequal 
world requires space for a 
multiplicity of voices and a 
system of public discourse
South–South trade and investment can reduce 
vulnerability to economic downturns in the 
North and provide opportunities to leverage 
foreign markets in new ways.
Regional trade and investment relationships 
can also be strengthened by streamlining 
transit, transport and customs procedures; 
harmonizing regulatory schemes; investing in 
regional transport infrastructure; and lowering 
tariffs on South–South trade in final products. 
Lowering such tariffs could yield collective 
gains of an estimated $59 billion for the eco-
nomies of the South.51
A new South Commission for the early 21st 
century could help bring a fresh vision of how 
the strength and diversity of the South can be 
a global force for development solidarity. The 
key elements are there: different endowments 
provide a basis for expanded exchange, diverse 
experiences are ripe for sharing, new cross-bor-
der partnerships can compete in world markets 
and, above all, the recognition and implement-
ation of win-win strategies can motivate new 
forms of South–South cooperation.
Greater representation for the South 
and civil society can accelerate 
progress on major global challenges
The rise of the South is leading to a greater 
diversity of voice on the world stage. This 
represents an opportunity to build governance 
institutions that fully represent all constituen-
cies that would make productive use of this di-
versity in finding solutions to world problems.
New guiding principles for international 
organizations are needed that incorporate the 
experience of the South. The G20 incorporates 
their experience, but the countries of the South 
also need more-equitable representation in 
the Bretton Woods institutions, the United 
Nations and other international bodies.
Active civil society and social movements, 
both national and transnational, are using the 
media to amplify their calls for just and fair 
governance. The spread of movements and in-
creasing platforms for vocalizing key messages 
and demands challenge governance institutions 
to adapt more-democratic and more-inclusive 
principles. More generally, a fair and less un-
equal world requires space for a multiplicity of 
voices and a system of public discourse.
The rise of the South presents 
new opportunities for generating 
a greater supply of public goods
A sustainable world requires both better gov-
ernance and a greater availability of global 
public goods. Global issues today are increasing 
in number and urgency, from mitigation of 
climate change and international economic 
and financial instability to the fight against 
terrorism and nuclear proliferation. They 
require a global response. Yet in many areas, 
inter national cooperation continues to be 
slow—and at times dangerously hesitant. The 
rise of the South presents new opportunities for 
providing global public goods more effectively 
and for unlocking today’s many stalemated 
global issues.
“Publicness” and “privateness” are in most 
cases not innate properties of a public good 
but social constructs. As such, they represent a 
policy choice. National governments can step 
in when there is underprovision at the national 
level, but when global challenges arise, interna-
tional cooperation is necessary and can happen 
only by voluntary action of many governments. 
Given the many pressing challenges, progress in 
determining what is public and what is private 
will require strong, committed, personal and 
institutional leadership.
*    *    *
The rise of the South is fundamentally the 
story of the fast-paced transformation of the 
developing world and its profound impact 
on diverse facets of human development. 
Global discussions of this phenomenon so far 
have focused almost exclusively on economic 
growth in the biggest developing countries. 
This Report uses a human development lens 
to cast a wider net and show that the impacts 
are widespread in terms of the large number of 
developing countries involved and the inter-
twining of ever-growing global challenges and 
possibilities—from environmental sustainabil-
ity and equity to poverty eradication and the 
reform of global institutions. The changes are 
occurring at unprecedented speed and scale, 
propelled by interaction with the wider world 
through trade, travel and telecommunications 
in ways that were not possible before.
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The fast-developing countries chose their 
own distinct development pathways. Yet they 
share important characteristics, including 
effective leadership from governments, open 
engagement with the world economy and in-
novative social policies addressing domestic hu-
man development needs. They also face many 
of the same challenges, from social inequalities 
to environmental risks. And they have de-
veloped their own domestic policy approaches 
with increasing autonomy, for their own sov-
ereign national reasons, without the strictures 
of enforced conditionality or imposed external 
models.
The South’s progress is propelled by inter-
connections with developed countries and 
increasingly with the developing world. In 
fact, economic exchanges are expanding 
faster  “horizontally”—on a South–South 
basis—than on the traditional North–South 
axis. People are sharing ideas and experiences 
through new communications channels and 
seeking greater accountability from govern-
ments and international institutions alike. The 
South as a whole is driving global economic 
growth and societal change for the first time in 
centuries. The South still needs the North, but, 
increasingly, the North also needs the South.
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Singapore and countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe that have joined 
the European Union. This gives a bal-
anced panel of 96 countries between 
1990 and 2012.
4 The internal armed conflict also 
meant that national statistics often 
excluded the northeast of the country.
5 UNDP 1993, 1996.
6 UNDP 1996.
7 Abe 2006.
8 For elaboration of the concepts of 
ownership and capacity for develop-
ment, see Fukuda-Parr, Lopes and 
Malik (2002).
9 See Commission on Growth and 
Development (2008).
10 For example, Rodrik (2004) empha-
sized that no short list of evident 
policy reforms can be applied to yield 
growth in developing countries.
11 Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 2005.
12 Serra and Stiglitz 2008.
13 Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco 2005.
14 Arrighi (2007) argues that self-
regulating markets are not the means 
to development and that governments 
must play a leading role in organizing 
market exchange and divisions of 
labour.
15 A country is said to have comparative 
advantage in an economic activity 
if it can undertake that activity at a 
lower opportunity cost than another 
country can.
16 See Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare 
(2010) for single-industry, cross-in-
dustry and cross-country evidence on 
infant industry protection and other 
forms of industrial policy. Succeeding 
in world markets is just one criterion 
(“Mill” test) for justifying government 
support. Such success can come at a 
net welfare cost to the economy and 
fail the “Bastable” test, which re-
quires the discounted future benefits 
to compensate for short-term costs 
of protection. According to Harrison 
and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), more 
instances of industrial policy satisfy 
the Mill test than the Bastable test.
17 Rodrik 2012, p. 9.
18 Chibber 1999.
19 Osmani 2005.
20 Ranis and Stewart 2005.
21 India Ministry of Finance 2012.
22 Rodrik 2005.
23 See Das (2000) and DeLong (2004).
24 UNCTAD 2003.
25 Done 2011. Between 1996 and 2005 
Embraer delivered 710 regional jets 
around the world (Baer 2008).
26 Pasha and Palanivel 2004.
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27 UNDP 1993, 1996.
28 Fine and others (2012), whose clas-
sification of Africa includes North 
Africa as well as Sub-Saharan Africa.
29 Fine and others 2012.
30 AfDB and others 2012.
31 Subramanian and Roy 2001.
32 Chuhan-Pole and Angwafo 2011.
33 The headcount poverty rate fell 
from 52% in 1983–1984 to 50% in 
1991–1992; by 2000, it had dropped 
to 40% (Osmani and others 2006).
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35 Nielsen and Spenceley 2011.
36 Kabananukye and others 2004.
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in this paragraph draw on Fine and 
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42 Cammett 2007.
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44 Agosin 1997.
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48 Ravallion 2009.
49 Malik 2012.
50 Rodrik 2011.
51 For faster economic growth, accessing 
world markets alone is not enough: 
the sophistication of exports matters 
equally, for which constant upgrading 
with the aid of foreign knowhow 
is key (see Hausmann, Hwang and 
Rodrik 2007).
52 Commission on Growth and 
Development (2008, p. 22).
53 Rodrik 2001.
54 See Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for 
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in this vein: Dollar (1992), Sachs and 
Warner (1995), Edwards (1998) and 
Frankel and Romer (1999).
55 Winters 2004.
56 The case for the use of in-depth 
country-specific case studies to un-
derstand and evaluate policy regimes 
is best articulated by Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (2001). They note that 
even if the theoretical, data and 
methodological weaknesses inherent 
in most cross-country regressions 
were ignored, cross-country results 
indicate only average effects, mask-
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57 Rodrik 2001.
58 See Baldwin (2004) and refer-
ences therein to notable country case 
studies.
59 Wacziarg and Welch 2008.
60 Rodrik 2011.
61 Mauritius embraced global markets 
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preferences and quotas, notably to 
export sugar and clothing. In the 
2000s, with the termination of quotas 
that governed world trade in textiles 
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EU sugar protocol prices, Mauritius 
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64 China can be viewed as a case that 
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65 Ahluwalia 2002.
66 OECD 2007.
67 Ahluwalia 2002.
68 World Bank 2012a.
69 Celasun 1994.
70 In addition to import protection, 
export promotion measures were also 
used to further industrial develop-
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and others (2008) measured the share 
of students in each country who reach 
a threshold of basic competency in 
mathematics and science, as well as 
the share of students who perform at 
very high levels.
90 Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2007) 
found that a one year increase in a 
population’s life expectancy contributes 
to a 4% increase in output. Similar 
positive effects are also associated 
with improvements in reproductive 
health. In a study of 97 countries, 
Bloom and others (2009) found that 
higher fertility is associated with lower 
labour force participation of women 
during their fertile years. On average, 
each additional child reduces female 
labour force participation 5–10 percent-
age points for women ages 20–44.
91 Stern 2003.
92 Cornia 2004.
93 Rodrik 1998.
94 Stern 2003.
95 Ssewanyana, Matovu and Twimukye 
2011.
96 Foster and Mijumbi 2002.
97 Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003.
98 Essama-Nssah 2011.
99 Sivananthiran and Venkata Ratnam 
2005.
100 Tsounta 2009.
101 Tangcharoensathien and others 2011.
102 UNESCAP 2011.
103 Frenk, Gómez-Dantés and Knaul 2009.
104 Kanbur 2004.
105 Ravallion 2009.
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Chapter 4
1 The distinction between equity and 
equality is linked to the difference 
between what can be observed and 
what cannot be. Equity is associated 
with equal opportunities, which are 
not observable. Unfortunately, as 
only outcomes can be observed and 
measured, the evaluation of whether 
a society is equitable can only be 
approximated based on the degree of 
prevailing inequality.
2 Inequalities across racial, ethnic and 
religious groups are particularly likely 
to cause political violence and tend 
to be extremely persistent unless 
confronted by comprehensive policies 
(Stewart 2013).
3 This beneficial trend in Latin America 
is driven by declining labour income 
inequality, a closing wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled workers 
and conditional cash transfers (see 
López-Calva and Lustig 2010).
4 Cleland 2002. Martin and Juarez 
(1995) argue that in some cases, 
over the short term, education does 
not necessarily immediately affect 
reproductive behaviour. See also Hori 
(2011); Serbessa (2002); Cochrane 
(1979); Bloom and others (2009); 
Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1992).
5 Taylor, Newman and Kelly 1976.
6 UNDESA 2007; Diamond, Newby and 
Varle 1999; Population Reference 
Bureau 2000.
7 This indicator is more commonly 
reported as deaths per 1,000 live 
births, or the infant mortality rate, 
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which is 61.7 deaths per 1,000 live 
birth per year.
8 UNDP 1995.
9 ILO 2012. The International Labour 
Organization constructed the index 
using Gallup survey data.
10 Westaway 2012.
11 Lagi, Bertrand and Bar-Yam 2011. The 
Food and Agriculture Organization 
food price index topped 180 in 2008.
12 ILO 2012. According to International 
Labour Organization estimates based 
on Gallup data, the majority of people 
in nearly all regions of the world are 
not satisfied with the availability of 
quality jobs. Dissatisfaction is highest 
in Central and Eastern Europe and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the 
Middle East and North Africa.
13 Bland 2012.
14 Tejada 2012.
15 Gooch 2012.
16 ILO 2012.
17 See, for example, Jenkins and 
Wallace (1996), who find an associa-
tion between education and protest 
involvement, and Dalton, Van Sickle 
and Weldon (2010), who find a strong 
positive correlation between educa-
tion levels and protest involvement 
across a wide range of developed and 
developing countries.
18 Between now and 2050, under varying 
assumptions, the share of the global 
population older than age 15 that 
is uneducated is projected to fall to 
either 3% or 8% depending on the 
scenario, down from 12% in 2010; the 
share of the population with second-
ary or tertiary education will rise to 
either 50% or 64% depending on the 
scenario, up from 44% in 2010 (see 
figure 4.1).
19 Hook 2012.
20 LaFraniere 2011; Wines and 
LaFraniere 2011.
21 Amartya Sen makes this distinction: 
unfair exclusion means that some 
people are kept out or left out; unjust 
inclusion means that some people 
are included on deeply unfavourable 
terms (APRI 2003).
22 Huntington (1968), cited in Campante 
and Chor (2012).
23 See Campante and Chor (2012).
24 Based on health, education and 
income attainments in 78 countries 
over 1980–2011. Unlike mean years of 
schooling, health and income attain-
ments have been reversed during this 
period in some countries.
25 Campante and Chor 2012.
26 Campante and Chor 2012, p. 175.
27 Polanyi 1944.
28 FitzGerald, Stewart and Venugopal 
2006.
29 For example, Guangdong Province and 
Liaoning Province have similar HDI 
values, but Guangdong has more than 
three times the carbon productivity of 
Liaoning (UNDP 2010c).
30 UNDP 2011a.
31 See UNDP (2011a) for more detail.
32 The United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
defines resilience as “the ability 
of a system, community or society 
exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, 
accommodate to and recover from the 
effects of a hazard in a timely and 
efficient manner, including through 
the preservation and restoration of 
its essential basic structures and 
functions” (United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction 2009).
33 Daniell and Vervaeck 2012.
34 IPCC 2012.
35 Each age group in a population 
faces different needs and behaves 
differently. Young people (ages 0–14) 
require investments in health and 
education. Working-age adults (ages 
15–64) require jobs and financial 
infrastructure to support production 
and savings. Older adults (ages 65 
and older) require health care and 
retirement income. A country’s age 
structure thus alters its challenges 
and opportunities.
36 With fewer children to support, 
parents invest more in their children’s 
education (Becker, Murphy and 
Tamura 1990; Galor 2006), save more 
for their retirement (Bloom, Canning 
and Sevilla 2003), and women 
increasingly participate in the formal 
labour market (Bloom and others 
2009). As a result, economic growth 
accelerates, yielding what has been 
called “the demographic dividend” 
(Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2003).
37 A low dependency ratio can generate 
a demographic dividend, since the 
increase in the labour force can 
spur economic growth and greater 
investment, given the low demand 
for spending from dependents. (See 
Abdurazakov, Minsat and Pineda 
[2013] for a detailed analysis of 
demographic trends based on projec-
tions by Lutz and KC 2013.) But coun-
tries can reap these dividends only if 
they provide productive employment 
for the large number of new entrants 
to the labour force.
38 Lutz and KC 2013.
39 A scenario of education level 
distribution where universal primary 
education is complemented by broad-
based secondary education brings 
the highest annual economic growth 
rates for a typical low HDI country 
with a large share of young people 
(IIASA 2008). This analysis uses a 
dataset that disaggregates each 
country’s population by age, sex and 
educational attainment. Thus, each 
five-year cohort’s population share 
can be described as having no educa-
tion, primary education, secondary 
education or tertiary education. And 
these attainments can be differenti-
ated by gender. The proportion of the 
population in each five-year cohort 
changes with trends in fertility, mor-
tality and migration. The proportion 
of the young, working-age and elderly 
populations will thus also change 
over time.
40 This approach is consistent with that 
of the Millennium Development Goals 
and the Education for All initiative. 
Governing this scenario are several 
key targets: near universal (99%) 
primary education by 2015, 50% 
lower secondary education by 2030 
and 90% by 2030, and 60% tertiary 
education by 2050.
41 HDRO calculations based on Lutz and 
KC (2013).
42 UNDESA 2007. For developed 
countries, international migration is 
unlikely to ease the economic impacts 
of an ageing population because the 
volume of migration needed is much 
larger than is politically feasible. In 
scenario III of the study, the migra-
tion needed to halt the expected 
increase in the ratio of the elderly 
over 1995–2050 ranges from an aver-
age annual net inflow of 1.1 million 
people for the United Kingdom and 
1.7 million for France to more than 
10 million each for Japan and the 
United States.
43 Becker, Murphy and Tamura 1990; 
Galor 2006; Bloom, Canning and 
Sevilla 2003; Bloom and others 2009.
44 Bloom and others 2012. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, the youth dependency 
ratio is 1.07 for the poorest 20% of 
households but 0.72 for the wealthi-
est 20%. In Latin America, the ratio is 
0.91 for the poorest households and 
0.57 for the wealthiest.
45 See The Economist (2012b) for a 
discussion of the main results of the 
Bloom and others (2012) study.
46 Hausmann and Székely (2001) found 
that the demographic transition in 
Latin America accentuated existing 
inequality trends, with faster and 
earlier demographic shifts among 
the wealthiest population groups 
widening the gap between the rich 
and the poor. Giroux (2008) found 
that although fertility differen-
tials associated with education 
have remained relatively stable in 
Sub-Saharan African countries as 
national fertility has fallen, inequal-
ity has increased. They show that 
changes in the education composi-
tion of the population have shaped 
recent variations in reproductive 
inequality in the region.
47 Bloom and others 2012.
48 World Bank 2011c.
49 In many countries, if the current age 
of retirement is unchanged, this win-
dow will close in a matter of decades. 
This suggests that important discus-
sions about the retirement age will 
take place in many countries where 
the population is ageing quickly.
50 The previous section discussed the 
role of migration on demographic 
trends; here the role of migration is 
more comprehensive, since it is fully 
integrated into a model in which 
demographic trends are just one part 
of several modules used in these pro-
jections exercise. See Pardee Center 
for International Futures (2013).
Chapter 5
1 The Doha round for trade negotiations 
at the World Trade Organization have 
been at an impasse since 2008 (Castle 
and Landler 2008; WTO n.d.). At the 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 18th Conference 
of the Parties in Doha in December 
2012, the main legally binding global 
agreement on climate change, the 
Kyoto Protocol, was extended until 
2020. Countries reiterated that they 
are determined to adopt, in 2015, 
a new “protocol, another legal instru-
ment or an agreed outcome with legal 
force” to come into effect from 2020. 
However, any agreement on the struc-
ture of the new protocol and financing 
mechanisms was left until next year. 
(Broder 2012; Harvey 2012)
2 Heller 2013.
3 Global public goods are those that 
have cross-border consequences. 
National governments, acting on their 
own, as well as markets, are unable 
to produce sufficient quantities of 
global public goods, and collective 
intergovernmental action is needed. In 
a world where trade, financial flows, 
environmental resources and pollu-
tion increasingly transcend national 
borders, multilateral cooperation for 
the provision of global public goods 
becomes crucial for human develop-
ment (Kaul 2013).
4 While bilateral arrangements can 
sometimes disadvantage the weaker 
partner, regional arrangements can 
help empower poorer regions in their 
negotiations with richer ones.
5 This is called trade diversion. 
Lowering of tariff barriers that leads 
to more trade is called trade creation. 
See Krugman (1991).
6 See Krugman (1991), who argues 
further that the net effect on world 
efficiency is unlikely to be negative 
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because trading blocs consist of 
geographical neighbours. Since 
these countries would be natural 
trading partners even without special 
arrangements, the losses from trade 
diversion are small, while gains from 
trade creation are large.
7 Multilateralizing regionalism also 
requires harmonizing a diverse array 
of trade regulations (such as varying 
rules of origin for determining local 
content) and expanding regional 
agreements to include as many de-
veloping country partners as possible. 
These ideas draw on Baldwin (2007).
8 The International Organization for 
Migration, not a part of the UN 
system, has the broadest mandate for 
migration issues of any interna-
tional institution. With 146 member 
states, it has become an increasingly 
prominent forum for discussions on 
international migration.
9 UNDP 2009.
10 Hansen 2010.
11 Betts and others 2013.
12 King, Richards and Tyldesley 2011.
13 UNDP 2011a.
14 Han 2012.
15 Leape 2012.
16 Leape 2012.
17 Romero and Broder 2012.
18 Glennie 2011.
19 OECD 2011c.
20 G8 2005.
21 Ocampo 2010.
22 General Assembly addresses by heads 
of government Sept. 25-Oct.1 (UN 
News Service www.un.org/news/).
23 At the Group of 20 Summit in Los 
Cabos in 2012, Brazil, China, India, 
the Russian Federation and South 
Africa announced contributions of 
$75 billion towards International 
Monetary Fund resources. These 
funds come with several conditions. 
They can be called upon only after 
existing resources are substantially 
used. The money was also given in 
anticipation that “all the reforms 
agreed upon in 2010 will be fully 
implemented in a timely manner, 
including a comprehensive reform 
of voting power and reform of quota 
shares” (Chowla 2012).
24 Heller 2013.
25 The video received more than 100 mil-
lion views and is one of the most 
“viral” videos of all time.
26 Chandhoke 2009; Heller 2013.
27 This takes many forms— restrictive 
nongovernmental organization 
laws, foreign currency and taxation 
regulations, registration require-
ments and the like—and is justified 
by governments on grounds such as 
national security, accounting failures 
by nongovernmental organizations, 
coordination and control, among 
others. The International Center for 
Non-profit Law and CIVICUS have 
consistently been reporting on and 
analyzing this situation worldwide.
28 Castells 2003; Burawoy 2003.
29 British political theorist Andrew 
Dobson developed the idea of an 
“ecological citizenship”. Thinking 
ecologically implies a broad notion 
of citizenship, one that includes the 
goal of reducing ecologic footprints. 
Ecological citizenship goes beyond 
individual responsibility, since 
ecological thinking views citizens as 
products of and influences on their 
communities (and their ecosystems) 
(Revkin 2012).
30 Chorev 2012.
31 Grabel 2013. For a useful summary 
see also Lamberte and Morgan (2012).
32 Reserve Bank of India 2012.
33 Grabel 2013.
34 Ocampo and Titelman 2009.
35 Grabel 2013.
36 The Bank of the South was founded 
in 2007 by Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez and officially launched 
in 2009. Initially envisaged with a 
very broad mission, by the time of its 
launch in 2009, its mandate had been 
narrowed to project finance in the 
South American region (Chin 2010). 
Its precise functions and goals are 
still being debated among member 
countries.
37 OECD 2010a.
38 Baldwin 2006.
39 See United Nations Security Council 
(2011), which contains the concept 
note on responsibility while protect-
ing, as developed by the government 
of Brazil.
40 India Ministry of External Affairs 
2012.
41 Bhattacharya, Romani and Stern 2012.
42 Bhattacharya, Romani and Stern 2012.
43 HDRO calculations based on World 
Bank (2012a) data on average spend-
ing for each country in the region 
between 2005 and 2010.
44 Based on HDRO calculations us-
ing World Bank (2012a) data on 
international reserves. Given that in-
ternational reserves play a prominent 
role in monetary and exchange rate 
policy, it may be too ambitious to 
expect a larger proportion of the 
reserves to be allocated for other 
purposes.
45 Some have proposed a global 
infrastructure initiative whereby rich 
countries channel investment funds 
to developing countries, generating 
a greater return on investment than 
they could at home (Harding 2012). 
The same principle applies to invest-
ment by emerging economies.
46 Bolton, Samama and Stiglitz 2011. 
Norway has also offered $1 billion 
to Brazil for its deforestation efforts, 
albeit not through its sovereign 
wealth fund.
47 Public-private partnerships and 
community-level initiatives can also 
help broaden the scope and impact of 
sovereign wealth fund investments.
48 See Hamdani (2013) and South 
Commission (1990).
49 The South Commission was formally 
established in 1987, following years 
of informal discussion among leaders 
from the South. The report of the 
South Commission (1990) emphasized 
that developing countries have many 
problems and much experience in 
common. It found that the South is 
not well organized at the global level 
and has been unable to effectively 
mobilize its combined expertise, 
experience and bargaining power. 
The report made practical sugges-
tions to be carried out by concerned 
policymakers.
50 Mwase and Yang 2012.
51 OECD 2010a.
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The Rise of the South Human progress in a Diverse World
Readers guide
The 14 statistical tables provide an overview of key aspects of 
human development. The tables include composite indices esti-
mated by the Human Development Report Office (HDRO) 
using data available to the HDRO on 15 October 2012. All 
indicators, along with the technical notes on the calculation of 
composite indicators and additional sources of information, are 
available online at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics.
Countries and territories are ranked by their 2012 HDI value. 
Robustness and reliability analysis has shown that for most 
countries the HDI is not statistically significant at the third dec-
imal place (see Aguna and Kovacevic 2011 and Høyland, Moene 
and Willumsen 2011). For this reason countries with the same 
HDI value at the third decimal place are listed with tied ranks.
Sources and definitions 
The HDRO uses data from international data agencies with 
the mandate, resources and expertise to collect national data 
on specific indicators, unless otherwise noted.
Definitions of indicators and sources for original data com-
ponents are given at the end of each table, with full source 
details in Statistical references.
Comparisons over time and across editions 
of the Report 
Because national and international data agencies continually 
improve their data series, the data— including the HDI values 
and ranks— presented in this Report are not comparable to 
those published in earlier editions. For the HDI, trends using 
consistent data  calculated at five-year intervals for 1980–2012 
are presented in table 2. 
Discrepancies between national and 
international estimates 
National and international data estimates can vary because 
international agencies harmonize national data for comparabil-
ity across countries, produce an estimate of missing data or do 
not incorporate the most recent national data. When HDRO 
becomes aware of discrepancies, these are brought to the atten-
tion of national and international data authorities.
Country groupings and aggregates 
Several weighted aggregates are presented in the tables. In gen-
eral, an aggregate is shown only when data are available for at 
least half the countries and represent at least two-thirds of the 
available population in that classification. Aggregates for each 
classification represent only the countries for which data are 
available.
Human development classification 
HDI classifications are relative—based on quartiles of HDI 
distribution across the 187 countries denoted as very high, 
high, medium (each with 47 countries) and low (with 46 
countries).
Regional groupings 
Regional groupings are based on United Nations Development 
Programme regional classification. Least Developed Countries 
and Small Island Developing States are defined according to 
UN classifications. The composition of each region is presented 
in Regions.
Country notes
Data for China do not include Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region of China, Macao Special Administrative 
Region of China or Taiwan Province of China, unless oth-
erwise noted. Data for Sudan include South Sudan unless 
otherwise noted.
Symbols 
A dash between two years, as in 2005–2012, indicates that the 
data are the most recent year available in the period specified. A 
slash between years, as in 2005/2012, indicates average for the 
period defined. Growth rates are usually average annual rates 
of growth between the first and last years of the period shown.
The following symbols are used in the tables: 
 ..  Not available 
0 or 0.0  Nil or negligible 
—  Not applicable
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Statistical acknowledgements
The Report’s composite indices and other statistical resources 
draw on a wide variety of the most respected international 
data providers in their specialized fields. We are particularly 
grateful to the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center 
of the US Department of Energy; Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters; Eurostat; Food and Agricultural 
Organization; Gallup; ICF Macro; International Energy 
Agency; International Labour Organization; International 
Monetary Fund; International Telecommunication Union; 
International Union for Conservation of Nature; Inter-Parlia-
mentary Union; Luxembourg Income Study; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development; Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute; United Nations Children’s 
Fund; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs; 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean; United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics; United Nations 
Office on Drug and Crime; United Nations World Tourism 
Organization; World Bank; World Health Organization; and 
World Intellectual Property Organization. The international 
educational database maintained by Robert Barro (Harvard 
University) and Jong-Wha Lee (Korea University) is another 
invaluable source for the calculation of the Report’s indices.
Statistical tables
The first five tables contain the composite human development 
indices and their components; the remaining nine tables pres-
ent a broader set of indicators related to human development. 
Four composite human development indices—the Human 
Development Index (HDI), the Inequality-adjusted Human 
Development Index (IHDI), the Gender Inequality Index 
(GII) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)—have 
been presented since the 2010 Human Development Report. 
The GII and the MPI remain experimental indices.
HDI values along with values of the four component indi-
cators on life expectancy, educational attainment and income 
are presented in table 1. Countries are ranked according to 
HDI value. The difference between rank by gross national 
income and HDI indicates whether a country is efficiently 
using its income for advancement in the two nonincome HDI 
dimensions. The nonincome HDI is calculated to provide an 
additional means of cross- country comparison and to order 
countries by achievements in the nonincome dimensions. 
A time series of HDI values based on data available in 2012, 
thus using the most recent revision of historical data and 
methodology, is presented in table 2. It is the only means for 
comparing HDI values for 2012 with those for past years. The 
change in HDI rank over the last five years and between 2011 
and 2012 as well as the average annual HDI growth rate across 
four time periods allow for easy assessment of the direction and 
speed of HDI changes.
Table 3 presents the IHDI, which goes beyond a country’s 
average achievements in health, education and income to 
show how the achievements are distributed among residents 
by discounting the value of each dimension according to its 
level of inequality. The IHDI can be interpreted as the actual 
level of human development (accounting for inequality), while 
the HDI is the potential human development that could be 
obtained if achievements were distributed equally among resi-
dents. The difference between the HDI and IHDI, expressed as 
a percentage, defines the loss in potential human development 
due to inequality. The difference in ranking by the HDI and 
the IHDI indicates that taking inequality into account would 
either lower a country’s rank (negative value) or improve it 
(positive).
Table 4 presents the Gender Inequality Index, an experimen-
tal composite measure of inequality in achievement between 
women and men in three dimensions: reproductive health, 
empowerment and the labour market. The GII is designed to 
provide empirical foundations for policy analysis and advocacy 
efforts. A high value indicates high inequality between women 
and men.
The Multidimensional Poverty Index, an experimental meas-
ure designed to capture the overlapping deprivations that people 
face in education, health and living standards, is presented in 
table 5. The MPI gives both the incidence of nonincome multi-
dimensional poverty (a headcount of those in multidimensional 
poverty) and its intensity (the relative number of deprivations 
people experience at the same time). The contributions of dep-
rivations in each dimension to overall poverty are included to 
provide a comprehensive picture of people living in poverty. 
Countries are presented alphabetically in two groups according 
to the year of the survey used to estimate the MPI.
Table 6 combines macroeconomic indicators such as gross 
domestic product (GDP), gross fixed capital formation and the 
consumer price index with public spending indicators. During 
economic uncertainty or recession, gross fixed capital forma-
tion typically declines. The consumer price index is presented as 
a measure of inflation. Indicators of public spending are given 
for two points in time to allow for analysis of change in spend-
ing. These indicators can be used to examine priorities in public 
spending and the pattern of expenditure and how it relates to 
human development outcomes.
Several indicators on the health of children, youth and adults 
as well as two indicators of health care quality are presented 
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in table 7. Table 8 comprises standard education indicators 
along with indicators on education quality, including average 
test scores (and deviations from the average scores) in reading, 
mathematics and science. The education quality indicators are 
based on standardized tests assigned to 15-year-old students by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment–managed Programme on International Student Assess-
ment using the 2009 dataset for 63 UN Member States. Two 
additional indicators of education quality, primary education 
teachers trained to teach and a perception-based indicator of 
satisfaction with the quality of education, complement the test-
based quality indicators.
Table 9’s data on social integration indicate whether a soci-
ety is inclusive and integrated. In particular, indicators show 
the extent of equal rights and opportunities for employment, 
overall inequality, human safety, and trust and community 
satisfaction. Complementary objective indicators and per-
ception-based indicators allow for a more nuanced picture of 
social integration. Life, freedom and job satisfaction focus on 
individuals’ views of their personal conditions, while trust in 
people and government, along with community satisfaction, 
give insight into people’s satisfaction with broader society.
The extent to which a country is integrated into the global 
economy is reflected in table 10. A distinction between trade 
in final goods and trade in parts and components is made to 
capture the phenomenon of global value added and produc-
tion sharing, which have important policy implications for 
the growth of world trade and for economic development in 
countries of the South.
Indicators on two aspects of globalization: capital flows and 
human mobility are shown in table  11. Increasing foreign 
investment is one measure of growing economic globalization. 
Migration is an opportunity for work and to send funds back 
home while expanding the labour force in recipient countries. 
Human mobility in all forms is also a potential factor in 
cross-cultural understanding.
Table 12 captures the importance of investment in research 
and development to advancing human development and build-
ing country capacities to effectively adopt and use technologies. 
Table 13 sheds light on environmental sustainability. It shows 
the proportion of fossil fuels and renewable energy sources in 
the energy supply, presents three ways of looking at carbon 
dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions data and shows impor-
tant measures for ecosystems and natural resources. The table 
also presents indicators on the direct human impacts of changes 
to the physical environment.
Major population indicators needed to understand current 
population conditions and the direction of changes are presented 
in table 14. Statistics on median age of the population, depend-
ency ratios and total fertility rates can be compared to assess the 
burden on the labour force and the ability of societies to sustain 
themselves. Deviations from the natural sex ratio at birth have 
implications for population replacement levels and indicate 
gender bias and potential future social and economic problems.
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afghanistan 175
albania 70
algeria 93
andorra 33
angola 148
antigua and Barbuda 67
argentina 45
armenia 87
australia 2
austria 18
azerbaijan 82
Bahamas 49
Bahrain 48
Bangladesh 146
Barbados 38
Belarus 50
Belgium 17
Belize 96
Benin 166
Bhutan 140
Bolivia, Plurinational State of 108
Bosnia and Herzegovina 81
Botswana 119
Brazil 85
Brunei Darussalam 30
Bulgaria 57
Burkina Faso 183
Burundi 178
Cambodia 138
Cameroon 150
Canada 11
Cape verde 132
Central african Republic 180
Chad 184
Chile 40
China 101
Colombia 91
Comoros 169
Congo 142
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 186
Costa Rica 62
Côte d’Ivoire 168
Croatia 47
Cuba 59
Cyprus 31
Czech Republic 28
Denmark 15
Djibouti 164
Dominica 72
Dominican Republic 96
Ecuador 89
Egypt 112
El Salvador 107
Equatorial Guinea 136
Eritrea 181
Estonia 33
Ethiopia 173
Fiji 96
Finland 21
France 20
Gabon 106
Gambia 165
Georgia 72
Germany 5
Ghana 135
Greece 29
Grenada 63
Guatemala 133
Guinea 178
Guinea-Bissau 176
Guyana 118
Haiti 161
Honduras 120
Hong Kong, China (SaR) 13
Hungary 37
Iceland 13
India 136
Indonesia 121
Iran, Islamic Republic of 76
Iraq 131
Ireland 7
Israel 16
Italy 25
Jamaica 85
Japan 10
Jordan 100
Kazakhstan 69
Kenya 145
Kiribati 121
Korea, Republic of 12
Kuwait 54
Kyrgyzstan 125
lao People’s Democratic Republic 138
latvia 44
lebanon 72
lesotho 158
liberia 174
libya 64
liechtenstein 24
lithuania 41
luxembourg 26
Madagascar 151
Malawi 170
Malaysia 64
Maldives 104
Mali 182
Malta 32
Mauritania 155
Mauritius 80
Mexico 61
Micronesia, Federated States of 117
Moldova, Republic of 113
Mongolia 108
Montenegro 52
Morocco 130
Mozambique 185
Myanmar 149
namibia 128
nepal 157
netherlands 4
new Zealand 6
nicaragua 129
niger 186
nigeria 153
norway 1
oman 84
Pakistan 146
Palau 52
Palestine, State of 110
Panama 59
Papua new Guinea 156
Paraguay 111
Peru 77
Philippines 114
Poland 39
Portugal 43
Qatar 36
Romania 56
Russian Federation 55
Rwanda 167
Saint Kitts and nevis 72
Saint lucia 88
Saint vincent and the Grenadines 83
Samoa 96
Sao tome and Principe 144
Saudi arabia 57
Senegal 154
Serbia 64
Seychelles 46
Sierra leone 177
Singapore 18
Slovakia 35
Slovenia 21
Solomon Islands 143
South africa 121
Spain 23
Sri lanka 92
Sudan 171
Suriname 105
Swaziland 141
Sweden 7
Switzerland 9
Syrian arab Republic 116
tajikistan 125
tanzania, united Republic of 152
thailand 103
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 78
timor-leste 134
togo 159
tonga 95
trinidad and tobago 67
tunisia 94
turkey 90
turkmenistan 102
uganda 161
ukraine 78
united arab Emirates 41
united Kingdom 26
united States 3
uruguay 51
uzbekistan 114
vanuatu 124
venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 71
viet nam 127
Yemen 160
Zambia 163
Zimbabwe 172
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Key to HDI countries and ranks, 2012
Human Development 
Index (HDI)
Life expectancy 
at birth
Mean years of 
schooling
Expected years 
of schooling 
Gross national income 
(GNI) per capita 
GNI per capita rank 
minus HDI rank
Nonincome  
HDI
value (years) (years) (years) (2005 PPP $) value
HDI rank 2012 2012 2010a 2011b 2012 2012 2012
VERy HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
1 norway 0.955 81.3 12.6 17.5 48,688 4 0.977
2 australia 0.938 82.0 12.0 c 19.6 d 34,340 15 0.978
3 united States 0.937 78.7 13.3 16.8 43,480 6 0.958
4 netherlands 0.921 80.8 11.6 c 16.9 37,282 8 0.945
5 Germany 0.920 80.6 12.2 16.4 e 35,431 10 0.948
6 new Zealand 0.919 80.8 12.5 19.7 d 24,358 26 0.978
7 Ireland 0.916 80.7 11.6 18.3 d 28,671 19 0.960
7 Sweden 0.916 81.6 11.7 c 16.0 36,143 6 0.940
9 Switzerland 0.913 82.5 11.0 c 15.7 40,527 2 0.926
10 Japan 0.912 83.6 11.6 c 15.3 32,545 11 0.942
11 Canada 0.911 81.1 12.3 15.1 35,369 5 0.934
12 Korea, Republic of 0.909 80.7 11.6 17.2 28,231 15 0.949
13 Hong Kong, China (SaR) 0.906 83.0 10.0 15.5 45,598 –6 0.907
13 Iceland 0.906 81.9 10.4 18.3 d 29,176 12 0.943
15 Denmark 0.901 79.0 11.4 c 16.8 33,518 4 0.924
16 Israel 0.900 81.9 11.9 15.7 26,224 13 0.942
17 Belgium 0.897 80.0 10.9 c 16.4 33,429 3 0.917
18 austria 0.895 81.0 10.8 15.3 36,438 –5 0.908
18 Singapore 0.895 81.2 10.1 c 14.4 f 52,613 –15 0.880
20 France 0.893 81.7 10.6 c 16.1 30,277 4 0.919
21 Finland 0.892 80.1 10.3 16.9 32,510 2 0.912
21 Slovenia 0.892 79.5 11.7 16.9 23,999 12 0.936
23 Spain 0.885 81.6 10.4 c 16.4 25,947 8 0.919
24 liechtenstein 0.883 79.8 10.3 g 11.9 84,880 h –22 0.832
25 Italy 0.881 82.0 10.1 c 16.2 26,158 5 0.911
26 luxembourg 0.875 80.1 10.1 13.5 48,285 –20 0.858
26 united Kingdom 0.875 80.3 9.4 16.4 32,538 –5 0.886
28 Czech Republic 0.873 77.8 12.3 15.3 22,067 10 0.913
29 Greece 0.860 80.0 10.1 c 16.3 20,511 13 0.899
30 Brunei Darussalam 0.855 78.1 8.6 15.0 45,690 –23 0.832
31 Cyprus 0.848 79.8 9.8 14.9 23,825 4 0.869
32 Malta 0.847 79.8 9.9 15.1 21,184 9 0.876
33 andorra 0.846 81.1 10.4 i 11.7 33,918 j –15 0.839
33 Estonia 0.846 75.0 12.0 15.8 17,402 13 0.892
35 Slovakia 0.840 75.6 11.6 14.7 19,696 9 0.872
36 Qatar 0.834 78.5 7.3 12.2 87,478 k –35 0.761
37 Hungary 0.831 74.6 11.7 15.3 16,088 13 0.874
38 Barbados 0.825 77.0 9.3 16.3 17,308 10 0.859
39 Poland 0.821 76.3 10.0 15.2 17,776 7 0.851
40 Chile 0.819 79.3 9.7 14.7 14,987 13 0.863
41 lithuania 0.818 72.5 10.9 15.7 16,858 7 0.850
41 united arab Emirates 0.818 76.7 8.9 12.0 42,716 –31 0.783
43 Portugal 0.816 79.7 7.7 16.0 19,907 0 0.835
44 latvia 0.814 73.6 11.5 c 14.8 14,724 10 0.856
45 argentina 0.811 76.1 9.3 16.1 15,347 7 0.848
46 Seychelles 0.806 73.8 9.4 l 14.3 22,615 –9 0.808
47 Croatia 0.805 76.8 9.8 c 14.1 15,419 4 0.837
HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
48 Bahrain 0.796 75.2 9.4 13.4 e 19,154 –3 0.806
49 Bahamas 0.794 75.9 8.5 12.6 27,401 –21 0.777
50 Belarus 0.793 70.6 11.5 l 14.7 13,385 11 0.830
51 uruguay 0.792 77.2 8.5 c 15.5 13,333 11 0.829
52 Montenegro 0.791 74.8 10.5 l 15.0 10,471 24 0.850
52 Palau 0.791 72.1 12.2 13.7 e 11,463 m 18 0.840
54 Kuwait 0.790 74.7 6.1 14.2 52,793 –51 0.730
55 Russian Federation 0.788 69.1 11.7 14.3 14,461 0 0.816
56 Romania 0.786 74.2 10.4 14.5 11,011 16 0.836
57 Bulgaria 0.782 73.6 10.6 c 14.0 11,474 12 0.826
57 Saudi arabia 0.782 74.1 7.8 14.3 22,616 –21 0.774
59 Cuba 0.780 79.3 10.2 16.2 5,539 n 44 0.894
59 Panama 0.780 76.3 9.4 13.2 13,519 1 0.810
61 Mexico 0.775 77.1 8.5 13.7 12,947 4 0.805
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Human Development 
Index (HDI)
Life expectancy 
at birth
Mean years of 
schooling
Expected years 
of schooling 
Gross national income 
(GNI) per capita 
GNI per capita rank 
minus HDI rank
Nonincome  
HDI
value (years) (years) (years) (2005 PPP $) value
HDI rank 2012 2012 2010a 2011b 2012 2012 2012
62 Costa Rica 0.773 79.4 8.4 13.7 10,863 12 0.816
63 Grenada 0.770 76.1 8.6 e 15.8 9,257 21 0.827
64 libya 0.769 75.0 7.3 16.2 13,765 –8 0.791
64 Malaysia 0.769 74.5 9.5 12.6 13,676 –7 0.791
64 Serbia 0.769 74.7 10.2 c 13.6 9,533 16 0.823
67 antigua and Barbuda 0.760 72.8 8.9 13.3 13,883 –12 0.776
67 trinidad and tobago 0.760 70.3 9.2 11.9 21,941 –28 0.743
69 Kazakhstan 0.754 67.4 10.4 15.3 10,451 8 0.791
70 albania 0.749 77.1 10.4 11.4 7,822 21 0.807
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 0.748 74.6 7.6 c 14.4 11,475 –2 0.774
72 Dominica 0.745 77.6 7.7 l 12.7 10,977 –1 0.771
72 Georgia 0.745 73.9 12.1 o 13.2 5,005 37 0.845
72 lebanon 0.745 72.8 7.9 l 13.9 12,364 –5 0.762
72 Saint Kitts and nevis 0.745 73.3 8.4 e 12.9 12,460 –5 0.763
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.742 73.2 7.8 14.4 10,695 –1 0.769
77 Peru 0.741 74.2 8.7 13.2 9,306 6 0.780
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 0.740 75.0 8.2 o 13.4 9,377 2 0.777
78 ukraine 0.740 68.8 11.3 14.8 6,428 22 0.813
80 Mauritius 0.737 73.5 7.2 13.6 13,300 –17 0.745
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.735 75.8 8.3 l 13.4 7,713 13 0.787
82 azerbaijan 0.734 70.9 11.2 l 11.7 8,153 5 0.780
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines 0.733 72.5 8.6 e 13.3 9,367 –1 0.767
84 oman 0.731 73.2 5.5 l 13.5 24,092 –51 0.694
85 Brazil 0.730 73.8 7.2 14.2 10,152 –8 0.755
85 Jamaica 0.730 73.3 9.6 13.1 6,701 14 0.792
87 armenia 0.729 74.4 10.8 12.2 5,540 16 0.808
88 Saint lucia 0.725 74.8 8.3 e 12.7 7,971 1 0.768
89 Ecuador 0.724 75.8 7.6 13.7 7,471 7 0.772
90 turkey 0.722 74.2 6.5 12.9 13,710 –32 0.720
91 Colombia 0.719 73.9 7.3 13.6 8,711 –6 0.751
92 Sri lanka 0.715 75.1 9.3 c 12.7 5,170 18 0.792
93 algeria 0.713 73.4 7.6 13.6 7,418 4 0.755
94 tunisia 0.712 74.7 6.5 14.5 8,103 –6 0.746
MEDIuM HuMaN DEVELopMENt
95 tonga 0.710 72.5 10.3 c 13.7 4,153 26 0.807
96 Belize 0.702 76.3 8.0 c 12.5 5,327 8 0.767
96 Dominican Republic 0.702 73.6 7.2 c 12.3 8,506 –11 0.726
96 Fiji 0.702 69.4 10.7 c 13.9 4,087 24 0.794
96 Samoa 0.702 72.7 10.3 l 13.0 3,928 28 0.800
100 Jordan 0.700 73.5 8.6 12.7 5,272 8 0.766
101 China 0.699 73.7 7.5 11.7 7,945 –11 0.728
102 turkmenistan 0.698 65.2 9.9 p 12.6 e 7,782 –10 0.727
103 thailand 0.690 74.3 6.6 12.3 7,722 –10 0.715
104 Maldives 0.688 77.1 5.8 c 12.5 7,478 –9 0.715
105 Suriname 0.684 70.8 7.2 o 12.4 7,327 –7 0.710
106 Gabon 0.683 63.1 7.5 13.0 12,521 –40 0.668
107 El Salvador 0.680 72.4 7.5 12.0 5,915 –5 0.723
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 0.675 66.9 9.2 13.5 4,444 7 0.740
108 Mongolia 0.675 68.8 8.3 14.3 4,245 10 0.746
110 Palestine, State of 0.670 73.0 8.0 l 13.5 3,359 q 20 0.761
111 Paraguay 0.669 72.7 7.7 12.1 4,497 4 0.730
112 Egypt 0.662 73.5 6.4 12.1 5,401 –6 0.702
113 Moldova, Republic of 0.660 69.6 9.7 11.8 3,319 19 0.747
114 Philippines 0.654 69.0 8.9 c 11.7 3,752 11 0.724
114 uzbekistan 0.654 68.6 10.0 o 11.6 3,201 19 0.740
116 Syrian arab Republic 0.648 76.0 5.7 c 11.7 e 4,674 r –2 0.692
117 Micronesia, Federated States of 0.645 69.2 8.8 p 11.4 e 3,352 m 14 0.719
118 Guyana 0.636 70.2 8.5 10.3 3,387 11 0.703
119 Botswana 0.634 53.0 8.9 11.8 13,102 –55 0.596
120 Honduras 0.632 73.4 6.5 11.4 3,426 8 0.695
121 Indonesia 0.629 69.8 5.8 12.9 4,154 –3 0.672
121 Kiribati 0.629 68.4 7.8 e 12.0 3,079 13 0.701
121 South africa 0.629 53.4 8.5 c 13.1 e 9,594 –42 0.608
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table 1 Human Development inDex anD its components
Human Development 
Index (HDI)
Life expectancy 
at birth
Mean years of 
schooling
Expected years 
of schooling 
Gross national income 
(GNI) per capita 
GNI per capita rank 
minus HDI rank
Nonincome  
HDI
value (years) (years) (years) (2005 PPP $) value
HDI rank 2012 2012 2010a 2011b 2012 2012 2012
124 vanuatu 0.626 71.3 6.7 e 10.6 3,960 –1 0.672
125 Kyrgyzstan 0.622 68.0 9.3 12.6 2,009 24 0.738
125 tajikistan 0.622 67.8 9.8 11.5 2,119 19 0.731
127 viet nam 0.617 75.4 5.5 11.9 2,970 9 0.686
128 namibia 0.608 62.6 6.2 11.3 5,973 –27 0.611
129 nicaragua 0.599 74.3 5.8 10.8 2,551 10 0.671
130 Morocco 0.591 72.4 4.4 10.4 4,384 –13 0.608
131 Iraq 0.590 69.6 5.6 10.0 3,557 –4 0.623
132 Cape verde 0.586 74.3 3.5 e 12.7 3,609 –6 0.617
133 Guatemala 0.581 71.4 4.1 10.7 4,235 –14 0.596
134 timor-leste 0.576 62.9 4.4 s 11.7 5,446 –29 0.569
135 Ghana 0.558 64.6 7.0 11.4 1,684 22 0.646
136 Equatorial Guinea 0.554 51.4 5.4 o 7.9 21,715 –97 0.463
136 India 0.554 65.8 4.4 10.7 3,285 –3 0.575
138 Cambodia 0.543 63.6 5.8 10.5 2,095 9 0.597
138 lao People’s Democratic Republic 0.543 67.8 4.6 10.1 2,435 2 0.584
140 Bhutan 0.538 67.6 2.3 s 12.4 5,246 –31 0.516
141 Swaziland 0.536 48.9 7.1 10.7 5,104 –30 0.515
Low HuMaN DEVELopMENt
142 Congo 0.534 57.8 5.9 10.1 2,934 –5 0.553
143 Solomon Islands 0.530 68.2 4.5 p 9.3 2,172 1 0.572
144 Sao tome and Principe 0.525 64.9 4.7 s 10.8 1,864 7 0.579
145 Kenya 0.519 57.7 7.0 11.1 1,541 15 0.588
146 Bangladesh 0.515 69.2 4.8 8.1 1,785 9 0.567
146 Pakistan 0.515 65.7 4.9 7.3 2,566 –9 0.534
148 angola 0.508 51.5 4.7 s 10.2 4,812 –35 0.479
149 Myanmar 0.498 65.7 3.9 9.4 1,817 5 0.537
150 Cameroon 0.495 52.1 5.9 10.9 2,114 –4 0.520
151 Madagascar 0.483 66.9 5.2 p 10.4 828 28 0.601
152 tanzania, united Republic of 0.476 58.9 5.1 9.1 1,383 10 0.527
153 nigeria 0.471 52.3 5.2 s 9.0 2,102 –6 0.482
154 Senegal 0.470 59.6 4.5 8.2 1,653 4 0.501
155 Mauritania 0.467 58.9 3.7 8.1 2,174 –12 0.473
156 Papua new Guinea 0.466 63.1 3.9 5.8 e 2,386 –15 0.464
157 nepal 0.463 69.1 3.2 8.9 1,137 11 0.526
158 lesotho 0.461 48.7 5.9 c 9.6 1,879 –8 0.476
159 togo 0.459 57.5 5.3 10.6 928 16 0.542
160 Yemen 0.458 65.9 2.5 8.7 1,820 –7 0.474
161 Haiti 0.456 62.4 4.9 7.6 e 1,070 7 0.521
161 uganda 0.456 54.5 4.7 11.1 1,168 5 0.511
163 Zambia 0.448 49.4 6.7 8.5 1,358 0 0.483
164 Djibouti 0.445 58.3 3.8 o 5.7 2,350 –22 0.435
165 Gambia 0.439 58.8 2.8 8.7 1,731 –9 0.448
166 Benin 0.436 56.5 3.2 9.4 1,439 –5 0.459
167 Rwanda 0.434 55.7 3.3 10.9 1,147 0 0.476
168 Côte d’Ivoire 0.432 56.0 4.2 6.5 1,593 –9 0.444
169 Comoros 0.429 61.5 2.8 p 10.2 986 4 0.484
170 Malawi 0.418 54.8 4.2 10.4 774 10 0.492
171 Sudan 0.414 61.8 3.1 4.5 1,848 –19 0.405
172 Zimbabwe 0.397 52.7 7.2 10.1 424 t 14 0.542
173 Ethiopia 0.396 59.7 2.2 s 8.7 1,017 –2 0.425
174 liberia 0.388 57.3 3.9 10.5 e 480 11 0.502
175 afghanistan 0.374 49.1 3.1 8.1 1,000 –3 0.393
176 Guinea-Bissau 0.364 48.6 2.3 o 9.5 1,042 –6 0.373
177 Sierra leone 0.359 48.1 3.3 7.3 e 881 0 0.380
178 Burundi 0.355 50.9 2.7 11.3 544 4 0.423
178 Guinea 0.355 54.5 1.6 s 8.8 941 –4 0.368
180 Central african Republic 0.352 49.1 3.5 6.8 722 1 0.386
181 Eritrea 0.351 62.0 3.4 e 4.6 531 3 0.418
182 Mali 0.344 51.9 2.0 c 7.5 853 –4 0.359
183 Burkina Faso 0.343 55.9 1.3 o 6.9 1,202 –18 0.332
184 Chad 0.340 49.9 1.5 p 7.4 1,258 –20 0.324
185 Mozambique 0.327 50.7 1.2 9.2 906 –9 0.327
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Human Development 
Index (HDI)
Life expectancy 
at birth
Mean years of 
schooling
Expected years 
of schooling 
Gross national income 
(GNI) per capita 
GNI per capita rank 
minus HDI rank
Nonincome  
HDI
value (years) (years) (years) (2005 PPP $) value
HDI rank 2012 2012 2010a 2011b 2012 2012 2012
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 0.304 48.7 3.5 8.5 319 0 0.404
186 niger 0.304 55.1 1.4 4.9 701 –4 0.313
NotES
a Data refer to 2010 or the most recent year available.
b Data refer to 2011 or the most recent year available.
c updated by HDRo based on unESCo Institute for 
Statistics (2012) data.
d For the HDI calculation this value is capped at 
18 years.
e Based on cross-country regression.
f Calculated by the Singapore Ministry of Education.
g assumes the same adult mean years of schooling 
as Switzerland before the most recent update.
h Estimated using the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) rate and the projected growth rate of 
Switzerland.
i assumes the same adult mean years of schooling 
as Spain before the most recent update.
j Estimated using the PPP rate and the projected 
growth rate of Spain.
k Based on implied PPP conversion factors from 
IMF (2012).
l Based on the unESCo Institute for Statistics 
(2012) estimate of educational attainment 
distribution.
m Based on projected growth rates by aDB (2012).
n PPP estimate based on cross-country regression; 
projected growth rate based on EClaC (2012) and 
unDESa (2012c) projected growth rates.
o Based on data from unICEF Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Surveys for 2002–2012.
p Based on data on years of schooling of adults 
from household surveys in the World Bank’s 
International Income Distribution Database.
q Based on an unpublished estimate of the PPP 
conversion rate from the World Bank and 
projected growth rates from unESCWa (2012) 
and unDESa (2012c).
r Based on projected growth rates from unDESa 
(2012c).
s Based on data from ICF Macro (2012).
t Based on PPP data from IMF (2012).
DEFINItIoNS
Human Development Index (HDI): a composite 
index measuring average achievement in three basic 
dimensions of human development—a long and 
healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of 
living. See Technical note 1 at http://hdr.undp.org/
en/media/HDR_2013_En_technotes.pdf for details 
on how the HDI is calculated.
Life expectancy at birth: number of years a 
newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing 
patterns of age-specific mortality rates at the time of 
birth stay the same throughout the infant’s life.
Mean years of schooling: average number of 
years of education received by people ages 25 and 
older, converted from educational attainment levels 
using official durations of each level.
Expected years of schooling: number of years 
of schooling that a child of school entrance age 
can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of 
age-specific enrolment rates persist throughout the 
child’s life.
Gross national income (GNI) per capita: 
aggregate income of an economy generated by 
its production and its ownership of factors of 
production, less the incomes paid for the use of 
factors of production owned by the rest of the world, 
converted to international dollars using PPP rates, 
divided by midyear population.
GNI per capita rank minus HDI rank: Difference 
in rankings by GnI per capita and by the HDI. a 
negative value means that the country is better 
ranked by GnI than by the HDI.
Nonincome HDI: value of the HDI computed from 
the life expectancy and education indicators only.
MaIN Data SouRCES
Column 1: HDRo calculations based on data from 
unDESa (2011), Barro and lee (2011), unESCo 
Institute for Statistics (2012), World Bank (2012a) 
and IMF (2012).
Column 2: unDESa (2011).
Column 3: Barro and lee (2011) and HDRo updates 
based on data on educational attainment from 
unESCo Institute for Statistics (2012) and on 
methodology from Barro and lee (2010).
Column 4: unESCo Institute for Statistics (2012).
Column 5: HDRo calculations based on data from 
World Bank (2012a), IMF (2012) and unSD (2012a).
Column 6: Calculated based on data in columns 
1 and 5.
Column 7: Calculated based on data in columns 
2, 3 and 4.
 
otHER CouNtRIES oR tERRItoRIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of .. 69.0 .. .. .. .. ..
Marshall Islands .. 72.3 .. 11.7 .. .. ..
Monaco .. 82.3 .. .. .. .. ..
nauru .. 80.0 .. 9.3 .. .. ..
San Marino .. 81.9 .. 12.5 .. .. ..
Somalia .. 51.5 .. 2.4 .. .. ..
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu .. 67.5 .. 10.8 .. .. ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 0.905 80.1 11.5 16.3 33,391 — 0.927
High human development 0.758 73.4 8.8 13.9 11,501 — 0.781
Medium human development 0.640 69.9 6.3 11.4 5,428 — 0.661
low human development 0.466 59.1 4.2 8.5 1,633 — 0.487
Regions
arab States 0.652 71.0 6.0 10.6 8,317 — 0.658
East asia and the Pacific 0.683 72.7 7.2 11.8 6,874 — 0.712
Europe and Central asia 0.771 71.5 10.4 13.7 12,243 — 0.801
latin america and the Caribbean 0.741 74.7 7.8 13.7 10,300 — 0.770
South asia 0.558 66.2 4.7 10.2 3,343 — 0.577
Sub-Saharan africa 0.475 54.9 4.7 9.3 2,010 — 0.479
Least developed countries 0.449 59.5 3.7 8.5 1,385 — 0.475
Small island developing states 0.648 69.8 7.3 10.7 5,397 — 0.673
world 0.694 70.1 7.5 11.6 10,184 — 0.690
Human Development RepoRt 2013
The Rise of the South Human progress in a Diverse World
taBlE 1 Human Development Index and its components    |    147
Human Development Index (HDI) HDI rank average annual HDI growth
value Change (%)
HDI rank 1980 1990 2000 2005 2007 2010 2011 2012 2007–2012a 2011–2012a 1980/1990 1990/2000 2000/2010 2000/2012
VERy HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
1 norway 0.804 0.852 0.922 0.948 0.952 0.952 0.953 0.955 0 0 0.59 0.79 0.32 0.29
2 australia 0.857 0.880 0.914 0.927 0.931 0.935 0.936 0.938 0 0 0.27 0.37 0.23 0.22
3 united States 0.843 0.878 0.907 0.923 0.929 0.934 0.936 0.937 0 –1 0.40 0.33 0.29 0.27
4 netherlands 0.799 0.842 0.891 0.899 0.911 0.919 0.921 0.921 2 0 0.52 0.56 0.31 0.28
5 Germany 0.738 0.803 0.870 0.901 0.907 0.916 0.919 0.920 5 0 0.85 0.81 0.53 0.47
6 new Zealand 0.807 0.835 0.887 0.908 0.912 0.917 0.918 0.919 –1 0 0.34 0.60 0.33 0.29
7 Ireland 0.745 0.793 0.879 0.907 0.918 0.916 0.915 0.916 –3 0 0.62 1.04 0.42 0.35
7 Sweden 0.792 0.823 0.903 0.905 0.909 0.913 0.915 0.916 0 0 0.38 0.93 0.11 0.12
9 Switzerland 0.818 0.840 0.882 0.898 0.901 0.912 0.912 0.913 3 0 0.27 0.49 0.33 0.29
10 Japan 0.788 0.837 0.878 0.896 0.903 0.909 0.910 0.912 1 0 0.61 0.48 0.35 0.32
11 Canada 0.825 0.865 0.887 0.906 0.909 0.909 0.910 0.911 –4 –1 0.48 0.25 0.24 0.22
12 Korea, Republic of 0.640 0.749 0.839 0.875 0.890 0.905 0.907 0.909 4 0 1.58 1.14 0.76 0.67
13 Hong Kong, China (SaR) 0.712 0.788 0.815 0.857 0.877 0.900 0.904 0.906 10 1 1.02 0.34 1.00 0.89
13 Iceland 0.769 0.815 0.871 0.901 0.908 0.901 0.905 0.906 –4 0 0.58 0.67 0.34 0.33
15 Denmark 0.790 0.816 0.869 0.893 0.898 0.899 0.901 0.901 –2 0 0.33 0.63 0.34 0.30
16 Israel 0.773 0.809 0.865 0.885 0.892 0.896 0.899 0.900 –2 0 0.45 0.68 0.34 0.33
17 Belgium 0.764 0.817 0.884 0.884 0.891 0.896 0.897 0.897 –2 0 0.67 0.79 0.14 0.12
18 austria 0.747 0.797 0.848 0.867 0.879 0.892 0.894 0.895 2 0 0.66 0.62 0.51 0.46
18 Singapore .. 0.756 0.826 0.852 .. 0.892 0.894 0.895 7 0 .. 0.89 0.77 0.67
20 France 0.728 0.784 0.853 0.877 0.885 0.891 0.893 0.893 –1 0 0.75 0.85 0.44 0.38
21 Finland 0.766 0.801 0.845 0.882 0.890 0.890 0.892 0.892 –5 0 0.45 0.54 0.52 0.45
21 Slovenia .. .. 0.842 0.876 0.888 0.892 0.892 0.892 –3 0 .. .. 0.58 0.48
23 Spain 0.698 0.756 0.847 0.865 0.874 0.884 0.885 0.885 1 0 0.80 1.15 0.43 0.37
24 liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. 0.882 0.883 0.883 .. 0 .. .. .. ..
25 Italy 0.723 0.771 0.833 0.869 0.878 0.881 0.881 0.881 –2 0 0.64 0.78 0.56 0.46
26 luxembourg 0.735 0.796 0.861 0.875 0.879 0.875 0.875 0.875 –5 0 0.81 0.78 0.16 0.14
26 united Kingdom 0.748 0.784 0.841 0.865 0.867 0.874 0.875 0.875 2 0 0.47 0.70 0.39 0.33
28 Czech Republic .. .. 0.824 0.862 0.869 0.871 0.872 0.873 –1 0 .. .. 0.56 0.48
29 Greece 0.726 0.772 0.810 0.862 0.865 0.866 0.862 0.860 0 0 0.62 0.48 0.67 0.50
30 Brunei Darussalam 0.765 0.782 0.830 0.848 0.853 0.854 0.854 0.855 0 0 0.22 0.59 0.28 0.25
31 Cyprus 0.715 0.779 0.808 0.817 0.827 0.849 0.849 0.848 4 0 0.86 0.36 0.50 0.41
32 Malta 0.713 0.757 0.801 0.827 0.829 0.844 0.846 0.847 2 1 0.59 0.57 0.52 0.46
33 andorra .. .. .. .. .. 0.846 0.847 0.846 .. –1 .. .. .. ..
33 Estonia .. 0.728 0.786 0.830 0.841 0.839 0.844 0.846 –2 1 .. 0.76 0.65 0.62
35 Slovakia .. 0.754 0.785 0.814 0.830 0.836 0.838 0.840 –1 0 .. 0.40 0.64 0.57
36 Qatar 0.729 0.743 0.801 0.828 0.833 0.827 0.832 0.834 –3 0 0.18 0.76 0.32 0.33
37 Hungary 0.709 0.714 0.790 0.820 0.826 0.829 0.830 0.831 1 0 0.07 1.02 0.48 0.42
38 Barbados 0.706 0.760 0.790 0.798 0.808 0.823 0.824 0.825 2 0 0.73 0.38 0.41 0.37
39 Poland .. .. 0.778 0.798 0.806 0.817 0.819 0.821 3 0 .. .. 0.49 0.46
40 Chile 0.638 0.702 0.759 0.789 0.800 0.813 0.817 0.819 5 0 0.96 0.78 0.68 0.64
41 lithuania .. 0.732 0.756 0.802 0.810 0.810 0.814 0.818 –2 2 .. 0.32 0.68 0.65
41 united arab Emirates .. .. .. 0.831 0.827 0.816 0.817 0.818 –5 –1 .. .. .. ..
43 Portugal 0.644 0.714 0.783 0.796 0.806 0.817 0.817 0.816 –1 –3 1.04 0.93 0.43 0.35
44 latvia 0.675 0.699 0.738 0.792 0.808 0.805 0.809 0.814 –4 1 0.35 0.55 0.87 0.82
45 argentina 0.675 0.701 0.755 0.771 0.787 0.805 0.810 0.811 4 –1 0.38 0.74 0.64 0.60
46 Seychelles .. .. 0.774 0.781 0.792 0.799 0.804 0.806 1 0 .. .. 0.31 0.33
47 Croatia .. 0.716 0.755 0.787 0.798 0.804 0.804 0.805 –1 –1 .. 0.52 0.63 0.54
HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
48 Bahrain 0.644 0.713 0.781 0.802 0.802 0.794 0.795 0.796 –4 0 1.02 0.92 0.16 0.15
49 Bahamas .. .. .. .. .. 0.791 0.792 0.794 .. 0 .. .. .. ..
50 Belarus .. .. .. 0.730 0.756 0.785 0.789 0.793 12 1 .. .. .. ..
51 uruguay 0.664 0.693 0.741 0.744 0.771 0.785 0.789 0.792 3 0 0.42 0.68 0.58 0.55
52 Montenegro .. .. .. 0.756 0.775 0.787 0.791 0.791 0 –2 .. .. .. ..
52 Palau .. .. 0.765 0.786 0.792 0.779 0.786 0.791 –4 2 .. .. 0.18 0.27
54 Kuwait 0.695 0.712 0.781 0.784 0.787 0.786 0.788 0.790 –4 –1 0.25 0.92 0.06 0.10
55 Russian Federation .. 0.730 0.713 0.753 0.770 0.782 0.784 0.788 0 0 .. –0.23 0.93 0.84
56 Romania .. 0.706 0.709 0.756 0.772 0.783 0.784 0.786 –3 –1 .. 0.05 0.99 0.86
57 Bulgaria 0.673 0.704 0.721 0.756 0.766 0.778 0.780 0.782 0 0 0.45 0.24 0.77 0.67
57 Saudi arabia 0.575 0.653 0.717 0.748 0.756 0.777 0.780 0.782 5 0 1.29 0.93 0.81 0.74
59 Cuba 0.626 0.681 0.690 0.735 0.770 0.775 0.777 0.780 –4 0 0.83 0.14 1.17 1.02
59 Panama 0.634 0.666 0.724 0.746 0.758 0.770 0.776 0.780 1 1 0.49 0.85 0.62 0.62
61 Mexico 0.598 0.654 0.723 0.745 0.758 0.770 0.773 0.775 –1 0 0.89 1.00 0.64 0.59
62 Costa Rica 0.621 0.663 0.705 0.732 0.744 0.768 0.770 0.773 4 0 0.65 0.62 0.85 0.76
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Human Development Index (HDI) HDI rank average annual HDI growth
value Change (%)
HDI rank 1980 1990 2000 2005 2007 2010 2011 2012 2007–2012a 2011–2012a 1980/1990 1990/2000 2000/2010 2000/2012
63 Grenada .. .. .. .. .. 0.768 0.770 0.770 .. –1 .. .. .. ..
64 libya .. .. .. 0.746 0.760 0.773 0.725 0.769 –5 23 b .. .. .. ..
64 Malaysia 0.563 0.635 0.712 0.742 0.753 0.763 0.766 0.769 1 1 1.21 1.15 0.69 0.64
64 Serbia .. .. 0.726 0.751 0.760 0.767 0.769 0.769 –5 0 .. .. 0.56 0.49
67 antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. .. .. 0.761 0.759 0.760 .. –1 .. .. .. ..
67 trinidad and tobago 0.680 0.685 0.707 0.741 0.752 0.758 0.759 0.760 –1 –1 0.08 0.32 0.70 0.60
69 Kazakhstan .. .. 0.663 0.721 0.734 0.744 0.750 0.754 2 –1 .. .. 1.15 1.08
70 albania .. 0.661 0.698 0.729 0.737 0.746 0.748 0.749 0 –1 .. 0.54 0.66 0.59
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 0.629 0.635 0.662 0.694 0.712 0.744 0.746 0.748 9 –1 0.11 0.41 1.17 1.03
72 Dominica .. .. 0.722 0.732 0.739 0.743 0.744 0.745 –3 0 .. .. 0.28 0.26
72 Georgia .. .. .. 0.713 0.732 0.735 0.740 0.745 0 3 .. .. .. ..
72 lebanon .. .. .. 0.714 0.728 0.743 0.744 0.745 3 0 .. .. .. ..
72 Saint Kitts and nevis .. .. .. .. .. 0.745 0.745 0.745 .. –1 .. .. .. ..
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.443 0.540 0.654 0.685 0.706 0.740 0.742 0.742 7 –2 1.99 1.94 1.25 1.05
77 Peru 0.580 0.619 0.679 0.699 0.716 0.733 0.738 0.741 3 –1 0.65 0.93 0.78 0.73
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia .. .. .. 0.711 0.719 0.736 0.738 0.740 1 –2 .. .. .. ..
78 ukraine .. 0.714 0.673 0.718 0.732 0.733 0.737 0.740 –5 0 .. –0.58 0.85 0.80
80 Mauritius 0.551 0.626 0.676 0.708 0.720 0.732 0.735 0.737 –2 –1 1.28 0.77 0.81 0.73
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina .. .. .. 0.724 0.729 0.733 0.734 0.735 –6 –1 .. .. .. ..
82 azerbaijan .. .. .. .. .. 0.734 0.732 0.734 .. –1 .. .. .. ..
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines .. .. .. .. .. 0.731 0.732 0.733 .. –2 .. .. .. ..
84 oman .. .. .. .. .. 0.728 0.729 0.731 .. –1 .. .. .. ..
85 Brazil 0.522 0.590 0.669 0.699 0.710 0.726 0.728 0.730 0 0 1.23 1.26 0.82 0.73
85 Jamaica 0.612 0.642 0.679 0.695 0.701 0.727 0.729 0.730 4 –2 0.47 0.57 0.69 0.61
87 armenia .. 0.628 0.648 0.695 0.723 0.722 0.726 0.729 –7 –1 .. 0.33 1.08 0.98
88 Saint lucia .. .. .. .. .. 0.723 0.724 0.725 .. 0 .. .. .. ..
89 Ecuador 0.596 0.635 0.659 0.682 0.688 0.719 0.722 0.724 10 0 0.63 0.37 0.89 0.79
90 turkey 0.474 0.569 0.645 0.684 0.702 0.715 0.720 0.722 –1 0 1.85 1.26 1.04 0.95
91 Colombia 0.556 0.600 0.658 0.681 0.698 0.714 0.717 0.719 0 0 0.76 0.93 0.82 0.75
92 Sri lanka 0.557 0.608 0.653 0.683 0.693 0.705 0.711 0.715 5 0 0.88 0.72 0.78 0.76
93 algeria 0.461 0.562 0.625 0.680 0.691 0.710 0.711 0.713 5 –1 2.01 1.07 1.28 1.10
94 tunisia 0.459 0.553 0.642 0.679 0.694 0.710 0.710 0.712 2 0 1.87 1.51 1.01 0.86
MEDIuM HuMaN DEVELopMENt
95 tonga .. 0.656 0.689 0.704 0.705 0.709 0.709 0.710 –7 0 .. 0.49 0.28 0.25
96 Belize 0.621 0.653 0.672 0.694 0.696 0.700 0.701 0.702 –4 0 0.51 0.29 0.40 0.35
96 Dominican Republic 0.525 0.584 0.641 0.669 0.683 0.697 0.700 0.702 4 2 1.07 0.93 0.85 0.76
96 Fiji 0.572 0.614 0.670 0.693 0.695 0.699 0.700 0.702 –3 2 0.71 0.87 0.43 0.39
96 Samoa .. .. 0.663 0.689 0.695 0.699 0.701 0.702 –3 0 .. .. 0.52 0.48
100 Jordan 0.545 0.592 0.650 0.684 0.695 0.699 0.699 0.700 –7 0 0.83 0.95 0.72 0.62
101 China 0.407 0.495 0.590 0.637 0.662 0.689 0.695 0.699 4 0 1.96 1.78 1.55 1.42
102 turkmenistan .. .. .. .. .. 0.688 0.693 0.698 .. 0 .. .. .. ..
103 thailand 0.490 0.569 0.625 0.662 0.676 0.686 0.686 0.690 –1 1 1.50 0.94 0.93 0.82
104 Maldives .. .. 0.592 0.639 0.663 0.683 0.687 0.688 1 –1 .. .. 1.43 1.26
105 Suriname .. .. .. 0.666 0.672 0.679 0.681 0.684 –2 0 .. .. .. ..
106 Gabon 0.526 0.610 0.627 0.653 0.662 0.676 0.679 0.683 0 0 1.49 0.27 0.75 0.72
107 El Salvador 0.471 0.528 0.620 0.655 0.671 0.678 0.679 0.680 –3 –1 1.14 1.62 0.90 0.78
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 0.489 0.557 0.620 0.647 0.652 0.668 0.671 0.675 0 0 1.31 1.08 0.75 0.71
108 Mongolia .. 0.559 0.564 0.622 0.638 0.657 0.668 0.675 4 2 .. 0.08 1.54 1.51
110 Palestine, State of .. .. .. .. .. 0.662 0.666 0.670 .. 1 .. .. .. ..
111 Paraguay 0.549 0.578 0.617 0.641 0.650 0.668 0.670 0.669 –1 –2 0.52 0.66 0.79 0.67
112 Egypt 0.407 0.502 0.593 0.625 0.640 0.661 0.661 0.662 0 0 2.12 1.68 1.08 0.92
113 Moldova, Republic of .. 0.650 0.592 0.636 0.644 0.652 0.657 0.660 –2 0 .. –0.93 0.96 0.91
114 Philippines 0.561 0.581 0.610 0.630 0.636 0.649 0.651 0.654 0 0 0.35 0.49 0.61 0.58
114 uzbekistan .. .. .. 0.617 0.630 0.644 0.649 0.654 1 1 .. .. .. ..
116 Syrian arab Republic 0.501 0.557 0.596 0.618 0.623 0.646 0.646 0.648 0 0 1.07 0.67 0.80 0.70
117 Micronesia, Federated States of .. .. .. .. .. 0.639 0.640 0.645 .. 0 .. .. .. ..
118 Guyana 0.513 0.502 0.578 0.610 0.617 0.628 0.632 0.636 1 1 –0.21 1.41 0.83 0.79
119 Botswana 0.449 0.586 0.587 0.604 0.619 0.633 0.634 0.634 –1 –1 2.71 0.00 0.77 0.66
120 Honduras 0.456 0.520 0.563 0.582 0.594 0.629 0.630 0.632 3 0 1.33 0.79 1.12 0.97
121 Indonesia 0.422 0.479 0.540 0.575 0.595 0.620 0.624 0.629 1 3 1.26 1.21 1.39 1.28
121 Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. 0.628 0.627 0.629 .. 0 .. .. .. ..
121 South africa 0.570 0.621 0.622 0.604 0.609 0.621 0.625 0.629 0 1 0.87 0.01 –0.01 0.11
124 vanuatu .. .. .. .. .. 0.623 0.625 0.626 .. –2 .. .. .. ..
125 Kyrgyzstan .. 0.609 0.582 0.601 0.612 0.615 0.621 0.622 –3 0 .. –0.45 0.54 0.56
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table 2 Human Development InDex trenDs, 1980–2012
Human Development Index (HDI) HDI rank average annual HDI growth
value Change (%)
HDI rank 1980 1990 2000 2005 2007 2010 2011 2012 2007–2012a 2011–2012a 1980/1990 1990/2000 2000/2010 2000/2012
125 tajikistan .. 0.615 0.529 0.582 0.587 0.612 0.618 0.622 3 1 .. –1.50 1.47 1.36
127 viet nam .. 0.439 0.534 0.573 0.590 0.611 0.614 0.617 0 0 .. 1.98 1.37 1.22
128 namibia .. 0.569 0.564 0.579 0.592 0.604 0.606 0.608 –2 0 .. –0.10 0.69 0.64
129 nicaragua 0.461 0.479 0.529 0.572 0.583 0.593 0.597 0.599 0 0 0.37 1.01 1.15 1.04
130 Morocco 0.371 0.440 0.512 0.558 0.571 0.586 0.589 0.591 0 0 1.71 1.54 1.35 1.20
131 Iraq .. .. .. 0.564 0.567 0.578 0.583 0.590 1 1 .. .. .. ..
132 Cape verde .. .. 0.532 .. .. 0.581 0.584 0.586 .. –1 .. .. 0.88 0.81
133 Guatemala 0.432 0.464 0.523 0.551 0.570 0.579 0.580 0.581 –1 0 0.72 1.20 1.02 0.89
134 timor-leste .. .. 0.418 0.461 0.519 0.565 0.571 0.576 5 0 .. .. 3.06 2.71
135 Ghana 0.391 0.427 0.461 0.491 0.506 0.540 0.553 0.558 7 0 0.90 0.77 1.58 1.60
136 Equatorial Guinea .. .. 0.498 0.523 0.533 0.547 0.551 0.554 –2 0 .. .. 0.96 0.90
136 India 0.345 0.410 0.463 0.507 0.525 0.547 0.551 0.554 –1 0 1.75 1.23 1.67 1.50
138 Cambodia .. .. 0.444 0.501 0.520 0.532 0.538 0.543 –1 0 .. .. 1.82 1.68
138 lao People’s Democratic Republic .. 0.379 0.453 0.494 0.510 0.534 0.538 0.543 3 0 .. 1.80 1.66 1.53
140 Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. 0.525 0.532 0.538 .. 1 .. .. .. ..
141 Swaziland .. 0.533 0.502 0.504 0.520 0.532 0.536 0.536 –3 –1 .. –0.59 0.58 0.55
Low HuMaN DEVELopMENt
142 Congo 0.470 0.510 0.482 0.506 0.511 0.529 0.531 0.534 –1 0 0.82 –0.56 0.94 0.86
143 Solomon Islands .. .. 0.486 0.510 0.522 0.522 0.526 0.530 –6 0 .. .. 0.70 0.71
144 Sao tome and Principe .. .. .. 0.488 0.503 0.520 0.522 0.525 0 0 .. .. .. ..
145 Kenya 0.424 0.463 0.447 0.472 0.491 0.511 0.515 0.519 1 0 0.88 –0.33 1.34 1.24
146 Bangladesh 0.312 0.361 0.433 0.472 0.488 0.508 0.511 0.515 1 1 1.49 1.83 1.61 1.46
146 Pakistan 0.337 0.383 0.419 0.485 0.498 0.512 0.513 0.515 –1 0 1.29 0.89 2.03 1.74
148 angola .. .. 0.375 0.406 0.472 0.502 0.504 0.508 1 0 .. .. 2.97 2.56
149 Myanmar 0.281 0.305 0.382 0.435 0.464 0.490 0.494 0.498 1 0 0.83 2.27 2.52 2.23
150 Cameroon 0.373 0.431 0.429 0.453 0.459 0.488 0.492 0.495 1 0 1.46 –0.05 1.29 1.20
151 Madagascar .. .. 0.428 0.467 0.478 0.484 0.483 0.483 –3 0 .. .. 1.24 1.02
152 tanzania, united Republic of .. 0.353 0.369 0.395 0.408 0.466 0.470 0.476 15 1 .. 0.43 2.36 2.15
153 nigeria .. .. .. 0.434 0.448 0.462 0.467 0.471 1 1 .. .. .. ..
154 Senegal 0.322 0.368 0.405 0.441 0.454 0.470 0.471 0.470 –2 –2 1.32 0.97 1.50 1.25
155 Mauritania 0.340 0.357 0.418 0.441 0.454 0.464 0.464 0.467 –3 0 0.48 1.61 1.04 0.92
156 Papua new Guinea 0.324 0.368 0.415 0.429 .. 0.458 0.462 0.466 1 0 1.29 1.22 0.99 0.96
157 nepal 0.234 0.341 0.401 0.429 0.440 0.458 0.460 0.463 2 0 3.85 1.62 1.35 1.21
158 lesotho 0.422 0.474 0.429 0.425 0.431 0.452 0.456 0.461 2 1 1.18 –0.99 0.53 0.61
159 togo 0.357 0.382 0.426 0.436 0.442 0.452 0.455 0.459 –2 1 0.67 1.11 0.60 0.62
160 Yemen .. 0.286 0.376 0.428 0.444 0.466 0.459 0.458 –4 –2 .. 2.78 2.16 1.66
161 Haiti 0.335 0.399 0.422 0.437 .. 0.450 0.453 0.456 –6 1 1.77 0.56 0.64 0.65
161 uganda .. 0.306 0.375 0.408 0.427 0.450 0.454 0.456 0 0 .. 2.06 1.84 1.65
163 Zambia 0.405 0.398 0.376 0.399 0.411 0.438 0.443 0.448 3 0 –0.18 –0.56 1.52 1.46
164 Djibouti .. .. .. 0.405 0.419 0.431 0.442 0.445 0 0 .. .. .. ..
165 Gambia 0.279 0.323 0.360 0.375 0.383 0.437 0.440 0.439 5 0 1.47 1.09 1.95 1.65
166 Benin 0.253 0.314 0.380 0.414 0.420 0.432 0.434 0.436 –3 0 2.16 1.95 1.28 1.14
167 Rwanda 0.277 0.233 0.314 0.377 0.400 0.425 0.429 0.434 2 0 –1.74 3.05 3.07 2.73
168 Côte d’Ivoire 0.348 0.360 0.392 0.405 0.412 0.427 0.426 0.432 –3 1 0.34 0.85 0.86 0.81
169 Comoros .. .. .. 0.425 0.425 0.426 0.428 0.429 –7 –1 .. .. .. ..
170 Malawi 0.272 0.295 0.352 0.363 0.381 0.413 0.415 0.418 1 1 0.83 1.78 1.61 1.44
171 Sudan 0.269 0.301 0.364 0.390 0.401 0.411 0.419 0.414 –3 –1 1.15 1.89 1.22 1.08
172 Zimbabwe 0.367 0.427 0.376 0.352 0.355 0.374 0.387 0.397 0 1 1.53 –1.26 –0.04 0.46
173 Ethiopia .. .. 0.275 0.316 0.350 0.387 0.392 0.396 1 –1 .. .. 3.49 3.09
174 liberia 0.298 .. 0.304 0.301 0.334 0.367 0.381 0.388 3 0 .. .. 1.88 2.04
175 afghanistan 0.209 0.246 0.236 0.322 0.346 0.368 0.371 0.374 0 0 1.63 –0.41 4.54 3.91
176 Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. 0.348 0.355 0.361 0.364 0.364 –4 0 .. .. .. ..
177 Sierra leone 0.255 0.247 0.244 0.315 0.331 0.346 0.348 0.359 1 2 –0.28 –0.15 3.58 3.29
178 Burundi 0.217 0.272 0.270 0.298 0.323 0.348 0.352 0.355 2 –1 2.26 –0.07 2.59 2.31
178 Guinea .. .. .. 0.331 0.342 0.349 0.352 0.355 –2 –1 .. .. .. ..
180 Central african Republic 0.285 0.312 0.294 0.308 0.316 0.344 0.348 0.352 2 –1 0.94 –0.59 1.59 1.50
181 Eritrea .. .. .. .. .. 0.342 0.346 0.351 .. 1 .. .. .. ..
182 Mali 0.176 0.204 0.270 0.312 0.328 0.344 0.347 0.344 –2 –1 1.50 2.86 2.45 2.04
183 Burkina Faso .. .. .. 0.301 0.314 0.334 0.340 0.343 1 0 .. .. .. ..
184 Chad .. .. 0.290 0.317 0.319 0.336 0.336 0.340 –2 0 .. .. 1.47 1.32
185 Mozambique 0.217 0.202 0.247 0.287 0.301 0.318 0.322 0.327 0 0 –0.70 2.00 2.57 2.37
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 0.286 0.297 0.234 0.258 0.280 0.295 0.299 0.304 0 0 0.37 –2.34 2.35 2.19
186 niger 0.179 0.198 0.234 0.269 0.278 0.298 0.297 0.304 1 1 0.98 1.72 2.42 2.20
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Human Development Index (HDI) HDI rank average annual HDI growth
value Change (%)
HDI rank 1980 1990 2000 2005 2007 2010 2011 2012 2007–2012a 2011–2012a 1980/1990 1990/2000 2000/2010 2000/2012
otHER CouNtRIES oR tERRItoRIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
San Marino .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NotES
a a positive value indicates an improvement in rank.
b the substantial change in rank is due to an 
updated International Monetary Fund estimate of 
libya’s GDP growth in 2011.
c Based on fewer than half the countries in the 
group or region.
DEFINItIoNS
Human Development Index (HDI): a composite 
index measuring average achievement in three basic 
dimensions of human development—a long and 
healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of 
living. See Technical note 1 at http://hdr.undp.org/
en/media/HDR_2013_En_technotes.pdf for details 
on how the HDI is calculated.
average annual HDI growth: a smoothed 
annualized growth of the HDI in a given period 
calculated as the annual compound growth rate.
MaIN Data SouRCES
Columns 1–8: HDRo calculations based on data 
from unDESa (2011), Barro and lee (2011), unESCo 
Institute for Statistics (2012), World Bank (2012a) 
and IMF (2012).
Columns 9–14: Calculated based on HDI values in 
the relevant year.
 
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 0.773 0.817 0.867 0.889 0.896 0.902 0.904 0.905 — — 0.56 0.59 0.40 0.36
High human development 0.605 c 0.656 c 0.695 0.725 0.738 0.753 0.755 0.758 — — 0.81 0.58 0.80 0.72
Medium human development 0.419 c 0.481 0.549 0.589 0.609 0.631 0.636 0.640 — — 1.38 1.32 1.41 1.29
low human development 0.315 0.350 0.385 0.424 0.442 0.461 0.464 0.466 — — 1.05 0.95 1.82 1.62
Regions
arab States 0.443 0.517 0.583 0.622 0.633 0.648 0.650 0.652 — — 1.56 1.21 1.07 0.94
East asia and the Pacific 0.432 c 0.502 c 0.584 0.626 0.649 0.673 0.678 0.683 — — 1.51 1.51 1.43 1.31
Europe and Central asia 0.651 c 0.701 c 0.709 0.743 0.757 0.766 0.769 0.771 — — 0.74 0.12 0.77 0.70
latin america and the Caribbean 0.574 0.623 0.683 0.708 0.722 0.736 0.739 0.741 — — 0.83 0.93 0.74 0.67
South asia 0.357 0.418 0.470 0.514 0.531 0.552 0.555 0.558 — — 1.58 1.19 1.60 1.43
Sub-Saharan africa 0.366 0.387 0.405 0.432 0.449 0.468 0.472 0.475 — — 0.58 0.44 1.47 1.34
Least developed countries 0.290 c 0.327 c 0.367 0.401 0.421 0.443 0.446 0.449 — — 1.22 1.15 1.91 1.70
Small island developing states 0.530 c 0.571 c 0.600 c 0.623 0.658 0.645 0.647 0.648 — — 0.75 0.50 0.73 0.65
world 0.561 c 0.600 0.639 0.666 0.678 0.690 0.692 0.694 — — 0.68 0.64 0.77 0.68
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Human Development 
Index (HDI)
Inequality-adjusted 
HDI (IHDI)
Inequality-adjusted 
life expectancy index
Inequality-adjusted 
education index
Inequality-adjusted 
income index
Quintile 
income ratio
Income Gini 
coefficient
value value
overall 
loss (%)
Difference from 
HDI ranka value loss (%) value loss (%) value loss (%)
HDI rank 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012b 2012 2012b 2012 2000–2010c 2000–2010c
VERy HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
1 norway 0.955 0.894 6.4 0 0.928 3.7 0.968 2.2 0.797 12.8 3.9 25.8
2 australia 0.938 0.864 7.9 0 0.930 4.7 0.965 1.7 0.719 16.6 .. ..
3 united States 0.937 0.821 12.4 –13 0.863 6.6 0.941 5.3 0.681 24.1 d 8.4 40.8
4 netherlands 0.921 0.857 6.9 0 0.916 4.3 0.897 3.9 0.766 12.3 .. ..
5 Germany 0.920 0.856 6.9 0 0.915 4.0 0.927 1.8 0.741 14.5 4.3 28.3
6 new Zealand 0.919 .. .. .. 0.907 5.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
7 Ireland 0.916 0.850 7.2 0 0.915 4.3 0.933 3.2 0.720 13.8 5.7 34.3
7 Sweden 0.916 0.859 6.2 3 0.937 3.3 0.878 3.8 0.772 11.2 4.0 25.0
9 Switzerland 0.913 0.849 7.0 1 0.942 4.1 0.856 2.0 0.760 14.3 5.5 33.7
10 Japan 0.912 .. .. .. 0.965 3.5 .. .. .. .. .. ..
11 Canada 0.911 0.832 8.7 –4 0.913 5.0 0.879 3.2 0.718 17.1 5.5 32.6
12 Korea, Republic of 0.909 0.758 16.5 –18 0.915 4.3 0.702 25.5 0.679 18.4 .. ..
13 Hong Kong, China (SaR) 0.906 .. .. .. 0.962 2.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
13 Iceland 0.906 0.848 6.4 3 0.945 3.0 0.889 2.5 0.727 13.2 .. ..
15 Denmark 0.901 0.845 6.2 3 0.887 4.4 0.891 3.1 0.764 11.0 .. ..
16 Israel 0.900 0.790 12.3 –8 0.935 3.9 0.840 7.9 0.627 23.7 7.9 39.2
17 Belgium 0.897 0.825 8.0 –1 0.903 4.4 0.822 7.6 0.756 11.9 4.9 33.0
18 austria 0.895 0.837 6.6 3 0.919 4.2 0.838 2.5 0.760 12.7 4.4 29.2
18 Singapore 0.895 .. .. .. 0.935 2.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
20 France 0.893 0.812 9.0 –2 0.930 4.2 0.788 9.4 0.732 13.3 .. ..
21 Finland 0.892 0.839 6.0 6 0.909 3.9 0.859 2.4 0.757 11.3 3.8 26.9
21 Slovenia 0.892 0.840 5.8 7 0.898 4.1 0.905 3.3 0.729 9.9 4.8 31.2
23 Spain 0.885 0.796 10.1 –1 0.930 4.1 0.823 5.5 0.659 19.7 6.0 34.7
24 liechtenstein 0.883 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
25 Italy 0.881 0.776 11.9 –4 0.937 3.9 0.740 13.1 0.673 18.1 6.5 36.0
26 luxembourg 0.875 0.813 7.2 4 0.913 3.5 0.729 6.3 0.807 11.6 4.6 30.8
26 united Kingdom 0.875 0.802 8.3 2 0.903 4.8 0.806 2.6 0.709 16.9 .. ..
28 Czech Republic 0.873 0.826 5.4 9 0.874 3.9 0.904 1.3 0.712 10.7 .. ..
29 Greece 0.860 0.760 11.5 –3 0.899 4.8 0.759 11.3 0.644 18.1 6.2 34.3
30 Brunei Darussalam 0.855 .. .. .. 0.862 5.8 .. .. .. .. .. ..
31 Cyprus 0.848 0.751 11.5 –4 0.901 4.1 0.672 16.3 0.698 13.6 .. ..
32 Malta 0.847 0.778 8.2 3 0.893 5.1 0.771 5.5 0.683 13.6 .. ..
33 andorra 0.846 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
33 Estonia 0.846 0.770 9.0 2 0.813 6.0 0.894 2.6 0.627 17.7 6.4 36.0
35 Slovakia 0.840 0.788 6.3 6 0.825 5.7 0.856 1.5 0.692 11.3 3.6 26.0
36 Qatar 0.834 .. .. .. 0.854 7.2 .. .. .. .. 13.3 41.1
37 Hungary 0.831 0.769 7.4 3 0.810 5.7 0.854 4.1 0.658 12.2 4.8 31.2
38 Barbados 0.825 .. .. .. 0.814 9.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
39 Poland 0.821 0.740 9.9 0 0.834 5.8 0.767 6.3 0.634 17.1 5.5 34.1
40 Chile 0.819 0.664 19.0 –10 0.871 6.6 0.689 13.7 0.488 34.1 13.5 52.1
41 lithuania 0.818 0.727 11.0 –1 0.767 7.2 0.830 5.0 0.605 20.1 6.7 37.6
41 united arab Emirates 0.818 .. .. .. 0.836 6.3 .. .. .. .. .. ..
43 Portugal 0.816 0.729 10.8 1 0.893 4.9 0.700 5.6 0.619 20.8 .. ..
44 latvia 0.814 0.726 10.9 –1 0.784 7.1 0.837 3.6 0.583 20.9 6.6 36.6
45 argentina 0.811 0.653 19.5 –8 0.796 9.7 0.716 12.1 0.487 34.4 11.3 44.5
46 Seychelles 0.806 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 18.8 65.8
47 Croatia 0.805 0.683 15.1 –3 0.845 5.5 0.703 10.4 0.537 27.8 5.2 33.7
HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
48 Bahrain 0.796 .. .. .. 0.815 6.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
49 Bahamas 0.794 .. .. .. 0.783 10.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
50 Belarus 0.793 0.727 8.3 3 0.737 7.4 0.819 5.4 0.636 12.1 4.0 27.2
51 uruguay 0.792 0.662 16.4 –4 0.815 9.3 0.682 10.8 0.521 27.9 10.3 45.3
52 Montenegro 0.791 0.733 7.4 8 0.803 6.8 0.817 2.5 0.600 12.6 4.6 30.0
52 Palau 0.791 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
54 Kuwait 0.790 .. .. .. 0.803 6.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
55 Russian Federation 0.788 .. .. .. 0.689 10.8 .. .. 0.647 11.9 7.3 40.1
56 Romania 0.786 0.687 12.6 2 0.770 9.6 0.779 5.0 0.540 22.2 4.6 30.0
57 Bulgaria 0.782 0.704 9.9 5 0.776 7.8 0.760 6.1 0.592 15.4 4.3 28.2
57 Saudi arabia 0.782 .. .. .. 0.754 11.5 .. .. .. .. .. ..
59 Cuba 0.780 .. .. .. 0.882 5.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
59 Panama 0.780 0.588 24.6 –15 0.776 12.4 0.609 17.8 0.431 40.5 17.1 51.9
Inequality-adjusted 
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Human Development 
Index (HDI)
Inequality-adjusted 
HDI (IHDI)
Inequality-adjusted 
life expectancy index
Inequality-adjusted 
education index
Inequality-adjusted 
income index
Quintile 
income ratio
Income Gini 
coefficient
value value
overall 
loss (%)
Difference from 
HDI ranka value loss (%) value loss (%) value loss (%)
HDI rank 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012b 2012 2012b 2012 2000–2010c 2000–2010c
61 Mexico 0.775 0.593 23.4 –12 0.801 10.9 0.564 21.9 0.463 35.6 11.3 48.3
62 Costa Rica 0.773 0.606 21.5 –10 0.862 7.8 0.601 15.7 0.430 37.9 14.5 50.7
63 Grenada 0.770 .. .. .. 0.798 9.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
64 libya 0.769 .. .. .. 0.782 9.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
64 Malaysia 0.769 .. .. .. 0.799 6.7 .. .. .. .. 11.3 46.2
64 Serbia 0.769 0.696 9.5 8 0.788 8.3 0.709 9.9 0.603 10.3 4.2 27.8
67 antigua and Barbuda 0.760 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
67 trinidad and tobago 0.760 0.644 15.3 –3 0.660 16.6 0.652 6.6 0.621 21.9 .. ..
69 Kazakhstan 0.754 0.652 13.6 3 0.624 16.2 0.781 6.9 0.567 17.3 4.2 29.0
70 albania 0.749 0.645 13.9 0 0.797 11.2 0.640 11.9 0.526 18.3 5.3 34.5
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 0.748 0.549 26.6 –17 0.754 12.2 0.571 18.1 0.385 44.9 11.5 44.8
72 Dominica 0.745 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
72 Georgia 0.745 0.631 15.3 –2 0.720 15.1 0.814 3.3 0.428 25.9 8.9 41.3
72 lebanon 0.745 0.575 22.8 –9 0.718 13.5 0.531 24.1 0.498 30.0 .. ..
72 Saint Kitts and nevis 0.745 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.742 .. .. .. 0.703 16.1 .. .. .. .. 7.0 38.3
77 Peru 0.741 0.561 24.3 –10 0.727 14.8 0.538 24.6 0.452 32.5 13.5 48.1
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 0.740 0.631 14.7 2 0.784 9.4 0.612 12.3 0.524 21.8 9.5 43.2
78 ukraine 0.740 0.672 9.2 13 0.687 10.5 0.808 6.1 0.548 10.9 3.8 26.4
80 Mauritius 0.737 0.639 13.3 5 0.760 9.8 0.570 13.5 0.602 16.6 .. ..
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.735 0.650 11.5 11 0.794 9.6 0.668 5.2 0.518 19.2 6.5 36.2
82 azerbaijan 0.734 0.650 11.4 11 0.636 20.6 0.697 8.3 0.620 4.5 5.3 33.7
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines 0.733 .. .. .. 0.710 14.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
84 oman 0.731 .. .. .. 0.777 7.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
85 Brazil 0.730 0.531 27.2 –12 0.725 14.4 0.503 25.3 0.411 39.7 20.6 54.7
85 Jamaica 0.730 0.591 19.1 2 0.710 15.3 0.669 10.6 0.434 30.1 9.6 45.5
87 armenia 0.729 0.649 10.9 13 0.728 14.9 0.735 3.7 0.510 13.9 4.5 30.9
88 Saint lucia 0.725 .. .. .. 0.773 10.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
89 Ecuador 0.724 0.537 25.8 –8 0.754 14.1 0.529 22.1 0.390 38.8 12.5 49.3
90 turkey 0.722 0.560 22.5 –1 0.743 12.8 0.442 27.4 0.534 26.5 7.9 39.0
91 Colombia 0.719 0.519 27.8 –11 0.732 13.7 0.523 21.5 0.366 44.5 20.1 55.9
92 Sri lanka 0.715 0.607 15.1 11 0.786 9.4 0.618 14.6 0.461 20.8 6.9 40.3
93 algeria 0.713 .. .. .. 0.717 14.5 .. .. .. .. .. ..
94 tunisia 0.712 .. .. .. 0.752 12.6 .. .. .. .. 8.1 41.4
MEDIuM HuMaN DEVELopMENt
95 tonga 0.710 .. .. .. 0.712 13.8 .. .. .. .. .. ..
96 Belize 0.702 .. .. .. 0.777 12.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
96 Dominican Republic 0.702 0.510 27.3 –15 0.708 16.0 0.458 26.8 0.410 37.6 11.3 47.2
96 Fiji 0.702 .. .. .. 0.676 13.0 .. .. .. .. 8.0 42.8
96 Samoa 0.702 .. .. .. 0.718 13.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
100 Jordan 0.700 0.568 19.0 5 0.732 13.1 0.541 22.4 0.462 21.1 5.7 35.4
101 China 0.699 0.543 22.4 0 0.731 13.5 0.481 23.2 0.455 29.5 9.6 42.5
102 turkmenistan 0.698 .. .. .. 0.521 26.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
103 thailand 0.690 0.543 21.3 0 0.768 10.1 0.491 18.0 0.424 34.0 7.1 40.0
104 Maldives 0.688 0.515 25.2 –8 0.834 7.3 0.335 41.2 0.489 23.2 6.8 37.4
105 Suriname 0.684 0.526 23.0 –2 0.680 15.0 0.504 20.1 0.426 32.8 .. ..
106 Gabon 0.683 0.550 19.5 6 0.489 27.8 0.611 7.3 0.556 22.1 7.8 41.5
107 El Salvador 0.680 0.499 26.6 –11 0.699 15.2 0.429 32.4 0.415 31.1 14.3 48.3
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 0.675 0.444 34.2 –12 0.553 25.1 0.537 27.6 0.294 47.4 27.8 56.3
108 Mongolia 0.675 0.568 15.9 13 0.623 18.8 0.661 8.9 0.444 19.7 6.2 36.5
110 Palestine, State of 0.670 .. .. .. 0.725 13.1 .. .. .. .. 5.8 35.5
111 Paraguay 0.669 .. .. .. 0.681 17.8 .. .. 0.374 33.4 17.3 52.4
112 Egypt 0.662 0.503 24.1 –7 0.724 13.9 0.347 40.9 0.505 14.2 4.4 30.8
113 Moldova, Republic of 0.660 0.584 11.6 18 0.693 11.2 0.670 6.1 0.429 17.0 5.3 33.0
114 Philippines 0.654 0.524 19.9 4 0.654 15.2 0.587 13.5 0.375 30.0 8.3 43.0
114 uzbekistan 0.654 0.551 15.8 13 0.578 24.3 0.706 1.4 0.409 20.1 6.2 36.7
116 Syrian arab Republic 0.648 0.515 20.4 3 0.793 10.0 0.372 31.5 0.464 18.3 5.7 35.8
117 Micronesia, Federated States of 0.645 .. .. .. 0.625 19.2 .. .. .. .. 40.2 61.1
118 Guyana 0.636 0.514 19.1 2 0.618 21.7 0.559 10.5 0.393 24.4 .. ..
119 Botswana 0.634 .. .. .. 0.394 24.3 .. .. .. .. .. ..
120 Honduras 0.632 0.458 27.5 –3 0.694 17.4 0.413 28.2 0.335 35.8 29.7 57.0
121 Indonesia 0.629 0.514 18.3 3 0.652 16.8 0.459 20.4 0.453 17.7 5.1 34.0
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table 3 InequalIty-adjusted Human development Index
Human Development 
Index (HDI)
Inequality-adjusted 
HDI (IHDI)
Inequality-adjusted 
life expectancy index
Inequality-adjusted 
education index
Inequality-adjusted 
income index
Quintile 
income ratio
Income Gini 
coefficient
value value
overall 
loss (%)
Difference from 
HDI ranka value loss (%) value loss (%) value loss (%)
HDI rank 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012b 2012 2012b 2012 2000–2010c 2000–2010c
121 Kiribati 0.629 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
121 South africa 0.629 .. .. .. 0.376 28.4 0.558 20.8 .. .. 25.3 63.1
124 vanuatu 0.626 .. .. .. 0.681 15.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
125 Kyrgyzstan 0.622 0.516 17.1 8 0.606 19.8 0.674 6.5 0.336 24.1 6.4 36.2
125 tajikistan 0.622 0.507 18.4 2 0.548 27.2 0.623 12.2 0.383 15.0 4.7 30.8
127 viet nam 0.617 0.531 14.0 14 0.755 13.4 0.447 17.1 0.444 11.4 5.9 35.6
128 namibia 0.608 0.344 43.5 –16 0.528 21.1 0.402 27.8 0.191 68.3 21.8 63.9
129 nicaragua 0.599 0.434 27.5 1 0.735 13.9 0.351 33.3 0.317 33.6 7.6 40.5
130 Morocco 0.591 0.415 29.7 0 0.686 16.7 0.243 45.8 0.430 23.0 7.3 40.9
131 Iraq 0.590 .. .. .. 0.622 20.3 0.334 33.0 .. .. 4.6 30.9
132 Cape verde 0.586 .. .. .. 0.746 12.7 .. .. .. .. 12.3 50.5
133 Guatemala 0.581 0.389 33.1 –3 0.659 18.6 0.280 36.1 0.318 42.5 19.6 55.9
134 timor-leste 0.576 0.386 33.0 –3 0.471 30.2 0.251 47.6 0.485 17.8 4.6 31.9
135 Ghana 0.558 0.379 32.2 –3 0.508 27.5 0.352 40.9 0.303 27.2 9.3 42.8
136 Equatorial Guinea 0.554 .. .. .. 0.270 45.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
136 India 0.554 0.392 29.3 1 0.525 27.1 0.264 42.4 0.434 15.8 4.9 33.4
138 Cambodia 0.543 0.402 25.9 3 0.488 28.8 0.372 28.3 0.358 20.3 6.1 37.9
138 lao People’s Democratic Republic 0.543 0.409 24.7 4 0.589 21.7 0.311 31.2 0.374 20.6 5.9 36.7
140 Bhutan 0.538 0.430 20.0 8 0.568 24.1 0.312 12.2 0.450 23.1 6.8 38.1
141 Swaziland 0.536 0.346 35.4 –3 0.296 35.0 0.409 29.8 0.343 40.9 14.0 51.5
Low HuMaN DEVELopMENt
142 Congo 0.534 0.368 31.1 1 0.374 37.0 0.384 25.4 0.348 30.3 10.7 47.3
143 Solomon Islands 0.530 .. .. .. 0.602 20.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
144 Sao tome and Principe 0.525 0.358 31.7 1 0.503 28.8 0.379 20.0 0.241 44.2 10.8 50.8
145 Kenya 0.519 0.344 33.6 –2 0.390 34.1 0.405 30.7 0.259 36.0 11.0 47.7
146 Bangladesh 0.515 0.374 27.4 5 0.595 23.2 0.252 39.4 0.350 17.7 4.7 32.1
146 Pakistan 0.515 0.356 30.9 2 0.487 32.3 0.217 45.2 0.426 11.0 4.2 30.0
148 angola 0.508 0.285 43.9 –12 0.267 46.1 0.303 34.6 0.286 50.0 30.9 58.6
149 Myanmar 0.498 .. .. .. 0.537 25.3 .. .. .. .. .. ..
150 Cameroon 0.495 0.330 33.4 –1 0.288 43.0 0.346 35.3 0.361 19.9 6.9 38.9
151 Madagascar 0.483 0.335 30.7 1 0.549 25.6 0.342 30.1 0.199 36.1 9.3 44.1
152 tanzania, united Republic of 0.476 0.346 27.3 5 0.414 32.4 0.326 28.3 0.307 20.9 6.6 37.6
153 nigeria 0.471 0.276 41.4 –13 0.286 43.8 0.250 45.2 0.295 34.5 12.2 48.8
154 Senegal 0.470 0.315 33.0 2 0.432 30.7 0.223 44.6 0.325 21.6 7.4 39.2
155 Mauritania 0.467 0.306 34.4 1 0.391 36.2 0.212 42.1 0.346 23.8 7.8 40.5
156 Papua new Guinea 0.466 .. .. .. 0.508 25.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
157 nepal 0.463 0.304 34.2 0 0.622 19.5 0.202 43.6 0.225 37.4 5.0 32.8
158 lesotho 0.461 0.296 35.9 –1 0.297 34.3 0.379 24.3 0.229 47.0 19.0 52.5
159 togo 0.459 0.305 33.5 3 0.371 37.2 0.291 41.5 0.263 20.0 5.6 34.4
160 Yemen 0.458 0.310 32.3 6 0.541 25.1 0.156 49.8 0.353 17.6 6.3 37.7
161 Haiti 0.456 0.273 40.2 –7 0.461 30.9 0.241 40.7 0.182 47.9 26.6 59.2
161 uganda 0.456 0.303 33.6 3 0.331 39.1 0.327 32.2 0.257 29.1 8.7 44.3
163 Zambia 0.448 0.283 36.7 –2 0.269 41.9 0.383 23.8 0.221 42.6 e 16.6 54.6
164 Djibouti 0.445 0.285 36.0 1 0.380 36.9 0.166 47.0 0.365 21.7 7.7 40.0
165 Gambia 0.439 .. .. .. 0.404 33.9 .. .. .. .. 11.0 47.3
166 Benin 0.436 0.280 35.8 –1 0.343 40.3 0.213 42.0 0.301 23.6 6.6 38.6
167 Rwanda 0.434 0.287 33.9 6 0.330 41.3 0.285 29.4 0.251 30.2 12.7 53.1
168 Côte d’Ivoire 0.432 0.265 38.6 –3 0.352 37.8 0.197 43.2 0.268 34.4 8.5 41.5
169 Comoros 0.429 .. .. .. 0.440 32.6 0.189 47.4 .. .. 26.7 64.3
170 Malawi 0.418 0.287 31.4 7 0.329 39.9 0.309 30.2 0.232 23.1 6.6 39.0
171 Sudan 0.414 .. .. .. 0.440 33.0 .. .. .. .. 6.2 35.3
172 Zimbabwe 0.397 0.284 28.5 5 0.357 30.6 0.469 17.8 0.137 35.8 .. ..
173 Ethiopia 0.396 0.269 31.9 1 0.404 35.4 0.179 38.3 0.271 20.8 4.3 29.8
174 liberia 0.388 0.251 35.3 0 0.367 37.6 0.230 46.4 0.188 19.0 7.0 38.2
175 afghanistan 0.374 .. .. .. 0.225 50.9 0.205 39.3 .. .. 4.0 27.8
176 Guinea-Bissau 0.364 0.213 41.4 –3 0.224 50.1 0.185 40.3 0.234 32.5 5.9 35.5
177 Sierra leone 0.359 0.210 41.6 –3 0.242 45.3 0.171 47.4 0.222 31.0 8.1 42.5
178 Burundi 0.355 .. .. .. 0.264 45.6 .. .. .. .. 4.8 33.3
178 Guinea 0.355 0.217 38.8 0 0.311 42.7 0.145 42.0 0.228 31.1 7.3 39.4
180 Central african Republic 0.352 0.209 40.5 –2 0.247 46.0 0.176 45.9 0.210 28.1 18.0 56.3
181 Eritrea 0.351 .. .. .. 0.485 26.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
182 Mali 0.344 .. .. .. 0.269 46.3 0.162 36.9 .. .. 5.2 33.0
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183 Burkina Faso 0.343 0.226 34.2 4 0.329 41.7 0.125 36.2 0.281 23.4 7.0 39.8
184 Chad 0.340 0.203 40.1 –1 0.226 52.0 0.126 43.4 0.295 21.0 7.4 39.8
185 Mozambique 0.327 0.220 32.7 5 0.286 40.8 0.182 18.2 0.205 37.0 f 9.8 45.7
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 0.304 0.183 39.9 –1 0.226 50.0 0.249 31.2 0.108 36.8 9.3 44.4
186 niger 0.304 0.200 34.2 0 0.317 42.6 0.107 39.5 0.236 17.9 5.3 34.6
NotES
a Based on countries for which the Inequality-
adjusted Human Development Index is calculated.
b the list of surveys used to estimate inequalities 
is available at http://hdr.undp.org.
c Data refer to the most recent year available 
during the period specified.
d Based on the 2010 Current Population Survey 
(from the luxembourg Income Study database). 
In the 2011 Human Development Report income 
inequality was based on the 2005 american 
Community Survey (from the World Bank’s 
International Income Distribution Database). the 
two sources seem to be inconsistent.
e Based on simulated income distribution from 
the 2007 Demographic and Health Survey. In the 
2011 Human Development Report inequality in 
consumption was based on the 2002–2003 living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey.
f Based on simulated income distribution from 
the 2009 Demographic and Health Survey. In the 
2011 Human Development Report inequality in 
consumption was based on the 2003 national 
Household Survey of living Conditions.
DEFINItIoNS
Human Development Index (HDI): a composite 
index measuring average achievement in three basic 
dimensions of human development—a long and 
healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of 
living. See Technical note 1 at http://hdr.undp.org/
en/media/HDR_2013_En_technotes.pdf for details 
on how the HDI is calculated.
Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI): HDI value 
adjusted for inequalities in the three basic 
dimensions of human development. See Technical 
note 2 at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2013_
En_technotes.pdf for details on how the IHDI is 
calculated.
overall loss: the loss in potential human 
development due to inequality, calculated as the 
percentage difference between the HDI and the IHDI.
Inequality-adjusted life expectancy index: the 
HDI life expectancy index adjusted for inequality in 
distribution of expected length of life based on data 
from life tables listed in Main data sources.
Inequality-adjusted education index: the 
HDI education index adjusted for inequality in 
distribution of years of schooling based on data from 
household surveys listed in Main data sources.
Inequality-adjusted income index: the HDI 
income index adjusted for inequality in income 
distribution based on data from household surveys 
listed in Main data sources.
Quintile income ratio: Ratio of the average income 
of the richest 20% of the population to the average 
income of the poorest 20% of the population.
Income Gini coefficient: Measure of the deviation 
of the distribution of income (or consumption) among 
individuals or households within a country from a 
perfectly equal distribution. a value of 0 represents 
absolute equality, a value of 100 absolute inequality.
MaIN Data SouRCES
Column 1: HDRo calculations based on data from 
unDESa (2011), Barro and lee (2011), unESCo 
Institute for Statistics (2012), World Bank (2012a) 
and IMF (2012).
Column 2: Calculated as the geometric mean of the 
values in columns 5, 7 and 9 using the methodology 
in Technical note 2.
Column 3: Calculated based on data in columns 
1 and 2.
Column 4: Calculated based on data in column 2 
and recalculated HDI ranks for countries with the 
IHDI.
Column 5: Calculated based on abridged life tables 
from unDESa (2011).
Column 6: Calculated based on data in column 5 
and the unadjusted life expectancy index.
Columns 7 and 9: Calculated based on data 
from lIS (2012), Eurostat (2012), World Bank 
(2012b), unICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys 
for 2002–2012 and ICF Macro (2012) using the 
methodology in Technical note 2.
Column 8: Calculated based on data in column 7 
and the unadjusted education index.
Column 10: Calculated based on data in column 9 
and the unadjusted income index.
Columns 11 and 12: World Bank (2012a).
 
otHER CouNtRIES oR tERRItoRIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
San Marino .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 45.5
tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 0.905 0.807 10.8 — 0.897 5.2 0.851 6.8 0.688 19.8 — —
High human development 0.758 0.602 20.6 — 0.736 12.4 0.592 19.9 0.500 28.6 — —
Medium human development 0.640 0.485 24.2 — 0.633 19.3 0.395 30.2 0.456 22.7 — —
low human development 0.466 0.310 33.5 — 0.395 35.7 0.246 38.7 0.307 25.6 — —
Regions
arab States 0.652 0.486 25.4 — 0.669 16.7 0.320 39.6 0.538 17.5 — —
East asia and the Pacific 0.683 0.537 21.3 — 0.711 14.2 0.480 21.9 0.455 27.2 — —
Europe and Central asia 0.771 0.672 12.9 — 0.716 11.7 0.713 10.5 0.594 16.3 — —
latin america and the Caribbean 0.741 0.550 25.7 — 0.744 13.4 0.532 23.0 0.421 38.5 — —
South asia 0.558 0.395 29.1 — 0.531 27.0 0.267 42.0 0.436 15.9 — —
Sub-Saharan africa 0.475 0.309 35.0 — 0.335 39.0 0.285 35.3 0.308 30.4 — —
Least developed countries 0.449 0.303 32.5 — 0.406 34.6 0.240 36.2 0.287 26.1 — —
Small island developing states 0.648 0.459 29.2 — 0.633 19.2 0.412 30.1 0.370 37.2 — —
world 0.694 0.532 23.3 — 0.638 19.0 0.453 27.0 0.522 23.5 — —
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Gender Inequality 
Index
Maternal 
mortality ratioa
adolescent  
fertility rateb
Seats in national 
parliamentc
population with at least 
secondary education Labour force participation rate 
Rank value
(deaths per 100,000 
live births)
(births per 1,000 women 
ages 15–19) (% female)
(% ages 25 and older) (% ages 15 and older)
Female Male Female Male
HDI rank 2012 2012 2010 2012d 2012 2006–2010e 2006–2010e 2011 2011
VERy HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
1 norway 5 0.065 7 7.4 39.6 95.6 94.7 61.7 70.1
2 australia 17 0.115 7 12.5 29.2 92.2 92.2 58.8 72.3
3 united States 42 0.256 21 27.4 17.0 f 94.7 94.3 57.5 70.1
4 netherlands 1 0.045 6 4.3 37.8 87.5 90.4 58.3 71.3
5 Germany 6 0.075 7 6.8 32.4 96.2 96.9 53.0 66.5
6 new Zealand 31 0.164 15 18.6 32.2 82.8 84.7 61.6 74.1
7 Ireland 19 0.121 6 8.8 19.0 74.8 73.0 52.6 68.5
7 Sweden 2 0.055 4 6.5 44.7 84.4 85.5 59.4 68.1
9 Switzerland 3 0.057 8 3.9 26.8 95.1 96.6 60.6 75.0
10 Japan 21 0.131 5 6.0 13.4 80.0 g 82.3 g 49.4 71.7
11 Canada 18 0.119 12 11.3 28.0 100.0 100.0 61.9 71.4
12 Korea, Republic of 27 0.153 16 5.8 15.7 79.4 g 91.7 g 49.2 71.4
13 Hong Kong, China (SaR) .. .. .. 4.2 .. 68.7 76.4 51.0 68.1
13 Iceland 10 0.089 5 11.6 39.7 91.0 91.6 70.8 78.4
15 Denmark 3 0.057 12 5.1 39.1 99.3 99.4 59.8 69.1
16 Israel 25 0.144 7 14.0 20.0 82.7 85.5 52.5 62.4
17 Belgium 12 0.098 8 11.2 38.9 76.4 82.7 47.7 60.6
18 austria 14 0.102 4 9.7 28.7 100.0 100.0 53.9 67.6
18 Singapore 13 0.101 3 6.7 23.5 71.3 78.9 56.5 76.6
20 France 9 0.083 8 6.0 25.1 75.9 81.3 51.1 61.9
21 Finland 6 0.075 5 9.3 42.5 100.0 100.0 55.9 64.2
21 Slovenia 8 0.080 12 4.5 23.1 94.2 97.1 53.1 65.1
23 Spain 15 0.103 6 10.7 34.9 63.3 69.7 51.6 67.4
24 liechtenstein .. .. .. 6.0 24.0 .. .. .. ..
25 Italy 11 0.094 4 4.0 20.7 68.0 78.1 37.9 59.6
26 luxembourg 26 0.149 20 8.4 25.0 77.1 78.7 49.2 65.2
26 united Kingdom 34 0.205 12 29.7 22.1 99.6 99.8 55.6 68.5
28 Czech Republic 20 0.122 5 9.2 21.0 99.8 99.8 49.6 68.2
29 Greece 23 0.136 3 9.6 21.0 57.7 66.6 44.8 65.0
30 Brunei Darussalam .. .. 24 22.7 .. 66.6 g 61.2 g 55.5 76.5
31 Cyprus 22 0.134 10 5.5 10.7 71.0 78.1 57.2 71.5
32 Malta 39 0.236 8 11.8 8.7 58.0 67.3 35.2 67.4
33 andorra .. .. .. 7.3 50.0 49.5 49.3 .. ..
33 Estonia 29 0.158 2 17.2 19.8 94.4 g 94.6 g 56.7 68.2
35 Slovakia 32 0.171 6 16.7 17.3 98.6 99.1 51.2 68.1
36 Qatar 117 0.546 7 15.5 0.1 h 70.1 62.1 51.8 95.2
37 Hungary 42 0.256 21 13.6 8.8 93.2 g 96.7 g 43.8 58.4
38 Barbados 61 0.343 51 40.8 19.6 89.5 g 87.6 g 64.8 76.2
39 Poland 24 0.140 5 12.2 21.8 76.9 83.5 48.2 64.3
40 Chile 66 0.360 25 56.0 13.9 72.1 75.9 47.1 74.2
41 lithuania 28 0.157 8 16.1 19.1 87.9 93.1 54.1 63.9
41 united arab Emirates 40 0.241 12 23.4 17.5 73.1 g 61.3 g 43.5 92.3
43 Portugal 16 0.114 8 12.5 28.7 40.9 40.2 56.5 68.0
44 latvia 36 0.216 34 12.8 23.0 98.6 98.2 55.2 67.2
45 argentina 71 0.380 77 54.2 37.7 57.0 g 54.9 g 47.3 74.9
46 Seychelles .. .. .. 47.6 43.8 66.9 66.6 .. ..
47 Croatia 33 0.179 17 12.8 23.8 57.4 g 72.3 g 46.0 59.7
HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
48 Bahrain 45 0.258 20 14.8 18.8 74.4 g 80.4 g 39.4 87.3
49 Bahamas 53 0.316 47 28.3 16.7 91.2 87.6 69.3 79.3
50 Belarus .. .. 4 20.5 29.7 .. .. 50.2 62.6
51 uruguay 69 0.367 29 59.0 12.3 50.6 48.8 55.6 76.5
52 Montenegro .. .. 8 14.8 12.3 97.5 98.8 .. ..
52 Palau .. .. .. 12.7 6.9 .. .. .. ..
54 Kuwait 47 0.274 14 14.4 6.3 53.7 46.6 43.4 82.3
55 Russian Federation 51 0.312 34 23.2 11.1 93.5 g 96.2 g 56.3 71.0
56 Romania 55 0.327 27 28.8 9.7 83.4 90.5 48.6 64.9
57 Bulgaria 38 0.219 11 36.2 20.8 90.9 94.4 48.6 60.3
57 Saudi arabia 145 0.682 24 22.1 0.1 h 50.3 g 57.9 g 17.7 74.1
59 Cuba 63 0.356 73 43.9 45.2 73.9 g 80.4 g 43.3 69.9
59 Panama 108 0.503 92 75.9 8.5 63.5 g 60.7 g 49.6 82.5
Gender Inequality Index
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Gender Inequality 
Index
Maternal 
mortality ratioa
adolescent  
fertility rateb
Seats in national 
parliamentc
population with at least 
secondary education Labour force participation rate 
Rank value
(deaths per 100,000 
live births)
(births per 1,000 women 
ages 15–19) (% female)
(% ages 25 and older) (% ages 15 and older)
Female Male Female Male
HDI rank 2012 2012 2010 2012d 2012 2006–2010e 2006–2010e 2011 2011
61 Mexico 72 0.382 50 65.5 36.0 51.2 57.0 44.3 80.5
62 Costa Rica 62 0.346 40 61.9 38.6 54.4 g 52.8 g 46.4 78.9
63 Grenada .. .. 24 35.4 17.9 .. .. .. ..
64 libya 36 0.216 58 2.6 16.5 55.6 g 44.0 g 30.1 76.8
64 Malaysia 42 0.256 29 9.8 13.2 66.0 g 72.8 g 43.8 76.9
64 Serbia .. .. 12 19.2 32.4 80.1 90.7 .. ..
67 antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. 49.1 19.4 .. .. .. ..
67 trinidad and tobago 50 0.311 46 31.6 27.4 59.4 59.2 54.9 78.3
69 Kazakhstan 51 0.312 51 25.5 18.2 99.3 99.4 66.6 77.2
70 albania 41 0.251 27 14.9 15.7 78.8 85.0 49.6 71.3
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 93 0.466 92 87.3 17.0 55.1 49.8 52.1 80.2
72 Dominica .. .. .. 18.9 12.5 29.7 23.2 .. ..
72 Georgia 81 0.438 67 39.5 6.6 89.7 92.7 55.8 74.2
72 lebanon 78 0.433 25 15.4 3.1 53.0 55.4 22.6 70.8
72 Saint Kitts and nevis .. .. .. 33.2 6.7 .. .. .. ..
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 107 0.496 21 25.0 3.1 62.1 69.1 16.4 72.5
77 Peru 73 0.387 67 48.7 21.5 47.3 59.1 67.8 84.7
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 30 0.162 10 17.8 30.9 72.0 85.3 42.9 68.9
78 ukraine 57 0.338 32 26.1 8.0 91.5 g 96.1 g 53.3 66.6
80 Mauritius 70 0.377 60 31.8 18.8 45.2 g 52.9 g 44.1 75.5
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina .. .. 8 13.4 19.3 .. .. 35.2 58.6
82 azerbaijan 54 0.323 43 31.4 16.0 90.0 95.7 61.6 68.5
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines .. .. 48 54.1 17.4 .. .. 55.7 78.4
84 oman 59 0.340 32 9.3 9.6 47.2 57.1 28.3 81.6
85 Brazil 85 0.447 56 76.0 9.6 50.5 48.5 59.6 80.9
85 Jamaica 87 0.458 110 69.7 15.5 74.0 g 71.1 g 56.0 71.8
87 armenia 59 0.340 30 33.2 10.7 94.1 g 94.8 g 49.4 70.2
88 Saint lucia .. .. 35 55.9 17.2 .. .. 64.2 77.3
89 Ecuador 83 0.442 110 80.6 32.3 36.6 36.6 54.3 82.7
90 turkey 68 0.366 20 30.5 14.2 26.7 42.4 28.1 71.4
91 Colombia 88 0.459 92 68.1 13.6 43.8 42.4 55.8 79.7
92 Sri lanka 75 0.402 35 22.1 5.8 72.6 75.5 34.7 76.3
93 algeria 74 0.391 97 6.1 25.6 20.9 27.3 15.0 71.9
94 tunisia 46 0.261 56 4.4 26.7 29.9 44.4 25.5 70.0
MEDIuM HuMaN DEVELopMENt
95 tonga 90 0.462 110 18.0 3.6 i 71.6 g 76.7 g 53.6 75.0
96 Belize 79 0.435 53 70.8 13.3 35.2 g 32.8 g 48.3 81.8
96 Dominican Republic 109 0.508 150 103.6 19.1 43.3 41.7 51.0 78.6
96 Fiji .. .. 26 42.8 .. 57.5 58.1 39.3 79.5
96 Samoa .. .. .. 25.5 4.1 64.3 60.0 42.8 77.8
100 Jordan 99 0.482 63 23.7 11.1 68.9 77.7 15.6 65.9
101 China 35 0.213 37 9.1 21.3 54.8 g 70.4 g 67.7 80.1
102 turkmenistan .. .. 67 16.9 16.8 .. .. 46.4 76.0
103 thailand 66 0.360 48 37.0 15.7 29.0 35.6 63.8 80.0
104 Maldives 64 0.357 60 10.2 6.5 20.7 30.1 55.7 76.8
105 Suriname 94 0.467 130 34.9 11.8 40.5 47.1 40.5 68.7
106 Gabon 105 0.492 230 81.0 16.7 53.8 g 34.7 g 56.3 65.0
107 El Salvador 82 0.441 81 76.2 26.2 34.8 40.8 47.4 78.6
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 97 0.474 190 74.7 30.1 39.8 49.7 64.1 80.9
108 Mongolia 56 0.328 63 18.7 12.7 83.0 g 81.8 g 54.3 65.5
110 Palestine, State of .. .. 64 48.3 .. 48.0 56.2 15.1 66.3
111 Paraguay 95 0.472 99 66.7 13.6 35.0 39.0 57.9 86.3
112 Egypt 126 0.590 66 40.6 2.2 43.4 g 59.3 g 23.7 74.3
113 Moldova, Republic of 49 0.303 41 29.1 19.8 91.6 95.3 38.4 45.1
114 Philippines 77 0.418 99 46.5 22.1 65.9 g 63.7 g 49.7 79.4
114 uzbekistan .. .. 28 12.8 19.2 .. .. 47.7 74.7
116 Syrian arab Republic 118 0.551 70 36.5 12.0 27.4 38.2 13.1 71.6
117 Micronesia, Federated States of .. .. 100 18.5 0.1 .. .. .. ..
118 Guyana 104 0.490 280 53.9 31.3 61.5 g 48.8 g 41.8 79.1
119 Botswana 102 0.485 160 43.8 7.9 73.6 g 77.5 g 71.7 81.6
120 Honduras 100 0.483 100 85.9 19.5 20.7 18.8 42.3 82.8
121 Indonesia 106 0.494 220 42.3 18.2 36.2 46.8 51.2 84.2
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table 4 Gender InequalIty Index
Gender Inequality 
Index
Maternal 
mortality ratioa
adolescent  
fertility rateb
Seats in national 
parliamentc
population with at least 
secondary education Labour force participation rate 
Rank value
(deaths per 100,000 
live births)
(births per 1,000 women 
ages 15–19) (% female)
(% ages 25 and older) (% ages 15 and older)
Female Male Female Male
HDI rank 2012 2012 2010 2012d 2012 2006–2010e 2006–2010e 2011 2011
121 Kiribati .. .. .. 16.4 8.7 .. .. .. ..
121 South africa 90 0.462 300 50.4 41.1 j 68.9 72.2 44.0 60.8
124 vanuatu .. .. 110 50.6 1.9 .. .. 61.3 79.7
125 Kyrgyzstan 64 0.357 71 33.0 23.3 81.0 g 81.2 g 55.5 78.6
125 tajikistan 57 0.338 65 25.7 17.5 93.2 g 85.8 g 57.4 75.1
127 viet nam 48 0.299 59 22.7 24.4 24.7 g 28.0 g 73.2 81.2
128 namibia 86 0.455 200 54.4 25.0 33.0 g 34.0 g 58.6 69.9
129 nicaragua 89 0.461 95 104.9 40.2 30.8 g 44.7 g 46.7 80.0
130 Morocco 84 0.444 100 10.8 11.0 20.1 g 36.3 g 26.2 74.7
131 Iraq 120 0.557 63 85.9 25.2 22.0 g 42.7 g 14.5 69.3
132 Cape verde .. .. 79 69.2 20.8 .. .. 50.8 83.3
133 Guatemala 114 0.539 120 102.4 13.3 12.6 17.4 49.0 88.3
134 timor-leste .. .. 300 52.3 38.5 .. .. 38.4 74.1
135 Ghana 121 0.565 350 62.4 8.3 45.7 g 61.8 g 66.9 71.8
136 Equatorial Guinea .. .. 240 114.6 10.0 .. .. 80.6 92.3
136 India 132 0.610 200 74.7 10.9 26.6 g 50.4 g 29.0 80.7
138 Cambodia 96 0.473 250 32.9 18.1 11.6 20.6 79.2 86.7
138 lao People’s Democratic Republic 100 0.483 470 30.1 25.0 22.9 g 36.8 g 76.5 79.5
140 Bhutan 92 0.464 180 44.9 13.9 34.0 34.5 65.8 76.5
141 Swaziland 112 0.525 320 67.9 21.9 49.9 g 46.1 g 43.6 70.8
Low HuMaN DEVELopMENt
142 Congo 132 0.610 560 112.6 9.6 43.8 g 48.7 g 68.4 72.9
143 Solomon Islands .. .. 93 64.6 .. .. .. 53.2 79.9
144 Sao tome and Principe .. .. 70 55.4 18.2 .. .. 43.7 76.6
145 Kenya 130 0.608 360 98.1 9.8 25.3 52.3 61.5 71.8
146 Bangladesh 111 0.518 240 68.2 19.7 30.8 g 39.3 g 57.2 84.3
146 Pakistan 123 0.567 260 28.1 21.1 18.3 43.1 22.7 83.3
148 angola .. .. 450 148.1 38.2 k .. .. 62.9 77.1
149 Myanmar 80 0.437 200 12.0 4.6 18.0 g 17.6 g 75.0 82.1
150 Cameroon 137 0.628 690 115.1 13.9 21.1 g 34.9 g 64.2 77.4
151 Madagascar .. .. 240 122.7 15.9 .. .. 83.4 88.7
152 tanzania, united Republic of 119 0.556 460 128.7 36.0 5.6 g 9.2 g 88.2 90.3
153 nigeria .. .. 630 111.3 6.7 .. .. 47.9 63.3
154 Senegal 115 0.540 370 89.7 41.6 4.6 11.0 66.1 88.4
155 Mauritania 139 0.643 510 71.3 19.2 8.0 g 20.8 g 28.7 79.2
156 Papua new Guinea 134 0.617 230 62.0 2.7 6.8 g 14.1 g 70.6 74.1
157 nepal 102 0.485 170 86.2 33.2 17.9 g 39.9 g 80.4 87.6
158 lesotho 113 0.534 620 60.8 26.1 21.9 19.8 58.9 73.4
159 togo 122 0.566 300 54.3 11.1 15.3 g 45.1 g 80.4 81.4
160 Yemen 148 0.747 200 66.1 0.7 7.6 g 24.4 g 25.2 72.0
161 Haiti 127 0.592 350 41.3 4.0 22.5 g 36.3 g 60.1 70.6
161 uganda 110 0.517 310 126.4 35.0 23.0 23.9 76.0 79.5
163 Zambia 136 0.623 440 138.5 11.5 25.7 44.2 73.2 85.6
164 Djibouti .. .. 200 19.5 13.8 .. .. 36.0 67.2
165 Gambia 128 0.594 360 66.9 7.5 16.9 g 31.4 g 72.4 83.1
166 Benin 135 0.618 350 97.0 8.4 11.2 g 25.6 g 67.4 78.2
167 Rwanda 76 0.414 340 35.5 51.9 7.4 g 8.0 g 86.4 85.4
168 Côte d’Ivoire 138 0.632 400 105.7 11.0 13.7 g 29.9 g 51.8 81.2
169 Comoros .. .. 280 51.1 3.0 .. .. 35.1 80.4
170 Malawi 124 0.573 460 105.6 22.3 10.4 g 20.4 g 84.8 81.3
171 Sudan 129 0.604 730 53.0 24.1 12.8 g 18.2 g 30.9 76.5
172 Zimbabwe 116 0.544 570 53.4 17.9 48.8 g 62.0 g 83.0 89.5
173 Ethiopia .. .. 350 48.3 25.5 .. .. 78.4 89.8
174 liberia 143 0.658 770 123.0 11.7 15.7 g 39.2 g 57.9 64.4
175 afghanistan 147 0.712 460 99.6 27.6 5.8 g 34.0 g 15.7 80.3
176 Guinea-Bissau .. .. 790 96.2 10.0 .. .. 68.0 78.2
177 Sierra leone 139 0.643 890 104.2 12.9 9.5 g 20.4 g 66.3 69.1
178 Burundi 98 0.476 800 20.9 34.9 5.2 g 9.2 g 83.7 82.1
178 Guinea .. .. 610 133.7 .. l .. .. 65.4 78.3
180 Central african Republic 142 0.654 890 98.6 12.5 10.3 g 26.2 g 72.5 85.1
181 Eritrea .. .. 240 53.7 22.0 .. .. 79.8 90.0
182 Mali 141 0.649 540 168.9 10.2 11.3 9.2 36.8 70.0
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Gender Inequality 
Index
Maternal 
mortality ratioa
adolescent  
fertility rateb
Seats in national 
parliamentc
population with at least 
secondary education Labour force participation rate 
Rank value
(deaths per 100,000 
live births)
(births per 1,000 women 
ages 15–19) (% female)
(% ages 25 and older) (% ages 15 and older)
Female Male Female Male
HDI rank 2012 2012 2010 2012d 2012 2006–2010e 2006–2010e 2011 2011
NotES
a Data were computed to ensure comparability 
across countries and are thus not necessarily the 
same as official country statistics, which may be 
based on alternative rigorous methods. Data are 
rounded according to the following scheme: less 
than 100, no rounding; 100–999, rounded to the 
nearest 10; and greater than 1,000, rounded to 
the nearest 100.
b Based on medium-fertility variant.
c For countries with bicameral legislative systems 
the share of seats in national parliament is 
calculated based on both houses.
d Data are annual average of projected values for 
2010–2015.
e Data refer to the most recent year available during 
the period specified.
f the denominator of the calculation refers to voting 
members of the House of Representatives only.
g Barro and lee (2011) estimate for 2010.
h For calculating the Gender Inequality Index, a 
value of 0.1% was used.
i no women were elected in 2010; however, one 
woman was appointed to the cabinet.
j Does not include the 36 rotating delegates 
appointed on an ad hoc basis.
k Estimate is for prior to the 31 august 2012 
elections.
l the parliament was dissolved following the 
December 2008 coup.
DEFINItIoNS
Gender Inequality Index: a composite measure 
reflecting inequality in achievements between 
women and men in three dimensions: reproductive 
health, empowerment and the labour market. See 
Technical note 3 at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/
HDR_2013_En_technotes.pdf for details on how 
the Gender Inequality Index is calculated.
Maternal mortality ratio: Ratio of the number of 
maternal deaths to the number of live births in a 
given year, expressed per 100,000 live births.
adolescent fertility rate: number of births to 
women ages 15–19 per 1,000 women ages 15–19.
Seats in national parliament: Proportion of seats 
held by women in a lower or single house or an 
upper house or senate, expressed as percentage of 
total seats.
population with at least secondary education: 
Percentage of the population ages 25 and older that 
have reached secondary education.
Labour force participation rate: Proportion of 
a country’s working-age population that engages 
in the labour market, either by working or actively 
looking for work, expressed as a percentage of the 
working-age population.
MaIN Data SouRCES
Columns 1 and 2: HDRo calculations based on 
WHo and others (2012), unDESa (2011), IPu (2012), 
Barro and lee (2010), unESCo Institute for Statistics 
(2012) and Ilo (2012).
Column 3: WHo and others (2012).
Column 4: unDESa (2011).
Column 5: IPu (2012).
Columns 6 and 7: unESCo Institute for Statistics 
(2012).
Columns 8 and 9: Ilo (2012).
 
183 Burkina Faso 131 0.609 300 117.4 15.3 0.9 3.2 77.5 90.4
184 Chad .. .. 1,100 138.1 12.8 .. .. 64.4 80.2
185 Mozambique 125 0.582 490 124.4 39.2 1.5 g 6.0 g 86.0 82.9
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 144 0.681 540 170.6 8.2 10.7 g 36.2 g 70.2 72.5
186 niger 146 0.707 590 193.6 13.3 2.5 g 7.6 g 39.9 89.9
otHER CouNtRIES oR tERRItoRIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of .. .. 81 0.6 15.6 .. .. 71.6 83.7
Marshall Islands .. .. .. 37.7 3.0 .. .. .. ..
Monaco .. .. .. 1.5 19.0 .. .. .. ..
nauru .. .. .. 23.0 0.1 .. .. .. ..
San Marino .. .. .. 2.5 18.3 .. .. .. ..
Somalia .. .. 1,000 68.0 13.8 .. .. 37.7 76.8
South Sudan .. .. .. .. 24.3 .. .. .. ..
tuvalu .. .. .. 21.5 6.7 .. .. .. ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development .. 0.193 15 18.7 25.0 84.7 87.1 52.7 68.7
High human development .. 0.376 47 45.9 18.5 62.9 65.2 46.8 75.3
Medium human development .. 0.457 121 44.7 18.2 42.1 58.8 50.5 79.9
low human development .. 0.578 405 86.0 19.2 18.0 32.0 56.4 79.9
Regions
arab States .. 0.555 176 39.2 13.0 31.8 44.7 22.8 74.1
East asia and the Pacific .. 0.333 73 18.5 17.7 49.6 63.0 65.2 80.6
Europe and Central asia .. 0.280 28 23.1 16.7 81.4 85.8 49.6 69.0
latin america and the Caribbean .. 0.419 74 70.6 24.4 49.8 51.1 53.7 79.9
South asia .. 0.568 203 66.9 18.5 28.3 49.7 31.3 81.0
Sub-Saharan africa .. 0.577 475 105.2 20.9 23.7 35.1 64.7 76.2
Least developed countries .. 0.566 394 90.9 20.3 16.9 27.1 64.8 82.4
Small island developing states .. 0.481 193 61.1 22.0 48.0 53.0 53.0 73.9
world .. 0.463 145 51.2 20.3 52.3 62.9 51.3 77.2
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Multidimensional 
poverty Index
population in multidimensional povertya
population 
vulnerable 
to poverty
population 
in severe 
poverty
Contribution of deprivation 
to overall poverty 
(%)
population below income 
poverty line 
(%)
Headcount
Intensity of 
deprivation
ppp $1.25 
a day
National 
poverty line
Yearb valuea (%) (thousands) (%) (%) (%) Education Health
living 
standards 2002–2011c 2002–2012c
EStIMatES baSED oN SuRVEyS FoR 2007–2011
 albania 2008/2009 (D) 0.005 1.4 45 37.7 7.4 0.1 32.0 44.9 23.0 0.6 12.4
armenia 2010 (D) 0.001 0.3 6 35.2 3.0 0.0 25.8 64.8 9.4 1.3 35.8
 Bangladesh 2007 (D) 0.292 57.8 83,207 50.4 21.2 26.2 18.7 34.5 46.8 43.3 31.5
 Bhutan 2010 (M) 0.119 27.2 198 43.9 17.2 8.5 40.4 21.2 38.4 10.2 23.2
 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 2008 (D) 0.089 20.5 1,972 43.7 18.7 5.8 19.8 27.5 52.6 15.6 60.1
Burkina Faso 2010 (D) 0.535 84.0 13,834 63.7 7.1 65.7 36.2 27.9 35.9 44.6
 Cambodia 2010 (D) 0.212 45.9 6,415 46.1 21.4 17.0 22.1 32.7 45.1 22.8 30.1
 Colombia 2010 (D) 0.022 5.4 2,500 40.9 6.4 1.1 31.8 33.5 34.7 8.2 37.2
 Congo 2009 (D) 0.208 40.6 1,600 51.2 17.7 22.9 10.4 45.6 44.0 54.1 50.1
 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 2010 (M) 0.392 74.0 48,815 53.0 15.1 45.9 18.0 25.1 56.9 87.7 71.3
 Dominican Republic 2007 (D) 0.018 4.6 439 39.4 8.6 0.7 39.1 22.6 38.2 2.2 34.4
Egypt 2008 (D) 0.024 6.0 4,699 40.7 7.2 1.0 48.1 37.3 14.5 1.7 22.0
 Ethiopia 2011 (D) 0.564 87.3 72,415 64.6 6.8 71.1 25.9 27.6 46.5 39.0 38.9
Ghana 2008 (D) 0.144 31.2 7,258 46.2 21.6 11.4 32.1 19.5 48.4 28.6 28.5
 Guyana 2009 (D) 0.030 7.7 58 39.2 12.3 1.0 17.4 50.4 32.2 .. ..
 Indonesia 2007 (D) 0.095 20.8 48,352 45.9 12.2 7.6 15.7 50.6 33.8 18.1 12.5
 Jordan 2009 (D) 0.008 2.4 145 34.4 1.3 0.1 49.6 47.4 3.1 0.1 13.3
 Kenya 2008/2009 (D) 0.229 47.8 18,863 48.0 27.4 19.8 12.7 30.1 57.2 43.4 45.9
lesotho 2009 (D) 0.156 35.3 759 44.1 26.7 11.1 21.9 18.9 59.2 43.4 56.6
 liberia 2007 (D) 0.485 83.9 3,218 57.7 9.7 57.5 29.7 25.0 45.3 83.8 63.8
Madagascar 2008/2009 (D) 0.357 66.9 13,463 53.3 17.9 35.4 34.3 16.7 49.1 81.3 68.7
 Malawi 2010 (D) 0.334 66.7 9,633 50.1 23.4 31.4 19.5 27.1 53.3 73.9 52.4
Maldives 2009 (D) 0.018 5.2 16 35.6 4.8 0.3 13.6 81.1 5.3 .. ..
 Mauritania 2007 (M) 0.352 d 61.7 d 1,982 d 57.1 d 15.1 d 40.7 d 32.0 21.6 46.5 23.4 42.0
 Morocco 2007 (n) 0.048 d 10.6 d 3,287 d 45.3 d 12.3 d 3.3 d 35.5 27.5 37.0 2.5 9.0
 Mozambique 2009 (D) 0.512 79.3 18,127 64.6 9.5 60.7 23.9 36.2 39.9 59.6 54.7
namibia 2006/2007 (D) 0.187 39.6 855 47.2 23.6 14.7 15.1 31.0 53.9 31.9 38.0
nepal 2011 (D) 0.217 44.2 13,242 49.0 17.4 20.8 21.8 33.7 44.4 24.8 25.2
 nigeria 2008 (D) 0.310 54.1 83,578 57.3 17.8 33.9 27.0 32.2 40.8 68.0 54.7
Pakistan 2006/2007 (D) 0.264 d 49.4 d 81,236 d 53.4 d 11.0 d 27.4 d 30.8 37.9 31.2 21.0 22.3
 Palestine, State of 2006/2007 (n) 0.005 1.4 52 37.3 8.8 0.1 33.9 55.3 10.8 0.0 21.9
 Peru 2008 (D) 0.066 15.7 4,422 42.2 14.9 3.9 18.6 20.8 60.6 4.9 31.3
Philippines 2008 (D) 0.064 13.4 12,083 47.4 9.1 5.7 15.8 56.5 27.7 18.4 26.5
 Rwanda 2010 (D) 0.350 69.0 6,900 50.8 19.4 34.7 19.5 30.9 49.6 63.2 44.9
Sao tome and Principe 2008/2009 (D) 0.154 34.5 56 44.7 24.3 10.7 28.8 27.5 43.6 .. 66.2
 Senegal 2010/2011 (D) 0.439 74.4 7,642 58.9 11.7 50.6 31.8 40.6 27.6 33.5 50.8
 Sierra leone 2008 (D) 0.439 77.0 4,321 57.0 13.1 53.2 31.5 19.3 49.2 53.4 66.4
 South africa 2008 (n) 0.057 13.4 6,609 42.3 22.2 2.4 7.5 50.5 42.0 13.8 23.0
Swaziland 2010 (M) 0.086 20.4 242 41.9 23.1 3.3 16.7 29.9 53.4 40.6 69.2
 tanzania, united Republic of 2010 (D) 0.332 65.6 28,552 50.7 21.0 33.4 18.3 26.4 55.3 67.9 33.4
 timor-leste 2009/2010 (D) 0.360 68.1 749 52.9 18.2 38.7 21.3 31.0 47.7 37.4 49.9
 ukraine 2007 (D) 0.008 2.2 1,018 35.5 1.0 0.2 4.7 91.1 4.2 0.1 2.9
uganda 2011 (D) 0.367 69.9 24,122 52.5 19.0 31.2 15.6 34.1 50.4 51.5 31.1
vanuatu 2007 (M) 0.129 30.1 67 42.7 33.5 6.5 29.7 17.3 53.0 .. ..
viet nam 2010/2011 (M) 0.017 4.2 3,690 39.5 7.9 0.7 32.8 25.1 42.1 40.1 28.9
 Zambia 2007 (D) 0.328 64.2 7,740 51.2 17.2 34.8 17.5 27.9 54.7 68.5 59.3
Zimbabwe 2010/2011 (D) 0.172 39.1 4,877 44.0 25.1 11.5 10.2 33.6 56.3 .. 72.0
EStIMatES baSED oN SuRVEyS FoR 2002–2006
argentina 2005 (n) 0.011 f 2.9 f 1,160 f 37.6 f 5.8 f 0.2 f 41.9 12.9 45.2 0.9 ..
azerbaijan 2006 (D) 0.021 5.3 461 39.4 12.5 0.6 24.4 49.4 26.2 0.4 15.8
Belarus 2005 (M) 0.000 0.0 0 35.1 0.8 0.0 16.6 61.8 21.7 0.1 5.4
Belize 2006 (M) 0.024 5.6 16 42.6 7.6 1.1 22.8 35.8 41.4 .. 33.5
Benin 2006 (D) 0.412 71.8 5,652 57.4 13.2 47.2 33.6 25.1 41.3 47.3 39.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006 (M) 0.003 0.8 30 37.2 7.0 0.1 29.2 51.8 19.0 0.0 14.0
Brazil 2006 (n) 0.011 2.7 5,075 39.3 7.0 0.2 39.0 40.2 20.7 6.1 21.4
Burundi 2005 (M) 0.530 84.5 6,128 62.7 12.2 61.9 31.5 22.4 46.1 81.3 66.9
Cameroon 2004 (D) 0.287 53.3 9,149 53.9 19.3 30.4 25.7 24.5 49.8 9.6 39.9
Chad 2003 (W) 0.344 62.9 5,758 54.7 28.2 44.1 40.9 4.6 54.5 61.9 55.0
China 2002 (W) 0.056 12.5 161,675 44.9 6.3 4.5 64.8 9.9 25.2 13.1 2.8
Croatia 2003 (W) 0.016 4.4 196 36.3 0.1 0.3 45.0 46.7 8.3 0.1 11.1
Czech Republic 2002/2003 (W) 0.010 3.1 316 33.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9 0.1 .. ..
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NotES
a not all indicators were available for all countries; 
caution should thus be used in cross-country 
comparisons. Where data are missing, indicator 
weights are adjusted to total 100%. For details 
on countries missing data, see alkire and others 
(2011) and alkire, Conconi and Roche (2012).
b D indicates data are from Demographic and 
Health Surveys, M indicates data are from 
Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys, W indicates 
data are from World Health Surveys and N 
indicates data are from national surveys.
c Data refer to the most recent year available 
during the period specified.
d lower bound estimate.
e upper bound estimate.
f Refers to only part of the country.
DEFINItIoNS
Multidimensional poverty Index: Percentage 
of the population that is multidimensionally poor 
adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations. See 
Technical note 4 at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/
HDR_2013_En_technotes.pdf for details on how 
the Multidimensional Poverty Index is calculated.
Multidimensional poverty headcount: 
Percentage of the population with a weighted 
deprivation score of at least 33%.
Intensity of deprivation of multidimensional 
poverty: average percentage of deprivation 
experienced by people in multidimensional poverty.
population vulnerable to poverty: Percentage of the 
population at risk of suffering multiple deprivations—
that is, those with a deprivation score of 20%–33%.
population in severe poverty: Percentage of the 
population in severe multidimensional poverty—that 
is, those with a deprivation score of 50% or more.
Contribution of deprivation to overall poverty: 
Percentage of the Multidimensional Poverty Index 
attributed to deprivations in each dimension.
population below ppp $1.25 a day: Percentage of 
the population living below the international poverty 
line $1.25 (in purchasing power parity terms) a day.
population below national poverty line: 
Percentage of the population living below the 
national poverty line, which is the poverty line 
deemed appropriate for a country by its authorities. 
national estimates are based on population-
weighted subgroup estimates from household 
surveys.
MaIN Data SouRCES
Columns 1 and 2: Calculated from various 
household surveys, including ICF Macro 
Demographic and Health Surveys, united nations 
Children’s Fund Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys 
and World Health organization World Health 
Surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010.
Columns 3–10: Calculated based on data on 
household deprivations in education, health and 
living standards from various household surveys as 
listed in column 1.
Columns 11 and 12: World Bank (2012a).
 
Multidimensional 
poverty Index
population in multidimensional povertya
population 
vulnerable 
to poverty
population 
in severe 
poverty
Contribution of deprivation 
to overall poverty 
(%)
population below income 
poverty line 
(%)
Headcount
Intensity of 
deprivation
ppp $1.25 
a day
National 
poverty line
Yearb valuea (%) (thousands) (%) (%) (%) Education Health
living 
standards 2002–2011c 2002–2012c
Côte d’Ivoire 2005 (D) 0.353 61.5 11,083 57.4 15.3 39.3 32.0 38.7 29.3 23.8 42.7
Djibouti 2006 (M) 0.139 29.3 241 47.3 16.1 12.5 38.3 24.6 37.1 18.8 ..
Ecuador 2003 (W) 0.009 2.2 286 41.6 2.1 0.6 78.6 3.3 18.1 4.6 32.8
Estonia 2003 (W) 0.026 7.2 97 36.5 1.3 0.2 91.2 1.2 7.6 0.5 ..
Gambia 2005/2006 (M) 0.324 60.4 935 53.6 17.6 35.5 33.5 30.7 35.8 33.6 48.4
Georgia 2005 (M) 0.003 0.8 36 35.2 5.3 0.0 23.2 33.8 43.0 15.3 24.7
Guatemala 2003 (W) 0.127 d 25.9 d 3,134 d 49.1 d 9.8 d 14.5 d 57.2 10.0 32.8 13.5 51.0
Guinea 2005 (D) 0.506 82.5 7,459 61.3 9.3 62.3 35.5 23.0 41.5 43.3 53.0
Haiti 2005/2006 (D) 0.299 56.4 5,346 53.0 18.8 32.3 27.0 21.5 51.5 .. ..
Honduras 2005/2006 (D) 0.159 32.5 2,281 48.9 22.0 11.3 38.0 18.5 43.6 17.9 60.0
Hungary 2003 (W) 0.016 4.6 466 34.3 0.0 0.0 1.8 95.6 2.7 0.2 ..
India 2005/2006 (D) 0.283 53.7 612,203 52.7 16.4 28.6 21.8 35.7 42.5 32.7 29.8
Iraq 2006 (M) 0.059 14.2 3,996 41.3 14.3 3.1 47.5 32.1 20.4 2.8 22.9
Kazakhstan 2006 (M) 0.002 0.6 92 36.9 5.0 0.0 14.6 56.8 28.7 0.1 8.2
Kyrgyzstan 2005/2006 (M) 0.019 4.9 249 38.8 9.2 0.9 36.6 36.9 26.4 6.2 33.7
lao People’s Democratic Republic 2006 (M) 0.267 47.2 2,757 56.5 14.1 28.1 33.1 27.9 39.0 33.9 27.6
latvia 2003 (W) 0.006 d 1.6 d 37 d 37.9 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 88.0 12.0 0.1 5.9
Mali 2006 (D) 0.558 86.6 11,771 64.4 7.6 68.4 34.5 26.2 39.3 50.4 47.4
Mexico 2006 (n) 0.015 4.0 4,313 38.9 5.8 0.5 38.6 23.9 37.5 1.2 51.3
Moldova, Republic of 2005 (D) 0.007 1.9 72 36.7 6.4 0.1 24.7 34.3 41.1 0.4 21.9
Mongolia 2005 (M) 0.065 15.8 403 41.0 20.6 3.2 15.4 27.9 56.6 .. 35.2
Montenegro 2005/2006 (M) 0.006 1.5 9 41.6 1.9 0.3 37.5 47.6 14.9 0.1 6.6
nicaragua 2006/2007 (D) 0.128 28.0 1,538 45.7 17.4 11.2 27.9 13.6 58.5 11.9 46.2
niger 2006 (D) 0.642 92.4 12,437 69.4 4.0 81.8 35.4 21.5 43.2 43.6 59.5
Paraguay 2002/2003 (W) 0.064 13.3 755 48.5 15.0 6.1 35.1 19.0 45.9 7.2 34.7
Russian Federation 2003 (W) 0.005 d 1.3 d 1,883 d 38.9 d 0.8 d 0.2 d 84.2 2.5 13.3 0.0 11.1
Serbia 2005/2006 (M) 0.003 0.8 79 40.0 3.6 0.1 30.5 40.1 29.4 0.3 9.2
Slovakia 2003 (W) 0.000 e 0.0 e 0 e 0.0 e 0.0 e 0.0 e 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 ..
Slovenia 2003 (W) 0.000 e 0.0 e 0 e 0.0 e 0.4 e 0.0 e 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 ..
Somalia 2006 (M) 0.514 81.2 6,941 63.3 9.5 65.6 34.2 18.6 47.2 .. ..
Sri lanka 2003 (W) 0.021 d 5.3 d 1,027 d 38.7 d 14.4 d 0.6 d 6.3 35.4 58.3 7.0 8.9
Suriname 2006 (M) 0.039 8.2 41 47.2 6.7 3.3 36.1 18.8 45.1 .. ..
Syrian arab Republic 2006 (M) 0.021 e 5.5 e 1,041 e 37.5 e 7.1 e 0.5 e 45.4 42.7 11.8 1.7 ..
tajikistan 2005 (M) 0.068 17.1 1,104 40.0 23.0 3.1 18.7 45.0 36.3 6.6 46.7
thailand 2005/2006 (M) 0.006 1.6 1,067 38.5 9.9 0.2 40.7 31.2 28.1 0.4 8.1
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2005 (M) 0.008 1.9 39 40.9 6.7 0.3 59.9 12.8 27.3 0.0 19.0
togo 2006 (M) 0.284 54.3 3,003 52.4 21.6 28.7 28.3 25.4 46.3 38.7 61.7
trinidad and tobago 2006 (M) 0.020 5.6 74 35.1 0.4 0.3 1.3 94.3 4.4 .. ..
tunisia 2003 (W) 0.010 d 2.8 d 272 d 37.1 d 4.9 d 0.2 d 25.0 47.3 27.6 1.4 3.8
turkey 2003 (D) 0.028 6.6 4,378 42.0 7.3 1.3 42.3 38.4 19.2 0.0 18.1
united arab Emirates 2003 (W) 0.002 0.6 20 35.3 2.0 0.0 94.4 0.4 5.2 .. ..
uruguay 2002/2003 (W) 0.006 1.7 57 34.7 0.1 0.0 96.0 0.6 3.4 0.2 18.6
uzbekistan 2006 (M) 0.008 2.3 603 36.2 8.1 0.1 23.2 55.7 21.1 .. ..
Yemen 2006 (M) 0.283 52.5 11,176 53.9 13.0 31.9 27.0 40.5 32.4 17.5 34.8
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Command over resources
Ta
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lE 6
ECoNoMy pubLIC SpENDING
GDp
GDp per 
capita
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
Consumer 
price Index
General government final 
consumption expenditure Health Education Militarya total debt service
(2005 PPP 
$ billions) (2005 PPP $) (% of GDP) (2005 = 100) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
HDI rank 2011 2011 2011 2010 2000 2011 2010 2010 2000 2005–2010b 2000 2010 2000 2009
VERy HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
1 norway 232.7 46,982 20.2 112 19.3 21.5 6.4 8.0 6.6 7.3 1.7 1.5 .. ..
2 australia 781.5 34,548 27.1 116 17.6 18.0 5.4 5.9 4.7 5.1 1.8 1.9 .. ..
3 united States 13,238.3 42,486 14.7 c 112 14.3 17.5 c 5.8 9.5 .. 5.4 3.0 4.8 .. ..
4 netherlands 621.9 37,251 18.6 108 22.0 28.1 5.0 9.4 5.0 5.9 1.5 1.4 .. ..
5 Germany 2,814.4 34,437 18.2 108 19.0 19.5 8.2 9.0 .. 4.6 1.5 1.4 .. ..
6 new Zealand 108.4 c 24,818 c 18.9 c 115 17.3 20.3 c 6.0 8.4 .. 7.2 1.2 1.2 .. ..
7 Ireland 159.9 35,640 11.5 c 107 14.2 18.9 c 4.6 6.4 4.2 5.7 0.7 0.6 .. ..
7 Sweden 331.3 35,048 18.4 108 25.8 26.6 7.0 7.8 7.2 7.3 2.0 1.3 .. ..
9 Switzerland 300.3 37,979 20.9 c 104 11.1 11.5 c 5.6 6.8 5.2 5.4 1.1 0.8 .. ..
10 Japan 3,918.9 30,660 20.1 c 100 16.9 19.8 6.2 7.8 3.7 3.8 1.0 1.0 .. ..
11 Canada 1,231.6 35,716 22.1 c 109 18.6 21.8 c 6.2 8.0 5.6 4.8 1.1 1.5 .. ..
12 Korea, Republic of 1,371.0 27,541 28.6 c 116 12.0 15.3 c 2.2 4.1 .. 5.0 2.6 2.7 .. ..
13 Hong Kong, China (SaR) 310.0 43,844 21.5 c 112 9.1 8.4 c .. .. .. 3.6 .. .. .. ..
13 Iceland 10.7 33,618 14.1 149 23.4 25.2 7.7 7.6 6.7 7.8 0.0 0.1 d .. ..
15 Denmark 180.6 32,399 17.2 111 25.1 28.6 6.8 9.7 8.3 8.7 1.5 1.5 .. ..
16 Israel 207.5 26,720 18.7 114 25.8 23.9 4.7 4.6 6.5 5.8 8.0 6.5 .. ..
17 Belgium 364.7 33,127 20.9 111 21.3 24.1 6.1 8.0 .. 6.4 1.4 1.1 .. ..
18 austria 306.1 36,353 21.1 109 19.0 19.3 7.6 8.5 5.7 5.5 1.0 0.9 .. ..
18 Singapore 277.8 53,591 23.4 114 10.9 10.3 1.3 1.4 3.4 3.3 4.6 3.7 .. ..
20 France 1,951.2 29,819 20.1 108 22.9 24.5 8.0 9.3 5.7 5.9 2.5 2.3 .. ..
21 Finland 173.8 32,254 19.2 110 20.6 23.9 5.1 6.7 5.9 6.8 1.3 1.4 .. ..
21 Slovenia 51.2 24,967 19.5 115 18.7 20.6 6.1 6.9 .. 5.7 1.1 1.6 .. ..
23 Spain 1,251.3 27,063 21.7 112 17.1 20.3 5.2 6.9 4.3 5.0 1.2 1.0 .. ..
24 liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.1 .. .. .. ..
25 Italy 1,645.0 27,069 19.5 110 18.3 20.5 5.8 7.4 4.4 4.7 2.0 1.7 .. ..
26 luxembourg 35.4 68,459 19.0 111 15.1 16.5 5.2 6.6 .. .. 0.6 0.6 .. ..
26 united Kingdom 2,034.2 32,474 14.3 114 18.6 22.5 5.6 8.1 4.5 5.6 2.4 2.6 .. ..
28 Czech Republic 252.8 23,967 23.9 115 20.3 20.9 5.9 6.6 4.0 4.5 2.0 1.3 .. ..
29 Greece 255.0 22,558 14.0 117 18.9 17.5 4.7 6.1 3.4 4.1 3.6 2.3 .. ..
30 Brunei Darussalam 18.2 c 45,507 c 15.9 c 105 25.8 22.4 c 2.6 2.4 3.7 2.0 5.7 3.2 .. ..
31 Cyprus 21.0 26,045 18.4 c 113 16.0 19.7 c 2.4 2.5 5.3 7.9 3.0 2.1 .. ..
32 Malta 9.6 23,007 15.0 112 18.2 21.1 4.9 5.7 .. 5.8 0.7 0.7 .. ..
33 andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.9 5.3 .. 2.9 .. .. .. ..
33 Estonia 24.0 17,885 21.5 126 19.8 19.5 4.1 4.7 5.4 5.7 1.4 1.7 .. ..
35 Slovakia 112.9 20,757 22.4 115 20.1 18.1 5.6 5.8 3.9 4.1 1.7 1.3 .. ..
36 Qatar 145.8 77,987 39.6 d 136 19.7 24.8 d 1.6 1.4 .. 2.4 .. 2.3 e .. ..
37 Hungary 172.5 17,295 16.7 130 21.5 10.0 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.1 1.7 1.0 .. ..
38 Barbados 4.8 d 17,564 d 14.6 c 132 21.2 20.3 c 4.1 5.2 5.6 6.7 .. .. .. ..
39 Poland 691.2 18,087 19.9 c 115 17.4 18.9 c 3.9 5.4 5.0 5.1 1.8 1.9 .. ..
40 Chile 263.7 15,272 23.2 101 12.5 11.8 3.4 3.8 3.9 4.5 3.8 3.2 8.2 6.2
41 lithuania 54.1 16,877 17.6 129 22.8 18.9 4.5 5.2 .. 5.7 1.7 1.1 9.7 24.3
41 united arab Emirates 333.7 42,293 23.8 c 115 .. 8.2 c 2.5 2.7 1.3 1.0 9.4 6.9 .. ..
43 Portugal 226.8 21,317 18.1 109 19.0 20.1 6.4 7.5 5.2 5.8 1.9 2.1 .. ..
44 latvia 30.6 13,773 22.4 139 20.8 15.6 3.2 4.1 5.4 5.6 0.9 1.1 7.7 43.9
45 argentina 631.9 15,501 22.6 154 13.8 15.1 5.0 4.4 4.6 6.0 1.1 0.9 9.4 3.8
46 Seychelles 2.0 23,172 22.0 d 185 24.2 11.1 d 4.0 3.1 .. 5.0 1.7 1.3 3.4 5.0
47 Croatia 71.2 16,162 21.9 117 23.8 21.2 6.7 6.6 .. 4.3 3.1 1.7 .. ..
HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
48 Bahrain 26.9 c 21,345 c 26.6 d 114 17.6 15.5 d 2.7 3.6 .. 2.9 4.0 3.4 .. ..
49 Bahamas 9.8 28,239 26.0 113 10.8 15.0 2.8 3.6 2.8 .. .. .. .. ..
50 Belarus 125.0 13,191 37.6 162 19.5 13.5 4.9 4.4 6.2 4.5 1.3 1.4 2.9 2.6
51 uruguay 44.9 13,315 19.0 142 12.4 13.0 6.1 5.6 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.0 5.3 3.5
52 Montenegro 6.6 10,402 22.1 122 21.9 18.2 5.4 6.1 .. .. .. 1.9 .. 2.4
52 Palau 0.3 13,176 .. .. .. .. 8.5 7.9 9.8 .. .. .. .. ..
54 Kuwait 135.1 47,935 17.8 d 130 21.5 13.5 1.9 2.1 .. 3.8 7.2 3.6 .. ..
55 Russian Federation 2,101.8 14,808 23.1 163 15.1 16.9 3.2 3.2 2.9 4.1 3.7 3.9 4.6 4.2
56 Romania 233.3 10,905 32.2 135 7.2 15.8 3.5 4.4 2.9 4.3 2.5 1.3 6.7 11.5
57 Bulgaria 88.2 11,799 23.3 138 19.0 15.4 3.6 3.7 .. 4.4 2.7 1.9 10.0 8.4
57 Saudi arabia 601.8 21,430 19.0 129 26.0 19.8 3.1 2.7 5.9 5.6 10.6 10.1 .. ..
59 Cuba .. .. 9.9 c .. 29.6 37.9 c 6.1 9.7 7.7 12.9 .. .. .. ..
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59 Panama 49.2 13,766 27.5 c 123 13.2 11.2 c 5.3 6.1 5.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 7.6 4.0
61 Mexico 1,466.6 12,776 20.4 124 11.1 12.0 2.4 3.1 4.9 5.3 0.6 0.5 10.1 3.0
62 Costa Rica 50.7 10,732 19.8 158 13.3 17.6 c 5.0 7.4 4.4 6.3 0.0 0.0 4.1 3.0
63 Grenada 1.0 9,806 23.1 d 121 11.7 15.6 d 4.2 2.6 .. .. .. .. 2.8 3.3
64 libya 96.2 d 15,361 d .. 125 20.8 .. 1.9 2.7 .. .. 3.1 1.2 e .. ..
64 Malaysia 394.6 13,672 20.3 c 114 10.2 12.7 c 1.7 2.4 6.0 5.8 1.6 1.6 6.9 5.6
64 Serbia 71.2 9,809 25.3 153 19.6 18.2 5.2 6.4 .. 5.0 5.5 2.2 2.0 11.2
67 antigua and Barbuda 1.3 14,139 18.3 d 112 19.0 17.6 d 3.3 4.3 .. 2.5 .. .. .. ..
67 trinidad and tobago 30.6 22,761 .. 155 9.3 .. 1.7 3.4 3.8 .. .. .. .. ..
69 Kazakhstan 191.5 11,568 23.9 162 12.1 9.8 2.1 2.5 3.3 3.1 0.8 1.1 18.4 32.3
70 albania 25.3 7,861 24.9 115 8.9 9.3 2.3 2.6 .. .. 1.2 1.6 0.8 3.9
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 329.6 11,258 17.0 163 12.4 10.4 2.4 1.7 .. 3.7 1.5 0.9 5.4 1.5
72 Dominica 0.8 11,120 22.3 c 116 18.5 17.2 c 4.1 5.2 .. 3.6 .. .. 3.3 3.3
72 Georgia 21.6 4,826 17.2 143 8.5 9.4 1.2 2.4 2.2 3.2 0.6 3.9 3.9 7.0
72 lebanon 54.9 12,900 30.0 105 17.3 12.3 3.2 2.8 1.9 1.8 5.4 4.2 8.6 10.9
72 Saint Kitts and nevis 0.7 13,291 30.3 d 122 17.6 16.0 d 3.3 4.0 5.2 4.5 .. .. 5.1 6.7
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 765.2 d 10,462 d .. 206 13.9 .. 1.9 2.2 4.4 4.7 3.7 1.8 e 2.9 ..
77 Peru 266.0 9,049 23.8 115 10.6 9.8 2.8 2.7 .. 2.7 1.8 1.3 4.8 4.4
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 19.5 9,451 21.5 115 18.2 18.0 4.9 4.5 .. .. 1.9 1.4 3.9 7.3
78 ukraine 290.6 6,359 19.3 195 20.9 18.8 2.9 4.4 4.2 5.3 3.6 2.7 11.7 22.1
80 Mauritius 16.4 12,737 24.4 137 14.1 14.0 2.0 2.5 3.8 3.1 0.2 0.1 9.9 1.3
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 28.5 7,607 20.7 118 .. 22.1 4.1 6.8 .. .. .. 1.2 5.8 8.2
82 azerbaijan 81.5 8,890 17.2 164 9.5 11.8 0.9 1.2 3.9 3.2 2.3 2.9 2.5 0.8
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines 1.0 9,482 23.5 d 124 16.4 19.5 d 3.6 3.9 7.9 4.9 .. .. 3.3 4.7
84 oman 72.1 c 25,330 d .. 131 20.7 19.9 d 2.5 2.2 3.1 4.3 10.8 8.5 .. ..
85 Brazil 2,021.3 10,278 19.3 126 19.2 20.7 2.9 4.2 4.0 5.7 1.8 1.6 10.1 2.1
85 Jamaica 19.2 7,074 22.9 179 14.3 17.7 2.9 2.6 5.0 6.1 0.5 0.8 7.8 8.5
87 armenia 15.8 5,112 30.9 131 11.8 11.8 1.1 1.8 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.2 2.4 10.3
88 Saint lucia 1.4 8,231 33.5 c 115 18.2 16.0 c 3.2 5.3 7.1 4.4 .. .. 4.2 3.6
89 Ecuador 109.2 7,443 24.2 124 9.8 15.8 1.3 3.0 1.3 .. 1.6 3.6 11.8 3.2
90 turkey 991.7 13,466 20.0 153 11.7 8.1 3.1 5.1 2.6 2.9 3.7 2.4 7.8 8.0
91 Colombia 415.8 8,861 21.9 126 16.7 10.6 5.5 5.5 3.5 4.8 3.0 3.6 5.1 3.4
92 Sri lanka 102.9 4,929 34.6 172 10.5 7.5 1.8 1.3 .. 2.1 5.0 3.0 4.8 2.9
93 algeria 275.0 7,643 38.3 d 122 13.6 14.2 d 2.6 3.2 .. 4.3 3.4 3.6 8.2 0.4
94 tunisia 88.1 8,258 24.0 123 16.7 13.4 3.3 3.4 6.2 6.3 1.8 1.4 8.9 5.3
MEDIuM HuMaN DEVELopMENt
95 tonga 0.4 4,092 24.3 c 131 18.2 18.9 c 4.0 4.1 4.9 .. .. .. 2.4 1.4
96 Belize 2.1 5,896 .. 113 12.9 .. 2.2 3.3 5.0 6.1 0.9 1.1 9.2 7.2
96 Dominican Republic 87.0 8,651 16.7 136 7.8 5.2 2.2 2.7 1.9 2.2 1.0 0.7 2.2 2.6
96 Fiji 3.6 4,199 .. 127 17.2 .. 3.2 3.4 5.9 4.5 1.9 1.6 1.5 0.7
96 Samoa 0.7 4,008 .. 131 .. .. 4.0 5.7 4.0 5.3 .. .. 2.2 1.8
100 Jordan 32.6 5,269 21.3 134 23.7 18.9 4.7 5.4 .. .. 6.3 5.0 8.7 2.5
101 China 9,970.6 7,418 45.5 115 15.8 13.1 1.8 2.7 .. .. 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.0
102 turkmenistan 41.1 8,055 60.0 .. 14.2 11.1 3.2 1.5 .. .. .. .. 16.1 0.8
103 thailand 530.6 7,633 25.8 116 11.3 13.3 1.9 2.9 5.4 3.8 1.5 1.5 11.4 3.5
104 Maldives 2.5 7,834 .. 138 22.9 .. 4.1 3.8 .. 8.7 .. .. 3.2 9.8
105 Suriname 3.7 c 7,110 c .. 145 37.5 .. 3.9 3.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
106 Gabon 21.5 13,998 25.1 113 9.6 8.8 1.0 1.8 3.8 .. 1.8 0.9 6.9 3.4
107 El Salvador 37.6 6,032 14.2 119 10.2 11.1 3.6 4.3 2.5 3.2 1.3 1.1 2.8 5.0
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 45.4 4,499 16.6 c 137 14.5 13.2 3.7 3.0 5.5 6.3 2.1 1.7 7.6 3.3
108 Mongolia 11.7 4,178 48.6 168 15.3 14.0 3.9 3.0 5.6 5.4 2.1 1.1 3.4 2.8
110 Palestine, State of .. .. .. .. 27.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
111 Paraguay 31.2 4,752 21.3 140 12.7 10.4 3.7 2.1 5.3 4.0 1.1 0.9 5.0 2.5
112 Egypt 457.8 5,547 19.4 173 11.2 11.3 2.2 1.7 .. 3.8 3.2 2.0 1.8 1.4
113 Moldova, Republic of 10.6 2,975 23.9 153 10.3 22.7 3.2 5.4 4.5 9.1 0.4 0.3 11.6 6.7
114 Philippines 344.4 3,631 15.8 127 11.4 10.2 1.6 1.3 3.3 2.7 1.6 1.2 8.7 6.5
114 uzbekistan 85.2 2,903 23.5 .. 18.7 16.6 2.5 2.8 .. .. 1.2 .. 6.4 1.5
116 Syrian arab Republic 96.9 c 4,741 c 18.8 c 142 12.4 10.1 c 2.0 1.6 .. 4.9 5.5 4.1 2.5 1.1
117 Micronesia, Federated States of 0.3 3,017 .. .. .. .. 7.7 12.9 6.7 .. .. .. .. ..
118 Guyana 2.3 c 3,104 c 26.3 c 136 24.7 15.1 c 4.6 5.1 8.5 3.7 1.5 2.1 9.7 1.4
119 Botswana 26.3 12,939 27.9 156 25.4 19.9 2.9 6.0 .. 7.8 3.3 2.4 1.2 0.5
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120 Honduras 27.7 3,566 22.2 139 13.4 17.1 3.0 4.4 .. .. 0.7 1.1 5.5 3.4
121 Indonesia 992.1 4,094 32.4 146 6.5 4.5 0.7 1.3 .. 3.0 .. 0.7 10.1 4.1
121 Kiribati 0.2 2,220 .. .. .. .. 7.5 9.3 11.0 .. .. .. .. ..
121 South africa 489.6 9,678 18.9 140 18.1 21.5 3.4 3.9 5.6 6.0 1.5 1.3 2.9 1.4
124 vanuatu 1.0 4,062 .. 119 20.8 .. 2.7 4.8 7.0 5.2 .. .. 0.7 0.9
125 Kyrgyzstan 11.7 2,126 24.8 167 20.0 19.1 2.1 3.5 3.5 6.2 2.9 4.4 12.6 11.6
125 tajikistan 14.3 2,052 18.7 170 8.3 28.9 0.9 1.6 2.3 4.0 1.2 .. 7.3 12.1
127 viet nam 264.6 3,013 31.9 167 6.4 5.7 1.6 2.6 .. 5.3 .. 2.5 4.2 1.3
128 namibia 13.9 5,986 26.5 141 23.5 21.6 4.2 4.0 7.9 8.1 2.7 3.9 .. ..
129 nicaragua 15.1 2,579 29.7 159 12.2 10.1 3.7 4.9 3.9 .. 0.8 0.7 7.3 7.9
130 Morocco 143.5 4,373 30.6 111 18.4 15.4 1.2 2.0 5.8 5.4 2.3 3.5 7.3 3.6
131 Iraq 112.5 3,412 .. 171 .. .. 0.4 6.8 .. .. .. 2.4 .. ..
132 Cape verde 1.8 3,616 36.5 121 30.7 20.7 3.4 3.1 .. 5.6 1.3 0.5 3.0 2.2
133 Guatemala 64.2 4,351 14.6 134 7.0 10.5 2.2 2.5 .. 3.2 0.8 0.4 2.0 3.8
134 timor-leste 1.6 1,393 .. 134 35.2 .. 6.3 5.1 .. 14.0 .. 4.9 .. ..
135 Ghana 41.3 1,652 21.8 189 10.2 8.5 3.0 3.1 .. 5.5 0.7 0.4 7.8 1.0
136 Equatorial Guinea 23.1 32,026 60.1 d 129 4.6 3.9 d 1.0 3.4 0.7 .. .. .. .. ..
136 India 3,976.5 3,203 29.5 152 12.6 11.7 1.3 1.2 4.4 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.3 1.2
138 Cambodia 29.8 2,080 16.2 c 148 5.2 6.3 c 1.3 2.1 1.7 2.6 2.2 1.6 0.9 0.6
138 lao People’s Democratic Republic 15.5 2,464 27.4 127 6.7 9.8 1.0 1.5 1.5 3.3 0.8 0.3 2.3 4.3
140 Bhutan 3.8 5,096 41.3 d 134 20.4 21.4 d 5.3 4.5 5.8 4.0 .. .. 1.6 5.6
141 Swaziland 5.7 5,349 10.4 144 18.2 19.4 3.3 4.2 5.5 7.4 1.5 3.0 2.0 1.1
Low HuMaN DEVELopMENt
142 Congo 16.1 3,885 23.4 130 11.6 9.7 1.2 1.1 .. 6.2 .. 1.1 1.4 1.6
143 Solomon Islands 1.4 2,581 .. 152 25.2 .. 4.8 8.0 .. 6.1 .. .. 2.1 3.0
144 Sao tome and Principe 0.3 1,805 .. 260 .. .. 3.6 2.7 .. .. .. .. .. 0.8
145 Kenya 62.7 1,507 24.3 180 15.1 13.3 1.9 2.1 5.2 6.7 1.3 1.9 4.7 1.2
146 Bangladesh 236.0 1,568 24.7 145 4.6 5.5 1.1 1.2 2.4 2.2 1.3 1.1 1.6 1.0
146 Pakistan 428.4 2,424 11.8 181 8.6 8.2 0.6 0.8 1.8 2.4 3.7 2.8 3.9 2.5
148 angola 102.0 5,201 10.7 186 .. 17.7 1.9 2.4 2.6 3.4 6.4 4.2 18.7 2.8
149 Myanmar .. .. .. 225 .. .. 0.3 0.2 0.6 .. 2.3 .. .. ..
150 Cameroon 41.9 2,090 .. 117 9.5 .. 1.0 1.5 1.9 3.5 1.3 1.6 5.5 0.9
151 Madagascar 18.2 853 33.0 d 159 9.0 11.6 d 2.5 2.3 2.9 3.2 1.2 0.7 3.0 0.6
152 tanzania, united Republic of 59.8 1,334 28.1 151 11.7 18.2 1.6 4.0 .. 6.2 1.5 1.2 1.6 0.9
153 nigeria 360.8 2,221 .. 161 .. .. 1.5 1.9 .. .. 0.8 1.0 4.0 0.2
154 Senegal 22.2 1,737 30.7 115 12.8 8.8 1.6 3.1 3.2 5.6 1.3 1.6 4.8 2.3
155 Mauritania 8.0 2,255 25.9 133 20.2 12.3 3.1 2.3 .. 4.3 3.5 3.8 6.4 3.0
156 Papua new Guinea 16.6 2,363 14.8 130 16.6 8.4 3.3 2.6 .. .. 0.9 0.4 8.6 8.6
157 nepal 33.6 1,102 21.2 155 8.9 9.6 1.3 1.8 3.0 4.7 0.8 1.4 1.9 1.2
158 lesotho 3.3 1,504 34.9 141 41.7 32.6 3.4 8.5 11.8 13.0 4.0 3.1 8.2 1.6
159 togo 5.6 914 19.4 116 10.5 .. 1.4 3.4 4.4 4.5 .. 1.7 2.3 1.1
160 Yemen 51.1 2,060 11.7 c 167 13.6 11.8 c 2.4 1.3 9.7 5.2 4.4 3.9 e 2.5 0.8
161 Haiti 10.5 1,034 .. 150 7.8 .. 1.7 1.5 .. .. 0.0 0.0 .. 2.0
161 uganda 41.0 1,188 24.4 150 14.5 11.3 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.2 2.5 1.6 1.2 0.4
163 Zambia 19.2 1,423 21.3 167 9.5 11.6 2.9 3.6 2.0 1.3 .. 1.7 5.7 0.9
164 Djibouti .. 2,087 d .. 129 29.7 .. 3.9 4.7 9.7 8.4 5.1 3.7 e 2.4 ..
165 Gambia 3.3 1,873 17.5 123 11.2 9.9 1.9 2.9 2.7 5.0 1.0 0.6 2.7 1.9
166 Benin 13.0 1,428 27.4 119 11.6 .. 1.9 2.0 3.3 4.5 0.6 1.0 e 3.3 0.6
167 Rwanda 12.0 1,097 21.0 c 155 11.0 15.5 c 1.7 5.2 4.1 4.7 3.5 1.3 2.1 0.3
168 Côte d’Ivoire 31.9 1,581 16.4 114 7.2 9.1 1.3 1.1 3.8 4.6 .. 1.6 9.8 1.7
169 Comoros 0.7 980 12.4 d 118 11.7 15.3 d 1.5 3.0 .. 7.6 .. .. 1.6 0.8
170 Malawi 12.4 805 20.8 156 14.6 15.7 2.8 4.0 5.2 5.7 0.7 1.1 3.6 0.4
171 Sudan 83.8 1,878 24.7 166 7.6 17.7 0.9 1.9 .. .. 4.5 3.4 2.0 0.7
172 Zimbabwe .. .. 6.5 .. 24.3 18.3 0.0 .. .. 2.5 4.7 1.3 6.3 1.5
173 Ethiopia 83.0 979 19.0 223 17.9 9.0 2.3 2.6 3.9 4.7 7.5 0.9 1.7 0.6
174 liberia 2.1 506 33.3 162 7.5 20.2 1.3 3.9 .. 2.8 .. 0.9 0.1 0.6
175 afghanistan 37.2 c 1,083 c 16.3 c 141 .. 10.7 c 2.3 0.9 .. .. .. 3.8 .. 0.1
176 Guinea-Bissau 1.7 1,097 .. 119 14.0 .. 1.0 0.9 .. .. 4.4 .. 2.4 2.1
177 Sierra leone 4.6 769 14.9 163 14.3 11.1 1.1 1.5 4.9 4.3 3.7 1.2 7.3 0.6
178 Burundi 4.6 533 18.4 163 15.5 26.3 2.1 4.4 3.2 9.2 6.0 3.8 e 2.6 0.2
178 Guinea 10.1 990 20.0 c 237 6.8 7.5 c 0.7 0.6 2.5 2.4 1.5 .. 5.0 1.8
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180 Central african Republic 3.2 716 10.8 d 124 14.0 4.5 d 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.2 .. 2.6 1.5 0.1
181 Eritrea 2.8 516 .. .. 63.8 .. 2.5 1.3 3.2 2.1 32.7 .. 0.5 1.1
182 Mali 15.3 964 .. 116 8.6 .. 2.1 2.3 3.6 4.5 2.2 1.9 3.8 0.6
183 Burkina Faso 19.5 1,149 .. 115 20.8 .. 2.0 3.4 .. 4.0 1.2 1.3 1.8 0.6
184 Chad 15.5 1,343 31.8 c 117 7.7 13.2 c 2.7 1.1 2.6 2.8 1.9 2.7 1.8 0.9
185 Mozambique 20.6 861 24.3 157 9.0 12.3 4.2 3.7 .. 5.0 1.3 0.9 d 2.3 1.0
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 22.3 329 28.7 d .. 7.5 7.6 d 0.1 3.4 .. 2.5 1.0 1.3 0.6 2.0
186 niger 10.3 642 .. 117 13.0 .. 1.8 2.6 3.2 3.8 1.2 0.9 1.4 0.5
NotES
a For country-specific footnotes, see the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute’s Military 
Expenditure database at www.sipri.org/research/
armaments/milex/milex_database.
b Data refer to the most recent year available 
during the period specified.
c Refers to 2010.
d Refers to 2009.
e Refers to 2008.
DEFINItIoNS
Gross domestic product (GDp): Sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products, 
expressed in 2005 international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates.
GDp per capita: Sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products, expressed in international 
dollars using purchasing power parity rates and 
divided by total population during the same period.
Gross fixed capital formation: value of acquisitions 
of new or existing fixed assets by the business 
sector, governments and households (excluding 
their unincorporated enterprises) less disposals of 
fixed assets, expressed as a percentage of GDP. no 
adjustment is made for depreciation of fixed assets.
Consumer price Index: an index that reflects 
changes in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be 
fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly.
General government final consumption 
expenditure: all government current expenditures 
for purchases of goods and services (including 
compensation of employees and most expenditures 
on national defense and security but excluding 
government military expenditures that are part 
of government capital formation), expressed as a 
percentage of GDP.
public spending on health: Current and 
capital spending from government (central and 
local) budgets, external borrowings and grants 
(including donations from international agencies 
and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or 
compulsory) health insurance funds, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP.
public spending on education: total public 
expenditure (current and capital) on education, 
expressed as a percentage of GDP.
public spending on the military: all expenditures 
of the defense ministry and other ministries on 
recruiting and training military personnel and on the 
construction and purchase of military supplies and 
equipment, expressed as a percentage of GDP.
total debt service: Sum of principal repayments 
and interest actually paid in foreign currency, 
goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid 
on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases 
and charges) to the International Monetary Fund, 
expressed as a percentage of GDP.
MaIN Data SouRCES
Columns 1–10: World Bank (2012a).
Columns 11 and 12: SIPRI (2012).
Columns 13 and 14: HDRo calculations based on 
data on total debt service as a percentage of GnI 
from World Bank (2012a).
 
otHER CouNtRIES oR tERRItoRIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.8 15.0 14.6 .. .. .. .. ..
Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.8 3.8 1.3 1.2 .. .. .. ..
nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
San Marino .. .. .. 114 .. .. 6.5 6.1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. 12.3 14.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 37,231.3 32,931 18.4 — 16.7 19.4 6.0 8.2 4.5 5.1 2.2 2.7 .. ..
High human development 11,740.8 11,572 21.4 — 15.5 15.8 2.9 3.6 .. 4.7 2.8 2.7 8.1 4.7
Medium human development 18,095.7 5,203 38.4 — 13.9 12.4 1.8 2.4 .. 3.6 2.2 2.0 3.7 1.6
low human development 1,948.5 1,623 18.4 — 10.1 11.1 1.4 1.8 .. 3.5 2.5 2.0 3.9 1.3
Regions
arab States 2,808.0 8,104 24.3 — 19.2 15.4 2.4 2.6 .. 3.9 6.8 5.5 .. ..
East asia and the Pacific 12,580.2 6,616 .. — .. .. 1.7 2.5 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Europe and Central asia 5,946.1 12,458 22.5 — 15.7 15.4 3.7 4.3 .. 4.1 2.8 2.7 6.8 8.3
latin america and the Caribbean 6,046.4 10,429 20.1 — 14.7 16.1 3.2 3.8 4.3 5.3 1.4 1.4 8.9 2.8
South asia 5,586.1 3,241 27.6 — 11.8 10.9 1.3 1.2 4.0 3.2 3.2 2.5 2.6 1.3
Sub-Saharan africa 1,691.4 2,094 20.8 — 15.9 16.9 2.5 3.0 .. 5.2 1.9 1.5 4.1 1.2
Least developed countries 1,065.9 1,346 .. — 9.7 .. 1.7 2.2 .. 3.7 .. 2.2 3.1 1.3
Small island developing states 223.2 5,340 .. — 17.3 .. 3.6 3.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
world 69,016.4 10,103 22.3 — 16.3 17.5 5.3 6.5 .. 4.9 2.3 2.6 .. ..
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IMMuNIZatIoN 
CoVERaGE 
underweight 
children 
(moderate 
and severe)
HIV pREVaLENCE, 
youtH MoRtaLIty RatES HEaLtH CaRE QuaLIty
Dtp Measles Female Male Infant 
under-
five 
adult Cause-specific
physicians
Satisfaction 
with health 
care qualityFemale Male
Due to 
malaria 
Due to 
cholera
Due to cardiovascular 
diseases and diabetesa
(% of one-
year-olds)
(% of children 
under age 5) (% ages 15–24)
(deaths per 
1,000 live births) (per 1,000 adults)
(per 100,000 
people per 
year) (number) (per 1,000 people)
(per 1,000 
people) (% satisfied)
HDI rank 2010 2010 2006–2010b 2009 2009 2010 2010 2009 2009 2008 2005–2010b 2008 2005–2010b 2007–2009b
VERy HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
1 norway 99 93 .. 0.1 0.1 3 3 50 83 0.0 0 124 4.1 68
2 australia 97 94 .. 0.1 0.1 4 5 45 79 0.0 0 112 3.0 60
3 united States 99 92 .. 0.2 0.3 7 8 78 134 0.0 0 156 2.7 56
4 netherlands 99 96 .. 0.1 0.1 4 4 56 75 0.0 0 122 3.9 77
5 Germany 97 96 .. 0.1 0.1 3 4 53 99 0.0 0 170 3.5 47
6 new Zealand 95 91 .. 0.1 0.1 5 6 57 86 0.0 0 138 2.4 64
7 Ireland 98 90 .. 0.1 0.1 3 4 57 97 0.0 .. 141 3.2 47
7 Sweden 99 96 .. 0.1 0.1 2 3 47 74 0.0 0 141 3.6 81
9 Switzerland 98 90 .. 0.1 0.2 4 5 43 74 0.0 0 114 4.1 81
10 Japan 99 94 .. 0.1 0.1 2 3 42 86 0.0 0 91 2.1 54
11 Canada 92 93 .. 0.1 0.1 5 6 53 87 0.0 0 121 1.9 73
12 Korea, Republic of 96 98 .. 0.1 0.1 4 5 46 109 0.0 0 141 2.0 60
13 Hong Kong, China (SaR) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 67
13 Iceland 98 93 .. 0.1 0.1 2 2 43 65 0.0 .. 121 3.9 87
15 Denmark 93 85 .. 0.1 0.1 3 4 65 107 0.0 0 143 3.4 82
16 Israel 96 98 .. 0.1 0.1 4 5 45 78 0.0 .. 116 3.6 70
17 Belgium 99 94 .. 0.1 0.1 4 4 59 105 0.0 0 131 3.0 88
18 austria 93 76 .. 0.2 0.3 4 4 50 102 0.0 0 155 4.7 89
18 Singapore 98 95 .. 0.1 0.1 2 3 42 76 0.0 .. 140 1.8 86
20 France 99 90 .. 0.1 0.2 3 4 54 117 0.0 0 98 3.5 84
21 Finland 99 98 .. 0.1 0.1 2 3 56 124 0.0 0 157 2.7 85
21 Slovenia 98 95 .. 0.1 0.1 2 3 54 131 0.0 0 168 2.5 68
23 Spain 99 95 .. 0.1 0.2 4 5 43 94 0.0 0 113 3.7 84
24 liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. 2 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
25 Italy 98 90 .. 0.1 0.1 3 4 41 77 0.0 0 128 4.2 59
26 luxembourg 99 96 .. 0.1 0.1 2 3 57 95 0.0 .. 150 2.9 90
26 united Kingdom 98 93 .. 0.1 0.2 5 5 58 95 0.0 0 133 2.7 81
28 Czech Republic 99 98 .. 0.1 0.1 3 4 63 138 0.0 .. 258 3.6 63
29 Greece 99 99 .. 0.1 0.1 3 4 44 106 0.0 .. 186 6.0 45
30 Brunei Darussalam 98 94 .. .. .. 6 7 82 105 0.0 .. 284 1.4 ..
31 Cyprus 99 87 .. .. .. 3 4 41 81 0.0 .. 188 2.3 60
32 Malta 97 73 .. 0.1 0.1 5 6 44 76 0.0 .. 175 3.1 81
33 andorra 99 99 .. .. .. 3 4 44 94 0.0 .. .. 3.7 ..
33 Estonia 96 95 .. 0.2 0.3 4 5 77 234 0.0 .. 342 3.4 47
35 Slovakia 99 98 .. 0.1 0.1 7 8 74 184 0.0 .. 343 3.0 ..
36 Qatar 98 99 .. 0.1 0.1 7 8 48 69 0.0 0 195 2.8 ..
37 Hungary 99 99 .. 0.1 0.1 5 6 99 229 0.0 .. 324 3.1 50
38 Barbados 95 85 .. 1.1 0.9 17 20 80 136 0.1 .. 233 1.8 ..
39 Poland 99 98 .. 0.1 0.1 5 6 76 197 0.0 0 283 2.1 45
40 Chile 93 93 .. 0.1 0.2 8 9 59 116 0.0 .. 156 1.1 45
41 lithuania 98 96 .. 0.1 0.1 5 7 95 274 0.0 .. 375 3.7 29
41 united arab Emirates 94 94 .. .. .. 6 7 66 84 0.0 .. 277 1.9 ..
43 Portugal 99 96 .. 0.2 0.3 3 4 54 123 0.0 .. 154 3.8 69
44 latvia 97 93 .. 0.1 0.2 8 10 105 284 0.0 .. 420 3.0 42
45 argentina 98 99 2.3 c 0.2 0.3 12 14 88 160 0.0 .. 207 3.2 66
46 Seychelles 99 99 .. .. .. 12 14 108 227 0.0 0 .. 1.5 ..
47 Croatia 98 95 .. 0.1 0.1 5 6 60 153 0.0 .. 294 2.6 ..
HIGH HuMaN DEVELopMENt
48 Bahrain 99 99 .. .. .. 9 10 87 127 0.1 .. 339 1.4 ..
49 Bahamas 99 94 .. 3.1 1.4 14 16 126 202 0.0 .. 239 .. ..
50 Belarus 99 99 1.3 0.1 0.1 4 6 117 324 0.0 .. 525 4.9 45
51 uruguay 98 95 5.4 0.2 0.3 9 11 84 156 0.0 .. 211 3.7 77
52 Montenegro 97 90 1.7 .. .. 7 8 85 161 0.0 .. 419 .. ..
52 Palau 99 75 .. .. .. 15 19 110 229 0.0 .. .. 1.3 ..
54 Kuwait 98 98 .. .. .. 10 11 50 66 0.0 .. 274 1.8 ..
55 Russian Federation 99 98 .. 0.3 0.2 9 12 144 391 0.0 0 580 4.3 35
56 Romania 99 95 3.5 0.1 0.1 11 14 90 219 0.0 .. 398 1.9 44
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IMMuNIZatIoN 
CoVERaGE 
underweight 
children 
(moderate 
and severe)
HIV pREVaLENCE, 
youtH MoRtaLIty RatES HEaLtH CaRE QuaLIty
Dtp Measles Female Male Infant 
under-
five 
adult Cause-specific
physicians
Satisfaction 
with health 
care qualityFemale Male
Due to 
malaria 
Due to 
cholera
Due to cardiovascular 
diseases and diabetesa
(% of one-
year-olds)
(% of children 
under age 5) (% ages 15–24)
(deaths per 
1,000 live births) (per 1,000 adults)
(per 100,000 
people per 
year) (number) (per 1,000 people)
(per 1,000 
people) (% satisfied)
HDI rank 2010 2010 2006–2010b 2009 2009 2010 2010 2009 2009 2008 2005–2010b 2008 2005–2010b 2007–2009b
57 Bulgaria 96 97 .. 0.1 0.1 11 13 86 205 0.0 .. 464 3.6 ..
57 Saudi arabia 98 98 .. .. .. 15 18 102 186 0.0 .. 456 0.9 69
59 Cuba 98 99 .. 0.1 0.1 5 6 78 120 0.0 .. 215 6.4 ..
59 Panama 98 95 3.9 0.3 0.4 17 20 82 145 0.0 .. 174 .. 54
61 Mexico 96 95 3.4 0.1 0.2 14 17 88 157 0.0 0 237 2.9 69
62 Costa Rica 96 83 1.1 0.1 0.2 9 10 69 115 0.0 .. 159 .. 75
63 Grenada 99 95 .. .. .. 9 11 143 248 0.0 .. 299 .. ..
64 libya 98 98 .. .. .. 13 17 101 175 0.0 .. 396 1.9 ..
64 Malaysia 98 96 12.9 0.1 0.1 5 6 95 175 0.1 2 278 0.9 89
64 Serbia 97 95 1.4 0.1 0.1 6 7 90 184 0.0 .. 422 2.0 ..
67 antigua and Barbuda 99 98 .. .. .. 7 8 158 197 0.0 .. .. .. ..
67 trinidad and tobago 96 92 .. 0.7 1.0 24 27 120 225 0.0 .. 427 1.2 32
69 Kazakhstan 99 99 3.9 0.2 0.1 29 33 185 432 0.0 0 696 3.9 49
70 albania 99 99 5.2 .. .. 16 18 88 126 0.0 .. 443 1.1 ..
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 90 79 3.7 .. .. 16 18 92 196 0.1 .. 237 .. 75
72 Dominica 99 99 .. .. .. 11 12 103 192 0.0 .. .. .. ..
72 Georgia 99 94 1.1 0.1 0.1 20 22 97 235 0.0 .. 505 4.5 61
72 lebanon 83 53 .. 0.1 0.1 19 22 85 166 0.0 0 332 3.5 50
72 Saint Kitts and nevis 98 99 .. .. .. 7 8 90 185 0.0 .. .. .. ..
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 99 99 .. 0.1 0.1 22 26 90 144 0.0 11 385 0.9 73
77 Peru 97 94 4.2 0.1 0.2 15 19 96 123 0.1 .. 135 0.9 48
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 98 98 1.5 .. .. 10 12 79 144 0.0 .. 465 2.5 ..
78 ukraine 96 94 .. 0.3 0.2 11 13 148 395 0.0 0 593 3.1 23
80 Mauritius 99 99 .. 0.2 0.3 13 15 99 219 0.0 0 444 1.1 ..
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 95 93 1.4 .. .. 8 8 67 145 0.0 .. 398 1.4 ..
82 azerbaijan 80 67 7.7 0.1 0.1 39 46 134 221 0.0 .. 619 3.8 53
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines 99 99 .. .. .. 19 21 110 204 0.0 .. 340 .. ..
84 oman 99 97 8.6 0.1 0.1 8 9 85 157 0.0 .. 455 1.9 ..
85 Brazil 99 99 1.7 .. .. 17 19 102 205 0.1 0 264 1.7 44
85 Jamaica 99 88 2.0 0.7 1.0 20 24 131 224 0.0 .. 248 0.9 ..
87 armenia 98 97 4.7 0.1 0.1 18 20 103 246 0.0 .. 537 3.7 61
88 Saint lucia 98 95 .. .. .. 14 16 90 188 0.0 .. 278 0.5 ..
89 Ecuador 99 98 6.2 0.2 0.2 18 20 96 173 0.0 .. 167 .. 64
90 turkey 97 97 1.7 0.1 0.1 14 18 73 134 0.0 .. 362 1.5 67
91 Colombia 96 88 3.4 0.1 0.2 17 19 80 166 0.3 .. 186 1.4 63
92 Sri lanka 99 99 21.1 0.1 0.1 14 17 82 275 0.0 .. 312 0.5 83
93 algeria 99 95 3.2 0.1 0.1 31 36 105 135 0.0 0 277 1.2 52
94 tunisia 98 97 3.3 0.1 0.1 14 16 70 129 0.1 .. 257 1.2 80
MEDIuM HuMaN DEVELopMENt
95 tonga 99 99 .. .. .. 13 16 233 135 0.8 .. 396 0.3 ..
96 Belize 99 98 4.3 1.8 0.7 14 17 129 202 0.0 .. 256 0.8 50
96 Dominican Republic 96 79 7.1 0.7 0.3 22 27 149 172 0.1 0 320 .. 58
96 Fiji 99 94 .. 0.1 0.1 15 17 157 263 0.0 .. 457 0.5 ..
96 Samoa 97 61 .. .. .. 17 20 167 198 0.9 .. 427 0.3 ..
100 Jordan 98 98 1.9 .. .. 18 22 111 195 0.0 .. 468 2.5 66
101 China 99 99 3.8 c .. .. 16 18 87 142 0.0 4 287 1.4 ..
102 turkmenistan 99 99 8.2 .. .. 47 56 212 380 0.0 .. 773 2.4 ..
103 thailand 99 98 7.0 .. .. 11 13 139 270 0.4 0 311 0.3 85
104 Maldives 97 97 17.3 0.1 0.1 14 15 70 97 0.9 .. 351 1.6 ..
105 Suriname 99 89 7.2 0.4 0.6 27 31 124 217 2.5 .. 351 .. ..
106 Gabon 69 55 .. 3.5 1.4 54 74 262 321 31.0 0 370 0.3 ..
107 El Salvador 97 92 5.5 0.3 0.4 14 16 128 281 0.0 .. 203 1.6 59
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 87 79 4.3 0.1 0.1 42 54 132 203 0.0 .. 290 .. 59
108 Mongolia 98 97 5.0 0.1 0.1 26 32 141 305 0.0 0 379 2.8 52
110 Palestine, State of .. .. .. .. .. 20 22 .. .. .. .. .. .. 50
111 Paraguay 96 94 3.4 0.1 0.2 21 25 98 168 0.0 0 249 1.1 66
112 Egypt 97 96 6.0 0.1 0.1 19 22 130 215 0.2 .. 406 2.8 53
113 Moldova, Republic of 93 97 3.2 0.1 0.1 16 19 134 309 0.0 .. 525 2.7 41
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table 7 HealtH
IMMuNIZatIoN 
CoVERaGE 
underweight 
children 
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and severe)
HIV pREVaLENCE, 
youtH MoRtaLIty RatES HEaLtH CaRE QuaLIty
Dtp Measles Female Male Infant 
under-
five 
adult Cause-specific
physicians
Satisfaction 
with health 
care qualityFemale Male
Due to 
malaria 
Due to 
cholera
Due to cardiovascular 
diseases and diabetesa
(% of one-
year-olds)
(% of children 
under age 5) (% ages 15–24)
(deaths per 
1,000 live births) (per 1,000 adults)
(per 100,000 
people per 
year) (number) (per 1,000 people)
(per 1,000 
people) (% satisfied)
HDI rank 2010 2010 2006–2010b 2009 2009 2010 2010 2009 2009 2008 2005–2010b 2008 2005–2010b 2007–2009b
114 Philippines 89 88 21.6 c 0.1 0.1 23 29 130 240 0.2 2 345 1.2 81
114 uzbekistan 99 98 4.0 0.1 0.1 44 52 139 220 0.0 .. 641 2.6 ..
116 Syrian arab Republic 89 82 10.1 .. .. 14 16 95 159 0.0 .. 400 1.5 56
117 Micronesia, Federated States of 90 80 .. .. .. 34 42 161 183 0.3 0 412 0.6 ..
118 Guyana 99 95 10.5 0.8 0.6 25 30 224 286 5.0 .. 452 .. 63
119 Botswana 98 94 11.2 11.8 5.2 36 48 324 372 1.0 0 346 0.3 72
120 Honduras 99 99 8.1 0.2 0.3 20 24 134 237 0.1 .. 376 .. 68
121 Indonesia 94 89 18.4 0.1 0.1 27 35 143 234 3.2 19 350 0.3 79
121 Kiribati 97 89 .. .. .. 39 49 173 325 2.6 .. .. 0.3 ..
121 South africa 73 65 8.7 c 13.6 4.5 41 57 479 521 0.2 28 321 0.8 63
124 vanuatu 78 52 .. .. .. 12 14 159 200 8.5 .. 399 0.1 ..
125 Kyrgyzstan 99 99 2.2 0.1 0.1 33 38 162 327 0.0 .. 605 2.3 57
125 tajikistan 95 94 15.0 0.1 0.1 52 63 160 183 0.0 .. 523 2.0 64
127 viet nam 93 98 20.2 0.1 0.1 19 23 107 173 0.1 0 339 1.2 74
128 namibia 87 75 16.6 5.8 2.3 29 40 357 540 29.0 0 495 0.4 68
129 nicaragua 99 99 5.5 0.1 0.1 23 27 122 210 0.0 .. 234 0.4 66
130 Morocco 99 98 8.6 0.1 0.1 30 36 87 126 0.0 .. 355 0.6 ..
131 Iraq 81 73 6.4 .. .. 31 39 145 292 0.0 24 424 0.7 44
132 Cape verde 99 96 .. .. .. 29 36 111 272 0.2 0 300 0.6 ..
133 Guatemala 96 93 13.0 c 0.3 0.5 25 32 151 280 0.1 .. 190 .. 60
134 timor-leste 75 66 44.7 .. .. 46 55 154 233 83.0 .. 318 0.1 ..
135 Ghana 96 93 13.9 1.3 0.5 50 74 253 402 48.0 51 386 0.1 74
136 Equatorial Guinea 65 51 .. 5.0 1.9 81 121 355 373 98.0 33 484 0.3 ..
136 India 83 74 42.5 0.1 0.1 48 63 169 250 1.9 6 336 0.6 67
138 Cambodia 93 93 28.3 0.1 0.1 43 51 190 350 3.7 0 408 0.2 75
138 lao People’s Democratic Republic 81 64 31.1 0.2 0.1 42 54 251 289 2.9 3 430 0.3 69
140 Bhutan 94 95 12.7 0.1 0.1 44 56 194 256 0.2 .. 425 0.0 ..
141 Swaziland 95 94 5.8 15.6 6.5 55 78 560 674 0.3 0 499 0.2 ..
Low HuMaN DEVELopMENt
142 Congo 90 76 11.4 2.6 1.2 61 93 320 409 121.0 0 463 0.1 34
143 Solomon Islands 85 68 11.8 .. .. 23 27 119 170 30.0 .. 367 0.2 ..
144 Sao tome and Principe 98 92 13.1 .. .. 53 80 104 161 9.2 33 308 0.5 ..
145 Kenya 93 86 16.1 4.1 1.8 55 85 282 358 12.0 21 363 0.1 62
146 Bangladesh 98 94 41.0 0.1 0.1 38 48 222 246 1.8 .. 418 0.3 69
146 Pakistan 90 86 31.3 0.1 0.1 70 87 189 225 0.6 0 422 0.8 41
148 angola 97 93 15.6 c 1.6 0.6 98 161 353 377 89.0 0 483 0.1 62
149 Myanmar 93 88 22.6 0.3 0.3 50 66 188 275 34.0 1 369 0.5 ..
150 Cameroon 92 79 16.0 3.9 1.6 84 136 409 420 121.0 110 498 0.2 54
151 Madagascar 78 67 .. 0.1 0.1 43 62 198 273 8.5 0 376 0.2 82
152 tanzania, united Republic of 98 92 15.8 3.9 1.7 50 76 311 456 87.0 94 427 0.0 30
153 nigeria 77 71 23.1 2.9 1.2 88 143 365 377 146.0 174 456 0.4 55
154 Senegal 80 60 13.7 0.7 0.3 50 75 218 266 76.0 458 373 0.1 57
155 Mauritania 82 67 14.7 c 0.3 0.4 75 111 262 315 36.0 70 422 0.1 31
156 Papua new Guinea 80 55 18.4 0.8 0.3 47 61 221 274 45.0 0 428 0.1 ..
157 nepal 85 86 38.6 0.1 0.2 41 50 159 234 0.0 0 350 0.2 80
158 lesotho 93 85 13.2 14.2 5.4 65 85 573 676 0.1 0 452 0.1 ..
159 togo 97 84 16.6 2.2 0.9 66 103 278 338 65.0 15 403 0.1 22
160 Yemen 94 73 43.1 .. .. 57 77 180 237 4.9 3 494 0.3 ..
161 Haiti 83 59 17.7 1.3 0.6 70 165 227 278 5.7 3,990 411 .. 35
161 uganda 83 55 15.9 4.8 2.3 63 99 348 539 103.0 98 473 0.1 48
163 Zambia 99 91 14.6 8.9 4.2 69 111 477 580 104.0 7 518 0.1 53
164 Djibouti 90 85 22.9 1.9 0.8 73 91 271 326 1.2 27 490 0.2 56
165 Gambia 99 97 18.1 2.4 0.9 57 98 246 296 93.0 13 417 0.0 ..
166 Benin 94 69 18.4 0.7 0.3 73 115 246 385 105.0 11 454 0.1 52
167 Rwanda 92 82 11.4 1.9 1.3 59 91 258 304 15.0 0 408 0.0 78
168 Côte d’Ivoire 95 70 15.9 1.5 0.7 86 123 456 528 116.0 6 536 0.1 ..
169 Comoros 81 72 .. 0.1 0.1 63 86 229 284 58.0 0 450 0.2 ..
170 Malawi 97 93 12.8 6.8 3.1 58 92 496 691 87.0 11 587 0.0 66
168    |    HuMan DEvEloPMEnt REPoRt 2013
IMMuNIZatIoN 
CoVERaGE 
underweight 
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and severe)
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Dtp Measles Female Male Infant 
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adult Cause-specific
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care qualityFemale Male
Due to 
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Due to 
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diseases and diabetesa
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under age 5) (% ages 15–24)
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1,000 live births) (per 1,000 adults)
(per 100,000 
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year) (number) (per 1,000 people)
(per 1,000 
people) (% satisfied)
HDI rank 2010 2010 2006–2010b 2009 2009 2010 2010 2009 2009 2008 2005–2010b 2008 2005–2010b 2007–2009b
171 Sudan 99 90 27.0 1.3 0.5 66 103 275 291 23.0 1,011 548 0.3 48
172 Zimbabwe 94 84 9.7 6.9 3.3 51 80 574 672 40.0 26 324 0.2 27
173 Ethiopia 90 81 33.2 .. .. 68 106 379 445 10.0 0 508 0.0 19
174 liberia 75 64 14.9 c 0.7 0.3 74 103 337 389 98.0 18 437 0.0 38
175 afghanistan 86 62 32.9 .. .. 103 149 352 440 0.3 0 675 0.2 46
176 Guinea-Bissau 92 61 18.1 2.0 0.8 92 150 369 431 203.0 399 513 0.0 ..
177 Sierra leone 96 82 21.1 1.5 0.6 114 174 363 414 239.0 0 440 0.0 46
178 Burundi 99 92 28.8 2.1 1.0 88 142 407 424 39.0 18 464 0.0 47
178 Guinea 75 51 20.8 0.9 0.4 81 130 337 474 165.0 107 520 0.1 31
180 Central african Republic 64 62 24.4 2.2 1.0 106 159 470 461 192.0 0 498 0.1 ..
181 Eritrea 99 99 34.5 0.4 0.2 42 61 179 249 0.7 0 383 0.1 ..
182 Mali 90 63 26.7 0.5 0.2 99 178 218 357 131.0 76 406 0.0 44
183 Burkina Faso 98 94 25.7 0.8 0.5 93 176 262 443 221.0 16 463 0.1 50
184 Chad 71 46 30.3 2.5 1.0 99 173 384 412 235.0 14 500 0.0 42
185 Mozambique 77 70 18.3 8.6 3.1 92 135 434 557 171.0 24 512 0.0 69
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 67 68 24.2 .. .. 112 170 331 442 193.0 244 477 0.1 ..
186 niger 80 71 40.2 c 0.5 0.2 73 143 224 229 184.0 55 381 0.0 46
NotES
a Estimates are age-standardized and based on 
a combination of country life tables, cause of 
death models, regional cause of death patterns, 
and World Health organization and Joint united 
nations Programme on HIv/aIDS estimates for 
some major causes (not including chronic diseases).
b Data are for the most recent year available during 
the period specified.
c Data differ from standard definition or refer to 
only part of the country.
DEFINItIoNS
Immunization coverage for Dtp: Percentage of 
one-year-olds who have received three doses of the 
combined diphtheria, tetanus toxoid and pertussis 
(DtP) vaccine.
Immunization coverage for measles: Percentage 
of one-year-olds who have received at least one 
dose of a measles vaccine.
underweight children: Percentage of children 
under age 5 falling two standard deviations or more 
below the median weight-for-age of the reference 
population.
HIV prevalence: Percentage of the population ages 
15–24 who are infected with HIv.
Infant mortality rate: Probability of dying between 
birth and exactly age 1, expressed per 1,000 live 
births.
under-five mortality rate: Probability of dying 
between birth and exactly age 5, expressed per 
1,000 live births.
adult mortality rate: Probability that a 15-year-old 
person will die before reaching age 60, expressed 
per 1,000 adults.
Cause-specific deaths: Deaths attributable to a 
certain disease or cause.
physicians: number of physicians (both generalists 
and specialists), expressed per 1,000 people.
Satisfaction with heath care quality: Percentage 
of respondents who answered “yes” to the Gallup 
World Poll question, “In this country, do you have 
confidence in the healthcare or medical systems?”
MaIN Data SouRCES
Columns 1, 2, 8 and 9: WHo (2012a).
Columns 3–5: unICEF (2012).
Columns 6, 10, 11 and 13: WHo (2012b).
Column 7: Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality 
Estimation (2012).
Column 12: HDRo calculations based on data 
on female deaths and male deaths due to 
cardiovascular diseases and diabetes from WHo 
(2012b) and population data from unDESa (2011).
Column 14: Gallup (2012).
 
otHER CouNtRIES oR tERRItoRIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of 94 99 18.8 .. .. 26 33 126 207 0.0 .. 303 3.3 ..
Marshall Islands 99 97 .. .. .. 22 26 386 429 1.1 .. .. 0.6 ..
Monaco 99 99 .. .. .. 3 4 51 112 0.0 .. .. .. ..
nauru 99 99 4.8 .. .. 32 40 303 448 0.0 .. .. 0.7 ..
San Marino 95 93 .. .. .. 2 2 48 57 0.0 .. .. .. ..
Somalia 55 46 31.6 0.6 0.4 108 180 350 382 28.0 1,182 572 0.0 ..
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu 99 85 1.6 .. .. 27 33 280 255 0.0 .. .. 0.6 ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 98 94 .. .. .. 5 6 60 114 0.0 .. 150 2.9 62
High human development 97 95 .. .. .. 16 18 105 221 0.0 .. 357 2.3 ..
Medium human development 90 85 22.7 .. .. 33 42 132 204 1.3 .. 324 1.0 ..
low human development 87 78 26.1 .. .. 73 110 287 346 65.4 138 450 0.3 50
Regions
arab States 93 87 .. .. .. 36 48 139 198 3.5 .. 409 1.4 ..
East asia and the Pacific 97 95 9.7 .. .. 20 24 103 168 1.5 .. 305 1.2 ..
Europe and Central asia 98 96 .. .. .. 17 21 118 281 0.0 .. 492 3.1 45
latin america and the Caribbean 96 93 4.0 .. .. 18 23 99 181 0.2 .. 236 .. 57
South asia 86 78 40.2 .. .. 50 65 173 245 1.6 .. 360 0.6 65
Sub-Saharan africa 84 75 21.2 .. .. 76 120 355 430 98.1 86 447 0.2 ..
Least developed countries 88 78 27.3 .. .. 71 108 282 357 62.1 190 459 0.2 ..
Small island developing states 89 72 .. .. .. 41 70 155 207 15.6 .. 342 2.6 ..
world 91 85 .. .. .. 40 55 137 211 12.2 .. 323 1.4 ..
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EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT GROSS ENROLMENT RATIO EDUCATION QUALITY
Primary 
school 
dropout 
rate
Adult 
literacy 
rate
Population 
with at 
least 
secondary 
education Primary Secondary Tertiary
Primary 
school 
teachers 
trained 
to teach
Performance of 15-year-old students
Satisfaction 
with 
education 
qualityMean score Deviation from mean
(% ages 
15 and 
older)
(% ages 25 
and older) (%) (%) Readinga Mathematicsb Sciencec Reading Mathematics Science (% satisfied)
(% of 
primary 
school 
cohort)
HDI rank 2005–2010d 2010 2002–2011d 2002–2011d 2002–2011d 2005–2011d 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2011 2002–2011d
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
1 Norway .. 95.2 99.0 110.0 73.8 .. 503 498 500 91 85 90 .. 0.5
2 Australia .. 92.2 104.0 129.0 75.9 .. 515 514 527 99 94 101 67.3 ..
3 United States .. 94.5 102.0 96.0 94.8 .. 500 487 502 97 91 98 62.8 6.9
4 Netherlands .. 88.9 108.0 120.0 62.7 .. 508 526 522 89 89 96 60.3 ..
5 Germany .. 96.5 102.0 103.0 .. .. 497 513 520 95 98 101 65.6 e 4.4
6 New Zealand .. 83.7 101.0 119.0 82.6 .. 521 519 532 103 96 107 69.9 ..
7 Ireland .. 73.9 108.0 117.0 61.0 .. 496 487 508 95 86 97 83.6 ..
7 Sweden .. 85.0 100.0 100.0 70.8 .. 497 494 495 99 94 100 61.6 1.0
9 Switzerland .. 95.8 102.0 95.0 51.5 .. 501 534 517 93 99 96 .. ..
10 Japan .. 81.1 f 103.0 102.0 59.0 .. 520 529 539 100 94 100 54.6 0.0
11 Canada .. 100.0 99.0 101.0 60.0 .. 524 527 529 90 88 90 75.4 ..
12 Korea, Republic of .. 85.4 f 104.0 97.0 103.9 .. 542 546 538 79 89 82 50.5 1.2
13 Hong Kong, China (SAR) .. 72.3 102.0 83.0 59.7 95.6 533 555 549 84 95 87 49.6 0.5
13 Iceland .. 91.3 99.0 107.0 74.1 .. 500 507 496 96 91 95 .. 2.5
15 Denmark .. 99.4 99.0 117.0 74.4 .. 495 503 499 84 87 92 64.5 0.5
16 Israel .. 84.1 113.0 91.0 62.5 .. 474 447 455 112 104 107 64.0 1.1
17 Belgium .. 79.4 105.0 111.0 67.5 .. 506 515 507 102 104 105 62.1 6.6
18 Austria .. 100.0 100.0 100.0 60.2 .. 470 496 494 100 96 102 63.7 2.3
18 Singapore 96.1 g 75.0 101.8 106.9 71.0 94.3 526 562 542 97 104 104 91.8 0.9
20 France .. 78.4 111.0 113.0 54.5 .. 496 497 498 106 101 103 58.5 ..
21 Finland .. 100.0 99.0 108.0 91.6 .. 536 541 554 86 82 89 81.9 0.5
21 Slovenia 99.7 h 95.6 98.0 97.0 86.9 .. 483 501 512 91 95 94 72.6 0.5
23 Spain 97.7 66.4 107.0 119.0 73.2 .. 481 483 488 88 91 87 59.0 0.5
24 Liechtenstein .. .. 106.0 70.0 34.4 .. 499 536 520 83 88 87 .. 18.2
25 Italy 98.9 h 72.8 103.0 99.0 66.0 .. 486 483 489 96 93 97 46.7 0.3
26 Luxembourg .. 77.9 100.0 98.0 10.5 .. 472 489 484 104 98 104 64.8 ..
26 United Kingdom .. 99.7 106.0 102.0 58.5 .. 494 492 514 95 87 99 76.9 e ..
28 Czech Republic .. 99.8 106.0 90.0 60.7 .. 478 493 500 92 93 97 71.4 0.4
29 Greece 97.2 h 62.0 100.0 101.0 89.4 .. 483 466 470 95 89 92 47.9 2.6
30 Brunei Darussalam 95.2 h 63.8 f 108.0 110.0 17.2 87.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.9
31 Cyprus 98.3 h 74.5 105.0 98.0 52.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 65.6 4.7
32 Malta 92.4 62.5 95.0 105.0 33.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 58.5 20.3
33 Andorra .. 49.4 84.0 87.0 11.2 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
33 Estonia 99.8 h 94.5 f 99.0 104.0 62.7 .. 501 512 528 83 81 84 49.5 1.6
35 Slovakia .. 98.8 102.0 89.0 54.2 .. 477 497 490 90 96 95 58.4 2.3
36 Qatar 96.3 63.4 103.0 94.0 10.0 42.9 372 368 379 115 98 104 69.9 6.4
37 Hungary 99.0 i 94.8 f 102.0 98.0 61.7 .. 494 490 503 90 92 86 56.4 2.3
38 Barbados .. 88.6 f 120.0 101.0 65.9 58.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.2
39 Poland 99.5 i 80.0 97.0 97.0 70.5 .. 500 495 508 89 88 87 60.8 2.4
40 Chile 98.6 74.0 106.0 88.0 59.2 .. 449 421 447 83 80 81 44.0 2.6
41 Lithuania 99.7 h 90.2 97.0 98.0 77.4 .. 468 477 491 86 88 85 51.1 1.6
41 United Arab Emirates 90.0 64.3 f 104.0 92.0 22.5 100.0 459 j 453 j 466 j 107 j 99 j 106 j 80.6 e 3.3
43 Portugal 95.2 i 40.4 114.0 107.0 62.2 .. 489 487 493 87 91 83 64.9 ..
44 Latvia 99.8 h 98.4 101.0 95.0 60.1 .. 484 482 494 80 79 78 51.0 5.4
45 Argentina 97.8 h 56.0 f 118.0 89.0 71.2 .. 398 388 401 108 93 102 62.6 6.2
46 Seychelles 91.8 66.8 117.0 119.0 .. 99.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.1
47 Croatia 98.8 h 64.4 f 93.0 95.0 49.2 .. 476 460 486 88 88 85 63.7 1.0
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
48 Bahrain 91.9 h 78.0 f 107.0 103.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 80.5 e 1.8
49 Bahamas .. 89.6 114.0 96.0 .. 91.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.5
50 Belarus 99.6 .. 100.0 96.0 83.0 99.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 55.4 0.3
51 Uruguay 98.1 49.8 113.0 90.0 63.3 .. 426 427 427 99 91 97 55.8 4.8
52 Montenegro 98.4 h 98.2 107.0 104.0 47.6 .. 408 403 401 93 85 87 62.1 ..
52 Palau .. .. 101.0 96.0 37.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
54 Kuwait 93.9 48.9 106.0 101.0 21.9 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 61.2 e 4.0
55 Russian Federation 99.6 h 94.7 f 99.0 89.0 75.9 .. 459 468 478 90 85 90 38.0 3.9
56 Romania 97.7 h 86.8 96.0 95.0 63.8 .. 424 427 428 90 79 79 45.3 4.9
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57 Bulgaria 98.4 92.6 103.0 88.0 53.0 .. 429 428 439 113 99 106 35.4 6.2
57 Saudi Arabia 86.6 h 54.6 f 106.0 101.0 36.8 91.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 61.8 e 6.7
59 Cuba 99.8 h 77.1 f 103.0 89.0 95.2 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.8
59 Panama 94.1 62.1 f 108.0 74.0 44.6 91.6 371 360 376 99 81 90 73.2 6.2
61 Mexico 93.1 53.9 115.0 87.0 27.0 95.6 425 419 416 85 79 77 64.5 6.0
62 Costa Rica 96.2 h 53.6 f 110.0 100.0 25.6 89.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 80.0 11.2
63 Grenada .. .. 103.0 108.0 52.8 65.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
64 Libya 89.2 i 49.6 f 114.0 110.0 54.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
64 Malaysia 93.1 69.4 f 96.0 68.0 40.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 91.4 2.3
64 Serbia 99.3 h 85.1 96.0 91.0 49.1 94.2 442 442 443 84 91 84 58.0 1.4
67 Antigua and Barbuda 99.0 .. 102.0 105.0 16.4 54.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
67 trinidad and tobago 98.8 h 59.3 105.0 90.0 11.5 88.0 416 414 410 113 99 108 83.3 10.6
69 Kazakhstan 99.7 h 99.3 111.0 100.0 40.8 .. 390 405 400 91 83 87 49.9 0.2
70 Albania 95.9 81.7 87.0 89.0 18.4 .. 385 377 391 100 91 89 54.7 4.8
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 95.5 52.4 103.0 83.0 78.1 88.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 81.2 7.9
72 Dominica .. 26.5 112.0 98.0 3.6 60.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.9
72 Georgia 99.7 h 91.0 109.0 86.0 28.2 94.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 65.7 3.8
72 Lebanon 89.6 54.2 105.0 81.0 54.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 67.6 e 8.2
72 Saint Kitts and Nevis .. .. 93.0 97.0 18.2 61.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 26.5
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 85.0 66.0 108.0 84.0 42.8 98.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 67.9 5.7
77 Peru 89.6 52.9 109.0 92.0 35.0 .. 370 365 369 98 90 89 49.1 ..
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 97.3 h 78.6 89.0 83.0 40.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 61.6 2.5
78 Ukraine 99.7 h 93.5 f 99.0 96.0 79.5 99.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 50.1 2.3
80 Mauritius 88.5 h 49.0 f 99.0 89.0 24.9 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 83.5 2.2
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 97.9 h .. 88.0 90.0 35.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 67.9 26.8
82 Azerbaijan 99.8 92.7 94.0 85.0 19.3 100.0 362 431 373 76 64 74 53.0 3.6
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines .. .. 105.0 107.0 .. 84.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
84 oman 86.6 53.9 105.0 100.0 24.5 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 70.0 e 2.7
85 Brazil 90.3 49.5 127.0 101.0 36.1 .. 412 386 405 94 81 84 53.7 24.3
85 Jamaica 86.6 i 72.6 f 89.0 93.0 29.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 73.7 4.8
87 Armenia 99.6 h 94.4 f 103.0 92.0 51.5 77.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 45.7 2.3
88 Saint Lucia .. .. 94.0 96.0 11.3 86.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.9
89 Ecuador 91.9 36.6 114.0 80.0 39.8 82.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 74.5 19.4
90 turkey 90.8 34.5 102.0 78.0 45.8 .. 464 445 454 82 93 81 54.3 8.2
91 Colombia 93.4 43.1 115.0 96.0 39.1 100.0 413 381 402 87 75 81 71.7 15.5
92 Sri Lanka 91.2 73.9 99.0 87.0 15.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 77.9 1.4
93 Algeria 72.6 24.1 110.0 95.0 30.8 99.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 67.1 e 5.0
94 tunisia 77.6 37.0 109.0 90.0 34.4 .. 404 371 401 85 78 81 54.8 e 5.3
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
95 tonga 99.0 74.0 f 110.0 101.0 6.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.6
96 Belize .. 34.0 f 121.0 75.0 21.5 45.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.7
96 Dominican Republic 89.5 42.5 108.0 76.0 34.0 84.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 68.9 ..
96 Fiji .. 57.8 105.0 86.0 16.1 97.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.1
96 Samoa 98.8 h 62.1 108.0 85.0 7.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
100 Jordan 92.6 73.3 97.0 91.0 41.8 .. 405 387 415 91 83 89 63.3 e 6.6
101 China 94.3 h 62.7 f 111.0 81.0 25.9 .. 556 k 600 k 575 k 80 k 103 k 82 k 62.6 ..
102 turkmenistan 99.6 h .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 74.3 ..
103 thailand 93.5 32.2 91.0 79.0 47.7 .. 421 419 425 72 79 80 88.7 ..
104 Maldives 98.4 25.4 109.0 71.0 .. 77.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
105 Suriname 94.7 43.7 113.0 75.0 12.1 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.7
106 Gabon 88.4 i 44.4 f 182.0 53.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 46.5 ..
107 El Salvador 84.5 37.5 114.0 65.0 23.4 92.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 72.7 13.5
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 91.2 44.5 105.0 80.0 38.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 68.2 16.3
108 Mongolia 97.4 h 82.4 f 100.0 93.0 53.3 97.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 57.9 5.9
110 Palestine, State of 94.9 52.1 91.0 86.0 50.2 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 63.5 e 1.5
111 Paraguay 93.9 36.9 100.0 67.0 36.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 66.9 21.9
112 Egypt 72.0 51.2 f 106.0 85.0 30.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 42.6 e ..
113 Moldova, Republic of 98.5 h 93.3 94.0 88.0 38.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 53.7 4.8
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114 Philippines 95.4 64.8 f 106.0 85.0 28.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 79.2 24.2
114 Uzbekistan 99.4 h .. 95.0 106.0 8.9 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 85.0 1.9
116 Syrian Arab Republic 83.4 h 32.8 118.0 72.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 59.1 e 5.4
117 Micronesia, Federated States of .. .. 110.0 83.0 14.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
118 Guyana .. 55.6 f 85.0 91.0 11.9 66.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16.5
119 Botswana 84.5 75.5 f 108.0 80.0 7.4 97.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 66.4 13.2
120 Honduras 84.8 19.8 116.0 73.0 18.8 36.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 63.6 23.8
121 Indonesia 92.6 41.4 118.0 77.0 23.1 .. 402 371 383 66 70 69 80.1 20.0
121 Kiribati .. .. 113.0 86.0 .. 85.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.1
121 South Africa 88.7 70.4 102.0 94.0 .. 87.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 69.3 23.0
124 vanuatu 82.6 .. 117.0 55.0 4.7 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 28.5
125 Kyrgyzstan 99.2 81.1 f 100.0 84.0 48.8 68.4 314 331 330 99 81 91 47.7 2.4
125 tajikistan 99.7 h 89.7 f 102.0 87.0 19.7 92.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 76.4 1.1
127 viet Nam 93.2 26.3 f 106.0 77.0 22.3 98.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 80.4 7.9
128 Namibia 88.8 h 33.5 f 107.0 64.0 9.0 95.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17.4
129 Nicaragua 78.0 37.6 f 118.0 69.0 18.0 74.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 81.0 51.6
130 Morocco 56.1 28.0 f 114.0 56.0 13.2 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 41.6 e 9.5
131 Iraq 78.2 h 32.4 f 105.0 53.0 16.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38.0 33.3
132 Cape verde 84.3 h .. 110.0 88.0 17.8 90.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.3
133 Guatemala 75.2 h 14.8 116.0 59.0 17.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 71.8 35.2
134 timor-Leste 58.3 .. 117.0 56.0 16.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 33.4
135 Ghana 67.3 h 53.8 f 107.0 58.0 8.8 50.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 57.2 27.8
136 Equatorial Guinea 93.9 h .. 87.0 27.0 3.3 45.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38.1
136 India 62.8 38.7 f 118.0 60.0 16.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 74.8 34.2
138 Cambodia 77.6 15.7 f 127.0 46.0 7.8 99.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 94.1 45.5
138 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 72.7 29.7 f 121.0 45.0 13.4 96.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 78.9 33.0
140 Bhutan 52.8 34.4 111.0 70.0 8.8 91.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.0
141 Swaziland 87.4 h 48.1 f 116.0 58.0 4.4 73.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 77.8 16.1
LOw HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
142 Congo .. 46.2 f 115.0 45.0 5.5 86.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 46.6 29.7
143 Solomon Islands .. .. 109.0 36.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
144 Sao tome and Principe 89.2 h .. 134.0 59.0 4.5 40.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32.0
145 Kenya 87.4 h 41.9 113.0 60.0 4.0 96.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 59.6 27.2
146 Bangladesh 56.8 h 35.1 f .. .. 10.6 58.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 81.6 33.8
146 Pakistan 54.9 31.2 95.0 34.0 5.4 84.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 60.5 38.5
148 Angola 70.1 h .. 124.0 31.0 3.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 42.0 68.1
149 Myanmar 92.3 h 17.8 f 126.0 54.0 11.0 99.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 25.2
150 Cameroon 70.7 27.9 f 120.0 42.0 11.5 57.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 62.1 33.8
151 Madagascar 64.5 .. 149.0 31.0 3.7 90.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 45.8 65.4
152 tanzania, United Republic of 73.2 h 7.4 f 102.0 .. 2.1 94.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.8 18.6
153 Nigeria 61.3 h .. 83.0 44.0 10.3 66.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 47.4 20.1
154 Senegal 49.7 7.5 f 87.0 37.0 7.9 47.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 38.0 40.4
155 Mauritania 58.0 h 14.2 f 102.0 24.0 4.4 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 39.2 e 29.3
156 Papua New Guinea 60.6 h 10.5 f 60.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
157 Nepal 60.3 h 28.3 f 115.0 44.0 5.6 80.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 73.0 38.3
158 Lesotho 89.6 h 20.9 103.0 46.0 3.5 63.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 43.2 30.7
159 togo 57.1 29.8 f 140.0 46.0 5.9 76.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 45.4 40.6
160 Yemen 63.9 16.0 f 87.0 44.0 10.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 37.2 e 40.5
161 Haiti 48.7 29.1 f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 39.9 ..
161 Uganda 73.2 23.4 121.0 28.0 4.2 89.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 48.8 68.2
163 Zambia 71.2 35.0 f 115.0 .. 2.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 68.0 46.9
164 Djibouti .. .. 59.0 36.0 4.9 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 66.6 35.7
165 Gambia 50.0 h 24.0 f 83.0 54.0 4.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38.9
166 Benin 42.4 h 18.4 f 126.0 37.0 6.0 42.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 60.7 35.7
167 Rwanda 71.1 h 7.7 f 143.0 32.0 5.5 91.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 83.9 63.0
168 Côte d’Ivoire 56.2 h 22.1 f 88.0 27.0 8.9 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 39.2
169 Comoros 74.9 h .. 104.0 46.0 7.9 57.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 46.0 e 25.9
170 Malawi 74.8 h 15.3 f 135.0 32.0 0.7 95.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 65.2 47.2
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171 Sudan 71.1 h 15.5 f 73.0 39.0 6.1 59.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 43.0 9.1
172 Zimbabwe 92.2 h 55.4 f .. .. 6.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 66.4 ..
173 Ethiopia 39.0 .. 102.0 36.0 5.5 39.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 52.5
174 Liberia 60.8 i 27.3 f 96.0 .. 19.1 40.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 49.6 54.4
175 Afghanistan .. 20.3 f 97.0 46.0 3.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 58.5 ..
176 Guinea-Bissau 54.2 h .. 123.0 36.0 2.7 38.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
177 Sierra Leone 42.1 14.8 125.0 .. 2.1 48.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 35.3 ..
178 Burundi 67.2 h 7.1 f 156.0 25.0 3.2 91.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 70.9 43.8
178 Guinea 41.0 h .. 94.0 38.0 9.5 65.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 39.0 34.3
180 Central African Republic 56.0 h 17.9 f 93.0 13.0 2.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 40.7 53.1
181 Eritrea 67.8 h .. 45.0 32.0 2.0 93.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31.0
182 Mali 31.1 10.3 82.0 39.0 5.8 50.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 34.6 24.5
183 Burkina Faso 28.7 2.0 79.0 23.0 3.3 85.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 53.0 36.4
184 Chad 34.5 h .. 90.0 26.0 2.2 45.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 60.1 76.7
185 Mozambique 56.1 h 3.6 f 115.0 25.0 1.5 75.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 63.2 64.6
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 66.8 h 23.2 f 94.0 38.0 6.2 91.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 39.3 45.2
186 Niger 28.7 5.1 f 71.0 13.0 1.5 96.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 55.3 30.7
NOTES
a Average score in reading for organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (oECD) 
countries is 493.
b Average score in mathematics for oECD countries 
is 495.
c Average score in science for oECD countries is 501.
d Data refer to the most recent year available 
during the period specified.
e Average of two or more surveys during the period.
f Barro and Lee (2011) estimates for 2010.
g Refers to 2011.
h United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural organization Institute for Statistics (UIS) 
estimate derived from its Global Age-specific 
Literacy Projections Model, which is based on 
national data since 2000.
i UIS estimate derived from its Global Age-specific 
Literacy Projections Model, which is based on 
national data from before 2000.
j Refers to Dubai only.
k Refers to Shanghai only.
DEFINITIONS
Adult literacy rate: Percentage of the population 
ages 15 and older who can, with understanding, both 
read and write a short simple statement on their 
everyday life.
Population with at least secondary education: 
Percentage of the population ages 25 and older that 
reached at least secondary education.
Gross enrolment ratio: total enrolment in a given 
level of education (primary, secondary or tertiary), 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the 
official school-age population for the same level of 
education.
School teachers trained to teach: Percentage 
of primary school teachers that have received the 
minimum organized teacher training (pre-service or 
in-service) required for teaching at the primary level.
Performance in reading, mathematics and 
science: Score obtained in testing of skills and 
knowledge of 15-year-old students in these subjects 
essential for participation in society.
Deviation from mean: Spread of scores in reading, 
mathematics and science relative to the average 
scores.
Satisfaction with education quality: Percentage 
of respondents who answered “satisfied” to the 
Gallup World Poll question, “Are you satisfied or 
dissatisfied with the education system?”
Primary school dropout rate: Percentage of 
students from a given cohort that have enrolled in 
primary school but that drop out before reaching 
the last grade of primary education. It is calculated 
as 100 minus the survival rate to the last grade of 
primary education and assumes that observed flow 
rates remain unchanged throughout the cohort life 
and that dropouts do not re-enter school.
MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1, 2–6 and 14: UNESCo Institute for 
Statistics (2012).
Columns 7–12: oECD (2010).
Column 13: Gallup (2012).
 
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. 539 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Marshall Islands .. .. 102.0 99.0 16.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16.5
Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Nauru .. .. 93.0 63.0 .. 74.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
San Marino .. .. 94.0 97.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Somalia .. .. 32.0 8.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu .. .. 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development .. 85.9 104.2 100.4 75.8 .. — — — — — — 61.3 3.8
High human development 92.7 64.2 110.5 91.0 48.7 .. — — — — — — 58.0 7.3
Medium human development 82.3 50.5 113.4 70.7 22.1 .. — — — — — — 69.2 18.8
Low human development 60.8 25.2 98.2 37.4 6.8 73.8 — — — — — — 56.5 41.7
Regions
Arab States 74.5 38.4 97.7 71.1 24.1 .. — — — — — — 50.0 9.9
East Asia and the Pacific 93.8 .. 111.0 78.8 26.1 .. — — — — — — .. ..
Europe and Central Asia 98.1 83.5 99.9 91.2 57.5 .. — — — — — — 51.8 4.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 91.3 50.4 115.9 90.9 42.5 92.3 — — — — — — .. 14.3
South Asia 62.8 39.2 113.6 57.6 15.7 77.2 — — — — — — 73.3 21.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 63.0 29.7 100.3 40.3 6.2 73.9 — — — — — — 52.0 37.8
Least developed countries 60.7 .. 101.8 36.0 6.6 71.9 — — — — — — 58.2 40.9
Small island developing states .. .. 97.0 77.0 45.2 89.4 — — — — — — .. ..
world 81.3 57.7 107.9 71.2 28.7 .. — — — — — — 64.2 18.0
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EMPLOYMENT, VULNERABILITY AND EQUITY
PERCEPTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL 
wELL-BEING PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIETY HUMAN SAFETY
Employment 
to population 
ratio
Youth 
unemployment
Child 
labour
Overall loss 
in Human 
Development 
Index due to 
inequality
Overall life 
satisfaction
Satisfaction 
with 
freedom 
of choice
Satisfaction 
with job
Trust in 
people
Satisfaction 
with 
communitya
Trust in 
national 
government
Perception 
of safety
Homicide 
rate
Suicide rate 
(per 100,000 
people)
(% ages 25 
and older)
(% ages  
15–24)
(% ages 
5–14) (%)
(0, least 
satisfied, 
10, most 
satisfied) (% satisfied) (% answering “yes”)
(% 
answering 
“yes”)
(per 
100,000 
people) Female Male
HDI rank 2011 2005–2011b
2001–
2010b 2012 2007–2011b 2007–2011b 2007–2011b 2011 2007–2011b 2007–2011b 2007–2011b
2004–
2011b
2001–
2010b
2001–
2010b
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
1 Norway 65.9 9.3 .. 6.4 7.6 93.0 .. .. 92.8 54.0 81.0 0.6 6.5 17.3
2 Australia 62.4 11.9 .. 7.9 7.4 94.0 87.4 .. 91.9 53.0 64.0 1.0 3.6 12.8
3 United States 61.2 18.7 .. 12.4 7.1 85.0 87.4 37.0 83.8 38.0 75.0 4.2 4.5 17.7
4 Netherlands 61.5 7.8 .. 6.9 7.6 91.0 94.5 46.0 94.5 60.0 79.0 1.1 5.5 13.1
5 Germany 57.2 9.1 .. 6.9 6.7 89.0 89.0 31.0 93.9 43.0 78.0 0.8 6.0 17.9
6 New Zealand 66.2 18.2 .. .. 7.2 93.0 89.0 .. 88.1 64.0 67.0 0.9 5.5 18.1
7 Ireland 55.8 35.3 .. 7.2 7.0 95.0 89.1 30.0 93.6 53.0 70.0 1.2 4.7 19.0
7 Sweden 62.5 23.8 .. 6.2 7.5 93.0 91.8 55.0 92.5 64.0 78.0 1.0 6.8 18.7
9 Switzerland 65.5 7.9 .. 7.0 7.5 88.0 .. 44.0 93.5 58.0 76.0 0.7 11.4 24.8
10 Japan 59.7 8.9 .. .. 6.1 78.0 76.2 33.0 84.6 23.0 69.0 0.4 13.2 36.2
11 Canada 62.7 15.9 .. 8.7 7.4 94.0 91.5 42.0 91.7 55.0 79.0 1.6 5.4 17.3
12 Korea, Republic of 64.8 12.1 .. 16.5 6.9 66.0 71.1 26.0 78.5 28.0 54.0 2.6 22.1 39.9
13 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 61.2 11.0 .. .. 5.5 89.0 84.4 29.0 84.1 58.0 88.0 0.2 10.7 19.0
13 Iceland 71.9 18.4 .. 6.4 6.9 86.0 .. .. 81.8 24.0 77.0 0.3 7.0 16.5
15 Denmark 59.8 15.7 .. 6.2 7.8 93.0 94.0 60.0 93.4 47.0 79.0 0.9 6.4 17.5
16 Israel 60.9 11.8 .. 12.3 7.4 52.0 84.0 26.0 82.3 45.0 59.0 2.1 1.5 7.0
17 Belgium 54.0 18.7 .. 8.0 6.9 86.0 90.3 30.0 91.2 29.0 64.0 1.7 10.3 28.8
18 Austria 58.6 8.8 .. 6.6 7.5 92.0 94.1 29.0 94.4 41.0 82.0 0.6 7.1 23.8
18 Singapore 69.2 6.7 .. .. 6.5 82.0 86.5 33.0 92.9 83.0 89.0 0.3 7.7 12.9
20 France 54.4 23.2 .. 9.0 7.0 90.0 87.4 20.0 89.4 38.0 63.0 1.1 8.5 24.7
21 Finland 57.8 19.3 .. 6.0 7.4 93.0 87.7 58.0 91.2 57.0 78.0 2.2 10.0 29.0
21 Slovenia 57.2 16.8 .. 5.8 6.0 90.0 85.0 15.0 90.6 18.0 84.0 0.7 9.4 34.6
23 Spain 49.5 48.2 .. 10.1 6.5 80.0 85.7 22.0 87.8 31.0 68.0 0.8 3.4 11.9
24 Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.8 .. ..
25 Italy 47.5 32.0 .. 11.9 6.1 55.0 81.0 20.0 75.7 26.0 52.0 0.9 2.8 10.0
26 Luxembourg 59.9 20.8 .. 7.2 7.1 95.0 93.5 26.0 94.7 77.0 77.0 2.5 3.2 16.1
26 United Kingdom 58.8 22.0 .. 8.3 6.9 90.0 88.3 35.0 86.6 49.0 70.0 1.2 3.0 10.9
28 Czech Republic 59.7 18.1 .. 5.4 6.3 73.0 79.9 24.0 88.1 21.0 59.0 1.7 4.4 23.9
29 Greece 49.1 51.5 .. 11.5 5.4 52.0 70.3 16.0 74.2 18.0 53.0 1.5 1.0 6.0
30 Brunei Darussalam 69.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 .. ..
31 Cyprus 66.2 23.1 .. 11.5 6.7 73.0 87.1 11.0 88.7 40.0 70.0 1.7 1.7 7.4
32 Malta 48.3 14.0 .. 8.2 6.2 86.0 86.0 16.0 84.1 49.0 64.0 1.0 1.0 5.9
33 Andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.3 .. ..
33 Estonia 58.4 23.8 .. 9.0 5.5 69.0 81.1 33.0 86.3 42.0 56.0 5.2 7.3 30.6
35 Slovakia 57.5 33.6 .. 6.3 5.9 68.0 78.6 21.0 86.6 28.0 59.0 1.5 3.4 22.3
36 Qatar 89.9 8.9 .. .. 6.6 90.0 86.0 23.0 90.4 89.0 87.0 0.9 .. ..
37 Hungary 49.6 27.2 .. 7.4 4.9 61.0 80.5 13.0 74.2 36.0 57.0 1.3 10.6 40.0
38 Barbados 66.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.3 0.0 7.3
39 Poland 55.1 28.9 .. 9.9 5.6 80.0 77.0 25.0 88.2 27.0 59.0 1.1 4.1 26.4
40 Chile 62.9 21.1 3.0 19.0 6.6 77.0 78.2 15.0 78.4 48.0 46.0 3.2 4.2 18.2
41 Lithuania 55.6 34.6 .. 11.0 5.4 52.0 78.2 25.0 84.2 18.0 39.0 6.6 10.4 61.3
41 United Arab Emirates 83.4 21.8 .. .. 7.2 87.0 88.7 18.0 93.8 .. 90.0 0.8 .. ..
43 Portugal 58.0 31.7 3.0 10.8 5.2 79.0 88.7 27.0 90.1 21.0 63.0 1.2 4.0 15.6
44 Latvia 55.1 29.6 .. 10.9 5.0 54.0 80.6 13.0 84.8 11.0 48.0 3.1 8.2 40.0
45 Argentina 62.6 22.2 7.0 19.5 6.4 79.0 80.7 23.0 89.0 61.0 50.0 3.4 3.0 12.6
46 Seychelles .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.3 0.0 8.9
47 Croatia 49.1 36.8 .. 15.1 5.6 46.0 .. 16.0 66.0 .. 64.0 1.4 7.5 28.9
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48 Bahrain 72.2 .. 5.0 .. 4.5 73.0 79.3 11.0 88.2 .. 60.0 0.6 3.5 4.0
49 Bahamas 71.9 21.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27.4 0.6 1.9
50 Belarus 54.4 .. 5.0 8.3 5.2 57.0 65.7 34.0 76.6 59.0 60.0 4.9 8.8 48.7
51 Uruguay 65.9 21.7 8.0 16.4 6.1 78.0 78.0 27.0 83.8 73.0 48.0 5.9 6.3 26.0
52 Montenegro .. 40.0 10.0 7.4 5.5 50.0 .. 21.0 68.3 .. 78.0 3.5 .. ..
52 Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.0 .. ..
54 Kuwait 75.5 11.8 .. .. 6.6 75.0 84.9 11.0 81.5 .. .. 2.2 1.7 1.9
55 Russian Federation 62.8 15.7 .. .. 5.4 54.0 67.9 24.0 69.4 48.0 40.0 10.2 9.5 53.9
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PERCEPTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL 
wELL-BEING PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIETY HUMAN SAFETY
Employment 
to population 
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Youth 
unemployment
Child 
labour
Overall loss 
in Human 
Development 
Index due to 
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Overall life 
satisfaction
Satisfaction 
with 
freedom 
of choice
Satisfaction 
with job
Trust in 
people
Satisfaction 
with 
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Trust in 
national 
government
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of safety
Homicide 
rate
Suicide rate 
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(% ages 25 
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15–24)
(% ages 
5–14) (%)
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satisfied, 
10, most 
satisfied) (% satisfied) (% answering “yes”)
(% 
answering 
“yes”)
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people) Female Male
HDI rank 2011 2005–2011b
2001–
2010b 2012 2007–2011b 2007–2011b 2007–2011b 2011 2007–2011b 2007–2011b 2007–2011b
2004–
2011b
2001–
2010b
2001–
2010b
56 Romania 57.3 23.8 1.0 12.6 5.0 60.0 69.5 15.0 78.1 12.0 55.0 2.0 3.5 21.0
57 Bulgaria 52.0 27.6 .. 9.9 3.9 60.0 73.3 20.0 74.0 27.0 52.0 2.0 6.2 18.8
57 Saudi Arabia 59.7 45.8 .. .. 6.7 57.0 81.8 36.0 85.9 .. 77.0 1.0 .. ..
59 Cuba 58.7 3.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.0 5.5 19.0
59 Panama 68.3 14.6 7.0 24.6 7.3 80.0 88.5 21.0 86.6 46.0 47.0 21.6 1.9 9.0
61 Mexico 63.9 10.4 5.0 23.4 6.8 80.0 74.4 29.0 73.7 38.0 42.0 22.7 1.5 7.0
62 Costa Rica 65.6 21.6 5.0 21.5 7.3 92.0 87.4 14.0 82.5 32.0 41.0 11.3 1.9 10.2
63 Grenada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.5 0.0 0.0
64 Libya 53.6 .. .. .. 4.9 41.0 64.3 .. 68.7 .. 91.0 2.9 .. ..
64 Malaysia 66.6 11.3 .. .. 5.8 79.0 85.6 14.0 87.3 79.0 46.0 2.3 .. ..
64 Serbia .. 46.1 4.0 9.5 4.5 41.0 .. 17.0 60.0 .. 68.0 1.2 10.0 28.1
67 Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.8 .. ..
67 trinidad and tobago 66.6 12.9 1.0 15.3 6.7 81.0 89.9 .. 87.3 29.0 42.0 35.2 3.8 17.9
69 Kazakhstan 75.0 5.0 2.0 13.6 5.5 76.0 77.9 33.0 79.7 72.0 56.0 8.8 9.4 43.0
70 Albania 56.5 28.3 12.0 13.9 5.3 46.0 .. 7.0 67.7 .. 67.0 4.0 3.3 4.7
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 68.1 22.0 8.0 26.6 7.5 75.0 85.1 13.0 79.0 59.0 31.0 45.1 1.2 5.3
72 Dominica .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22.1 .. ..
72 Georgia 62.8 35.6 18.0 15.3 4.2 58.0 55.0 16.0 78.3 66.0 91.0 4.3 1.7 7.1
72 Lebanon 47.6 22.3 7.0 22.8 5.2 65.0 70.8 7.0 74.1 37.0 69.0 2.2 .. ..
72 Saint Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38.2 .. ..
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 46.1 33.9 .. .. 4.8 57.0 65.0 .. 76.3 56.0 55.0 3.0 .. ..
77 Peru 77.4 16.2 34.0 24.3 5.6 72.0 74.1 12.0 75.3 19.0 46.0 10.3 1.0 1.9
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 43.4 55.7 6.0 14.7 4.2 56.0 .. 11.0 66.7 .. 63.0 1.9 4.0 9.5
78 Ukraine 58.3 18.7 7.0 9.2 5.1 53.0 61.4 29.0 71.4 24.0 48.0 5.2 7.0 37.8
80 Mauritius 60.8 28.0 .. 13.3 5.5 83.0 84.6 .. 90.5 67.0 55.0 2.5 1.9 11.8
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 37.2 60.0 5.0 11.5 4.7 33.0 .. 18.0 61.7 .. 67.0 1.5 .. ..
82 Azerbaijan 70.8 15.2 7.0 11.4 4.7 49.0 57.8 27.0 73.4 74.0 74.0 2.2 0.3 1.0
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22.9 1.9 5.4
84 oman 65.7 .. .. .. 6.9 91.0 85.3 .. 89.9 .. .. 0.7 .. ..
85 Brazil 68.2 23.1 3.0 27.2 6.8 80.0 81.3 15.0 78.5 51.0 40.0 21.0 2.0 7.7
85 Jamaica 65.9 37.9 6.0 19.1 .. .. 68.3 .. 72.2 .. .. 52.2 .. ..
87 Armenia 47.3 54.7 4.0 10.9 4.4 41.0 45.4 15.0 52.7 34.0 75.0 1.4 1.1 2.8
88 Saint Lucia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 25.2 0.0 4.9
89 Ecuador 71.5 18.1 8.0 25.8 5.8 78.0 79.8 9.0 86.0 59.0 49.0 18.2 3.6 10.5
90 turkey 48.8 20.7 3.0 22.5 5.3 44.0 71.2 8.0 78.9 60.0 51.0 3.3 .. ..
91 Colombia 68.3 29.9 9.0 27.8 6.4 81.0 81.5 14.0 82.9 55.0 43.0 33.4 2.0 7.9
92 Sri Lanka 58.2 24.7 .. 15.1 4.2 81.0 84.7 17.0 89.7 86.0 77.0 3.6 .. ..
93 Algeria 43.9 37.5 5.0 .. 5.2 53.0 58.7 16.0 73.9 53.0 49.0 1.5 .. ..
94 tunisia 46.3 31.4 .. .. 4.7 58.0 59.4 15.0 66.0 47.0 47.0 1.1 .. ..
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95 tonga .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.0 .. ..
96 Belize 66.3 28.8 40.0 .. 6.5 62.0 .. .. 67.1 26.0 43.0 41.4 0.7 6.6
96 Dominican Republic 62.4 44.5 10.0 27.3 4.7 82.0 76.3 15.0 79.2 45.0 38.0 25.0 0.7 3.9
96 Fiji 62.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.8 .. ..
96 Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.1 .. ..
100 Jordan 44.9 46.8 .. 19.0 5.7 72.0 74.9 9.0 75.6 77.0 81.0 1.8 0.0 0.2
101 China 74.6 .. .. 22.4 5.0 77.0 69.9 57.0 77.1 .. 80.0 1.1 .. ..
102 turkmenistan 62.6 .. .. .. 5.8 .. 93.6 27.0 97.5 .. 83.0 4.2 .. ..
103 thailand 76.9 3.0 8.0 21.3 6.7 92.0 96.3 27.0 95.2 54.0 74.0 4.8 3.8 12.0
104 Maldives 64.7 30.5 .. 25.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.6 0.0 0.7
105 Suriname 56.4 .. 6.0 23.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.6 4.8 23.9
106 Gabon 68.2 .. .. 19.5 .. 77.0 53.7 .. 54.8 53.0 39.0 13.8 .. ..
107 El Salvador 64.5 13.0 5.0 26.6 6.7 74.0 77.3 18.0 81.9 49.0 42.0 69.2 3.6 12.9
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 77.4 .. 26.0 34.2 5.8 67.0 83.9 10.0 84.8 38.0 44.0 8.9 .. ..
108 Mongolia 67.9 .. 18.0 15.9 5.0 64.0 82.1 14.0 80.6 29.0 47.0 8.7 .. ..
110 Palestine, State of 41.2 49.6 .. .. 4.8 51.0 70.8 9.0 71.5 49.0 59.0 4.1 .. ..
111 Paraguay 73.4 17.8 15.0 .. 5.8 71.0 85.6 12.0 85.5 48.0 38.0 11.5 2.0 5.1
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Employment 
to population 
ratio
Youth 
unemployment
Child 
labour
Overall loss 
in Human 
Development 
Index due to 
inequality
Overall life 
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HDI rank 2011 2005–2011b
2001–
2010b 2012 2007–2011b 2007–2011b 2007–2011b 2011 2007–2011b 2007–2011b 2007–2011b
2004–
2011b
2001–
2010b
2001–
2010b
112 Egypt 51.3 54.1 7.0 24.1 4.1 57.0 64.7 22.0 61.0 63.0 58.0 1.2 0.0 0.1
113 Moldova, Republic of 43.9 15.8 16.0 11.6 5.8 58.0 66.1 12.0 70.6 24.0 50.0 7.5 5.6 30.1
114 Philippines 68.8 19.3 .. 19.9 5.0 88.0 81.1 14.0 85.6 72.0 62.0 5.4 .. ..
114 Uzbekistan 62.8 .. .. 15.8 5.1 90.0 87.3 26.0 93.8 .. 80.0 3.1 2.3 7.0
116 Syrian Arab Republic 45.8 40.2 4.0 20.4 4.1 47.0 55.5 9.0 44.8 .. 65.0 2.3 .. ..
117 Micronesia, Federated States of .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.9 .. ..
118 Guyana 61.0 50.0 16.0 19.1 6.0 66.0 .. .. 74.8 46.0 47.0 18.6 13.4 39.0
119 Botswana 73.8 .. 9.0 .. 3.6 82.0 45.9 9.0 56.5 74.0 31.0 14.5 .. ..
120 Honduras 67.3 11.2 16.0 27.5 5.9 77.0 79.4 13.0 82.8 29.0 45.0 91.6 .. ..
121 Indonesia 70.1 23.0 7.0 18.3 5.2 86.0 74.1 21.0 92.3 74.0 88.0 8.1 .. ..
121 Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.3 .. ..
121 South Africa 49.6 55.0 .. .. 4.7 84.0 56.5 17.0 62.0 63.0 38.0 31.8 0.4 1.4
124 vanuatu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.9 .. ..
125 Kyrgyzstan 70.4 16.2 4.0 17.1 4.9 71.0 75.2 34.0 84.8 44.0 62.0 20.1 3.6 14.1
125 tajikistan 70.3 .. 10.0 18.4 4.3 70.0 82.7 31.0 89.9 89.0 85.0 2.1 2.3 2.9
127 viet Nam 81.3 .. 16.0 14.0 5.8 61.0 71.8 26.0 70.1 77.0 67.0 1.6 .. ..
128 Namibia 57.4 63.8 .. 43.5 4.9 76.0 .. .. 76.5 82.0 33.0 17.2 .. ..
129 Nicaragua 66.3 9.7 15.0 27.5 5.7 75.0 79.8 11.0 86.0 54.0 51.0 13.6 2.6 9.0
130 Morocco 50.9 18.1 8.0 29.7 5.1 54.0 65.4 58.0 69.4 60.0 67.0 1.4 .. ..
131 Iraq 41.9 .. 11.0 .. 5.0 30.0 64.2 15.0 66.7 37.0 41.0 2.0 .. ..
132 Cape verde 66.7 .. 3.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.6 .. ..
133 Guatemala 69.7 7.1 21.0 33.1 6.3 74.0 79.8 15.0 85.7 36.0 41.0 38.5 1.7 5.6
134 timor-Leste 62.8 .. 4.0 33.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.9 .. ..
135 Ghana 81.3 .. 34.0 32.2 5.6 85.0 63.8 19.0 68.9 68.0 78.0 15.7 .. ..
136 Equatorial Guinea 86.5 .. 28.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20.7 .. ..
136 India 61.0 11.5 12.0 29.3 4.6 80.0 71.2 20.0 82.6 58.0 70.0 3.4 7.8 13.0
138 Cambodia 86.7 3.5 39.0 25.9 4.2 92.0 77.6 9.0 90.2 90.0 68.0 3.4 .. ..
138 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 85.1 .. 11.0 24.7 5.0 87.0 87.9 .. 94.3 98.0 84.0 4.6 .. ..
140 Bhutan 80.3 10.9 18.0 20.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.0 .. ..
141 Swaziland 55.9 .. 9.0 35.4 .. .. 55.1 .. 62.3 .. .. 12.9 .. ..
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142 Congo 78.8 .. 25.0 31.1 4.5 76.0 56.4 .. 67.1 48.0 58.0 30.8 .. ..
143 Solomon Islands 73.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.7 .. ..
144 Sao tome and Principe .. .. 8.0 31.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.9 .. ..
145 Kenya 75.9 .. 26.0 33.6 4.4 71.0 50.0 10.0 69.3 46.0 50.0 20.1 .. ..
146 Bangladesh 74.0 13.6 13.0 27.4 5.0 78.0 76.4 15.0 91.3 79.0 80.0 2.7 .. ..
146 Pakistan 55.4 10.5 .. 30.9 5.3 34.0 73.2 20.0 83.6 28.0 46.0 7.8 .. ..
148 Angola 75.8 .. 24.0 43.9 4.2 69.0 65.2 .. 49.8 61.0 53.0 19.0 .. ..
149 Myanmar 83.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 80.4 .. .. 10.2 .. ..
150 Cameroon 80.3 .. 31.0 33.4 4.4 82.0 62.2 13.0 69.4 65.0 56.0 19.7 .. ..
151 Madagascar 90.5 2.8 28.0 30.7 4.4 54.0 38.0 .. 72.0 65.0 53.0 8.1 .. ..
152 tanzania, United Republic of 84.2 10.1 21.0 27.3 4.1 74.0 63.0 26.0 67.4 56.0 61.0 24.5 .. ..
153 Nigeria 61.7 .. 29.0 41.4 4.8 77.0 58.6 13.0 67.4 55.0 69.0 12.2 .. ..
154 Senegal 76.3 20.1 22.0 33.0 3.8 64.0 42.2 28.0 52.1 30.0 55.0 8.7 .. ..
155 Mauritania 44.7 .. 16.0 34.4 5.0 56.0 55.3 30.0 62.2 43.0 62.0 14.7 .. ..
156 Papua New Guinea 78.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.0 .. ..
157 Nepal 86.4 .. 34.0 34.2 3.8 43.0 87.3 17.0 86.7 33.0 61.0 2.8 .. ..
158 Lesotho 59.7 41.9 23.0 35.9 .. .. 46.9 .. 52.4 .. .. 35.2 .. ..
159 togo 84.1 .. 47.0 33.5 2.8 56.0 42.4 .. 57.7 51.0 52.0 10.9 .. ..
160 Yemen 50.9 .. 23.0 32.3 3.7 59.0 54.3 27.0 51.9 39.0 67.0 4.2 .. ..
161 Haiti 74.6 .. 21.0 40.2 3.8 37.0 43.4 30.0 57.9 46.0 42.0 6.9 0.0 0.0
161 Uganda 86.9 5.4 25.0 33.6 4.2 73.0 50.1 17.0 69.7 52.0 42.0 36.3 .. ..
163 Zambia 76.6 23.4 41.0 36.7 5.0 65.0 47.3 31.0 62.6 40.0 54.0 38.0 .. ..
164 Djibouti .. .. 8.0 36.0 4.4 74.0 70.0 55.0 75.3 68.0 72.0 3.4 .. ..
165 Gambia 81.1 .. 25.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.8 .. ..
166 Benin 80.6 .. 46.0 35.8 3.7 76.0 46.7 .. 66.8 78.0 58.0 15.1 .. ..
167 Rwanda 92.3 .. 35.0 33.9 4.0 82.0 58.6 30.0 74.3 95.0 92.0 17.1 .. ..
168 Côte d’Ivoire 72.8 .. 35.0 38.6 4.2 76.0 .. 13.0 40.6 42.0 47.0 56.9 .. ..
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169 Comoros 62.7 .. 27.0 .. 3.9 50.0 49.8 35.0 77.2 44.0 78.0 12.2 .. ..
170 Malawi 92.0 .. 26.0 31.4 5.1 88.0 50.9 33.0 80.8 83.0 55.0 36.0 .. ..
171 Sudan 89.0 .. .. .. 4.4 56.0 48.8 31.0 72.7 54.0 75.0 24.2 .. ..
172 Zimbabwe 89.0 .. .. 28.5 4.8 63.0 58.6 15.0 68.4 43.0 39.0 14.3 .. ..
173 Ethiopia 84.0 29.4 53.0 31.9 4.4 39.0 .. .. 52.1 32.0 49.0 25.5 .. ..
174 Liberia 72.1 6.6 21.0 35.3 4.2 82.0 63.0 12.0 63.4 54.0 38.0 10.1 .. ..
175 Afghanistan 53.8 .. 13.0 .. 3.8 47.0 82.0 25.0 71.7 31.0 29.0 2.4 .. ..
176 Guinea-Bissau 78.1 .. 57.0 41.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20.2 .. ..
177 Sierra Leone 77.4 .. 48.0 41.6 4.1 77.0 61.3 16.0 52.3 58.0 50.0 14.9 .. ..
178 Burundi 88.5 .. 19.0 .. 3.8 49.0 64.7 38.0 76.0 85.0 65.0 21.7 .. ..
178 Guinea 79.1 .. 25.0 38.8 4.0 79.0 58.9 .. 75.3 77.0 62.0 22.5 .. ..
180 Central African Republic 82.8 .. 47.0 40.5 3.6 68.0 66.5 37.0 75.8 75.0 62.0 29.3 .. ..
181 Eritrea 84.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17.8 .. ..
182 Mali 56.0 .. 36.0 .. 3.8 75.0 54.9 45.0 63.9 71.0 80.0 8.0 .. ..
183 Burkina Faso 86.0 4.6 38.0 34.2 4.0 58.0 60.1 26.0 78.2 55.0 62.0 18.0 .. ..
184 Chad 77.0 .. 48.0 40.1 3.7 54.0 72.0 21.0 70.1 39.0 30.0 15.8 .. ..
185 Mozambique 90.1 .. 22.0 32.7 5.0 64.0 63.1 .. 83.1 63.0 42.0 8.8 .. ..
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 82.8 .. 42.0 39.9 4.0 62.0 45.6 39.0 60.2 35.0 38.0 21.7 .. ..
186 Niger 66.2 .. 43.0 34.2 4.1 82.0 69.7 40.0 85.2 78.0 81.0 3.8 .. ..
NOTES
a Based on the Gallup survey question on overall 
satisfaction with city.
b Data refer to the most recent year available during the 
period specified.
DEFINITIONS
Employment to population ratio: Percentage of the 
population ages 25 years or older that is employed.
Youth unemployment: Percentage of the labour force 
population ages 15–24 that is not in paid employment 
or self-employed but is available for work and has taken 
steps to seek paid employment or self-employment.
Child labour: Percentage of children ages 5–11 who, 
during the reference week, did at least one hour of 
economic activity or at least 28 hours of household 
chores, or children ages 12–14 who, during the reference 
week, did at least 14 hours of economic activity or at 
least 28 hours of household chores.
Overall loss in Human Development Index (HDI) 
due to inequality: Loss in potential human development 
due to inequality, calculated as the percentage difference 
between the HDI and Inequality-adjusted HDI. See 
Technical note 2 for details on how the Inequality-
adjusted HDI is calculated.
Overall life satisfaction: Average response to the 
Gallup World Poll Question: Please imagine a ladder, with 
steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. 
Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the 
best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder 
represents the worst possible life for you. on which 
step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you 
stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the 
better you feel about your life, and the lower the step the 
worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the 
way you feel?
Satisfaction with freedom of choice: Percentage of 
respondents answering “yes” to the Gallup World Poll 
question, “In this country, are you satisfied or dissatisfied 
with your freedom to choose what you do with your life?”
Satisfaction with job: Percentage of respondents 
answering “satisfied” to the Gallup World Poll question, 
“Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your job?”
Trust in people: Percentage of respondents answering 
“yes” to the Gallup World Poll question, “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you have to be careful in dealing with people?”
Satisfaction with community: Percentage of 
respondents answering “yes” to the Gallup World 
Poll question, “Right now, do you think that economic 
conditions in the city or area where you live, as a whole, 
are getting better or getting worse?”
Trust in national government: Percentage of 
respondents answering “yes” to the Gallup World Poll 
question, “In this country, do you have confidence in the 
national government?”
Perception of safety: Percentage of respondents 
answering “yes” to the Gallup World Poll question, “Do 
you feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area 
where you live?”
Homicide rate: Number of intentional homicides—that 
is, unlawful deaths purposefully inflicted on a person by 
another person—expressed per 100,000 people.
Suicide rate: Estimated total number of deaths from 
purposely self-inflicted injuries, in the total population or 
of a given sex or age, divided by the total number of the 
reference population, expressed per 100,000 people.
MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1 and 2: ILo (2012).
Column 3: UNICEF (2012).
Column 4: Calculated based on HDI and Inequality-
adjusted HDI values from tables 1 and 3.
Columns 5–11: Gallup (2012).
Column 12: UNoDC (2012).
Columns 13 and 14: WHo (2012c).
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OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of 78.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.2 .. ..
Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.0 .. ..
Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.8 .. ..
San Marino .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Somalia 59.9 .. 49.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.5 .. ..
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 58.8 19.5 .. 10.8 6.7 81.5 84.3 30.9 85.9 38.1 68.4 2.1 6.6 20.6
High human development 61.2 22.4 .. 20.6 5.9 66.3 73.4 19.3 76.4 .. 47.6 13.0 .. ..
Medium human development 68.4 .. .. 24.2 4.9 77.8 71.4 .. 79.9 .. 73.4 3.9 .. ..
Low human development 72.2 .. 29.7 33.5 4.5 61.8 63.4 .. 72.2 50.8 57.7 14.6 .. ..
Regions
Arab States 52.6 .. .. 25.4 4.8 54.6 63.9 24.9 67.6 .. 62.9 4.5 .. ..
East Asia and the Pacific 74.5 .. .. 21.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.8 .. ..
Europe and Central Asia 58.4 20.9 .. 12.9 5.3 58.5 71.0 21.5 76.5 43.9 53.5 5.5 6.9 35.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 67.2 19.6 8.5 25.7 6.5 77.9 .. .. 79.0 47.1 42.0 22.2 2.1 8.1
South Asia 61.2 12.9 .. 29.1 4.7 72.9 72.1 19.5 83.2 56.1 66.9 3.7 .. ..
Sub-Saharan Africa 74.5 .. 33.5 35.0 4.4 69.1 56.2 .. 65.2 53.6 55.3 20.4 .. ..
Least developed countries 77.4 .. 30.2 32.5 4.3 64.2 63.2 .. 72.3 56.4 59.5 14.6 .. ..
Small island developing states 65.9 .. .. 29.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.6 .. ..
world 65.8 .. .. 23.3 5.3 73.9 73.1 29.8 79.0 52.0 66.0 6.9 .. ..
Human Development RepoRt 2013
The Rise of the South Human progress in a Diverse World
tABLE 9 Social integration    |    177
International trade flows of 
goods and servicesTa
b
lE 10
TRADE OF GOODSa TRADE OF SERVICES COMPOSITION OF MERCHANDISE GOODS
Exports of 
merchandise 
goods
Imports of 
merchandise 
goods
Exports of 
services
Imports of 
services
Share of merchandise exports 
(%)
Share of merchandise imports 
(%) Parts and componentsb
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
Agricultural 
exports
Manufactured 
exports
Agricultural 
imports
Manufactured 
imports
(% of 
manufactured 
exports)
(% of 
manufactured 
imports)
HDI rank 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
1 Norway 130.7 33.0 77.3 19.5 39.7 10.0 42.8 10.8 7.8 18.6 9.4 75.1 37.0 21.5
2 Australia 206.7 20.1 187.9 18.3 48.5 4.7 51.5 5.0 13.1 12.8 5.9 72.4 24.2 21.6
3 United States 1,121.8 7.9 1,966.5 13.9 544.4 3.9 402.0 2.8 12.3 65.2 5.9 68.8 30.3 28.8
4 Netherlands 492.6 62.9 440.0 56.2 95.4 12.2 85.2 10.9 16.2 56.5 11.4 56.5 26.0 28.9
5 Germany 1,271.1 38.8 1,066.8 32.5 237.6 7.2 263.2 8.0 6.0 81.8 8.6 67.4 28.1 32.0
6 New Zealand 29.7 22.9 30.2 23.3 8.7 6.7 9.1 7.1 65.6 20.3 11.2 70.0 16.0 18.6
7 Ireland 118.3 55.3 60.5 28.3 97.1 45.4 108.4 50.7 9.7 84.2 13.0 66.4 13.5 22.6
7 Sweden 158.4 36.5 148.8 34.3 64.4 14.8 48.5 11.2 8.8 74.5 10.2 69.2 28.6 31.1
9 Switzerland 195.6 38.3 176.3 34.5 83.6 16.4 39.6 7.8 4.1 87.6 6.8 79.6 15.9 16.9
10 Japan 769.8 14.6 692.6 13.2 141.5 2.7 157.6 3.0 1.3 88.3 11.2 50.0 36.0 31.8
11 Canada 362.1 24.8 388.3 26.6 69.2 4.7 91.3 6.3 14.2 46.7 8.2 74.7 22.7 29.5
12 Korea, Republic of 466.4 50.6 425.2 46.1 .. .. .. .. 2.0 88.3 6.3 56.4 36.8 35.3
13 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 14.8 6.8 441.4 203.9 .. .. .. .. 5.7 46.3 4.7 84.7 18.1 56.9
13 Iceland 4.6 37.3 3.9 31.9 2.5 20.0 2.2 17.7 41.9 14.6 12.2 58.8 8.9 29.0
15 Denmark 96.5 31.0 84.5 27.1 59.9 19.2 50.7 16.3 21.3 60.4 16.0 72.7 22.1 22.8
16 Israel 58.4 28.4 59.2 28.7 24.7 12.0 18.1 8.8 4.0 65.4 8.5 57.4 28.7 24.1
17 Belgium 411.1 87.5 389.5 82.9 83.3 17.7 78.5 16.7 10.3 70.7 9.8 66.9 13.5 17.6
18 Austria 144.9 38.2 150.6 39.7 54.5 14.4 36.9 9.7 8.7 79.5 9.5 72.5 30.2 27.0
18 Singapore 351.9 180.9 310.8 159.8 112.3 57.7 96.5 49.6 2.2 72.1 3.5 64.7 64.5 61.4
20 France 511.7 19.8 592.1 22.9 143.7 5.6 129.8 5.0 12.9 78.2 9.9 73.1 26.5 25.8
21 Finland 70.1 29.5 68.8 28.9 24.6 10.3 21.7 9.1 8.5 76.5 9.6 60.5 23.1 26.2
21 Slovenia 24.4 50.9 26.5 55.2 5.8 12.0 4.4 9.1 6.0 84.8 11.2 69.1 25.6 26.4
23 Spain 246.3 17.3 315.5 22.2 124.1 8.7 87.1 6.1 16.2 71.9 11.8 65.3 21.3 26.7
24 Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
25 Italy 446.8 21.5 487.0 23.5 98.3 4.7 110.1 5.3 8.6 81.7 11.3 63.0 24.2 23.0
26 Luxembourg 13.8 26.4 20.3 38.8 67.5 128.6 37.3 71.2 11.3 79.3 12.3 63.3 19.0 17.7
26 United Kingdom 405.9 18.4 559.3 25.3 237.9 10.8 168.8 7.6 7.0 68.2 10.9 67.1 26.0 26.1
28 Czech Republic 132.1 67.1 125.7 63.8 21.7 11.0 18.2 9.2 5.3 86.4 6.7 76.9 40.6 43.2
29 Greece 21.7 7.0 63.9 20.6 37.5 12.1 20.2 6.5 27.5 49.1 13.4 59.2 14.7 12.5
30 Brunei Darussalam .. .. .. .. 1.1 d 7.9 1.4 d 12.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
31 Cyprus 0.8 3.2 8.6 37.0 11.5 49.5 4.2 17.9 36.1 50.2 15.6 61.6 34.2 14.6
32 Malta 3.7 45.7 5.7 70.5 4.0 49.0 2.6 31.6 5.3 67.6 11.3 62.6 60.4 37.1
33 Andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
33 Estonia 12.8 67.3 13.2 69.4 4.5 23.7 2.8 14.6 15.2 62.2 13.6 63.8 24.9 27.1
35 Slovakia 64.0 73.4 64.0 73.5 .. .. .. .. 5.6 86.3 7.7 75.5 26.6 43.9
36 Qatar 48.3 43.0 .. .. 2.3 2.0 6.2 5.5 0.1 6.8 .. .. 0.9 ..
37 Hungary 94.7 74.0 87.4 68.3 19.1 14.9 15.9 12.4 8.1 81.7 5.8 71.8 50.1 51.6
38 Barbados 0.2 6.1 1.2 31.1 1.5 38.1 0.8 19.6 33.5 63.9 26.7 70.0 15.7 16.7
39 Poland 157.1 34.9 174.1 38.7 32.5 7.2 29.0 6.4 12.0 79.1 9.4 74.2 30.6 29.2
40 Chile 70.9 36.5 59.4 30.5 10.8 5.6 11.8 6.1 22.2 12.0 7.7 68.7 9.7 19.3
41 Lithuania 20.8 56.9 23.4 63.9 4.1 11.3 2.8 7.7 19.7 54.0 14.2 49.9 13.4 16.4
41 United Arab Emirates .. .. .. .. 11.7 4.1 41.7 14.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
43 Portugal 48.7 21.2 75.6 32.8 23.3 10.1 14.4 6.2 13.9 73.1 15.1 66.7 24.8 22.1
44 Latvia 8.9 35.5 11.1 44.7 3.7 14.7 2.2 8.8 30.0 57.6 16.3 59.1 13.7 16.0
45 Argentina 68.2 20.2 56.8 16.8 13.2 3.9 14.1 4.2 50.8 32.2 3.7 84.4 13.1 29.1
46 Seychelles .. .. .. .. 0.4 47.7 0.3 36.8 .. .. .. .. .. ..
47 Croatia 11.8 19.0 20.1 32.3 11.0 17.7 3.5 5.6 15.0 68.0 11.5 67.2 24.6 17.2
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48 Bahrain 15.5 73.3 16.0 75.7 4.0 19.2 1.9 9.0 1.9 5.6 8.1 38.8 1.4 25.1
49 Bahamas 0.3 3.9 2.9 37.0 .. .. .. .. 25.6 63.4 19.3 52.9 0.0 14.1
50 Belarus 25.2 48.3 34.9 66.7 4.5 8.6 2.9 5.5 14.7 52.9 9.4 47.5 10.7 20.2
51 Uruguay 5.4 d 15.4 6.9 d 19.8 2.5 7.1 1.4 4.1 73.5 23.7 12.2 62.5 10.5 15.6
52 Montenegro .. .. .. .. 1.0 24.0 0.4 9.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
52 Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
54 Kuwait 50.3 43.8 .. .. 7.7 6.7 13.6 11.8 0.4 6.2 .. .. 3.4 ..
55 Russian Federation 400.1 29.5 248.7 18.4 44.3 3.3 73.5 5.4 4.1 14.1 14.0 68.6 9.7 21.7
56 Romania 49.4 30.6 62.0 38.4 8.6 5.3 9.4 5.8 10.1 78.5 9.1 75.3 37.0 32.6
57 Bulgaria 20.6 42.8 25.4 52.7 7.0 14.5 4.5 9.3 17.5 49.3 10.6 54.9 22.1 20.4
57 Saudi Arabia 245.9 59.4 106.9 25.8 10.7 2.6 76.8 18.5 1.2 11.0 16.5 76.1 2.7 23.0
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TRADE OF GOODSa TRADE OF SERVICES COMPOSITION OF MERCHANDISE GOODS
Exports of 
merchandise 
goods
Imports of 
merchandise 
goods
Exports of 
services
Imports of 
services
Share of merchandise exports 
(%)
Share of merchandise imports 
(%) Parts and componentsb
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
Agricultural 
exports
Manufactured 
exports
Agricultural 
imports
Manufactured 
imports
(% of 
manufactured 
exports)
(% of 
manufactured 
imports)
HDI rank 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
59 Cuba .. .. .. .. 8.0 d .. 1.4 d .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
59 Panama 0.7 2.8 16.7 65.8 6.1 24.0 2.8 10.9 67.6 11.9 8.2 89.7 0.1 11.8
61 Mexico 298.3 31.0 301.5 31.4 15.4 1.6 25.6 2.7 6.3 74.5 7.8 79.5 40.3 46.2
62 Costa Rica 9.0 27.6 13.9 42.4 4.2 12.7 1.8 5.4 37.3 60.7 10.1 73.0 43.9 31.8
63 Grenada .. .. 0.3 d 36.2 0.1 17.7 0.1 13.0 .. .. 25.8 58.8 .. 14.1
64 Libya .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
64 Malaysia 198.8 92.3 164.5 76.3 34.0 15.8 33.7 15.6 14.5 67.0 9.8 73.2 54.5 54.5
64 Serbia .. .. .. .. 3.5 9.0 3.5 9.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
67 Antigua and Barbuda 0.0 0.2 0.5 42.3 0.5 43.2 0.2 18.8 50.7 47.6 22.5 48.3 0.0 23.1
67 trinidad and tobago 10.0 49.1 6.5 31.9 0.9 4.2 0.4 2.1 2.6 31.0 11.9 49.9 1.0 20.0
69 Kazakhstan .. .. .. .. 4.2 3.2 11.3 8.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
70 Albania 1.5 12.9 4.6 38.4 2.2 18.7 2.0 16.8 6.9 62.0 19.0 63.6 5.7 12.5
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 67.0 18.5 32.3 9.0 .. .. .. .. 0.2 4.0 16.7 80.8 7.2 25.0
72 Dominica 0.0 5.9 0.2 47.1 0.1 24.7 0.1 13.2 27.1 66.0 25.1 57.1 0.9 16.2
72 Georgia 1.3 11.5 5.1 45.5 1.6 14.3 1.1 9.7 21.5 46.3 18.9 60.2 6.0 13.3
72 Lebanon 4.3 11.5 18.0 48.6 15.3 41.3 13.0 35.2 12.6 54.6 16.7 54.8 18.4 11.7
72 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.0 3.9 0.3 39.6 .. .. .. .. 12.7 87.2 21.6 73.7 87.8 17.5
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 83.8 25.3 54.7 16.5 .. .. .. .. 6.5 15.6 17.6 70.0 4.3 21.3
77 Peru 35.2 25.1 30.0 21.4 4.0 2.8 6.0 4.3 16.9 10.9 12.0 72.5 4.5 17.9
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2.7 d 29.2 5.0 d 54.7 .. .. .. .. 25.4 69.0 17.4 74.8 7.0 11.8
78 Ukraine 51.4 40.7 60.7 48.0 17.1 13.5 12.2 9.7 20.4 63.7 10.3 52.9 13.9 16.9
80 Mauritius 1.5 16.1 4.4 47.5 2.7 29.1 2.0 21.4 39.5 56.3 23.1 54.6 1.6 15.6
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 4.8 28.5 9.2 54.7 1.3 7.6 0.6 3.5 13.2 54.7 19.7 57.8 27.6 15.6
82 Azerbaijan 21.3 43.8 6.6 13.6 2.1 4.3 3.8 7.8 2.8 2.5 20.2 76.3 6.0 23.1
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines 0.0 5.2 0.4 56.3 .. .. .. .. 82.4 15.7 24.0 53.3 0.2 15.1
84 oman 31.6 60.4 19.8 37.8 1.8 3.4 6.5 12.5 2.6 10.5 12.7 73.3 8.6 21.9
85 Brazil 197.4 10.5 179.7 9.6 31.8 1.7 62.6 3.3 34.8 35.8 6.0 73.9 22.8 30.7
85 Jamaica 1.2 9.5 5.2 39.7 2.6 20.0 1.8 13.9 24.8 7.9 18.7 48.7 1.5 14.5
87 Armenia 0.9 9.6 3.7 41.5 0.8 8.5 1.0 11.1 17.3 21.2 18.6 52.5 10.4 17.1
88 Saint Lucia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
89 Ecuador 17.5 31.8 20.6 37.4 1.4 2.5 3.0 5.4 34.1 9.6 9.4 67.8 12.9 17.4
90 turkey 114.0 16.9 185.5 27.6 34.4 5.1 19.7 2.9 10.9 77.7 6.9 62.5 14.8 21.3
91 Colombia 39.5 15.0 40.5 15.4 4.4 1.7 8.0 3.0 14.6 21.0 11.1 80.9 8.4 17.3
92 Sri Lanka 8.3 18.1 12.4 27.0 2.5 5.4 3.1 6.8 30.8 61.2 16.7 61.8 5.5 13.7
93 Algeria 57.1 38.0 41.0 27.3 3.6 2.4 11.9 7.9 0.6 0.8 17.9 78.4 2.9 20.5
94 tunisia 16.4 37.4 22.2 50.6 5.8 13.2 3.3 7.6 8.2 76.0 11.5 72.3 28.9 26.8
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95 tonga 0.0 2.4 0.2 47.0 0.0 12.2 0.0 13.5 90.6 7.6 31.3 44.8 0.2 16.3
96 Belize 0.3 20.5 0.7 50.9 0.4 25.7 0.2 11.8 62.3 1.3 17.4 60.9 0.3 12.3
96 Dominican Republic 4.8 9.7 15.1 30.8 5.1 10.3 2.1 4.4 28.5 67.6 14.6 59.4 10.4 18.7
96 Fiji 0.6 18.6 1.8 60.2 0.7 d 23.3 0.5 d 14.9 62.2 22.1 18.7 48.1 5.7 19.1
96 Samoa 0.1 10.6 0.3 55.3 0.2 28.3 0.1 15.5 21.5 78.2 26.9 54.0 97.8 17.4
100 Jordan 5.9 23.6 15.3 60.8 5.2 20.5 4.3 17.0 16.5 72.0 17.6 56.3 5.4 18.4
101 China 1,577.8 28.9 1,289.1 23.6 171.2 3.1 193.3 3.5 3.3 93.4 8.4 60.9 28.7 44.8
102 turkmenistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
103 thailand 195.3 67.0 180.1 61.8 34.0 11.7 45.9 15.7 18.0 71.6 6.6 66.2 38.1 40.9
104 Maldives 0.1 3.7 1.1 54.5 0.8 38.3 0.3 15.3 96.2 0.1 24.6 50.2 0.0 21.1
105 Suriname 2.0 49.2 1.4 33.9 0.2 5.9 0.3 6.3 2.9 1.9 15.3 63.7 27.8 18.3
106 Gabon 5.4 d 44.4 2.5 d 20.7 0.4 3.3 1.9 15.9 9.6 4.2 17.6 74.1 30.3 26.1
107 El Salvador 4.5 21.4 8.5 40.3 1.0 4.6 1.1 5.1 21.9 71.5 18.5 63.8 7.8 14.1
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 7.0 37.7 5.6 30.3 .. .. .. .. 16.1 6.3 8.4 78.1 2.6 12.3
108 Mongolia .. .. .. .. 0.5 9.0 0.8 14.5 .. .. .. .. .. ..
110 Palestine, State of 0.4 d .. 4.0 d .. .. .. .. .. 17.2 66.9 22.9 43.8 1.5 10.1
111 Paraguay 4.5 27.8 10.0 61.6 1.5 9.2 0.7 4.4 88.5 10.7 8.1 79.4 7.4 20.1
112 Egypt 26.3 12.9 53.0 26.0 .. .. .. .. 19.5 41.7 22.4 59.9 8.4 18.1
113 Moldova, Republic of 0.9 16.6 3.9 68.5 .. .. .. .. 73.0 22.6 16.2 62.4 8.2 15.6
114 Philippines 51.5 28.0 58.5 31.8 13.2 7.2 11.3 6.1 8.0 85.1 11.7 66.8 72.8 58.4
114 Uzbekistan .. .. .. .. 1.1 3.1 0.6 1.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
116 Syrian Arab Republic 11.4 20.1 17.6 31.1 5.2 8.5 .. .. 22.7 24.7 23.4 54.1 6.6 16.0
117 Micronesia, Federated States of .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
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table 10 InternatIonal trade flows of goods and servIces
TRADE OF GOODSa TRADE OF SERVICES COMPOSITION OF MERCHANDISE GOODS
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118 Guyana 0.9 43.2 1.4 67.6 0.3 12.7 0.3 16.3 49.0 3.8 15.3 54.8 2.1 15.5
119 Botswana 4.7 35.5 5.7 42.8 0.8 6.1 1.2 9.3 5.2 10.5 13.2 57.2 16.3 21.8
120 Honduras 2.6 d 17.8 6.0 d 40.4 1.0 6.9 1.3 9.0 53.1 33.8 20.1 59.9 18.3 15.0
121 Indonesia 157.8 25.3 135.5 21.7 16.8 2.7 26.1 4.2 22.8 37.0 11.5 63.4 18.8 32.9
121 Kiribati 0.0 2.8 0.1 52.4 .. .. .. .. 68.3 27.6 41.7 32.0 0.1 18.3
121 South Africa 71.5 22.1 79.9 24.7 14.0 4.3 18.5 5.7 11.0 43.2 6.8 64.1 15.0 27.3
124 vanuatu .. .. .. .. 0.2 d 38.2 0.1 d 16.8 .. .. .. .. .. ..
125 Kyrgyzstan 1.3 27.4 3.2 68.0 .. .. .. .. 17.1 18.6 18.1 53.9 14.6 12.8
125 tajikistan .. .. .. .. 0.2 3.9 0.4 7.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
127 viet Nam 72.2 d 71.1 84.8 d 83.5 .. .. .. .. 23.3 64.0 12.1 71.9 19.0 23.6
128 Namibia 5.8 58.3 6.0 59.6 0.9 8.5 0.7 7.0 25.5 23.3 15.5 69.6 6.7 16.4
129 Nicaragua 1.8 28.9 4.2 65.5 0.5 7.4 0.7 10.8 78.7 6.3 17.1 60.8 5.7 14.5
130 Morocco 17.8 19.6 35.4 38.9 12.5 13.8 7.4 8.2 20.6 63.4 13.6 59.9 28.2 21.5
131 Iraq .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
132 Cape verde 0.0 2.9 0.7 44.8 0.5 31.3 0.4 23.2 81.6 17.5 29.1 57.8 0.0 18.2
133 Guatemala 8.5 21.4 13.8 35.0 2.2 5.6 2.4 6.0 46.3 42.6 14.6 66.0 3.0 15.7
134 timor-Leste .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
135 Ghana 5.2 18.0 8.1 27.7 1.5 5.1 3.0 10.3 24.2 7.3 16.4 81.3 8.9 19.0
136 Equatorial Guinea .. .. .. .. 0.1 0.5 2.2 16.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
136 India 220.4 14.5 350.0 23.0 123.8 8.1 116.8 7.7 10.5 52.4 5.1 36.9 14.5 29.8
138 Cambodia 5.6 51.7 4.9 45.3 1.8 17.0 1.2 10.8 3.7 96.1 8.6 79.4 0.2 7.3
138 Lao People’s Democratic Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
140 Bhutan 0.4 29.7 0.9 61.4 0.1 d 4.2 0.1 d 5.3 7.4 69.5 13.7 60.8 0.0 19.1
141 Swaziland .. .. .. .. 0.2 7.2 0.6 17.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
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142 Congo 6.9 64.1 4.4 40.5 .. .. .. .. 2.1 30.2 7.4 86.7 2.5 9.1
143 Solomon Islands 0.2 32.9 0.4 65.6 0.1 14.7 0.2 28.8 29.2 0.1 18.7 20.1 14.5 21.6
144 Sao tome and Principe 0.0 3.2 0.1 56.4 0.0 d 5.3 d 0.0 d 9.6 d 95.3 4.7 30.6 52.0 20.1 13.5
145 Kenya 5.2 16.5 12.1 38.5 3.7 11.7 2.0 6.4 57.6 33.9 13.6 62.8 6.3 16.1
146 Bangladesh .. .. .. .. 2.4 2.6 4.4 4.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
146 Pakistan 21.0 12.4 37.5 22.1 6.4 3.8 7.1 4.2 18.8 74.0 18.0 48.4 0.6 17.1
148 Angola .. .. .. .. 0.6 0.8 17.3 22.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
149 Myanmar 7.6 .. 4.2 .. 0.3 .. 0.7 .. 30.2 5.5 8.7 67.9 2.3 14.3
150 Cameroon 3.9 17.4 5.1 22.9 1.2 5.2 1.7 7.8 39.2 6.9 19.3 51.3 18.6 17.5
151 Madagascar 0.9 11.0 2.5 29.6 1.0 d 9.9 1.2 d 14.2 29.9 46.7 14.6 69.6 1.5 22.5
152 tanzania, United Republic of 3.9 17.7 8.0 36.2 .. .. .. .. 29.6 17.2 10.8 60.5 8.0 15.0
153 Nigeria 86.6 47.3 44.2 24.2 3.1 1.7 22.3 12.2 5.0 6.7 11.0 86.5 8.0 24.0
154 Senegal 2.2 16.9 4.8 37.3 1.1 8.9 1.1 8.9 27.2 36.4 23.9 44.4 3.2 15.9
155 Mauritania 0.7 21.9 1.7 52.0 0.2 4.8 0.8 23.2 38.4 0.0 19.9 52.8 0.0 30.7
156 Papua New Guinea .. .. .. .. 0.2 2.4 2.8 32.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
157 Nepal 0.8 5.8 5.1 35.5 0.7 4.7 0.9 6.0 23.0 72.3 13.4 56.5 3.0 15.5
158 Lesotho 0.6 32.3 1.4 69.7 0.0 2.5 0.5 26.5 12.9 84.7 30.4 57.8 8.4 16.2
159 togo 0.4 13.9 1.0 31.3 0.3 8.6 0.3 11.0 18.8 70.2 17.0 67.2 0.3 12.1
160 Yemen 6.2 d 22.1 9.3 d 33.0 .. .. .. .. 6.8 1.1 31.6 46.7 5.3 13.7
161 Haiti .. .. .. .. 0.4 5.8 0.9 13.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
161 Uganda 1.2 7.0 4.7 28.3 1.3 7.9 1.8 11.1 74.0 22.8 13.5 65.3 2.7 18.0
163 Zambia 7.2 49.7 5.3 36.7 0.3 2.2 0.9 6.5 6.8 8.7 5.3 61.7 14.0 18.5
164 Djibouti 0.2 d 15.0 0.6 d 61.7 0.3 d 30.7 0.1 d 12.2 0.5 92.7 30.1 62.7 47.0 19.0
165 Gambia 0.0 3.4 0.3 28.0 .. .. .. .. 79.0 10.5 35.9 42.9 5.7 22.2
166 Benin 0.4 6.6 1.5 22.7 0.3 5.3 0.4 6.6 84.4 14.7 35.5 43.1 4.8 8.0
167 Rwanda 0.2 d 4.4 1.1 d 20.5 0.4 6.9 0.6 11.0 52.9 20.8 14.9 75.8 3.0 17.5
168 Côte d’Ivoire 10.3 44.8 7.8 34.2 .. .. .. .. 58.1 16.1 20.1 54.9 5.8 11.7
169 Comoros .. .. .. .. 0.1 11.3 0.1 17.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
170 Malawi 1.1 21.8 2.2 44.4 0.1 1.7 0.4 7.7 79.8 9.0 14.8 74.1 11.6 10.1
171 Sudan 9.0 d 14.9 8.6 d 14.1 0.3 0.4 2.9 4.8 6.2 0.4 16.1 78.9 4.4 16.8
172 Zimbabwe 3.2 48.1 9.1 136.0 0.2 3.6 0.4 6.6 24.7 29.5 20.7 49.2 1.9 11.3
173 Ethiopia 2.3 7.4 8.6 27.9 2.4 7.6 2.5 8.2 82.7 8.2 11.5 68.8 17.7 18.8
174 Liberia .. .. .. .. 0.2 16.9 1.1 115.7 .. .. .. .. .. ..
175 Afghanistan 0.4 2.5 5.2 32.8 .. .. .. .. 50.8 19.6 13.7 19.1 0.0 27.1
176 Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
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TRADE OF GOODSa TRADE OF SERVICES COMPOSITION OF MERCHANDISE GOODS
Exports of 
merchandise 
goods
Imports of 
merchandise 
goods
Exports of 
services
Imports of 
services
Share of merchandise exports 
(%)
Share of merchandise imports 
(%) Parts and componentsb
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
($ 
billions)
(% of 
GDP)c
Agricultural 
exports
Manufactured 
exports
Agricultural 
imports
Manufactured 
imports
(% of 
manufactured 
exports)
(% of 
manufactured 
imports)
HDI rank 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
177 Sierra Leone .. .. .. .. 0.1 3.2 0.1 7.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
178 Burundi 0.1 6.2 0.4 21.0 0.1 4.1 0.2 8.8 76.8 5.3 15.1 81.7 16.1 13.9
178 Guinea .. .. .. .. 0.1 1.4 0.4 8.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
180 Central African Republic 0.1 d 4.5 0.2 d 10.6 0.1 3.3 0.2 8.7 37.4 3.1 30.2 67.2 13.2 18.4
181 Eritrea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
182 Mali 1.9 21.0 4.7 51.2 0.4 3.8 0.9 9.8 14.2 3.7 12.1 61.3 11.0 21.3
183 Burkina Faso 1.3 15.0 2.0 23.9 0.1 1.4 0.6 7.1 28.0 2.9 15.9 61.3 13.3 15.7
184 Chad .. .. .. .. 0.2 2.0 2.4 30.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
185 Mozambique 2.2 23.3 3.6 37.7 0.6 6.9 1.1 12.1 20.1 2.0 12.6 49.6 20.9 17.4
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
186 Niger 0.5 9.1 2.3 43.0 0.1 2.5 1.1 19.8 20.7 11.9 17.3 69.3 2.6 18.3
NOTES
a All data on merchandise trade are extracted at 
the six-digit level of the 1996 Harmonized System 
nomenclature; for definitional purposes, they are 
concorded with the Standard International trade 
Classification using concordance tables.
b For methodology of classification of parts and 
components, see Athukorala (2012) and its 
discussion paper version cited therein.
c GDP in current dollars is averaged for 2009 and 
2010.
d Refers to 2009.
DEFINITIONS
Exports of merchandise goods: Goods that 
subtract from the stock of material resources of a 
country by leaving its economic territory.
Imports of merchandise goods: Goods that add 
to the stock of material resources of a country by 
entering its economic territory.
Exports of services: Exports of a heterogeneous 
range of intangible products and activities that 
changes the conditions of the consuming units or 
facilitates the exchange of products or financial 
assets.
Imports of services: Imports of a heterogeneous 
range of intangible products and activities that 
changes the conditions of the consuming units or 
facilitates the exchange of products or financial 
assets.
Agricultural or manufacured goods as share of 
merchandise exports: Exports of agricultural or 
manufactured goods, expressed as a percentage of 
total merchandise exports.
Agricultural or manufacured goods as share of 
merchandise imports: Imports of agricultural or 
manufactured goods, expressed as a percentage of 
total merchandise imports.
Parts and components: Intermediate goods used 
as an input in the production of manufactures for 
final consumption, expressed as a percentage of 
manufactured exports or imports.
MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1, 3, and 9–14: UNSD (2012b).
Columns 2 and 4: HDRo calculations based on 
UNSD (2012b) and World Bank (2012a).
Columns 5 and 7: UNCtAD (2012).
Columns 6 and 8: HDRo calculations based on 
UNCtAD (2012) and World Bank (2012a).
 
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
San Marino .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 8,889.2 21.6 9,960.0 24.2 2,682.8 6.6 2,333.0 5.8 9.4 70.1 8.5 67.4 29.5 30.6
High human development 2,088.2 26.8 1,769.7 23.2 302.6 4.0 426.9 5.9 10.5 37.4 11.3 71.6 30.0 30.4
Medium human development 2,475.3 27.0 2,409.2 26.2 418.1 4.7 446.8 5.1 7.9 79.9 8.7 59.0 28.5 38.8
Low human development 188.8 24.9 210.0 27.9 29.1 3.3 82.6 9.8 18.0 19.4 14.1 66.9 3.8 18.9
Regions
Arab States 546.6 38.9 367.5 .. 86.4 5.8 .. .. 4.4 17.8 16.7 70.5 12.5 21.0
East Asia and the Pacific .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Europe and Central Asia 1,226.6 33.5 1,218.4 33.1 251.7 6.6 232.3 6.2 8.5 54.9 10.3 68.3 28.7 29.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 857.8 18.9 842.6 18.5 120.0 2.7 151.8 3.6 21.0 42.0 8.5 76.3 31.5 32.3
South Asia 335.2 14.2 466.8 23.3 136.6 7.4 132.7 7.2 10.6 44.8 8.7 44.2 11.8 26.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 237.5 28.3 246.3 29.1 39.6 4.3 93.5 10.3 15.7 21.5 11.4 69.1 12.4 22.2
Least developed countries .. .. .. .. 16.8 3.5 49.9 11.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Small island developing states .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
world 13,641.6 23.2 14,348.9 24.5 3,432.6 5.9 3,289.3 5.7 9.4 66.5 9.0 66.6 29.2 31.6
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FINANCIAL FLOwS
Total reserves 
minus gold
HUMAN MOBILITY
Foreign 
direct 
investment, 
net inflows 
Net official 
development 
assistance 
receiveda
Private 
capital flows
Remittances 
(% of GDP)
Migration
International 
inbound 
tourism
International 
telephone traffic 
(minutes per person)
Stock of 
emigrantsb
Stock of 
immigrants 
Net migration 
rate
(% of GDP) (% of GNI) (% of GDP) Inflows outflows (% of GDP) (% of population)
(per 1,000 
people) (thousands) Incoming outgoing
HDI rank 2007–2011c 2010 2007–2011c 2010 2010 2007–2011c 2010 2010 2005/2010d 2010 2005–2010c 2005–2010c
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
1 Norway 2.8 –1.1 –4.9 0.16 0.97 10.2 3.8 10.0 7.2 4,767 .. 241.9
2 Australia 2.7 –0.3 6.5 0.43 0.33 3.1 2.1 25.7 10.5 5,885 .. ..
3 United States 1.5 –0.2 –0.2 0.04 0.36 0.9 0.8 13.5 3.3 59,791 82.5 237.1
4 Netherlands 1.9 –0.8 1.1 0.50 1.67 2.4 6.0 10.5 0.6 10,883 .. 96.5
5 Germany 1.1 –0.4 1.2 0.35 0.49 1.9 4.3 13.1 1.3 26,875 .. 182.5
6 New Zealand 0.5 –0.3 1.7 0.59 e 0.82 e 11.7 14.5 22.4 3.1 2,492 .. 173.3
7 Ireland 6.4 –0.5 25.3 0.29 0.85 0.6 16.1 19.6 4.6 7,189 .. 441.8
7 Sweden 2.3 –1.0 2.2 0.15 0.15 8.2 3.4 14.1 5.8 4,951 .. 160.5
9 Switzerland 0.4 –0.4 –9.0 0.49 4.09 44.0 5.4 23.2 4.8 8,628 .. 409.3
10 Japan 0.0 –0.2 0.7 0.03 0.08 21.4 0.6 1.7 0.4 8,611 13.8 ..
11 Canada 2.4 –0.3 4.1 .. .. 3.8 3.5 21.3 6.6 16,097 .. ..
12 Korea, Republic of 0.4 –0.1 –0.5 0.86 1.12 27.3 4.3 1.1 –0.1 8,798 22.2 47.7
13 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 34.1 .. –0.8 0.15 0.19 117.1 10.2 38.8 5.1 20,085 524.3 1,446.9
13 Iceland 7.2 –0.3 –55.2 0.20 0.10 60.1 13.0 11.3 6.8 1,213 233.1 148.0
15 Denmark 4.6 –0.9 –1.6 0.20 1.02 24.6 4.7 8.8 3.3 8,744 183.9 190.6
16 Israel 4.7 .. –0.2 0.65 1.72 30.8 14.0 40.4 7.8 2,803 .. ..
17 Belgium 18.0 –0.6 –0.2 2.18 0.87 3.5 4.2 13.7 3.8 7,186 .. 255.0
18 Austria 3.3 –0.3 0.6 0.86 0.92 2.6 7.1 15.6 3.8 22,004 .. 171.6
18 Singapore 18.1 .. –1.4 .. .. 99.1 6.1 40.7 30.9 9,161 447.5 1,525.2
20 France 1.5 –0.5 10.8 0.61 0.21 1.8 2.8 10.7 1.6 77,148 182.1 192.1
21 Finland 0.0 –0.6 2.9 0.35 0.18 3.0 6.2 4.2 2.7 3,670 .. ..
21 Slovenia 2.2 .. 6.8 0.66 0.34 1.7 6.5 8.1 2.2 1,869 f 88.2 112.0
23 Spain 1.7 .. –3.2 0.76 0.88 2.2 3.0 15.2 10.1 52,677 .. 118.9
24 Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. 17.1 34.6 .. 52 .. ..
25 Italy 1.5 –0.2 –3.4 0.33 0.60 2.2 5.8 7.4 6.7 43,626 .. 152.0
26 Luxembourg 542.9 –1.1 214.8 2.99 19.69 1.5 11.8 35.2 17.6 849 810.6 822.5
26 United Kingdom 2.2 –0.6 –4.9 0.33 0.16 3.3 7.5 11.2 3.3 28,295 .. 147.5
28 Czech Republic 2.5 .. 2.1 0.57 0.92 18.4 3.6 4.4 4.6 8,185 120.1 50.5
29 Greece 0.6 .. –7.8 0.50 0.65 0.4 10.8 10.1 2.7 15,007 g 96.1 201.3
30 Brunei Darussalam 4.0 .. 4.3 .. 3.60 12.6 6.0 36.4 1.8 157 f .. ..
31 Cyprus 1.0 .. 35.1 0.63 1.75 2.0 17.0 17.5 8.3 2,173 314.7 555.4
32 Malta 12.2 .. –42.2 0.58 0.56 5.6 26.2 3.8 2.4 1,332 .. 144.0
33 Andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.7 64.4 .. 1,830 638.6 708.3
33 Estonia 0.8 .. 15.0 1.71 0.50 0.9 12.6 13.6 0.0 2,120 102.9 80.8
35 Slovakia 0.6 .. 1.4 1.83 0.08 0.9 9.6 2.4 1.3 1,298 h 137.2 140.6
36 Qatar 4.3 .. .. .. .. 9.4 0.7 86.5 132.9 1,866 422.7 484.8
37 Hungary 17.1 .. 6.5 1.76 0.98 34.8 4.6 3.7 1.5 9,510 116.2 48.2
38 Barbados 16.3 0.3 e 10.4 2.99 0.97 22.1 41.0 10.9 0.0 532 .. ..
39 Poland 2.8 .. 4.9 1.62 0.34 18.0 8.3 2.2 0.3 12,470 .. 24.9
40 Chile 7.0 0.1 –0.3 0.00 0.00 16.9 3.7 1.9 0.4 2,766 26.2 12.2
41 Lithuania 2.9 .. 6.1 4.34 1.48 18.5 13.2 4.0 –2.1 1,507 75.1 34.4
41 United Arab Emirates 1.3 .. .. .. .. 10.3 1.2 70.0 106.3 7,126 .. 643.1
43 Portugal 4.3 –0.3 –3.8 1.56 0.62 0.8 20.8 8.6 2.8 6,756 f 173.9 111.2
44 Latvia 5.5 .. 2.9 2.56 0.18 21.2 12.3 15.0 –0.9 1,373 .. 94.1
45 Argentina 1.6 0.0 0.9 0.17 0.27 9.7 2.4 3.6 –1.0 5,325 .. 18.4
46 Seychelles 17.4 6.3 19.3 1.13 2.72 25.1 14.6 12.8 .. 175 64.7 111.3
47 Croatia 2.3 0.3 3.8 2.16 0.27 22.7 17.1 15.9 0.5 9,111 224.1 90.9
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
48 Bahrain 0.7 .. 19.9 .. 7.16 e 22.2 3.7 39.1 90.2 4,935 .. ..
49 Bahamas 7.6 .. 7.1 .. 1.18 13.7 12.8 9.7 3.9 1,370 .. ..
50 Belarus 7.2 0.3 8.7 0.68 0.19 10.9 18.4 11.4 –1.0 119 69.6 52.2
51 Uruguay 4.1 0.1 9.0 0.26 0.02 22.0 10.5 2.4 –3.0 2,353 76.2 46.3
52 Montenegro 18.5 2.0 .. 7.32 0.67 8.6 0.0 6.8 –0.8 1,088 .. ..
52 Palau 1.4 19.5 .. .. .. .. 38.8 28.1 .. 84 179.9 205.1
54 Kuwait 0.1 .. –7.8 .. 9.47 e 14.6 8.5 68.8 22.2 207 .. ..
55 Russian Federation 2.8 .. –1.7 0.35 1.26 24.4 7.9 8.7 1.6 22,281 .. ..
56 Romania 1.5 .. 3.0 2.40 0.22 23.9 13.1 0.6 –0.9 7,575 105.4 ..
57 Bulgaria 3.4 .. 2.2 2.91 0.05 28.5 16.0 1.4 –1.3 6,047 107.1 47.4
57 Saudi Arabia 2.8 .. –0.5 0.05 6.00 93.7 0.7 27.8 8.2 10,850 .. ..
International capital flows and migration
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FINANCIAL FLOwS
Total reserves 
minus gold
HUMAN MOBILITY
Foreign 
direct 
investment, 
net inflows 
Net official 
development 
assistance 
receiveda
Private 
capital flows
Remittances 
(% of GDP)
Migration
International 
inbound 
tourism
International 
telephone traffic 
(minutes per person)
Stock of 
emigrantsb
Stock of 
immigrants 
Net migration 
rate
(% of GDP) (% of GNI) (% of GDP) Inflows outflows (% of GDP) (% of population)
(per 1,000 
people) (thousands) Incoming outgoing
HDI rank 2007–2011c 2010 2007–2011c 2010 2010 2007–2011c 2010 2010 2005/2010d 2010 2005–2010c 2005–2010c
59 Cuba 0.0 0.2 .. .. .. 8.1 10.9 0.1 –3.4 2,507 32.7 2.5
59 Panama 8.8 0.5 7.5 0.86 0.93 7.5 4.0 3.4 0.7 1,324 54.4 75.5
61 Mexico 1.7 0.0 4.5 2.13 .. 12.5 10.7 0.7 –3.3 22,260 .. ..
62 Costa Rica 5.1 0.3 5.8 1.52 0.75 11.6 2.7 10.5 3.4 2,100 85.7 43.1
63 Grenada 7.7 4.6 6.0 6.96 0.47 14.8 65.5 12.1 –9.7 114 488.1 315.8
64 Libya 2.2 0.1 e –5.0 0.03 e .. .. 1.7 10.4 –0.7 34 h .. ..
64 Malaysia 3.9 0.0 –1.4 0.55 2.75 47.3 5.3 8.4 0.6 24,577 e .. ..
64 Serbia 6.0 1.8 10.6 8.72 0.18 33.0 2.0 5.3 0.0 683 104.4 32.1
67 Antigua and Barbuda 8.4 1.7 5.2 2.15 0.19 13.1 47.6 23.6 .. 230 487.3 247.8
67 trinidad and tobago 2.6 0.0 2.6 0.57 .. 46.3 26.7 2.6 –3.0 413 243.7 200.6
69 Kazakhstan 6.9 0.2 –2.7 0.20 2.04 13.5 23.6 19.5 0.1 3,393 40.1 38.9
70 Albania 9.4 2.9 6.7 9.75 0.20 18.5 45.4 2.8 –3.0 2,417 224.3 23.6
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 1.7 0.0 2.4 0.04 0.20 3.1 1.8 3.5 0.3 615 .. 20.1
72 Dominica 5.2 7.0 6.6 5.56 0.04 16.8 104.8 8.3 .. 77 140.8 172.6
72 Georgia 6.8 5.5 6.7 6.93 0.43 19.6 25.1 4.0 –6.8 2,033 125.6 36.4
72 Lebanon 11.0 1.2 2.1 19.38 9.58 80.0 15.6 17.8 –0.6 2,168 318.4 87.3
72 Saint Kitts and Nevis 17.9 1.8 14.4 6.52 0.85 34.5 61.1 9.6 .. 92 820.6 629.7
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.9 0.0 .. 0.32 e .. 16.3 1.7 2.8 –0.5 2,034 3.5 10.9
77 Peru 4.8 –0.2 7.8 1.65 0.08 26.7 3.7 0.1 –5.1 2,299 92.7 19.6
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 4.0 2.1 3.4 4.25 0.25 22.9 21.9 6.3 0.2 262 .. 23.3
78 Ukraine 4.4 0.5 5.2 4.11 0.02 18.4 14.4 11.6 –0.2 21,203 .. ..
80 Mauritius 4.4 1.3 19.9 2.33 0.14 22.8 10.9 3.3 0.0 935 140.8 108.5
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.4 3.0 2.4 11.44 0.33 22.9 38.9 0.7 –0.5 365 213.8 49.6
82 Azerbaijan 2.3 0.3 1.0 2.71 1.82 16.2 16.0 3.0 1.2 1,280 74.8 17.5
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines 15.3 2.6 15.5 4.54 1.05 13.0 37.7 7.9 –9.2 72 .. ..
84 oman 1.1 –0.1 –0.8 0.07 e 9.86 e 20.0 0.5 28.4 11.7 1,048 e 223.1 206.9
85 Brazil 2.7 0.0 4.1 0.19 0.06 14.1 0.7 0.4 –0.5 5,161 .. 2.3
85 Jamaica 1.6 1.1 –1.5 14.50 2.26 15.1 36.1 1.1 –7.4 1,922 252.4 828.6
87 Armenia 6.5 3.5 4.3 10.63 1.67 18.9 28.2 10.5 –4.9 575 174.9 243.8
88 Saint Lucia 9.2 3.6 9.7 2.62 0.37 17.3 23.3 5.9 –1.2 306 292.7 203.6
89 Ecuador 0.3 0.3 0.9 4.43 0.14 2.5 8.3 2.9 –1.7 1,047 62.7 11.7
90 turkey 2.1 0.1 4.6 0.12 0.02 10.1 5.6 1.9 –0.1 27,000 57.8 43.4
91 Colombia 4.0 0.3 3.7 1.41 0.04 9.5 4.6 0.2 –0.5 2,147 .. ..
92 Sri Lanka 1.0 1.2 3.3 8.38 1.10 10.6 9.1 1.7 –2.5 654 28.6 ..
93 Algeria 1.4 0.1 1.1 1.26 0.03 96.9 3.4 0.7 –0.8 1,912 36.5 17.1
94 tunisia 3.2 1.3 3.0 4.45 0.03 21.4 6.3 0.3 –0.4 6,903 58.0 16.1
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
95 tonga 4.5 19.5 0.0 23.65 2.60 32.9 45.4 0.8 –16.0 45 .. ..
96 Belize 6.2 2.0 5.2 5.68 1.65 16.1 16.1 15.0 –0.7 239 135.8 178.5
96 Dominican Republic 3.2 0.4 5.6 6.53 0.06 7.4 10.1 4.2 –2.9 4,125 309.4 52.2
96 Fiji 6.2 2.5 6.0 5.78 0.69 21.8 21.3 2.2 –6.8 632 .. ..
96 Samoa 0.1 25.5 1.8 24.11 1.21 25.7 67.3 5.0 –17.3 130 .. ..
100 Jordan 6.4 3.6 6.0 13.78 1.87 39.8 11.3 45.9 7.0 4,557 95.8 6.8
101 China 3.1 0.0 2.6 0.89 0.03 43.8 0.6 0.1 –0.3 55,664 9.2 2.9
102 turkmenistan 10.4 0.2 .. .. .. .. 5.0 4.0 –2.2 8 .. ..
103 thailand 3.0 0.0 4.2 0.55 .. 48.4 1.2 1.7 1.5 15,936 20.5 ..
104 Maldives 7.9 5.6 7.9 0.20 5.31 17.0 0.6 1.0 0.0 792 .. 428.6
105 Suriname –5.9 2.4 –6.2 0.10 e 0.03 e 13.8 39.0 7.5 –2.0 205 .. ..
106 Gabon 1.3 0.9 .. .. .. 12.7 1.7 18.9 0.7 358 .. ..
107 El Salvador 1.5 1.4 2.1 16.10 0.11 9.3 20.5 0.7 –9.5 1,150 223.3 175.7
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 3.2 3.6 4.2 5.54 0.53 40.6 6.8 1.5 –3.5 807 85.6 11.4
108 Mongolia 23.5 5.4 54.9 4.46 2.73 26.6 1.2 0.4 –1.1 457 35.2 17.2
110 Palestine, State of .. .. .. .. .. .. 68.4 43.6 –4.7 522 .. ..
111 Paraguay 2.1 0.6 2.0 3.67 .. 20.7 7.9 2.5 –1.3 465 37.6 19.4
112 Egypt 2.9 0.3 7.2 3.53 0.12 6.5 4.4 0.3 –0.9 14,051 55.4 7.8
113 Moldova, Republic of 3.9 7.5 3.7 23.57 2.01 28.1 21.5 11.4 –9.4 8 198.1 59.8
114 Philippines 0.6 0.3 3.0 10.73 0.03 29.9 4.6 0.5 –2.8 3,520 .. ..
114 Uzbekistan 2.1 0.6 .. .. .. .. 7.0 4.2 –3.9 975 .. ..
116 Syrian Arab Republic 2.5 0.2 2.2 2.78 0.36 32.9 4.2 9.8 –0.6 8,546 .. 23.4
117 Micronesia, Federated States of 3.4 40.2 .. .. .. 23.6 19.7 2.4 –16.3 26 .. ..
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table 11 InternatIonal capItal flows and mIgratIon
FINANCIAL FLOwS
Total reserves 
minus gold
HUMAN MOBILITY
Foreign 
direct 
investment, 
net inflows 
Net official 
development 
assistance 
receiveda
Private 
capital flows
Remittances 
(% of GDP)
Migration
International 
inbound 
tourism
International 
telephone traffic 
(minutes per person)
Stock of 
emigrantsb
Stock of 
immigrants 
Net migration 
rate
(% of GDP) (% of GNI) (% of GDP) Inflows outflows (% of GDP) (% of population)
(per 1,000 
people) (thousands) Incoming outgoing
HDI rank 2007–2011c 2010 2007–2011c 2010 2010 2007–2011c 2010 2010 2005/2010d 2010 2005–2010c 2005–2010c
118 Guyana 11.9 6.7 11.8 13.65 3.41 34.6 56.9 1.5 –10.7 150 103.4 26.8
119 Botswana 1.8 1.1 4.6 0.67 0.68 45.8 3.2 5.8 1.9 2,145 .. 26.3
120 Honduras 5.9 3.9 5.8 17.27 0.08 15.9 7.5 0.3 –2.8 896 96.0 139.9
121 Indonesia 2.1 0.2 1.7 0.98 0.40 12.6 1.1 0.1 –1.1 7,003 .. ..
121 Kiribati 2.4 10.5 .. .. .. .. 6.5 2.0 .. 5 f .. ..
121 South Africa 1.4 0.3 1.6 0.31 0.38 10.4 1.7 3.7 2.9 8,074 .. ..
124 vanuatu 5.6 16.2 7.1 0.93 0.38 21.2 1.6 0.3 0.0 97 .. ..
125 Kyrgyzstan 6.6 8.5 3.9 26.60 6.19 28.8 11.2 4.0 –5.1 1,316 23.6 50.0
125 tajikistan 0.3 7.8 0.4 39.96 15.17 4.4 11.2 4.0 –8.9 325 .. ..
127 viet Nam 7.5 2.9 6.4 7.76 .. 10.9 2.5 0.1 –1.0 3,747 .. ..
128 Namibia 7.1 2.4 4.5 0.13 0.14 14.5 0.7 6.3 –0.1 984 .. ..
129 Nicaragua 13.3 9.8 13.3 12.48 .. 25.9 12.5 0.7 –7.1 1,011 .. ..
130 Morocco 2.5 1.1 2.0 7.07 0.07 19.5 9.3 0.2 –4.3 9,288 114.1 14.5
131 Iraq 1.8 2.8 –1.1 0.09 0.04 52.6 4.9 0.3 –1.0 1,518 .. ..
132 Cape verde 6.7 20.7 4.8 8.36 0.71 17.8 37.6 2.4 –7.1 382 110.4 28.5
133 Guatemala 2.2 1.0 1.5 10.23 0.05 12.4 6.1 0.4 –3.0 1,876 119.6 50.0
134 timor-Leste 32.0 9.2 .. .. .. 43.8 1.4 1.2 –9.4 40 6.9 11.4
135 Ghana 7.9 5.3 9.8 0.42 .. 14.0 3.4 7.6 –0.4 803 45.3 24.5
136 Equatorial Guinea 4.8 0.9 .. .. .. 15.4 14.9 1.1 6.1 .. .. ..
136 India 1.4 0.2 3.0 3.21 0.23 14.7 0.9 0.4 –0.5 5,776 20.1 7.5
138 Cambodia 7.0 6.9 6.5 3.29 1.91 26.8 2.3 2.2 –3.7 2,399 .. ..
138 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 3.9 6.2 4.6 0.57 0.11 9.8 5.7 0.3 –2.5 1,670 .. ..
140 Bhutan 1.3 9.2 .. 0.32 5.41 46.8 6.3 5.7 4.9 27 .. ..
141 Swaziland 3.7 2.6 5.0 2.95 0.30 15.1 13.4 3.4 –1.0 868 38.2 3.7
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142 Congo 23.5 14.5 .. 0.12 0.85 38.3 5.6 3.8 2.6 85 .. ..
143 Solomon Islands 35.1 61.4 34.3 0.43 0.65 49.2 1.0 1.3 0.0 21 .. ..
144 Sao tome and Principe 12.3 24.2 12.2 0.99 0.27 20.7 21.9 3.2 –8.2 8 40.7 14.6
145 Kenya 0.6 5.1 0.8 5.52 0.19 12.7 1.1 2.0 –1.0 1,469 16.5 7.6
146 Bangladesh 0.7 1.3 0.8 10.81 0.01 7.7 3.3 0.7 –4.0 267 .. ..
146 Pakistan 1.1 1.6 0.6 5.48 0.01 6.9 2.5 2.3 –2.4 855 24.8 13.1
148 Angola –3.9 0.3 –5.9 0.10 h 0.87 28.5 2.8 0.3 0.9 425 .. ..
149 Myanmar .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.0 0.2 –2.1 311 2.9 0.2
150 Cameroon 0.0 2.4 0.5 0.87 0.24 12.6 1.4 1.0 –0.2 298 23.2 5.4
151 Madagascar 9.9 5.4 .. .. .. 12.9 0.4 0.2 –0.1 196 5.5 2.1
152 tanzania, United Republic of 1.9 13.0 4.6 0.11 0.55 15.7 0.7 1.5 –1.4 783 3.8 3.2
153 Nigeria 3.1 1.2 4.9 5.10 0.02 14.9 0.6 0.7 –0.4 1,414 18.7 11.8
154 Senegal 1.8 7.3 3.1 10.47 1.12 13.6 5.0 1.6 –2.3 875 86.5 26.9
155 Mauritania 0.4 10.6 .. .. .. 11.9 3.5 2.9 0.6 .. 39.9 15.8
156 Papua New Guinea 0.3 5.5 –0.8 0.16 3.41 32.9 0.9 0.4 0.0 114 h .. ..
157 Nepal 0.5 5.1 0.5 21.66 0.20 19.2 3.3 3.2 –0.7 603 12.9 ..
158 Lesotho 5.4 9.5 5.5 34.23 0.88 .. 20.5 0.3 –1.9 414 .. ..
159 togo 1.3 13.3 –0.6 10.49 2.27 21.5 5.4 2.7 –0.2 150 34.9 10.2
160 Yemen 0.2 2.3 –1.8 3.99 1.09 13.2 4.7 2.1 –1.2 536 76.6 4.6
161 Haiti 2.3 45.5 2.3 22.59 2.03 16.3 9.9 0.3 –5.0 423 .. ..
161 Uganda 4.7 10.2 6.3 5.32 3.50 15.6 2.2 1.9 –0.9 946 .. 4.9
163 Zambia 10.3 6.4 4.6 0.27 0.42 12.1 1.4 1.8 –1.4 815 .. ..
164 Djibouti 9.2 14.9 e 9.2 3.09 e .. .. 1.5 13.0 0.0 53 41.1 209.2
165 Gambia 3.2 11.9 3.2 11.02 5.53 20.1 3.7 16.6 –1.7 91 h .. ..
166 Benin 1.7 10.5 1.1 3.78 1.34 12.2 5.8 2.5 1.2 199 h 40.8 23.9
167 Rwanda 0.8 18.5 1.1 1.63 1.27 16.5 2.6 4.5 0.3 666 9.2 3.0
168 Côte d’Ivoire 1.8 3.9 1.4 0.78 3.29 17.9 5.4 11.2 –3.8 .. .. ..
169 Comoros 1.7 12.5 .. .. .. 25.4 5.6 2.0 –2.9 15 .. ..
170 Malawi 2.8 20.8 1.4 .. .. 3.5 1.4 1.8 –0.3 746 .. 0.9
171 Sudan 3.1 3.4 3.1 2.95 0.00 0.3 2.2 1.7 0.7 420 10.4 16.0
172 Zimbabwe 1.4 10.1 .. .. .. .. 9.9 2.9 –14.3 2,239 16.0 21.8
173 Ethiopia 1.0 11.9 2.0 0.76 0.09 .. 0.7 0.6 –0.8 330 5.7 0.4
174 Liberia 45.8 175.5 45.8 2.71 0.10 .. 10.5 2.3 16.7 .. 24.5 28.0
175 Afghanistan 0.4 42.4 .. .. .. 25.9 8.1 0.3 –2.6 .. 4.9 2.5
176 Guinea-Bissau 1.1 16.7 1.4 5.76 2.03 22.6 6.8 1.2 –1.4 30 .. ..
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Total reserves 
minus gold
HUMAN MOBILITY
Foreign 
direct 
investment, 
net inflows 
Net official 
development 
assistance 
receiveda
Private 
capital flows
Remittances 
(% of GDP)
Migration
International 
inbound 
tourism
International 
telephone traffic 
(minutes per person)
Stock of 
emigrantsb
Stock of 
immigrants 
Net migration 
rate
(% of GDP) (% of GNI) (% of GDP) Inflows outflows (% of GDP) (% of population)
(per 1,000 
people) (thousands) Incoming outgoing
HDI rank 2007–2011c 2010 2007–2011c 2010 2010 2007–2011c 2010 2010 2005/2010d 2010 2005–2010c 2005–2010c
177 Sierra Leone 4.5 24.4 36.9 3.01 0.31 19.6 4.6 1.8 2.2 39 .. ..
178 Burundi 0.0 31.0 0.1 1.39 0.06 12.6 4.2 0.7 9.5 201 .. ..
178 Guinea 2.1 5.1 22.7 1.28 0.92 .. 5.2 3.8 –6.3 30 i .. ..
180 Central African Republic 3.6 13.2 .. .. .. 7.1 2.9 1.8 0.2 52 5.5 6.6
181 Eritrea 2.6 7.7 .. .. .. 4.4 18.0 0.3 2.3 84 22.9 1.7
182 Mali 1.6 12.1 –0.6 4.63 1.77 13.0 7.6 1.2 –1.4 169 8.8 14.1
183 Burkina Faso 0.4 12.0 0.4 1.08 1.13 9.4 9.7 6.4 –1.6 274 .. ..
184 Chad 9.1 6.2 .. .. .. 10.0 2.1 3.4 –1.4 31 .. ..
185 Mozambique 8.6 21.4 16.1 1.43 0.87 19.3 5.0 1.9 –0.2 2,224 5.9 2.6
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 22.4 29.0 .. .. .. 8.1 1.3 0.7 –0.1 53 3.9 3.1
186 Niger 17.5 13.8 13.4 1.63 0.41 11.2 2.4 1.3 –0.4 66 .. ..
NOTES
a A negative value refers to net official development 
assistance disbursed by donor countries.
b Some values may exceed 100% (see Definitions).
c Data refer to the most recent year available 
during the period specified.
d Data are average annual estimates for 2005–2010.
e Refers to 2009.
f Refers to 2007.
g Refers to 2006.
h Refers to 2008.
DEFINITIONS
Foreign direct investment, net inflows: Sum 
of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other 
long-term capital and short-term capital, expressed 
as a percentage of GDP.
Net official development assistance received: 
Disbursements of loans made on concessional 
terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by 
official agencies to promote economic development 
and welfare in countries and territories in part I 
of the Development Assistance Committee list of 
aid recipients, expressed as a percentage of the 
recipient country’s GNI.
Private capital flows: Net foreign direct 
investment and portfolio investment, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP.
Remittances, inflows: Earnings and material 
resources transferred by international migrants or 
refugees to recipients in their country of origin or 
countries where they formerly resided.
Remittances, outflows: Current transfers by 
migrant workers and wages and salaries earned 
by nonresident workers. Remittances are classified 
as current private transfers from migrant workers 
resident in the host country for more than a year, 
irrespective of their immigration status, to recipients 
in their country of origin. Migrants’ transfers are 
defined as the net worth of migrants who are 
expected to remain in the host country for more 
than one year that is transferred from one country to 
another at the time of migration. Compensation of 
employees is the income of migrants who have lived 
in the host country for less than a year. Data are 
expressed as a share of GDP.
Total reserves minus gold: Sum of special 
drawing rights, reserves of International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) members held by the IMF and holdings 
of foreign exchange under the control of monetary 
authorities, excluding gold holdings, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP.
Stock of emigrants: Ratio of the stock of 
emigrants from a country to the population (not to 
the sum of population and emigrants), expressed 
as a percentage of the country’s population. the 
definition of emigrant varies across countries but 
generally refers to residents that left the country 
with the intention to remain abroad for more than 
a year.
Stock of immigrants: Ratio of the stock of 
immigrants into a country, expressed as a 
percentage of the country’s population. the 
definition of immigrant varies across countries 
but generally includes the stock of foreign-born 
people or the stock of foreign people (according to 
citizenship) or the combination of the two.
Net migration rate: Ratio of the difference 
between the number of in-migrants and out-
migrants from a country during a specified period to 
the average population during the period, expressed 
per 1,000 people.
International inbound tourism: Arrivals of 
nonresident visitors (overnight visitors, tourists, 
same-day visitors, excursionists) at national borders.
International telephone traffic, incoming: 
Effective (completed) telephone calls (fixed and 
mobile) originating outside a given country with a 
destination inside the country, expressed in minutes 
of traffic per person.
International telephone traffic, outgoing: 
Effective (completed) telephone calls (fixed and 
mobile) originating in a given country with a 
destination outside the country, expressed in 
minutes of traffic per person.
MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1 and 3–6: World Bank (2012a).
Column 2: World Bank (2012a) and oECD–DAC 
(2012).
Column 7: HDRo calculations based on data from 
World Bank (2011) and UNDESA (2011).
Column 8: HDRo calculations based on data from 
World Bank (2011) and population data from World 
Bank (2012a).
Column 9: UNDESA (2011).
Column 10: UN Wto (2012).
Columns 11 and 12: HDRo calculations based on 
incoming and outgoing total telephone traffic data 
from ItU (2012).
 
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.3 0.2 0.0 .. .. ..
Marshall Islands 5.3 45.9 .. .. .. .. 16.6 2.7 .. 5 .. ..
Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. 56.3 71.6 .. 279 .. ..
Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
San Marino .. .. .. .. .. 1.2 9.9 37.0 .. 120 .. ..
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. 20.7 8.7 0.2 –6.8 .. .. ..
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu 4.8 26.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 .. ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 2.7 .. 0.9 0.31 0.50 7.8 3.6 11.3 4.0 534,968 .. 189.8
High human development 2.7 0.2 2.2 0.99 1.25 23.2 6.7 4.5 –0.3 199,071 62.5 24.9
Medium human development 2.8 0.2 2.8 1.81 0.13 33.8 1.6 0.7 –0.6 163,618 .. ..
Low human development 2.3 5.5 1.9 4.91 0.46 13.6 2.8 1.6 –1.5 19,020 .. ..
Regions
Arab States 2.4 .. 0.5 2.29 3.76 43.7 5.4 8.0 3.3 76,540 .. ..
East Asia and the Pacific 3.1 0.1 .. .. .. 40.3 1.1 0.3 –0.5 116,484 .. ..
Europe and Central Asia 3.4 .. 1.8 1.22 0.81 19.4 10.3 6.5 –0.1 149,901 90.3 49.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.7 0.2 3.7 1.15 0.12 13.1 5.3 1.1 –1.8 66,379 101.7 23.9
South Asia 1.3 0.7 2.6 3.60 0.23 14.0 1.6 0.8 –1.1 11,008 19.5 ..
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.7 3.8 2.8 1.99 0.52 15.0 2.5 2.1 –0.5 30,141 .. ..
Least developed countries 2.4 8.3 1.5 5.09 .. 14.8 3.3 1.4 –1.4 16,915 .. ..
Small island developing states 2.7 3.4 5.0 6.13 1.05 16.7 12.5 1.8 –3.5 15,782 .. ..
world 2.7 0.0 1.4 0.76 0.53 14.7 2.9 3.1 0.0 917,082 .. ..
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Innovation and technology
Ta
b
lE 12
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
 Expenditure Researchers 
Graduates in 
science and 
engineeringa
Patents granted 
to residents and 
nonresidents 
Royalty and 
licence fees 
receipts
Electrification 
rate
Personal 
computers Internet users
Fixed broadband 
Internet 
subscriptions
Fixed and mobile 
telephone 
subscribers
(% of  
GDP)
(per million 
people)
(% of  
total) (per million people) ($ per capita) (% of population) (per 100 people)
HDI rank 2005–2010b 2002–2010b 2002–2011b 2005–2010b 2005–2011b 2009 2002–2009b 2010 2010 2010
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
1 Norway 1.8 5,503.7 15.3 334.0 101.9 99.7 c 62.9 93.3 35.3 149.3
2 Australia 2.3 4,258.5 18.1 653.7 32.7 99.7 c 60.3 75.9 24.2 139.7
3 United States 2.8 4,673.2 15.5 707.6 387.1 99.7 c 80.6 74.2 27.6 139.0
4 Netherlands 1.8 2,817.6 14.0 117.6 320.8 99.7 c 91.2 90.7 38.1 158.9
5 Germany 2.8 3,780.1 28.6 166.2 174.9 99.7 c 65.6 82.5 31.7 183.7
6 New Zealand 1.2 4,323.7 20.5 995.2 53.5 99.7 c 52.6 83.0 24.9 157.7
7 Ireland 1.8 3,372.5 21.6 54.4 574.2 99.7 c 58.2 69.8 21.1 151.5
7 Sweden 3.6 5,017.6 25.0 147.1 619.4 99.7 c 88.1 90.0 31.8 168.6
9 Switzerland 3.0 3,319.8 21.6 96.7 .. 99.7 c 96.2 82.2 37.9 177.7
10 Japan 3.4 5,189.3 20.6 1,759.9 226.8 99.7 c 40.7 77.6 26.9 126.4
11 Canada 2.0 4,334.7 21.1 562.1 114.4 99.7 c 94.5 81.3 29.8 120.3
12 Korea, Republic of 3.4 4,946.9 31.5 1,428.8 86.8 99.7 c 57.6 82.5 35.7 162.3
13 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 0.8 2,759.5 34.7 758.9 56.6 99.7 c 69.3 71.8 29.9 256.9
13 Iceland 2.6 7,428.1 14.5 434.2 0.1 99.7 c 52.7 95.6 34.1 168.1
15 Denmark 3.0 6,390.3 19.6 27.9 .. 99.7 c 54.9 88.8 37.7 172.2
16 Israel 4.3 .. .. 502.0 137.3 99.7 24.2 65.4 25.1 172.5
17 Belgium 2.0 3,490.7 16.3 49.7 232.1 99.7 c 37.7 73.7 31.5 154.1
18 Austria 2.7 4,122.1 28.8 134.6 92.6 99.7 c 60.7 72.7 23.9 184.6
18 Singapore 2.7 5,834.0 .. 873.3 367.7 100.0 74.3 71.1 24.9 184.8
20 France 2.2 3,689.8 26.2 157.7 240.0 99.7 c 63.1 77.5 34.0 151.8
21 Finland 3.8 7,647.4 29.4 172.1 556.5 99.7 c 50.0 86.9 28.6 179.7
21 Slovenia 1.9 3,678.8 18.2 123.2 42.7 99.7 c 42.5 69.3 24.2 148.0
23 Spain 1.4 2,931.8 25.3 60.2 23.0 99.7 c 39.3 65.8 22.9 155.9
24 Liechtenstein .. .. 19.8 .. .. 99.7 c .. 80.0 63.8 152.9
25 Italy 1.3 1,690.0 20.5 303.4 59.8 99.7 c 36.7 53.7 21.9 185.3
26 Luxembourg 1.7 4,824.8 32.5 171.4 890.0 99.7 c 67.3 90.1 33.2 197.1
26 United Kingdom 1.8 3,794.2 21.7 90.2 226.3 99.7 c 80.2 84.7 31.6 184.0
28 Czech Republic 1.5 2,754.8 23.8 86.8 10.2 99.7 c 27.4 68.6 14.5 159.7
29 Greece 0.6 1,849.5 24.9 42.2 6.1 99.7 c 9.4 44.6 19.9 154.6
30 Brunei Darussalam .. 286.3 21.9 107.2 .. 99.7 c 9.1 50.0 5.4 129.1
31 Cyprus 0.5 752.0 13.7 17.2 2.1 99.7 c 30.9 53.0 17.6 131.2
32 Malta 0.6 1,168.1 15.0 9.6 81.0 .. .. 63.1 28.0 169.2
33 Andorra .. .. .. .. .. 99.7 c .. 81.0 28.9 122.2
33 Estonia 1.4 3,210.3 19.4 89.5 16.9 99.7 c 25.5 74.2 25.1 159.3
35 Slovakia 0.5 2,437.7 20.6 68.8 0.7 99.7 c 58.1 79.9 12.7 129.4
36 Qatar .. .. 24.0 .. .. 98.7 16.0 81.6 8.2 149.4
37 Hungary 1.1 2,005.9 15.1 6.5 102.8 99.7 c 25.6 65.2 19.6 149.9
38 Barbados .. .. 8.7 .. 12.6 99.7 c 14.8 70.0 20.6 177.9
39 Poland 0.7 1,597.5 15.7 78.5 7.1 99.7 c 16.9 62.5 13.0 143.0
40 Chile 0.4 354.8 20.4 59.6 3.7 98.5 14.1 45.0 10.5 136.2
41 Lithuania 0.8 2,541.1 21.0 25.3 0.2 99.7 c 24.2 62.8 20.6 171.1
41 United Arab Emirates .. .. 27.3 .. .. 100.0 30.0 78.0 10.5 165.1
43 Portugal 1.7 4,307.8 33.8 13.1 5.7 99.7 c 18.2 51.3 19.2 185.0
44 Latvia 0.5 1,601.2 14.3 81.7 4.5 99.7 c 32.7 71.5 19.3 126.8
45 Argentina 0.5 1,045.5 14.3 30.6 4.7 97.2 9.0 36.0 9.6 166.5
46 Seychelles 0.3 155.7 .. .. 21.6 99.7 c 21.2 40.8 7.3 160.5
47 Croatia 0.8 1,571.3 24.4 18.6 5.3 99.7 c 18.0 60.1 18.3 186.2
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
48 Bahrain .. .. .. .. .. 99.4 55.0 55.0 5.4 142.2
49 Bahamas .. .. .. .. .. .. 12.5 43.0 7.2 162.6
50 Belarus 0.6 .. 26.6 127.4 2.1 .. .. 32.1 17.4 152.5
51 Uruguay 0.7 346.1 13.6 8.6 0.1 98.3 13.6 47.9 10.9 160.8
52 Montenegro 1.1 .. .. 418.1 .. .. .. 52.0 8.3 211.9
52 Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.2 105.0
54 Kuwait 0.1 151.9 .. .. .. 100.0 26.5 38.3 1.7 181.5
55 Russian Federation 1.3 3,091.4 28.1 212.1 6.1 .. 13.3 43.4 11.0 199.4
56 Romania 0.5 894.8 21.7 20.8 13.7 .. 19.2 40.0 13.9 135.9
57 Bulgaria 0.5 1,586.7 18.8 33.5 2.5 .. 11.0 46.0 14.5 164.9
57 Saudi Arabia 0.1 .. 35.8 7.1 .. 99.0 65.7 41.0 5.5 203.0
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 Expenditure Researchers 
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science and 
engineeringa
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receipts
Electrification 
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Personal 
computers Internet users
Fixed broadband 
Internet 
subscriptions
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(% of  
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HDI rank 2005–2010b 2002–2010b 2002–2011b 2005–2010b 2005–2011b 2009 2002–2009b 2010 2010 2010
59 Cuba 0.5 .. 3.3 12.4 .. 97.0 5.6 15.9 0.0 19.2
59 Panama 0.2 111.3 19.2 107.5 .. 88.1 6.3 42.7 7.8 200.4
61 Mexico 0.4 347.3 25.6 82.9 .. .. 13.9 31.1 10.0 98.1
62 Costa Rica 0.4 257.4 11.9 9.7 0.9 99.3 23.2 36.5 6.2 96.9
63 Grenada .. .. .. .. 0.7 .. 15.6 33.6 13.8 144.5
64 Libya .. .. .. .. .. 99.8 2.3 14.0 1.1 190.8
64 Malaysia 0.6 364.6 37.7 76.7 9.5 99.4 22.7 56.3 7.3 135.3
64 Serbia 0.9 1,060.1 23.7 43.3 7.8 .. 17.6 43.1 11.2 178.7
67 Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. 104.7 .. .. 20.6 80.6 8.0 232.2
67 trinidad and tobago 0.0 .. 30.4 67.6 .. 99.0 13.2 48.5 10.8 163.1
69 Kazakhstan 0.2 .. .. 10.9 0.0 .. .. 33.4 8.9 143.7
70 Albania 0.2 146.8 6.1 108.9 4.1 .. 4.6 45.0 3.3 152.3
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of .. 182.6 .. .. .. 99.0 9.3 35.9 5.4 121.3
72 Dominica .. .. .. .. 0.2 .. 18.8 47.3 13.9 178.0
72 Georgia 0.2 .. 8.2 59.3 1.0 .. 5.4 26.3 5.8 114.2
72 Lebanon .. .. 25.0 .. 1.7 99.9 10.3 31.0 4.7 89.0
72 Saint Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. .. .. .. 22.7 76.6 27.9 191.9
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.8 750.7 44.4 63.9 .. 98.4 10.5 13.0 0.7 127.5
77 Peru .. .. .. 12.6 0.1 85.7 10.2 34.3 3.1 111.0
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 0.2 471.6 21.4 163.7 4.7 .. 36.6 51.9 12.5 124.6
78 Ukraine 0.9 1,353.1 26.3 85.2 2.3 .. 4.5 44.6 6.5 145.8
80 Mauritius 0.4 .. .. 6.2 1.7 99.4 17.6 28.7 6.1 123.2
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0 197.2 .. 46.0 3.4 .. 6.4 52.0 8.2 109.3
82 Azerbaijan 0.3 .. 16.6 22.9 0.0 .. 8.0 46.7 5.0 117.1
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.2 .. 11.4 140.8
84 oman .. .. 38.9 .. .. 98.0 18.0 62.0 1.6 175.6
85 Brazil 1.1 695.7 12.2 16.7 3.0 98.3 16.1 40.7 6.8 125.7
85 Jamaica .. .. .. 15.9 1.8 92.0 6.8 26.5 4.3 127.5
87 Armenia 0.3 .. 15.9 40.1 .. .. 9.7 44.0 2.8 144.2
88 Saint Lucia .. .. .. 203.6 .. .. 16.0 40.1 11.6 135.9
89 Ecuador 0.3 106.1 12.8 1.9 .. 92.2 12.5 29.0 1.4 116.6
90 turkey 0.8 803.9 20.9 9.0 .. .. 6.4 39.8 9.7 107.2
91 Colombia 0.2 157.2 23.2 13.8 1.3 93.6 11.2 36.5 5.6 111.6
92 Sri Lanka 0.1 96.3 .. 24.2 .. 76.6 3.7 12.0 1.1 100.4
93 Algeria 0.1 170.1 28.0 6.3 0.1 99.3 1.1 12.5 2.5 100.7
94 tunisia 1.1 1,862.5 .. .. 2.4 99.5 9.7 36.6 4.6 117.6
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
95 tonga .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.9 12.0 1.0 82.0
96 Belize .. .. .. 24.4 7.0 .. 14.4 12.6 2.9 65.1
96 Dominican Republic .. .. .. .. .. 95.9 2.2 39.5 3.6 99.8
96 Fiji .. .. .. .. 0.6 .. 6.1 14.8 2.7 96.3
96 Samoa .. .. .. 60.7 .. .. 2.3 7.0 0.1 110.2
100 Jordan 0.4 .. 25.1 10.3 .. 99.9 7.6 38.9 3.2 117.5
101 China 1.5 1,198.9 .. 100.7 0.6 99.4 5.7 34.4 9.4 86.2
102 turkmenistan .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.3 2.2 0.0 73.7
103 thailand 0.2 315.5 .. 11.2 2.2 99.3 6.6 21.2 4.6 113.6
104 Maldives .. .. .. .. 26.5 .. 20.0 28.3 4.8 171.6
105 Suriname .. .. .. .. 1.3 .. 4.0 31.6 3.0 185.7
106 Gabon 0.6 .. .. .. .. 36.7 3.4 7.2 0.3 109.0
107 El Salvador 0.1 .. 26.4 .. 0.0 86.4 5.8 15.9 2.8 140.5
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of .. 120.3 .. .. 0.7 77.5 2.4 20.0 1.0 80.8
108 Mongolia 0.2 .. 17.1 34.8 0.8 67.0 25.8 12.9 2.6 98.1
110 Palestine, State of .. 144.3 16.5 .. 1.4 .. 5.5 36.4 .. ..
111 Paraguay 0.1 74.8 .. .. 45.2 96.7 7.8 19.8 0.4 97.3
112 Egypt 0.2 420.4 .. 4.0 1.6 99.6 4.1 26.7 1.8 99.0
113 Moldova, Republic of 0.5 794.1 .. 36.9 1.5 .. 11.8 40.1 7.5 121.5
114 Philippines 0.1 78.5 23.8 3.8 0.1 89.7 7.2 25.0 1.8 92.9
114 Uzbekistan .. .. 21.1 7.0 .. .. 3.1 19.4 0.3 80.8
116 Syrian Arab Republic .. .. .. 2.4 0.1 92.7 9.4 20.7 0.3 77.6
117 Micronesia, Federated States of .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.5 20.0 0.9 32.4
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118 Guyana .. .. 14.4 .. 62.2 .. 3.6 29.9 1.5 93.4
119 Botswana 0.5 .. 13.0 .. 0.1 45.4 6.1 6.0 0.6 124.6
120 Honduras .. .. 6.8 .. .. 70.3 2.5 11.1 1.0 133.9
121 Indonesia 0.1 89.6 22.8 .. 0.3 64.5 2.0 9.9 0.8 107.5
121 Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.1 9.0 0.9 14.1
121 South Africa 0.9 395.6 .. 106.3 1.3 75.0 8.4 12.3 1.5 109.2
124 vanuatu .. .. .. .. 0.7 .. 1.4 8.0 0.2 121.0
125 Kyrgyzstan 0.2 .. 15.2 20.4 0.3 .. 1.9 19.6 0.3 105.8
125 tajikistan 0.1 .. 26.0 0.4 0.1 .. 1.3 11.5 0.1 91.7
127 viet Nam .. 115.9 .. 9.4 .. 97.6 9.7 27.9 4.1 196.0
128 Namibia .. .. 2.6 .. 0.0 34.0 23.2 6.5 0.4 73.9
129 Nicaragua .. .. .. .. .. 72.1 4.1 10.0 0.8 69.6
130 Morocco 0.6 661.0 34.9 25.3 0.2 97.0 5.7 49.0 1.6 111.8
131 Iraq .. 49.5 29.4 .. 43.5 86.0 0.8 2.5 0.0 79.9
132 Cape verde .. 132.5 .. .. 0.0 .. 14.3 30.0 3.2 89.5
133 Guatemala 0.1 39.4 16.8 7.2 1.0 80.5 2.1 10.5 1.8 136.0
134 timor-Leste .. .. .. .. .. 22.0 .. 0.2 0.0 53.7
135 Ghana 0.2 17.3 16.7 .. .. 60.5 1.1 9.5 0.2 72.6
136 Equatorial Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.5 6.0 0.2 59.0
136 India 0.8 135.8 .. 5.1 0.1 75.0 3.2 7.5 0.9 64.3
138 Cambodia .. 17.4 12.5 .. 0.0 24.0 0.4 1.3 0.3 60.2
138 Lao People’s Democratic Republic .. 15.8 12.8 .. .. 55.0 1.7 7.0 0.2 66.2
140 Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.9 13.6 1.2 57.9
141 Swaziland .. .. 2.7 .. 0.2 .. 4.1 9.0 0.1 73.6
LOw HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
142 Congo .. .. .. .. .. 37.1 0.5 5.0 0.0 94.2
143 Solomon Islands .. .. .. .. 0.0 .. 4.7 5.0 0.4 7.1
144 Sao tome and Principe .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.9 18.8 0.4 66.8
145 Kenya 0.4 56.2 .. 0.5 1.3 16.1 1.4 25.9 0.0 62.6
146 Bangladesh .. .. 10.6 0.6 0.0 41.0 2.5 3.7 0.0 46.8
146 Pakistan 0.5 161.9 .. 1.0 0.0 62.4 0.5 16.8 0.3 59.1
148 Angola .. .. 11.9 .. 0.7 26.2 0.7 10.0 0.1 48.3
149 Myanmar .. 18.4 .. .. .. 13.0 1.0 .. 0.0 2.5
150 Cameroon .. .. 21.0 .. 0.0 48.7 1.1 4.0 0.0 46.8
151 Madagascar 0.1 46.2 18.2 2.7 0.1 19.0 0.6 1.7 0.0 37.9
152 tanzania, United Republic of 0.4 .. 21.1 .. 0.0 13.9 0.9 11.0 0.0 47.2
153 Nigeria 0.2 38.6 .. .. .. 50.6 0.9 28.4 0.1 55.8
154 Senegal 0.4 384.1 .. .. 0.1 42.0 2.3 16.0 0.6 69.9
155 Mauritania .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.4 3.0 0.2 81.4
156 Papua New Guinea .. .. .. 0.2 .. .. 6.4 1.3 0.1 29.6
157 Nepal .. 58.7 23.2 0.0 .. 43.6 0.5 7.9 0.2 33.5
158 Lesotho 0.0 21.3 .. .. .. 16.0 0.2 3.9 0.0 47.3
159 togo .. 38.2 .. .. 0.0 20.0 3.4 5.4 0.1 44.2
160 Yemen .. .. .. .. 1.4 39.6 2.8 12.3 0.3 50.4
161 Haiti .. .. .. .. .. 38.5 5.2 8.4 .. 40.5
161 Uganda 0.4 .. 9.5 .. 0.8 9.0 1.7 12.5 0.2 39.4
163 Zambia 0.3 43.3 .. .. .. 18.8 1.1 10.1 0.1 42.8
164 Djibouti .. .. 46.5 .. .. .. 4.2 6.5 0.9 20.7
165 Gambia 0.0 .. .. 4.4 .. .. 3.6 9.2 0.0 88.3
166 Benin .. .. .. .. 0.0 24.8 0.7 3.1 0.0 81.5
167 Rwanda .. 11.9 .. 2.1 0.0 .. 0.3 13.0 0.0 33.8
168 Côte d’Ivoire .. 70.4 .. .. 0.0 47.3 1.8 2.6 0.0 77.6
169 Comoros .. .. 12.0 .. .. .. 0.8 5.1 0.0 25.3
170 Malawi .. 29.9 .. .. .. 9.0 0.2 2.3 0.0 21.5
171 Sudan 0.3 .. .. 4.4 0.1 35.9 10.8 .. 0.4 41.4
172 Zimbabwe .. .. 24.8 .. .. 41.5 7.6 11.5 0.3 64.3
173 Ethiopia 0.2 20.8 20.9 0.2 0.0 17.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 9.4
174 Liberia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.0 0.0 39.5
175 Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. 15.5 0.3 3.7 0.0 38.2
176 Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.2 2.5 .. 39.5
177 Sierra Leone .. .. .. .. 0.2 .. .. .. .. 34.3
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178 Burundi .. .. 9.6 .. 0.0 .. 0.9 2.1 0.0 14.1
178 Guinea .. .. .. .. 0.0 .. 0.5 1.0 0.0 40.3
180 Central African Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.3 2.3 .. 22.4
181 Eritrea .. .. 7.9 .. .. 32.0 1.0 5.4 0.0 4.6
182 Mali 0.2 37.7 .. .. 0.0 .. 0.7 2.7 0.0 49.2
183 Burkina Faso 0.2 45.1 23.3 .. 0.0 14.6 0.6 1.4 0.1 35.5
184 Chad .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.2 1.7 0.0 24.3
185 Mozambique 0.2 15.8 12.1 1.8 0.0 11.7 1.4 4.2 0.1 31.3
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 0.5 .. .. .. .. 11.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 18.0
186 Niger .. 7.8 .. .. 0.0 .. 0.1 0.8 0.0 25.1
NOTES
a Includes graduates in manufacturing and 
construction.
b Data refer to the most recent year available 
during the period specified.
c In the absence of data on electrification rate, 
99.7% is assumed.
DEFINITIONS
Research and development expenditure: 
Current and capital expenditures (both public and 
private) on creative work undertaken systematically 
to increase knowledge and the use of knowledge for 
new applications. It covers basic research, applied 
research and experimental development.
Researchers in research and development: 
Professionals engaged in the conception or creation 
of new knowledge, products, processes, methods 
or systems and in the management of the projects 
concerned. Postgraduate doctoral students (ISCED97 
level 6) engaged in research and development are 
included.
Graduates in science and engineering: People 
who have successfully completed the final year 
of a level or sublevel of education in science and 
engineering.
Patents granted to residents and nonresidents: 
Number of exclusive rights granted for an invention, 
which is a product or a process that provides a new 
way of doing something or offers a new technical 
solution to a problem, expressed per 1 million people.
Royalty and licence fee receipts: Payments 
and receipts between residents and nonresidents 
for the authorized use of intangible, nonproduced, 
nonfinancial assets and proprietary rights (such as 
patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial processes 
and franchises) and for the use, through licensing 
agreements, of produced originals of prototypes 
(such as films and manuscripts).
Electrification rate: Number of people with access 
to electricity, expressed as a percentage of total 
population. It includes electricity sold commercially 
(both on-grid and off-grid) and self-generated 
electricity but not unauthorized connections.
Personal computers: Number of self-contained 
computers designed for use by a single individual, 
expressed per 100 people.
Internet users: People with access to the 
worldwide network, expressed per 100 people.
Fixed broadband Internet subscriptions: 
Broadband high-speed access to the public Internet 
(a tCP/IP connection), at speeds equal to or 
greater than 256 kilobits per second, in one or both 
directions, expressed per 100 people
Fixed and mobile telephone subscribers: 
Sum of telephone lines and mobile subscribers, 
expressed per 100 people.
MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1 and 2: World Bank (2012a).
Column 3: UNESCo Institute for Statistics (2012).
Column 4: HDRo calculation based on data from 
WIPo (2012) and population data from UNDESA 
(2011).
Column 5: HDRo calculations based on data on 
royalty and licence fee receipts from World Bank 
(2012b).
Column 6: IEA (2012).
Column 7: World Bank (2012c).
Columns 8 and 9: ItU (2012).
Column 10: HDRo calculations based on data on 
cellular subscribers and telephone lines from ItU 
(2012) and population data from UNDESA (2011).
 
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of .. .. .. 258.4 .. 26.0 .. .. .. 6.6
Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.6 .. .. 15.2
Monaco 0.0 308.1 .. 141.2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Nauru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.9 ..
San Marino .. .. .. .. .. .. 78.9 .. 32.0 144.9
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.9 .. .. 8.0
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.7 25.0 3.3 41.9
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 2.5 3,854.0 20.3 566.2 210.9 99.6 58.3 72.8 26.5 153.2
High human development 0.8 .. .. 63.4 .. .. 13.6 35.8 7.1 133.5
Medium human development .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.6 20.8 4.4 84.5
Low human development .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.5 10.7 0.1 42.7
Regions
Arab States .. .. .. .. .. 86.7 10.8 27.2 2.0 99.6
East Asia and the Pacific .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.6 29.8 7.2 92.2
Europe and Central Asia 1.0 1,948.2 23.9 93.8 8.2 .. 12.3 43.4 10.0 150.0
Latin America and the Caribbean .. .. .. .. .. 93.4 12.2 34.1 6.6 116.7
South Asia .. .. .. 7.0 .. 70.1 3.0 8.4 0.7 64.4
Sub-Saharan Africa .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.6 11.3 0.2 47.1
Least developed countries .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.7 4.8 0.1 34.5
Small island developing states .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.6 18.7 2.2 62.7
world .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.1 30.0 7.7 95.2
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PRIMARY 
ENERGY SUPPLY EMISSIONS NATURAL RESOURCES IMPACTS
Fossil 
fuels Renewables 
Carbon dioxide
Greenhouse 
gas Natural 
resource 
depletion Forest area
Fresh water 
withdrawals
Endangered 
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Agricultural 
land 
Number of 
deaths due 
to natural 
disasters
Population 
living on 
degraded 
landTotal Per capita Per capita
(% of total) (megatonnes) (tonnes)
(average 
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(tonnes 
of carbon 
dioxide 
equivalent) (% of GNI)
(% of 
land area) (% change)
(% of total 
renewable 
water 
resources)
(% of all 
species)
(% of land 
area)
(annual 
average 
per million 
people) (%)
HDI rank 2009 2009 2008 2008 1970/2008 2005 2010 2010 1990/2010 2003–2012a 2011 2009 2005/2011 2010
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
1 Norway 58.8 43.3 50 10.5 1.0 5.8 10.2 33.1 10.2 0.8 6.9 3.3 0 ..
2 Australia 94.4 5.6 399 18.6 1.2 9.6 6.5 19.4 –3.4 4.6 18.5 53.2 3 9.0
3 United States 84.1 5.4 5,461 18.0 –0.4 3.7 0.9 33.2 2.6 15.6 19.9 44.1 1 1.0
4 Netherlands 93.1 4.0 174 10.6 –0.1 2.4 0.8 10.8 5.8 11.7 5.4 56.8 12 5.0
5 Germany 79.5 8.7 787 9.6 .. 1.9 0.1 31.8 3.1 21.0 10.5 48.4 12 8.0
6 New Zealand 63.7 36.1 33 7.8 1.1 10.0 .. 30.9 7.1 1.5 20.4 43.6 0 5.0
7 Ireland 95.0 4.5 44 9.9 1.1 5.8 0.2 10.7 58.9 1.5 7.3 60.8 0 ..
7 Sweden 32.7 34.8 49 5.3 –2.0 2.1 0.4 68.7 3.4 1.5 4.9 7.5 0 ..
9 Switzerland 53.3 17.7 40 5.3 –0.6 1.2 0.0 31.0 7.7 4.9 6.6 38.1 14 ..
10 Japan 81.0 3.3 1,208 9.5 0.7 1.0 0.0 68.5 0.1 20.9 13.7 12.6 1 ..
11 Canada 74.9 16.9 544 16.3 0.1 4.7 2.3 34.1 0.0 1.6 7.2 7.4 0 3.0
12 Korea, Republic of .. .. 509 10.5 4.9 1.2 0.0 63.0 –2.3 36.5 9.5 19.1 1 3.0
13 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 95.1 0.4 39 5.5 2.6 0.5 0.0 .. .. .. 8.3 .. 0 ..
13 Iceland 15.7 84.2 2 7.0 0.1 3.3 0.0 0.3 243.7 0.1 8.4 22.8 .. ..
15 Denmark 80.4 17.4 46 8.4 –1.1 2.9 1.7 12.8 22.3 10.8 6.3 62.1 0 9.0
16 Israel 96.5 5.0 38 5.2 –0.2 1.1 0.2 7.1 16.7 101.9 11.2 24.1 1 13.0
17 Belgium 73.6 3.9 105 9.8 –0.7 1.8 0.0 22.4 0.1 34.0 5.5 45.0 20 10.0
18 Austria 70.2 27.8 68 8.1 0.5 1.9 0.2 47.1 2.9 4.7 11.6 38.4 4 3.0
18 Singapore 99.8 0.1 32 6.7 –0.7 1.4 0.0 3.3 0.0 31.7 13.7 1.0 .. ..
20 France 51.0 7.7 377 5.9 –1.0 2.3 0.0 29.0 9.8 15.0 12.8 53.4 33 4.0
21 Finland 54.0 23.8 57 10.6 0.5 3.4 0.1 72.9 1.2 1.5 4.4 7.6 0 ..
21 Slovenia 69.3 12.7 17 8.5 .. 2.6 0.3 62.2 5.5 3.0 11.8 23.2 15 8.0
23 Spain 79.9 9.6 329 7.2 2.0 1.7 0.0 36.4 31.5 29.0 17.7 55.5 33 1.0
24 Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 43.1 6.2 .. 1.1 40.6 .. ..
25 Italy 87.5 9.7 445 7.4 0.8 1.4 0.1 31.1 20.5 23.7 13.5 47.3 33 2.0
26 Luxembourg 88.8 3.1 11 21.5 –1.7 3.5 0.0 33.5 1.1 1.9 2.8 50.6 33 ..
26 United Kingdom 87.3 3.2 523 8.5 –0.8 1.8 1.3 11.9 10.3 8.8 10.1 71.6 1 3.0
28 Czech Republic 79.6 5.8 117 11.2 .. 2.1 0.5 34.4 1.1 14.8 5.0 54.9 5 4.0
29 Greece 92.4 6.4 98 8.7 3.1 1.4 0.3 30.3 18.3 12.7 16.3 63.6 1 1.0
30 Brunei Darussalam 100.0 0.0 11 27.5 –2.3 17.9 .. 72.1 –8.0 1.1 8.4 2.2 .. ..
31 Cyprus 95.7 3.9 9 7.9 2.8 1.3 0.0 18.7 7.5 19.3 7.7 13.5 0 11.0
32 Malta 99.9 0.1 3 6.2 2.8 0.9 .. 1.1 0.0 71.3 6.8 29.1 .. ..
33 Andorra .. .. 1 6.5 .. .. .. 35.6 0.0 .. 3.7 38.3 .. ..
33 Estonia 84.8 15.1 18 13.6 .. 2.3 1.6 52.3 6.1 14.0 3.5 22.0 0 5.0
35 Slovakia 69.5 7.3 38 6.9 .. 1.4 0.4 40.2 0.6 1.4 5.2 40.1 2 9.0
36 Qatar 100.0 0.0 68 49.1 –0.9 18.0 .. 0.0 0.0 455.2 7.3 5.6 .. ..
37 Hungary 74.2 7.4 55 5.4 –0.6 1.6 0.5 22.6 12.7 5.4 8.0 63.9 7 17.0
38 Barbados .. .. 1 5.0 2.7 .. .. 19.4 0.0 76.1 8.7 44.2 0 ..
39 Poland 92.8 6.7 316 8.3 –0.3 2.7 1.4 30.5 5.1 19.4 5.7 53.0 3 13.0
40 Chile 74.5 25.1 73 4.4 1.4 1.6 12.4 21.7 6.3 1.2 9.9 21.2 1 1.0
41 Lithuania 55.8 10.4 15 4.5 .. 2.5 0.6 34.5 11.1 9.6 4.1 42.9 1 5.0
41 United Arab Emirates 100.0 0.0 155 25.0 –2.5 6.2 .. 3.8 29.5 2,032.0 7.7 6.8 .. 2.0
43 Portugal 78.0 19.7 56 5.3 2.9 1.8 0.1 38.1 3.9 12.3 17.0 40.3 26 2.0
44 Latvia 59.5 37.1 8 3.3 .. 2.3 0.5 53.8 5.7 1.2 4.6 29.5 4 2.0
45 Argentina 89.4 7.0 192 4.8 0.9 3.9 4.9 10.7 –15.5 4.0 9.0 51.3 0 2.0
46 Seychelles .. .. 1 7.8 7.3 .. 0.0 88.5 0.0 .. 16.1 6.5 0 ..
47 Croatia 83.4 10.9 23 5.3 .. 1.5 0.9 34.3 3.8 0.6 14.3 23.2 18 18.0
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
48 Bahrain 99.9 0.0 22 21.4 1.5 4.3 .. 0.7 143.5 219.8 7.2 10.3 .. ..
49 Bahamas .. .. 2 6.5 –2.2 .. .. 51.5 0.0 .. 10.0 1.4 3 ..
50 Belarus 92.5 5.0 63 6.5 .. 2.4 1.0 41.6 10.9 7.5 4.2 44.0 0 5.0
51 Uruguay 60.3 37.1 8 2.5 0.5 8.1 0.6 10.0 89.6 2.6 10.8 84.6 1 6.0
52 Montenegro .. .. 2 3.1 .. .. .. 40.4 0.0 .. 10.5 38.2 0 8.0
52 Palau .. .. 0 10.5 –0.3 .. .. 87.6 5.6 .. 11.4 10.9 .. ..
54 Kuwait 100.0 0.0 77 30.1 –0.3 6.3 .. 0.4 81.2 2,465.0 7.4 8.5 .. 1.0
55 Russian Federation 90.2 2.8 1,709 12.0 .. 4.9 14.3 49.4 0.0 1.5 10.2 13.2 40 3.0
56 Romania 76.3 15.3 95 4.4 –0.8 1.7 1.6 28.6 3.2 3.2 9.4 58.8 3 13.0
57 Bulgaria 73.1 6.2 51 6.6 –0.2 2.0 2.0 36.1 18.0 28.7 9.3 46.3 1 8.0
Environment
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57 Saudi Arabia 100.0 0.0 434 16.6 2.0 2.5 .. 0.5 0.0 943.3 8.8 80.7 1 4.0
59 Cuba 84.1 15.9 31 2.8 0.7 1.4 .. 26.1 39.5 19.8 18.1 62.5 0 17.0
59 Panama 78.6 21.5 7 2.0 0.9 1.4 0.0 43.7 –14.3 0.3 7.2 30.0 2 4.0
61 Mexico 88.9 9.6 476 4.3 1.8 1.7 5.7 33.3 –7.8 17.5 17.3 52.9 1 4.0
62 Costa Rica 44.7 55.3 8 1.8 2.5 0.9 0.1 51.0 1.6 2.4 8.0 35.3 2 1.0
63 Grenada .. .. 0 2.4 4.4 .. .. 50.0 0.0 .. 10.5 36.8 38 ..
64 Libya 99.2 0.8 58 9.5 –1.4 2.7 .. 0.1 0.0 718.0 8.7 8.8 .. 8.0
64 Malaysia 94.7 5.3 208 7.6 4.7 2.4 6.9 62.3 –8.6 2.3 15.4 24.0 0 1.0
64 Serbia 92.4 8.1 50 6.8 .. 2.3 .. 31.0 17.3 .. 7.2 57.8 0 19.0
67 Antigua and Barbuda .. .. 0 5.1 –0.8 .. .. 22.3 –4.9 3.3 8.3 29.5 0 ..
67 trinidad and tobago 99.9 0.1 50 37.4 3.7 7.8 32.0 44.1 –5.9 6.0 6.8 10.5 0 ..
69 Kazakhstan 99.0 1.1 237 15.1 .. 4.3 23.4 1.2 –3.3 28.9 8.4 77.2 1 24.0
70 Albania 54.0 38.8 4 1.3 –0.8 1.1 2.5 28.3 –1.6 4.4 12.7 44.0 1 6.0
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 87.7 12.4 170 6.1 –0.4 3.0 12.4 52.5 –11.1 0.7 8.3 24.3 1 2.0
72 Dominica .. .. 0 1.9 4.4 .. 0.0 59.5 –10.7 .. 8.6 32.7 15 ..
72 Georgia 68.0 33.3 5 1.2 .. 1.4 0.6 39.5 –1.3 2.6 9.3 36.1 0 2.0
72 Lebanon 95.9 2.6 17 4.1 2.5 0.4 0.0 13.4 4.5 28.1 10.0 67.3 0 1.0
72 Saint Kitts and Nevis .. .. 0 4.9 .. .. .. 42.3 0.0 .. 8.6 21.2 .. ..
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 99.5 0.5 538 7.4 2.2 2.1 .. 6.8 0.0 67.7 8.8 29.8 1 25.0
77 Peru 73.5 26.5 41 1.4 0.1 0.9 8.1 53.1 –3.1 1.0 8.4 16.8 6 1.0
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 84.3 11.3 12 5.8 .. 1.0 5.9 39.2 9.4 16.1 13.3 40.2 1 7.0
78 Ukraine 80.0 1.6 324 7.0 .. 2.1 3.7 16.8 4.7 27.6 8.2 71.2 2 6.0
80 Mauritius .. .. 4 3.1 4.4 .. 0.0 17.3 –9.8 26.4 15.2 48.3 1 ..
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 92.2 12.1 31 8.3 .. 1.2 .. 42.7 –1.1 0.9 9.8 41.7 0 6.0
82 Azerbaijan 98.2 1.7 47 5.4 .. 4.7 34.5 11.3 0.0 35.2 8.2 57.6 0 4.0
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines .. .. 0 1.8 4.7 .. 0.0 68.5 5.5 .. 9.0 25.6 0 ..
84 oman 100.0 0.0 46 17.3 11.1 7.1 .. 0.0 0.0 86.6 8.5 5.9 5 6.0
85 Brazil 51.3 45.8 393 2.1 2.0 4.0 3.4 62.4 –9.6 0.7 10.0 31.3 1 8.0
85 Jamaica 83.7 16.3 12 4.5 1.4 0.7 0.6 31.1 –2.2 6.2 15.2 41.5 3 3.0
87 Armenia 68.4 6.7 6 1.8 .. 1.3 1.0 9.3 –24.5 36.4 7.9 61.6 0 10.0
88 Saint Lucia .. .. 0 2.3 3.4 .. .. 77.0 7.3 .. 9.4 18.0 6 ..
89 Ecuador 86.7 12.4 27 1.9 2.6 1.7 12.9 35.6 –28.6 3.6 12.7 30.3 1 2.0
90 turkey 89.9 10.2 284 4.0 3.2 1.4 0.4 14.7 17.1 18.8 15.3 50.6 0 5.0
91 Colombia 75.2 25.1 68 1.5 0.3 1.8 7.8 54.5 –3.2 0.6 11.5 38.3 4 2.0
92 Sri Lanka 45.3 54.7 12 0.6 1.8 0.6 0.3 28.8 –20.9 24.5 17.8 41.6 2 21.0
93 Algeria 99.8 0.2 111 3.2 2.9 1.8 18.1 0.6 –10.5 52.7 12.2 17.4 4 29.0
94 tunisia 85.7 14.2 25 2.4 3.2 1.0 5.1 6.5 56.5 61.7 11.2 63.0 0 37.0
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95 tonga .. .. 0 1.7 4.6 .. 0.0 12.5 0.0 .. 8.5 43.1 0 ..
96 Belize .. .. 0 1.3 0.7 .. 0.0 61.1 –12.2 0.8 6.4 6.7 13 1.0
96 Dominican Republic 76.6 23.4 22 2.2 3.1 0.9 0.2 40.8 0.0 16.6 16.1 51.1 9 7.0
96 Fiji .. .. 1 1.5 1.0 .. 0.0 55.5 6.4 0.3 13.1 22.9 8 ..
96 Samoa .. .. 0 0.9 3.9 .. 0.3 60.4 31.5 .. 10.8 23.7 5 ..
100 Jordan 98.0 1.8 21 3.7 3.4 0.5 1.0 1.1 0.0 99.4 9.1 11.5 0 22.0
101 China 87.4 11.9 7,032 5.3 4.7 1.5 5.1 21.9 31.6 19.5 12.1 56.2 1 9.0
102 turkmenistan 100.7 0.0 48 9.7 .. 6.7 .. 8.8 0.0 100.8 8.4 69.4 .. 11.0
103 thailand 79.4 20.5 286 4.2 6.3 1.6 2.4 37.1 –3.0 13.1 12.5 38.7 2 17.0
104 Maldives .. .. 1 3.0 .. .. 0.0 3.0 0.0 15.7 9.1 26.7 0 ..
105 Suriname .. .. 2 4.7 0.2 .. .. 94.6 –0.1 0.5 3.5 0.5 2 ..
106 Gabon 33.9 66.1 2 1.7 –2.2 6.4 33.1 85.4 0.0 0.1 5.9 19.9 0 ..
107 El Salvador 37.8 62.0 6 1.0 2.6 0.8 0.4 13.9 –23.9 5.5 3.8 74.5 7 6.0
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 79.1 20.9 13 1.3 2.2 4.9 12.3 52.7 –8.9 0.3 4.7 34.1 5 2.0
108 Mongolia 96.4 3.2 11 4.1 1.6 3.7 32.3 7.0 –13.1 1.4 6.4 74.5 4 31.0
110 Palestine, State of .. .. 2 0.5 .. .. .. 1.5 1.0 49.9 6.2 61.0 0 ..
111 Paraguay 28.5 153.2 4 0.7 2.1 4.1 0.0 44.3 –16.9 0.1 3.9 52.6 0 1.0
112 Egypt 96.3 3.8 210 2.7 4.0 0.9 7.1 0.1 59.1 119.0 8.9 3.7 0 25.0
113 Moldova, Republic of 91.3 3.1 5 1.3 .. 1.1 0.2 11.7 21.0 16.4 6.7 75.2 1 22.0
114 Philippines 57.0 43.0 83 0.9 0.7 0.8 2.1 25.7 16.7 17.0 16.8 40.1 9 2.0
114 Uzbekistan 98.4 1.6 125 4.6 .. 1.9 19.2 7.7 7.6 118.3 7.9 62.6 0 27.0
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table 13 environment
PRIMARY 
ENERGY SUPPLY EMISSIONS NATURAL RESOURCES IMPACTS
Fossil 
fuels Renewables 
Carbon dioxide
Greenhouse 
gas Natural 
resource 
depletion Forest area
Fresh water 
withdrawals
Endangered 
species
Agricultural 
land 
Number of 
deaths due 
to natural 
disasters
Population 
living on 
degraded 
landTotal Per capita Per capita
(% of total) (megatonnes) (tonnes)
(average 
annual % 
growth)
(tonnes 
of carbon 
dioxide 
equivalent) (% of GNI)
(% of 
land area) (% change)
(% of total 
renewable 
water 
resources)
(% of all 
species)
(% of land 
area)
(annual 
average 
per million 
people) (%)
HDI rank 2009 2009 2008 2008 1970/2008 2005 2010 2010 1990/2010 2003–2012a 2011 2009 2005/2011 2010
116 Syrian Arab Republic 99.3 0.7 72 3.6 3.3 0.9 11.9 2.7 32.0 99.8 10.9 75.7 1 33.0
117 Micronesia, Federated States of .. .. 0 0.6 .. .. .. 91.7 0.9 .. 13.7 31.4 45 ..
118 Guyana .. .. 2 2.0 –0.2 .. 6.0 77.2 0.0 0.7 3.8 8.5 4 ..
119 Botswana 64.3 23.6 5 2.5 .. 4.1 3.4 20.0 –17.3 1.6 2.0 45.6 0 22.0
120 Honduras 50.3 49.8 9 1.2 2.2 1.2 0.5 46.4 –36.2 1.2 8.3 28.5 4 15.0
121 Indonesia 65.6 34.4 406 1.7 4.7 1.5 6.6 52.1 –20.3 5.6 14.3 29.6 2 3.0
121 Kiribati .. .. 0 0.3 –1.0 .. .. 15.0 0.0 .. 12.4 42.0 0 ..
121 South Africa 87.8 10.0 436 8.9 0.7 1.9 6.1 7.6 0.0 25.0 14.1 81.7 1 17.0
124 vanuatu .. .. 0 0.4 –0.4 .. 0.0 36.1 0.0 .. 12.0 15.3 0 ..
125 Kyrgyzstan 72.5 28.4 6 1.2 .. 1.0 6.9 5.0 14.0 43.7 5.9 55.4 2 10.0
125 tajikistan 41.2 58.6 3 0.5 .. 0.9 0.8 2.9 0.5 74.8 6.4 33.9 3 10.0
127 viet Nam 56.2 43.3 127 1.5 2.2 1.3 9.4 44.5 47.4 9.3 12.1 33.1 3 8.0
128 Namibia 70.5 19.2 4 1.8 .. 4.4 0.7 8.9 –16.8 1.7 5.6 47.1 7 28.0
129 Nicaragua 44.7 55.3 4 0.8 0.7 1.7 1.6 25.7 –31.0 0.7 4.8 42.8 7 14.0
130 Morocco 92.5 4.9 48 1.5 3.1 0.5 1.6 11.5 1.6 43.4 15.2 67.3 1 39.0
131 Iraq 97.6 0.9 103 3.4 0.9 0.7 45.7 1.9 2.6 87.3 8.2 20.1 0 5.0
132 Cape verde .. .. 0 0.6 4.2 .. 0.1 21.1 47.3 6.8 12.5 21.8 0 ..
133 Guatemala 46.1 53.9 12 0.9 1.9 1.1 1.7 33.7 –23.0 2.6 9.3 41.0 14 9.0
134 timor-Leste .. .. 0 0.2 .. .. .. 49.9 –23.2 .. 5.2 25.2 1 ..
135 Ghana 24.3 76.2 9 0.4 0.5 0.6 8.0 21.7 –33.7 1.8 5.7 68.1 1 1.0
136 Equatorial Guinea .. .. 5 7.3 11.3 .. 49.4 58.0 –12.6 0.1 6.4 10.9 .. ..
136 India 73.0 26.1 1,743 1.5 3.8 0.7 4.4 23.0 7.0 39.8 14.0 60.5 2 10.0
138 Cambodia 27.8 70.8 5 0.3 1.8 1.9 0.1 57.2 –22.0 0.5 12.1 31.5 1 39.0
138 Lao People’s Democratic Republic .. .. 2 0.3 0.5 .. 8.3 68.2 –9.0 1.3 10.5 10.2 0 4.0
140 Bhutan .. .. 1 1.0 12.4 .. 3.6 69.1 7.1 0.4 6.8 13.2 1 ..
141 Swaziland .. .. 1 1.1 0.7 .. 0.1 32.7 19.3 23.1 2.7 71.0 0 ..
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142 Congo 44.2 53.1 2 0.5 0.4 2.7 59.6 65.6 –1.4 0.0 4.4 30.9 0 ..
143 Solomon Islands .. .. 0 0.4 1.1 .. 15.6 79.1 –4.8 .. 14.8 3.0 4 ..
144 Sao tome and Principe .. .. 0 0.8 3.7 .. 0.8 28.1 0.0 0.3 14.9 58.3 .. ..
145 Kenya 16.8 83.2 10 0.3 0.0 0.9 1.1 6.1 –6.5 8.9 8.4 48.1 2 31.0
146 Bangladesh 69.8 30.2 47 0.3 .. 0.7 2.3 11.1 –3.5 2.9 8.6 70.3 6 11.0
146 Pakistan 61.8 37.4 163 1.0 2.3 1.1 2.8 2.2 –33.2 79.5 8.6 34.1 3 4.0
148 Angola 37.6 62.4 24 1.4 2.1 5.1 35.1 46.9 –4.1 0.4 4.6 46.8 2 3.0
149 Myanmar 27.7 72.3 13 0.3 1.1 2.2 .. 48.3 –19.0 2.8 7.9 19.0 287 19.0
150 Cameroon 30.9 69.1 5 0.3 3.0 1.6 4.8 42.1 –18.1 0.3 10.9 19.8 0 15.0
151 Madagascar .. .. 2 0.1 –1.1 .. 1.0 21.6 –8.3 4.4 21.0 70.2 5 ..
152 tanzania, United Republic of 11.1 88.9 6 0.2 0.4 1.4 3.2 37.7 –19.4 5.4 12.3 40.1 0 25.0
153 Nigeria 14.7 85.3 96 0.6 1.4 1.1 22.0 9.9 –47.5 3.6 6.6 81.8 0 12.0
154 Senegal 57.8 41.8 5 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.8 44.0 –9.4 5.7 6.9 49.4 0 16.0
155 Mauritania .. .. 2 0.6 1.2 .. 34.3 0.2 –41.7 14.0 8.1 38.5 1 24.0
156 Papua New Guinea .. .. 2 0.3 0.3 .. 22.2 63.4 –8.9 0.0 11.4 2.5 4 ..
157 Nepal 11.1 88.5 4 0.1 5.0 1.0 2.5 25.4 –24.5 4.7 6.1 29.6 6 2.0
158 Lesotho .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.0 1.4 10.0 1.7 3.0 77.0 0 64.0
159 togo 14.4 83.4 1 0.2 1.7 0.8 3.4 5.3 –58.1 1.2 4.2 62.1 1 5.0
160 Yemen 98.7 1.3 23 1.0 2.5 0.5 14.5 1.0 0.0 168.6 9.3 44.4 2 32.0
161 Haiti 28.1 71.9 2 0.3 3.0 0.6 .. 3.7 –12.9 8.6 19.4 66.8 65 15.0
161 Uganda .. .. 4 0.1 –0.6 .. 4.5 15.2 –37.1 0.5 7.6 69.9 2 23.0
163 Zambia 7.6 92.2 2 0.2 –4.6 3.8 18.9 66.5 –6.3 1.7 3.3 31.5 1 5.0
164 Djibouti .. .. 1 0.6 –0.9 .. .. 0.2 0.0 6.3 8.2 73.4 6 8.0
165 Gambia .. .. 0 0.3 2.3 .. 0.8 48.0 8.6 0.9 4.9 66.5 1 18.0
166 Benin 40.4 57.4 4 0.5 4.3 0.9 0.3 41.2 –20.8 0.5 4.5 29.8 1 2.0
167 Rwanda .. .. 1 0.1 4.0 .. 3.1 17.6 36.8 1.6 5.7 81.1 1 10.0
168 Côte d’Ivoire 23.5 76.9 7 0.4 –0.5 1.0 3.9 32.7 1.8 1.7 6.7 63.8 0 1.0
169 Comoros .. .. 0 0.2 1.0 .. 1.1 1.6 –75.0 0.8 11.7 83.3 0 ..
170 Malawi .. .. 1 0.1 –0.4 .. 1.8 34.4 –16.9 5.6 8.6 59.1 4 19.0
171 Sudan 30.2 69.8 14 0.3 0.1 3.0 12.9 29.4 –8.4 57.6 4.8 57.5 1 40.0
172 Zimbabwe 25.7 69.4 9 0.7 –2.0 1.3 2.7 40.4 –29.5 21.0 3.3 42.4 0 29.0
173 Ethiopia 7.1 92.9 7 0.1 1.2 1.1 4.2 11.2 –18.6 4.6 6.7 35.0 2 72.0
174 Liberia .. .. 1 0.2 –4.6 .. 6.4 44.9 –12.2 0.1 8.4 27.1 0 ..
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HDI rank 2009 2009 2008 2008 1970/2008 2005 2010 2010 1990/2010 2003–2012a 2011 2009 2005/2011 2010
175 Afghanistan .. .. 1 0.0 –4.4 .. 2.6 2.1 0.0 35.6 5.8 58.1 11 11.0
176 Guinea-Bissau .. .. 0 0.2 1.4 .. 0.5 71.9 –8.8 0.6 5.7 58.0 1 1.0
177 Sierra Leone .. .. 1 0.2 –0.9 .. 2.1 38.1 –12.6 0.3 6.5 47.7 3 ..
178 Burundi .. .. 0 0.0 0.6 .. 12.7 6.7 –40.5 2.3 4.5 83.7 2 19.0
178 Guinea .. .. 1 0.1 –0.7 .. 14.3 26.6 –9.9 0.7 7.3 58.0 0 1.0
180 Central African Republic .. .. 0 0.1 –1.6 .. 0.0 36.3 –2.6 0.0 1.6 8.4 0 ..
181 Eritrea 22.6 77.4 0 0.1 .. 0.8 0.0 15.2 –5.5 9.2 7.4 75.2 0 59.0
182 Mali .. .. 1 0.0 0.5 .. 9.8 10.2 –11.2 6.5 2.8 33.7 0 60.0
183 Burkina Faso .. .. 2 0.1 4.2 .. 4.3 20.6 –17.5 7.9 2.7 43.7 0 73.0
184 Chad .. .. 0 0.0 0.8 .. 29.0 9.2 –12.1 0.9 3.7 39.2 2 45.0
185 Mozambique 7.7 96.7 2 0.1 –2.9 1.1 3.3 49.6 –10.0 0.3 7.0 62.7 1 2.0
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 3.7 96.6 3 0.0 –2.8 1.9 13.7 68.0 –3.9 0.0 6.4 9.9 0 ..
186 Niger .. .. 1 0.1 0.5 .. 2.4 1.0 –38.1 7.0 3.6 34.6 0 25.0
NOTE
a Data refer to the most recent year available 
during the period specified.
DEFINITIONS
Fossil fuels: Percentage of total energy supply that 
comes from natural resources formed from biomass in 
the geological past (such as coal, oil and natural gas).
Renewables: Percentage of total energy supply 
that comes from constantly replenished natural 
processes, including solar, wind, biomass, 
geothermal, hydropower and ocean resources and 
some waste. Nuclear energy is not included.
Carbon dioxide emissions: Human-originated 
carbon dioxide emissions stemming from the burning 
of fossil fuels, gas flaring and the production of 
cement, including carbon dioxide emitted by forest 
biomass through depletion of forest areas.
Carbon dioxide emissions per capita: Carbon 
dioxide emissions divided by midyear population.
Greenhouse gas emissions per capita: 
Emissions from methane, nitrous oxide and other 
greenhouse gases, including hydrofluorocarbons, 
per fluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride, divided by 
midyear population. Carbon dioxide emissions are 
not included.
Natural resource depletion: Monetary expression 
of energy, mineral and forest depletion, expressed 
as a percentage of total gross national income (GNI).
Forest area: Land spanning more than 0.5 hectare 
with trees taller than 5 metres and a canopy cover 
of more than 10%, or trees able to reach these 
thresholds in situ. It excludes land predominantly 
under agricultural or urban land use, tree stands in 
agricultural production systems (for example, in fruit 
plantations and agroforestry systems) and trees in 
urban parks and gardens. Areas under reforestation 
that have not yet reached but are expected to reach 
a canopy cover of 10% and a tree height of 5 meters 
are included, as are temporarily unstocked areas, 
resulting from human intervention or natural causes, 
which are expected to regenerate.
Fresh water withdrawals: total fresh water 
withdrawn in a given year, expressed as a 
percentage of total renewable water resources.
Endangered species: Percentage of animal 
species (including mammals, birds, reptiles, 
amphibians, fish and invertebrates) classified as 
critically endangered, endangered or vulnerable 
by the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature.
Agricultural land: the sum of areas under 
arable land (land under temporary agricultural 
crops; multiple-cropped areas are counted only 
once), temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, 
land under market and kitchen gardens and land 
temporarily fallow (less than five years), expressed 
as a percentage of total land. Abandoned land 
resulting from shifting cultivation is excluded.
Number of deaths due to natural disasters: 
Number of people confirmed as dead and missing 
and presumed dead as a result of a natural disaster. 
Natural disasters are classified as climatological, 
hydrological and meteorological disasters, which 
include drought, extreme temperature, flood, mass 
movement, wet storm and wildfire.
Population living on degraded land: Percentage 
of the population living on severely or very severely 
degraded land. Land degradation estimates consider 
biomass, soil health, water quantity and biodiversity 
and range in severity.
MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1 and 2: HDRo calculations based on data 
on total primary energy supply from IEA (2012).
Columns 3 and 4: World Bank (2012a).
Columns 5 and 7: HDRo calculations based on data 
from World Bank (2012a).
Column 6: HDRo calculations based on data from 
World Bank (2012a) and UNDESA (2011).
Columns 8 and 9: HDRo calculations based on data 
on forest and total land area from FAo (2012).
Column 10: FAo (2011).
Column 11: IUCN (2012).
Column 12: HDRo calculations based on data from 
FAo (2012).
Column 13: CRED EM-DAt (2012) and UNDESA 
(2011).
Column 14: FAo (2012).
 
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of 81.7 0.7 78 3.2 .. 1.0 .. 47.1 –30.9 11.2 8.6 24.1 5 3.0
Marshall Islands .. .. 0 1.9 .. .. .. 70.2 0.0 .. 11.0 72.2 0 ..
Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.0 0.0 .. 6.8 .. .. ..
Nauru .. .. .. 3.9 .. .. .. 0.0 0.0 .. 12.1 20.0 .. ..
San Marino .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.0 0.0 .. 0.0 16.7 .. ..
Somalia .. .. 1 0.1 0.5 .. .. 10.8 –18.5 22.4 6.8 70.2 2 26.0
South Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 33.3 0.0 .. 13.0 60.0 .. ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 81.0 7.5 12,643 11.4 –0.2 2.7 0.9 29.1 1.1 8.2 13.6 42.6 8 ..
High human development 86.7 9.5 5,765 5.8 1.0 2.8 .. 38.0 –4.1 2.8 11.4 26.5 7 8.4
Medium human development .. .. 10,877 3.2 3.8 .. 5.3 24.6 1.3 16.4 12.8 60.9 2 ..
Low human development .. .. 473 0.4 0.5 .. 9.5 28.8 –10.6 4.4 7.6 45.8 14 20.2
Regions
Arab States 96.7 3.1 1,509 4.6 1.1 1.5 .. 7.1 –7.8 87.4 9.4 63.1 1 24.9
East Asia and the Pacific .. .. 8,255 4.3 4.5 .. .. 29.4 2.1 .. 12.5 44.9 9 ..
Europe and Central Asia 88.3 4.7 3,723 7.9 .. 3.0 7.3 38.5 0.7 5.8 9.6 20.5 13 8.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 72.6 26.3 1,637 2.9 1.2 2.7 5.7 47.2 –8.9 1.5 11.5 37.5 3 5.4
South Asia 76.7 22.6 2,509 1.5 3.2 0.8 4.0 14.5 2.4 28.6 12.5 33.9 2 10.1
Sub-Saharan Africa .. .. 670 0.9 0.4 .. 11.6 28.4 –10.2 1.6 7.5 54.7 1 25.0
Least developed countries .. .. 191 0.2 –0.5 .. 9.0 29.6 –9.4 2.8 7.6 47.1 20 26.0
Small island developing states .. .. 137 2.7 1.4 .. .. 63.1 –3.5 .. 14.9 3.3 16 ..
world 80.7 13.1 29,837 4.5 0.4 1.7 3.3 31.1 –3.3 7.3 11.7 38.6 6 10.6
Human Development RepoRt 2013
The Rise of the South Human progress in a Diverse World
tABLE 13 Environment    |    193
Population
Totala Annual growth Urban Median age Total dependency ratio Total fertility rate Sex ratio at birthb
(millions) (%) (% of total) (years)
(per 100 people 
ages 15–64)
(births  
per woman) (male to female births)
HDI rank 2012 2030 2000/2005 2010/2015a,c 2000 2012 2000 2010 2000 2012 2000 2012a,c 2000d 2012c
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
1 Norway 5.0 e 5.6 e 0.6 e 0.7 e 76.1 79.7 36.9 38.7 54.2 51.5 1.8 2.0 1.05 1.06
2 Australia 22.9 f 27.8 f 1.3 f 1.3 f 87.2 89.4 35.4 36.9 49.6 49.3 1.7 2.0 1.06 1.06
3 United States 315.8 361.7 1.0 0.9 79.1 82.6 35.3 36.9 51.0 50.7 2.0 2.1 1.05 1.05
4 Netherlands 16.7 17.3 0.6 0.3 76.8 83.6 37.3 40.7 47.3 50.6 1.7 1.8 1.06 1.06
5 Germany 82.0 79.5 0.0 –0.2 73.1 74.1 39.9 44.3 47.0 51.7 1.3 1.4 1.06 1.06
6 New Zealand 4.5 5.2 1.4 1.0 85.7 86.3 34.3 36.6 52.7 51.4 1.9 2.1 1.05 1.06
7 Ireland 4.6 5.4 1.8 1.1 59.1 62.5 32.5 34.7 49.2 50.8 1.9 2.1 1.07 1.07
7 Sweden 9.5 10.4 0.4 0.6 84.0 85.4 39.4 40.7 55.3 55.5 1.6 1.9 1.06 1.06
9 Switzerland 7.7 8.1 0.7 0.4 73.3 73.8 38.6 41.4 48.7 47.9 1.4 1.5 1.05 1.05
10 Japan 126.4 120.2 0.1 –0.1 78.6 91.9 41.3 44.7 46.6 59.6 1.3 1.4 1.06 1.06
11 Canada 34.7 39.8 1.0 0.9 79.5 80.8 36.8 39.9 46.3 45.1 1.5 1.7 1.05 1.06
12 Korea, Republic of 48.6 50.3 0.5 0.4 79.6 83.5 32.1 37.9 39.5 38.0 1.3 1.4 1.10 1.10
13 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 7.2 8.5 0.1 1.0 100.0 100.0 36.5 41.8 39.3 32.3 0.8 1.1 1.07 1.07
13 Iceland 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.2 92.4 93.8 32.8 34.8 53.5 49.6 2.0 2.1 1.04 1.05
15 Denmark 5.6 5.9 0.3 0.3 85.1 87.1 38.4 40.6 50.0 54.1 1.8 1.9 1.06 1.06
16 Israel 7.7 9.8 1.9 1.7 91.2 91.9 28.0 30.1 61.6 61.6 2.9 2.9 1.05 1.05
17 Belgium 10.8 11.2 0.5 0.3 97.1 97.5 39.1 41.2 51.6 53.3 1.6 1.8 1.05 1.05
18 Austria 8.4 8.6 0.6 0.2 65.8 67.9 38.2 41.8 48.0 48.1 1.4 1.3 1.06 1.06
18 Singapore 5.3 6.0 1.7 1.1 100.0 100.0 34.1 37.6 40.5 35.4 1.4 1.3 1.07 1.07
20 France 63.5 68.5 0.6 0.5 76.9 86.4 37.7 39.9 53.6 55.7 1.8 2.0 1.05 1.05
21 Finland 5.4 5.6 0.3 0.3 82.2 83.8 39.3 42.0 49.3 53.5 1.7 1.9 1.05 1.05
21 Slovenia 2.0 2.1 0.2 0.2 50.8 49.8 38.0 41.7 42.7 45.0 1.2 1.5 1.05 1.05
23 Spain 46.8 g 50.0 g 1.5 g 0.6 g 76.3 77.6 37.6 40.1 46.3 48.4 1.2 1.5 1.06 1.06
24 Liechtenstein 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.8 15.1 14.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
25 Italy 61.0 60.9 0.6 0.2 67.2 68.5 40.2 43.2 48.3 53.8 1.2 1.5 1.06 1.06
26 Luxembourg 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.4 83.8 85.7 37.3 38.9 49.1 46.1 1.7 1.7 1.06 1.06
26 United Kingdom 62.8 69.3 0.4 0.6 78.7 79.7 37.7 39.8 53.4 52.7 1.7 1.9 1.05 1.05
28 Czech Republic 10.6 10.8 0.0 0.3 74.0 73.4 37.4 39.4 43.7 42.9 1.1 1.5 1.06 1.06
29 Greece 11.4 11.6 0.4 0.2 59.7 61.7 38.3 41.4 47.1 50.6 1.3 1.5 1.07 1.07
30 Brunei Darussalam 0.4 0.5 2.1 1.7 71.2 76.4 25.8 28.9 49.8 41.6 2.4 2.0 1.06 1.06
31 Cyprus 1.1 1.3 1.8 1.1 68.6 70.7 31.8 34.2 48.4 41.4 1.7 1.5 1.07 1.07
32 Malta 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.3 92.4 95.0 36.1 39.5 46.6 42.1 1.6 1.3 1.06 1.06
33 Andorra 0.1 0.1 3.7 1.5 92.4 86.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
33 Estonia 1.3 1.3 –0.4 –0.1 69.4 69.5 37.9 39.7 49.8 50.0 1.3 1.7 1.06 1.06
35 Slovakia 5.5 5.5 0.0 0.2 56.2 54.7 33.6 36.9 45.4 37.9 1.3 1.4 1.05 1.05
36 Qatar 1.9 2.4 6.6 2.9 96.3 98.9 30.3 31.6 38.4 18.3 3.1 2.2 1.05 1.04
37 Hungary 9.9 9.6 –0.2 –0.2 64.6 69.9 38.5 39.8 46.8 46.2 1.3 1.4 1.06 1.06
38 Barbados 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 38.3 44.9 33.6 37.5 50.3 40.0 1.6 1.6 1.04 1.04
39 Poland 38.3 37.8 –0.1 0.0 61.7 60.8 35.3 38.0 46.3 40.5 1.3 1.4 1.06 1.06
40 Chile 17.4 19.5 1.1 0.9 85.9 89.4 28.8 32.1 54.0 45.2 2.1 1.8 1.04 1.04
41 Lithuania 3.3 3.1 –0.5 –0.4 67.0 67.2 35.9 39.3 51.2 44.9 1.3 1.5 1.06 1.05
41 United Arab Emirates 8.1 10.5 5.9 2.2 80.2 84.7 28.1 30.1 36.3 20.9 2.6 1.7 1.05 1.05
43 Portugal 10.7 10.3 0.4 0.0 54.4 61.6 37.7 41.0 47.8 50.0 1.5 1.3 1.06 1.06
44 Latvia 2.2 2.1 –0.7 –0.4 68.1 67.7 38.1 40.2 49.9 47.3 1.2 1.5 1.05 1.06
45 Argentina 41.1 46.8 0.9 0.9 90.1 92.7 27.9 30.4 60.7 54.4 2.5 2.2 1.04 1.04
46 Seychelles 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.3 50.4 54.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
47 Croatia 4.4 4.2 –0.3 –0.2 55.6 58.1 39.1 41.5 48.4 47.9 1.4 1.5 1.06 1.06
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
48 Bahrain 1.4 1.7 2.5 2.1 88.4 88.7 27.4 30.1 44.1 29.2 2.7 2.5 1.05 1.05
49 Bahamas 0.4 0.4 1.4 1.1 82.0 84.5 27.0 30.9 52.9 40.9 2.1 1.9 1.06 1.06
50 Belarus 9.5 8.9 –0.5 –0.3 70.0 75.5 36.3 38.3 47.5 40.5 1.2 1.5 1.06 1.06
51 Uruguay 3.4 3.6 0.0 0.3 91.3 92.6 31.6 33.7 60.2 56.2 2.2 2.0 1.05 1.05
52 Montenegro 0.6 0.6 –0.2 0.1 58.5 63.5 33.5 35.9 47.1 46.5 1.8 1.6 1.08 1.08
52 Palau 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 70.0 85.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
54 Kuwait 2.9 4.0 3.1 2.4 98.1 98.3 28.3 28.2 42.3 41.1 2.6 2.3 1.03 1.03
55 Russian Federation 142.7 136.4 –0.4 –0.1 73.4 74.0 36.5 37.9 44.1 39.8 1.2 1.5 1.06 1.06
56 Romania 21.4 20.3 –0.4 –0.2 53.0 52.8 34.7 38.5 46.7 43.6 1.3 1.4 1.06 1.06
57 Bulgaria 7.4 6.5 –0.7 –0.7 68.9 73.7 39.7 41.6 47.7 47.3 1.2 1.5 1.06 1.06
57 Saudi Arabia 28.7 38.5 3.6 2.1 79.8 82.5 20.9 25.9 72.5 49.0 4.0 2.7 1.03 1.03
59 Cuba 11.2 11.0 0.3 0.0 75.6 75.1 32.8 38.4 45.8 41.8 1.6 1.4 1.06 1.06
59 Panama 3.6 4.5 1.8 1.5 65.8 75.9 24.8 27.3 59.6 54.3 2.7 2.4 1.05 1.05
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Totala Annual growth Urban Median age Total dependency ratio Total fertility rate Sex ratio at birthb
(millions) (%) (% of total) (years)
(per 100 people 
ages 15–64)
(births  
per woman) (male to female births)
HDI rank 2012 2030 2000/2005 2010/2015a,c 2000 2012 2000 2010 2000 2012 2000 2012a,c 2000d 2012c
61 Mexico 116.1 135.4 1.3 1.1 74.7 78.4 23.4 26.6 62.5 53.5 2.6 2.2 1.05 1.05
62 Costa Rica 4.8 5.7 1.9 1.4 59.0 65.1 24.8 28.4 58.5 44.5 2.4 1.8 1.05 1.05
63 Grenada 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 35.9 39.5 21.8 25.0 74.9 51.9 2.6 2.2 1.05 1.05
64 Libya 6.5 7.8 2.0 0.8 76.3 77.9 21.9 25.9 55.6 55.0 3.1 2.4 1.06 1.06
64 Malaysia 29.3 37.3 2.2 1.6 62.0 73.5 23.8 26.0 59.1 52.8 3.1 2.6 1.06 1.06
64 Serbia 9.8 h 9.5 h –0.6 h –0.1 h 53.0 56.7 35.7 37.6 50.5 46.7 1.7 1.6 1.08 1.08
67 Antigua and Barbuda 0.1 0.1 1.6 1.0 32.1 29.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
67 trinidad and tobago 1.4 1.4 0.4 0.3 10.8 14.0 26.9 30.8 47.3 38.6 1.6 1.6 1.04 1.04
69 Kazakhstan 16.4 18.9 0.3 1.0 55.7 53.5 27.7 29.0 52.6 47.2 1.9 2.5 1.07 1.07
70 Albania 3.2 3.3 0.5 0.3 41.7 54.5 27.4 30.0 59.6 46.1 2.2 1.5 1.07 1.07
71 venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 29.9 37.0 1.8 1.5 89.9 93.7 23.3 26.1 62.0 53.3 2.8 2.4 1.05 1.05
72 Dominica 0.1 0.1 –0.2 0.0 67.2 67.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
72 Georgia 4.3 3.8 –1.2 –0.6 52.6 52.9 34.4 37.3 52.5 44.8 1.6 1.5 1.11 1.11
72 Lebanon 4.3 4.7 1.6 0.7 86.0 87.4 25.6 29.1 59.4 45.1 2.4 1.8 1.05 1.05
72 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.1 0.1 1.3 1.2 32.8 32.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 75.6 84.4 1.3 1.0 64.0 69.2 20.8 27.1 65.2 38.7 2.2 1.6 1.05 1.05
77 Peru 29.7 35.5 1.3 1.1 73.0 77.6 23.0 25.6 63.8 54.9 2.9 2.4 1.05 1.05
78 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2.1 2.0 0.3 0.1 59.4 59.4 32.5 35.9 47.7 41.2 1.7 1.4 1.08 1.08
78 Ukraine 44.9 40.5 –0.8 –0.5 67.1 69.1 37.7 39.3 46.0 42.8 1.1 1.5 1.06 1.06
80 Mauritius 1.3 1.4 1.0 0.5 42.7 41.8 28.6 32.4 48.0 39.6 2.0 1.6 1.04 1.04
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.7 3.5 0.5 –0.2 43.0 48.8 35.1 39.4 44.5 40.5 1.4 1.1 1.07 1.07
82 Azerbaijan 9.4 10.8 1.1 1.2 51.4 53.9 25.6 29.5 58.1 38.3 2.0 2.2 1.17 1.15
83 Saint vincent and the Grenadines 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 45.2 49.7 24.2 27.9 62.3 48.3 2.4 2.0 1.03 1.03
84 oman 2.9 3.6 1.4 1.9 71.6 73.7 21.0 25.3 64.5 42.8 3.6 2.2 1.05 1.05
85 Brazil 198.4 220.5 1.3 0.8 81.2 84.9 25.4 29.1 54.0 46.8 2.4 1.8 1.05 1.05
85 Jamaica 2.8 2.8 0.8 0.4 51.8 52.1 24.5 27.0 67.0 55.9 2.6 2.3 1.05 1.05
87 Armenia 3.1 3.1 –0.1 0.3 64.7 64.1 30.3 32.1 55.9 45.3 1.7 1.7 1.18 1.14
88 Saint Lucia 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.0 28.0 16.8 24.0 27.4 66.5 46.9 2.3 1.9 1.03 1.03
89 Ecuador 14.9 17.9 1.7 1.3 60.3 68.0 22.6 25.5 65.1 56.3 3.0 2.4 1.05 1.05
90 turkey 74.5 86.7 1.4 1.1 64.7 72.5 24.5 28.3 56.0 46.8 2.4 2.0 1.05 1.05
91 Colombia 47.6 56.9 1.6 1.3 72.1 75.6 23.8 26.8 60.1 51.5 2.6 2.3 1.05 1.05
92 Sri Lanka 21.2 23.1 1.1 0.8 15.7 15.2 27.8 30.7 48.9 50.6 2.2 2.3 1.04 1.04
93 Algeria 36.5 43.5 1.5 1.4 60.8 73.8 21.7 26.2 62.2 45.6 2.6 2.2 1.05 1.05
94 tunisia 10.7 12.2 0.9 1.0 63.4 66.5 24.7 28.9 57.2 43.2 2.1 1.9 1.05 1.05
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95 tonga 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 23.0 23.5 19.9 21.3 78.9 76.1 4.3 3.8 1.05 1.05
96 Belize 0.3 0.4 2.3 2.0 47.7 44.5 18.8 21.8 83.4 60.8 3.6 2.7 1.03 1.03
96 Dominican Republic 10.2 12.1 1.5 1.2 61.7 70.3 22.7 25.1 67.1 58.3 2.9 2.5 1.05 1.05
96 Fiji 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.8 47.9 52.6 22.1 26.4 62.6 51.7 3.1 2.6 1.06 1.06
96 Samoa 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 22.0 19.6 19.7 20.9 81.6 72.7 4.6 3.8 1.08 1.08
100 Jordan 6.5 8.4 2.0 1.9 79.8 83.0 19.4 20.7 75.8 66.9 3.9 2.9 1.05 1.05
101 China 1,353.6 i,j 1,393.1 i,j 0.6 i,j 0.4 i,j 35.9 j 51.9 29.7 34.5 48.1 37.6 1.7 1.6 1.21 1.18
102 turkmenistan 5.2 6.2 1.1 1.2 45.9 49.0 21.6 24.5 68.4 48.4 2.8 2.3 1.05 1.05
103 thailand 69.9 73.3 1.1 0.5 31.1 34.4 30.2 34.2 44.7 41.1 1.7 1.5 1.06 1.06
104 Maldives 0.3 0.4 1.5 1.3 27.7 42.3 18.8 24.6 79.2 43.6 2.9 1.7 1.06 1.06
105 Suriname 0.5 0.6 1.3 0.9 64.9 70.1 25.7 27.6 57.1 52.3 2.7 2.3 1.08 1.08
106 Gabon 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.9 80.1 86.5 19.3 21.6 84.2 64.0 4.1 3.2 1.03 1.03
107 El Salvador 6.3 7.1 0.4 0.6 58.9 65.3 20.7 23.2 78.2 60.6 2.9 2.2 1.05 1.05
108 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 10.2 13.4 1.9 1.6 61.8 67.2 20.0 21.7 78.1 66.9 4.1 3.2 1.05 1.05
108 Mongolia 2.8 3.5 1.1 1.5 57.1 69.5 21.8 25.4 63.9 46.8 2.2 2.5 1.03 1.03
110 Palestine, State of 4.3 6.8 2.1 2.8 72.0 74.6 16.2 18.1 98.7 79.5 5.4 4.3 1.05 1.05
111 Paraguay 6.7 8.7 2.0 1.7 55.3 62.5 20.4 23.1 74.0 61.4 3.7 2.9 1.05 1.05
112 Egypt 84.0 106.5 1.9 1.7 42.8 43.6 21.4 24.4 67.9 57.2 3.3 2.7 1.05 1.05
113 Moldova, Republic of 3.5 3.1 –1.7 –0.7 44.6 48.4 32.3 35.2 50.8 38.8 1.6 1.5 1.06 1.06
114 Philippines 96.5 126.3 2.0 1.7 48.0 49.1 20.4 22.2 71.5 62.4 3.8 3.1 1.06 1.06
114 Uzbekistan 28.1 33.4 0.9 1.1 37.4 36.2 20.9 24.2 71.4 48.7 2.7 2.3 1.05 1.05
116 Syrian Arab Republic 21.1 27.9 2.9 1.7 51.9 56.5 19.1 21.1 77.7 65.2 3.6 2.8 1.05 1.05
117 Micronesia, Federated States of 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 22.3 22.7 18.9 20.8 78.2 65.1 4.3 3.3 1.07 1.07
118 Guyana 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.2 28.7 28.4 23.0 23.8 66.7 55.8 2.5 2.2 1.05 1.05
119 Botswana 2.1 2.3 1.3 1.1 53.2 62.3 20.0 22.9 69.5 56.7 3.4 2.6 1.03 1.03
120 Honduras 7.9 10.7 2.0 2.0 45.5 52.7 18.4 21.0 86.0 66.9 4.0 3.0 1.05 1.05
121 Indonesia 244.8 279.7 1.3 1.0 42.0 51.5 24.4 27.8 54.7 47.3 2.5 2.1 1.05 1.05
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121 Kiribati 0.1 0.1 1.8 1.5 43.0 44.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
121 South Africa 50.7 54.7 1.3 0.5 56.9 62.4 22.9 24.9 59.6 52.9 2.9 2.4 1.03 1.03
124 vanuatu 0.3 0.4 2.6 2.4 21.7 25.2 18.9 20.6 81.3 70.0 4.4 3.8 1.07 1.07
125 Kyrgyzstan 5.4 6.7 0.4 1.1 35.3 35.4 22.5 23.8 67.9 51.9 2.7 2.6 1.05 1.06
125 tajikistan 7.1 9.0 0.9 1.5 26.5 26.5 18.5 20.4 84.9 65.3 4.0 3.2 1.05 1.05
127 viet Nam 89.7 101.5 1.1 1.0 24.4 31.7 23.8 28.2 60.5 40.9 2.0 1.8 1.05 1.05
128 Namibia 2.4 3.0 1.9 1.7 32.4 39.0 19.5 21.2 77.6 64.8 4.0 3.1 1.03 1.03
129 Nicaragua 6.0 7.2 1.3 1.4 54.7 57.8 18.9 22.1 80.4 61.2 3.3 2.5 1.05 1.05
130 Morocco 32.6 37.5 1.1 1.0 53.3 57.4 22.6 26.3 62.0 49.2 2.7 2.2 1.06 1.06
131 Iraq 33.7 55.3 2.7 3.1 67.8 66.4 18.0 18.3 89.5 84.3 5.3 4.6 1.07 1.07
132 Cape verde 0.5 0.6 1.6 0.9 53.4 63.4 18.5 22.8 88.9 55.8 3.7 2.3 1.03 1.03
133 Guatemala 15.1 22.7 2.5 2.5 45.1 50.2 17.7 18.9 92.4 82.4 4.8 3.9 1.05 1.05
134 timor-Leste 1.2 2.0 3.9 2.9 24.3 28.7 15.3 16.6 106.8 93.0 7.1 6.0 1.05 1.05
135 Ghana 25.5 36.5 2.4 2.3 44.0 52.6 19.1 20.5 79.9 73.0 4.7 4.0 1.06 1.06
136 Equatorial Guinea 0.7 1.1 3.1 2.7 38.8 39.6 19.5 20.3 85.9 72.0 5.8 5.0 1.03 1.03
136 India 1,258.4 1,523.5 1.6 1.3 27.7 31.6 22.7 25.1 63.8 53.8 3.1 2.6 1.08 1.08
138 Cambodia 14.5 17.4 1.4 1.2 18.6 20.1 18.1 22.9 80.5 53.2 3.8 2.4 1.05 1.05
138 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 6.4 7.8 1.6 1.3 22.0 35.4 18.6 21.5 85.0 58.4 4.2 2.6 1.05 1.05
140 Bhutan 0.8 0.9 2.9 1.5 25.4 36.4 19.4 24.6 79.2 49.7 3.7 2.3 1.04 1.04
141 Swaziland 1.2 1.5 0.8 1.4 22.6 21.2 17.2 19.5 90.8 69.4 4.2 3.2 1.03 1.03
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142 Congo 4.2 6.2 2.4 2.2 58.7 64.1 18.9 19.6 82.7 79.3 4.9 4.5 1.03 1.03
143 Solomon Islands 0.6 0.8 2.8 2.5 15.8 20.9 18.8 19.9 80.6 74.1 4.7 4.1 1.09 1.09
144 Sao tome and Principe 0.2 0.2 1.6 2.0 53.4 63.4 17.8 19.3 88.3 75.8 4.6 3.5 1.03 1.03
145 Kenya 42.7 65.9 2.6 2.7 19.9 24.4 17.4 18.5 89.0 82.1 5.0 4.6 1.03 1.03
146 Bangladesh 152.4 181.9 1.6 1.3 23.6 28.9 20.8 24.2 70.4 53.0 3.1 2.2 1.05 1.05
146 Pakistan 180.0 234.4 1.9 1.8 33.1 36.5 19.0 21.7 82.8 63.4 4.5 3.2 1.05 1.05
148 Angola 20.2 30.8 3.4 2.7 49.0 60.0 16.1 16.6 100.5 93.9 6.8 5.2 1.03 1.03
149 Myanmar 48.7 54.3 0.6 0.8 27.2 33.2 24.7 28.2 55.2 43.0 2.4 2.0 1.03 1.03
150 Cameroon 20.5 28.8 2.3 2.1 45.5 52.7 18.2 19.3 86.3 78.3 5.0 4.3 1.03 1.03
151 Madagascar 21.9 35.3 3.0 2.8 27.1 33.2 17.4 18.2 93.8 83.7 5.5 4.5 1.02 1.03
152 tanzania, United Republic of 47.7 81.9 2.6 3.1 22.3 27.2 17.4 17.5 91.0 92.6 5.7 5.5 1.03 1.03
153 Nigeria 166.6 257.8 2.5 2.5 42.4 50.3 18.1 18.5 86.4 86.1 5.9 5.5 1.06 1.06
154 Senegal 13.1 20.0 2.7 2.6 40.3 42.8 17.0 17.8 92.1 84.3 5.5 4.7 1.03 1.03
155 Mauritania 3.6 5.2 2.8 2.2 40.0 41.7 18.4 19.8 83.0 73.1 5.2 4.4 1.05 1.05
156 Papua New Guinea 7.2 10.2 2.5 2.2 13.2 12.5 19.6 20.4 74.7 70.3 4.5 3.8 1.08 1.08
157 Nepal 31.0 39.9 2.2 1.7 13.4 17.3 19.2 21.4 80.5 64.1 4.1 2.6 1.05 1.05
158 Lesotho 2.2 2.6 1.0 1.0 20.0 28.3 18.6 20.3 84.1 69.1 4.1 3.1 1.03 1.03
159 togo 6.3 8.7 2.4 2.0 32.9 38.5 18.0 19.7 86.4 73.6 5.1 3.9 1.02 1.02
160 Yemen 25.6 41.3 3.1 3.0 26.3 32.9 15.5 17.4 105.6 86.4 6.5 5.0 1.05 1.05
161 Haiti 10.3 12.5 1.6 1.3 35.6 54.8 19.1 21.5 79.2 65.5 4.3 3.2 1.05 1.05
161 Uganda 35.6 59.8 3.2 3.1 12.1 16.0 15.6 15.7 106.0 103.1 6.9 6.0 1.03 1.03
163 Zambia 13.9 24.5 2.3 3.0 34.8 39.6 17.1 16.7 93.2 99.0 6.1 6.3 1.03 1.03
164 Djibouti 0.9 1.3 2.0 1.9 76.5 77.1 18.9 21.4 78.8 62.8 4.8 3.6 1.04 1.04
165 Gambia 1.8 2.8 3.0 2.7 48.8 57.9 16.9 17.8 92.1 83.8 5.6 4.7 1.03 1.03
166 Benin 9.4 14.6 3.2 2.7 38.3 45.6 17.1 17.9 94.5 86.9 6.0 5.1 1.04 1.04
167 Rwanda 11.3 17.6 2.6 2.9 13.8 19.4 16.9 18.7 92.4 84.2 5.8 5.3 1.01 1.01
168 Côte d’Ivoire 20.6 29.8 1.7 2.2 43.5 52.0 18.7 19.2 81.6 79.3 5.2 4.3 1.02 1.02
169 Comoros 0.8 1.2 2.7 2.5 28.1 28.1 18.5 18.9 79.2 82.8 5.3 4.8 1.05 1.05
170 Malawi 15.9 28.2 2.7 3.2 14.6 15.8 17.0 16.9 95.6 96.3 6.1 6.0 1.03 1.03
171 Sudan 35.0 50.8 2.3 2.4 32.5 33.3 18.6 k 19.7 k 83.7 k 76.0 k 5.5 k .. 1.05 k 1.05 k
172 Zimbabwe 13.0 17.6 0.1 2.2 33.8 39.1 18.2 19.3 82.3 71.6 3.9 3.1 1.02 1.02
173 Ethiopia 86.5 118.5 2.5 2.1 14.7 17.2 17.0 18.7 95.7 77.3 6.1 3.9 1.03 1.03
174 Liberia 4.2 6.5 2.2 2.6 44.3 48.5 17.9 18.2 85.9 86.0 5.8 5.1 1.06 1.06
175 Afghanistan 33.4 53.3 3.8 3.1 20.6 23.8 15.9 16.6 101.3 92.6 7.7 6.0 1.06 1.06
176 Guinea-Bissau 1.6 2.3 2.0 2.1 35.9 44.6 18.2 19.0 86.7 79.7 5.8 4.9 1.03 1.03
177 Sierra Leone 6.1 8.5 4.4 2.1 35.8 39.6 18.5 18.4 80.2 80.8 5.7 4.8 1.02 1.02
178 Burundi 8.7 11.4 2.6 1.9 8.2 11.2 16.7 20.2 96.5 67.7 5.8 4.1 1.03 1.03
178 Guinea 10.5 15.9 1.6 2.5 31.0 35.9 17.7 18.3 90.7 85.0 6.0 5.1 1.06 1.06
180 Central African Republic 4.6 6.4 1.6 2.0 37.6 39.3 18.7 19.4 85.1 78.0 5.4 4.5 1.03 1.03
181 Eritrea 5.6 8.4 4.0 2.9 17.6 21.8 17.1 19.0 89.7 78.9 5.4 4.3 1.03 1.03
182 Mali 16.3 26.8 3.1 3.0 28.1 35.6 16.3 16.3 98.8 97.3 6.8 6.2 1.05 1.05
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Population
Totala Annual growth Urban Median age Total dependency ratio Total fertility rate Sex ratio at birthb
(millions) (%) (% of total) (years)
(per 100 people 
ages 15–64)
(births  
per woman) (male to female births)
HDI rank 2012 2030 2000/2005 2010/2015a,c 2000 2012 2000 2010 2000 2012 2000 2012a,c 2000d 2012c
183 Burkina Faso 17.5 29.1 2.9 3.0 17.8 27.4 16.5 17.1 95.3 90.5 6.3 5.8 1.05 1.05
184 Chad 11.8 18.4 3.5 2.6 21.5 21.9 16.9 17.1 96.2 92.6 6.6 5.8 1.03 1.03
185 Mozambique 24.5 35.9 2.6 2.2 29.1 31.4 17.9 17.8 88.8 89.1 5.7 4.8 1.03 1.03
186 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 69.6 106.0 2.9 2.6 29.3 34.8 16.0 16.7 102.6 94.0 6.9 5.5 1.03 1.03
186 Niger 16.6 30.8 3.5 3.5 16.2 18.1 15.8 15.5 102.3 104.8 7.5 7.0 1.05 1.05
NOTES
a Projections based on medium-fertility variant.
b the natural sex ratio at birth is commonly 
assumed and empirically confirmed to be 105 
male births to 100 female births.
c Data are annual average of projected values for 
2010–2015.
d Data are average annual estimates for 
2000–2005.
e Includes Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands.
f Includes Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands 
and Norfolk Island.
g Includes Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla.
h Includes Kosovo.
i Includes taiwan, China, and excludes Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region and Macao Special 
Administrative Region.
j Excludes Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region and Macao Special Administrative Region.
k Estimates are for Sudan only and do not include 
South Sudan.
l HDRo calculations based on population data from 
UNDESA (2012b).
T Aggregate from original data source.
DEFINITIONS
Population: De facto population in a country, area 
or region as of 1 July.
Annual population growth rate: Average annual 
exponential growth rate for the period specified.
Urban population: De facto population living in 
areas classified as urban according to the criteria 
used by each area or country as of 1 July.
Median age: Age that divides the population 
distribution into two equal parts—that is, 50% of the 
population is above that age and 50% is below it.
Total dependency ratio: Ratio of the sum of the 
population ages 0–14 and ages 65 and older to the 
population ages 15–64.
Total fertility rate: Number of children that would 
be born to each woman if she were to live to the 
end of her child-bearing years and bear children at 
each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific 
fertility rates.
Sex ratio at birth: Number of male births per 
female birth.
MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1, 2, 13 and 14: UNDESA (2012b).
Columns 3, 4 and 7–12: UNDESA (2011).
Columns 5 and 6: UNDESA (2012a).
 
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES
Korea, Democratic People’s Rep. of 24.6 26.2 0.7 0.4 59.4 60.4 29.9 32.9 49.5 47.0 2.1 2.0 1.05 1.05
Marshall Islands 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.6 68.4 72.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Monaco 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 100.0 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Nauru 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 100.0 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
San Marino 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.6 93.4 94.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Somalia 9.8 16.4 2.4 2.6 33.2 38.2 18.0 17.5 88.3 91.0 6.5 6.3 1.03 1.03
South Sudan 10.7 16.1 2.8 l 3.2 l 16.5 18.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
tuvalu 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 46.0 51.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Human Development Index groups
very high human development 1,134.3 1,216.9 0.7 0.5 77.0 81.2 36.8 39.3 49.1 50.3 1.6 1.8 1.05 1.06
High human development 1,039.2 1,150.1 0.9 0.8 70.1 74.1 27.6 30.4 54.7 46.4 2.2 1.9 1.05 1.05
Medium human development 3,520.5 4,017.4 1.2 1.0 34.8 43.7 25.6 28.9 56.8 47.0 2.5 2.1 1.10 1.10
Low human development 1,280.7 1,845.3 2.3 2.2 28.6 33.6 18.4 19.8 85.2 75.5 5.1 4.2 1.04 1.04
Regions
Arab States 357.3 480.8 2.2 2.0 53.2 57.2 20.6 23.3 72.3 59.7 3.9 3.0 1.05 1.05
East Asia and the Pacific 1,991.4 2,135.3 0.8 0.6 36.7 49.7 28.1 32.3 50.8 40.9 2.0 1.8 1.14 1.12
Europe and Central Asia 481.6 491.3 0.0 0.2 63.2 64.8 32.9 34.9 49.5 43.4 1.6 1.7 1.06 1.06
Latin America and the Caribbean 597.7 696.0 1.3 1.1 75.3 79.3 24.4 27.5 60.3 52.1 2.6 2.2 1.05 1.05
South Asia 1,753.0 2,141.8 1.6 1.4 29.0 32.9 22.0 24.6 66.7 54.6 3.3 2.6 1.07 1.07
Sub-Saharan Africa 852.5 1,284.0 2.5 2.5 32.0 37.0 17.8 18.5 88.6 83.4 5.6 4.8 1.04 1.04
Least developed countries 870.4 t 1,256.8 t 2.2 t 2.2 t 24.3 t 28.9 t 18.3 t 19.7 t 85.5 t 75.5 t 5.1 t 4.1 t 1.04 t 1.04 t
Small island developing states 53.8 63.8 1.3 1.1 48.2 52.6 24.0 26.6 64.6 57.3 3.1 2.7 1.06 1.06
world 7,052.1 T 8,321.3 T 1.2 T 1.2 T 46.7 T 52.6 T 26.7 T 29.2 T 59.0 T 52.0 T 2.7 T 2.5 T 1.07 T 1.07 T
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Regions
Arab States (20 countries or territories)
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, oman, State of Palestine, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
East Asia and the Pacific (24 countries)
Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Kiribati, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, thailand, timor-Leste, tonga, tuvalu, vanuatu, viet Nam
Europe and Central Asia1 (31 countries)
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, turkey, turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries)
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
trinidad and tobago, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of venezuela
South Asia (9 countries)
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Sub-Saharan Africa (46 countries)
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Swaziland, United 
Republic of tanzania, togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Note: Countries included in aggregates for Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States follow UN classifications, which are available at www.unohrlls.org.
1. the former socialist countries of Europe and Central Asia that have undergone a political and economic transformation since 1989–1991 as well as Cyprus, Malta and turkey.
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Technical appendix:  
explanatory note for projections exercise
This technical appendix summarizes the two projection models 
discussed in chapter 4.
Lutz and KC (2013) Model for demography, 
education and human development
The Lutz and KC (2013) Model is used to project demographic 
trends through to 2050. It is based on the premise that trends in 
population growth are affected by improvements in education 
quality and quantity. This Report employs a dataset covering 
120 countries, with their populations disaggregated by age, sex 
and education level.
Lutz and KC’s multistate population modelling approach 
was developed in the 1970s at the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria and is well accepted 
among technical demographers. The idea behind the projection 
is straightforward: with a baseline year of 2000 (the latest year 
for which internationally comparable data are available for 
most countries) and assuming that education level remains 
invariant after a certain age, the proportion of women ages 
50–54 without any formal education in 2005 can be derived 
directly from the proportion of women ages 45–49 without any 
formal education in 2000.
Given that the size of a birth cohort as it ages over time can 
change only through mortality and migration, these propor-
tions would be constant only if no individual moved up to the 
primary education category after age 15 and if mortality and 
migration did not differ by education level. However, strong 
links exist between education level and mortality, fertility 
and migration behaviour, so the approach must be adjusted 
to correct for these effects. The size of a birth cohort depends 
on the education level of women of childbearing age, where a 
negative relationship is traditionally observed. In projecting 
these cohorts forward, differential survival rates, based on a 
comprehensive literature review and modelling exercises using 
past data, are applied to the education groups.
In reality, the likelihood of an individual transitioning from 
one education level to the next highest strongly depends on 
the education level of his or her parents. But this educational 
inheritance mechanism is not explicitly modelled here. Instead, 
assumptions regarding transition rates and their future devel-
opment are statistically derived from the aggregate behaviour 
of education systems in the past. Since this expansion is partly 
the result of the inheritance mechanism—the fact that many 
parents desire that their children reach an education level at 
least as high as their own—inheritance is implicitly reflected 
in the projection, even though it is not formally part of the 
model. Such an approach appears preferable because data on 
the aggregate growth patterns of education systems, on which 
assumptions for the future can be based, are much more readily 
available than robust data on the microprocess of educational 
inheritance.
The procedure for each country can be summarized as 
follows: 
• A baseline population distribution by five-year age group 
cohorts, sex and education level is derived for 2000.
• For each five-year time step, cohorts move to the next five-
year age group.
• Mortality rates specific to each age cohort, sex and education 
group and to each period are applied.
• Age- and sex-specific education transition rates are applied.
• Age-, sex- and education-specific net migrants are added to or 
removed from the population. In the projections presented 
here the migration assumptions correspond to those used in 
the UN population projections.
• Fertility rates, specific to each age, sex and education group 
and to each period, are applied to determine the size of the 
new 0–5 age group.
• The new population distribution by age, sex and education 
level is noted, and the above steps are repeated for the next 
five-year time step.
The projection aims to yield a dataset with the population 
distributed by five-year age groups (from ages 15–20 to ages 100 
and older), by sex, and by four education levels over 50 years 
from 2000 (the base year) to 2050 in five-year intervals.
Pardee Center for International Futures 
(2013) Model for prospects of human 
development and policy scenarios 
This Report uses the International Futures Model for long-term 
human development projections based on closely interacting 
policy-related issues, including income, health, education, pov-
erty, gender, social change (instability and risk) and environ-
mental sustainability. For more detailed information on how 
the model was developed, see Pardee Center for International 
Futures (2013) and the University of Denver Korbel School 
website (www.ifs.du.edu/introduction). 
The International Futures Model is a large-scale, long-term, 
integrated global modelling system that incorporates demo-
graphic, economic, education, health, energy, agricultural, 
sociopolitical, infrastructural, technological and environmental 
submodels for 183 countries interacting in the global system.
The model was used in the 2011 Human Development Report 
to project long-term environmental trend scenarios and evalu-
ate their impact on human development.
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Core features of the model pertinent to human development 
analysis include:
• A production function that sets parameters of productivity 
in four major categories: human resources, social capital, 
physical capital and knowledge. 
• A population model containing 22 age-sex cohorts in a struc-
ture representing changes in fertility rates, with an extensive 
health model to compute mortality (and morbidity) across 
13 cause categories. 
• An equilibrium-seeking economic model across six sectors. It 
does not assume that exact equilibrium will exist in any given 
year; rather, it uses inventories as buffer stocks and to provide 
price signals so that the model converges to equilibrium over 
time. 
• An education model representing formal education across 
primary, secondary (separating lower and upper secondary 
levels) and tertiary levels. 
• A health model drawing on both the World Health Organi-
zation’s Global Burden of Disease project for major causes of 
death and disability and the Comparative Risk Assessment 
approach on relative risk to represent key drivers of health 
such as malnutrition, obesity and smoking. 
• A sociopolitical model representing fiscal policy through tax-
ing and spending decisions and other governance variables, 
including corruption levels and regime types. 
There are also models for international politics (focusing 
on trade, foreign investment, intergovernmental transfers and 
technology upgrade), infrastructure (focusing on level of access 
to major infrastructure systems) and the environment (focusing 
on resource use, such as water and land, and carbon produc-
tion). The agricultural and energy models are partial equilibri-
um systems at the physical level, and their dynamics shape the 
financial sector representations in the economic model. 
The projection identifies aggressive but reasonable policy inter-
ventions to construct an accelerated progress scenario, which 
combines interventions in a dozen clusters of policy initiatives 
(see table A1) and analyses their impact relative to the forecasts 
under the base case scenario. The cost of inaction is the differ-
ence in outcomes between the two scenarios. The definition of 
“aggressive but reasonable” builds on the analysis of the Pardee 
Center for International Futures series Patterns of Potential 
Human Progress and relies on cross-sectional functions relating 
the target variable to development level and using the function 
itself or some number of standard deviations above it. 
TablE a1
Twelve clusters of policy intervention levers for comparative analysis
Primarily domestic levers Primarily international levers
1. Demographics
Fertility rates
Female labour force participation rates
7. Social capital and governance
Probability of internal conflict
Government revenues and corruption
Democracy and inclusion
2. Savings and investment
Savings and investment rates
8. Trade
trade barriers
Export promotion
3. Domestic transfers
transfers to unskilled households
9. Foreign investment
Foreign direct investment
Portfolio flows
4. Human capital
Education participation targets and education spending
Health spending targets and targets on selected health risk factors
10. Household transfers
Remittances
5. Infrastructure capital
Infrastructure access
11. Intergovernmental transfers
Foreign aid
Flows from international financial institutions
6. Knowledge capital
Research and development
12. Technology
technology upgrade
Source: Adapted from Pardee Center for International Futures (2013).
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The base case scenario
The base case scenario implies continuity with historical 
patterns (including development policies pursued in recent 
decades). However, the model’s complex dynamics—including 
a wide range of nonlinear relationships—provide a structure 
that can also generate nonlinear future patterns that differ 
considerably from historical trajectories. 
The accelerated progress scenario
Under the accelerated progress scenario, resources and policy 
ambition increase substantially compared with the base case. 
Table A2 lists choices and targets for appropriate (aggressive but 
reasonable) magnitudes of intervention in poverty reduction, 
infrastructure and governance, among others. Changes are 
relative to the underlying values for each country in the base 
case scenario and therefore take into account different national 
starting points and patterns. 
TablE a2
Targets for appropriate magnitudes of intervention, relative to the base case scenario
Policy area Over 10 years Over 20 years Over 30 years Over 40 years
Global level
Poverty reduction • Doubling of lending by international 
financial institutions
• Foreign aid donations from developed 
countries increased to at least 0.5% 
of GDP
• 30% increase in foreign direct 
investment
• 50% increase in portfolio investment 
flows
• 20% increase in expenditure on 
research and development
• 50% increase in migration
Infrastructurea • Rural population living more than 2 
kilometres from an all-season road 
reduced by half or to below 10% 
(whichever comes first)
• Universal access to electricity
• Elimination of solid fuels as the 
primary source for heating and 
cooking in the home
• 20% improvement in 
infrastructure
• Universal access to an improved 
source of water and sanitation 
(after having been halved from 
1990 levels by 2015)
• Universal access to mobile 
telephone and broadband service
• 50% increase in 
renewable energy 
production
Governanceb • Corruption reduced and governance 
effectiveness and regulatory quality 
increased globally to one standard error 
above typical values for each country’s 
GDP per capita
• Measures of democracy and gender 
empowerment increased to one 
standard error above typical values for 
each country’s GDP per capita
• Probability of internal conflict 
reduced to 0
• 10% increase (about 3 percentage 
points of GDP) in government revenue 
in non–organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development countries
Regional and 
domestic levelsc
• For developing countries: 20% increase 
in health spending, 20% improvement in 
governance effectiveness on the World 
Bank scale, 20% increase in economic 
freedom on Fraser Institute scale, and 
0.2% increase in technologically based 
productivity growth
• 30% decrease in corruption on the 
transparency International scale
a. Includes transportation, energy, water and sanitation, and information and communication technology. the global targets are a combination of normative targets (such as aspirational targets from the 
Millennium Development Goals) and, considering the possibility of goal fulfilment by all countries, 97.5% level of truly universal goals.
b. Governance is conceptualized in three dimensions—security, capacity and inclusion. the security dimension is operationalized with two generally complementary measures of the probability of domestic 
conflict and of the vulnerability to conflict. the capacity dimension is operationalized as the governments’ ability to mobilize revenue (up to 30% of GDP) and to use it effectively (looking especially to lower 
levels of corruption). the inclusion dimension is operationalized as the democratic character of institutions and also as broader inclusiveness, as represented by the Human Development Report’s Gender 
Empowerment Measure.
c. Regional specific targets are available in Pardee Center for International Futures (2013).
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Afghanistan 175
Albania 70 –1
Algeria 93 –1
Andorra 33 –1
Angola 148
Antigua and Barbuda 67 –1
Argentina 45 –1
Armenia 87 –1
Australia 2
Austria 18
Azerbaijan 82 –1
Bahamas 49
Bahrain 48
Bangladesh 146 1
Barbados 38
Belarus 50 1
Belgium 17
Belize 96
Benin 166
Bhutan 140 1
Bolivia, Plurinational State of 108
Bosnia and Herzegovina 81 –1
Botswana 119 –1
Brazil 85
Brunei Darussalam 30
Bulgaria 57
Burkina Faso 183
Burundi 178 –1
Cambodia 138
Cameroon 150
Canada 11 –1
Cape Verde 132 –1
Central African Republic 180 –1
Chad 184
Chile 40
China 101
Colombia 91
Comoros 169 –1
Congo 142
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 186
Costa Rica 62
Côte d'Ivoire 168 1
Croatia 47 –1
Cuba 59
Cyprus 31
Czech Republic 28
Denmark 15
Djibouti 164
Dominica 72
Dominican Republic 96 2
Ecuador 89
Egypt 112
El Salvador 107 –1
Equatorial Guinea 136
Eritrea 181 1
Estonia 33 1
Ethiopia 173 –1
Fiji 96 2
Finland 21
France 20
Gabon 106
Gambia 165
Georgia 72 3
Germany 5
Ghana 135
Greece 29
Grenada 63 –1
Guatemala 133
Guinea 178 –1
Guinea-Bissau 176
Guyana 118 1
Haiti 161 1
Honduras 120
Hong Kong, China (SAR) 13 1
Hungary 37
Iceland 13
India 136
Indonesia 121 3
Iran, Islamic Republic of 76 –2
Iraq 131 1
Ireland 7
Israel 16
Italy 25
Jamaica 85 –2
Japan 10
Jordan 100
Kazakhstan 69 –1
Kenya 145
Kiribati 121
Korea, Republic of 12
Kuwait 54 –1
Kyrgyzstan 125
Lao People's Democratic Republic 138
Latvia 44 1
Lebanon 72
Lesotho 158 1
Liberia 174
Libya 64 23
Liechtenstein 24
Lithuania 41 2
Luxembourg 26
Madagascar 151
Malawi 170 1
Malaysia 64 1
Maldives 104 –1
Mali 182 –1
Malta 32 1
Mauritania 155
Mauritius 80 –1
Mexico 61
Micronesia, Federated States of 117
Moldova, Republic of 113
Mongolia 108 2
Montenegro 52 –2
Morocco 130
Mozambique 185
Myanmar 149
Namibia 128
Nepal 157
Netherlands 4
New Zealand 6
Nicaragua 129
Niger 186 1
Nigeria 153 1
Norway 1
Oman 84 –1
Pakistan 146
Palau 52 2
Palestine, State of 110 1
Panama 59 1
Papua New Guinea 156
Paraguay 111 –2
Peru 77 –1
Philippines 114
Poland 39
Portugal 43 –3
Qatar 36
Romania 56 –1
Russian Federation 55
Rwanda 167
Saint Kitts and Nevis 72 –1
Saint Lucia 88
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 83 –2
Samoa 96
Sao Tome and Principe 144
Saudi Arabia 57
Senegal 154 –2
Serbia 64
Seychelles 46
Sierra Leone 177 2
Singapore 18
Slovakia 35
Slovenia 21
Solomon Islands 143
South Africa 121 1
Spain 23
Sri Lanka 92
Sudan 171 –1
Suriname 105
Swaziland 141 –1
Sweden 7
Switzerland 9
Syrian Arab Republic 116
Tajikistan 125 1
Tanzania, United Republic of 152 1
Thailand 103 1
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 78 –2
Timor-Leste 134
Togo 159 1
Tonga 95
Trinidad and Tobago 67 –1
Tunisia 94
Turkey 90
Turkmenistan 102
Uganda 161
Ukraine 78
United Arab Emirates 41 –1
United Kingdom 26
United States 3 –1
Uruguay 51
Uzbekistan 114 1
Vanuatu 124 –2
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 71 –1
Viet Nam 127
Yemen 160 –2
Zambia 163
Zimbabwe 172 1
Countries and HDI ranks in 2012 and change in rank from 2011 to 2012
Note: Positive or negative values in the rightmost column indicate the number of positions upward or downward in the country’s ranking over 2011–2012 using consistent data and methodology; 
a blank indicates no change.
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The 21st century is witnessing a profound shift in global 
dynamics, driven by the fast-rising new powers of the 
developing world. China has overtaken Japan as the 
world’s second biggest economy, lifting hundreds of 
millions of people out of poverty in the process. India is 
reshaping its future with new entrepreneurial creativity 
and social policy innovation. Brazil is raising its living 
standards by expanding international relationships and 
antipoverty programmes that are emulated worldwide.
But the “Rise of the South” is a much larger phe-
nomenon. Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey and other developing countries are becoming 
leading actors on the world stage. The 2013 Human 
Development Report identifies more than 40 developing 
countries that have done better than expected in human 
development in recent decades, with their progress 
accelerating markedly over the past 10 years.
Each of these countries has its own unique history 
and has chosen its own distinct development pathway. 
Yet they share important characteristics and face 
many of the same challenges. They are also becoming 
more interconnected and interdependent. And people 
throughout the developing world are increasingly 
demanding to be heard, as they share ideas through new 
communications channels and seek greater accountability 
from governments and international institutions.
The 2013 Human Development Report analyses the 
causes and consequences of the continuing “Rise of 
the South” and identifies policies rooted in this new 
reality that could promote greater progress throughout 
the world for decades to come. The Report calls for far 
better representation of the South in global governance 
systems and points to potential new sources of 
financing within the South for essential public goods. 
With fresh analytical insights and clear proposals for 
policy reforms, the Report charts a course for people 
in all regions to face shared human development 
challenges together, fairly and effectively.
“The Report refreshes our understanding of the current state of global development, and demonstrates how much can be 
learned from the experiences of fast development progress in so many countries in the South.”  
 —UNDP Administrator Helen Clark, from the Foreword 
“The human development approach is a major advance in the difficult exercise of understanding the successes and 
deprivations of human lives, and in appreciating the importance of reflection and dialogue, and through that advancing 
fairness and justice in the world.”  —Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, from chapter 1
“No one has a monopoly on good ideas, which is why New York will continue to learn from the best practices of other cities 
and countries.” —New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, from chapter 3
“A close look at the diverse pathways that successful developing countries have pursued enriches the menu of policy 
options for all countries and regions.”  —Report lead author Khalid Malik, from the Introduction
USD 30
ISBN 978-92-1-126340-4
